Scurlock v. Johnson CA2/4

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Filed 8/4/25 Scurlock v. Johnson CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

REGINALD SCURLOCK, B332474

Petitioner and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NF011041)
v.

SHANNON JOHNSON,

Defendant and Respondent;

LOS ANGELES COUNTY CHILD
SUPPORT SERVICES
DEPARTMENT,

Intervener and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Christine J. Gonong, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Law Office of Cliff Dean Schneider and Cliff Dean
Schneider for Petitioner and Appellant.
Jenesse Center and Lisa Smith Szekely for Defendant and
Respondent.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Maureen C. Onyeagbako,
Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Ricardo Enriquez, Deputy
Attorney General, for Intervener and Respondent.

____________________________

In July 2022, the Los Angeles Child Support Services
Department (CSSD) requested an order to modify monthly child
support for A.J., the child of appellant Reginald Scurlock (father)
and respondent Roman James, formerly known as Shannon
Johnson (mother). Following several hearings, the court set a
new guideline support order payable to the County of Los Angeles
(County) in the amount of $1,144 per month to be paid by father.
Mother, a recipient of benefits of the California Opportunities
and Responsibility to Kids program (CalWORKs), was not
ordered to pay monthly support.
On appeal, father contends the court committed reversible
error by failing to admit evidence supporting the modification
order and denying his request to cross-examine mother. We
affirm.

BACKGROUND
Father and mother are the parents of A.J., the child subject
to this family proceeding. In 2019, father and mother agreed to
set child support obligations at zero.
In July 2022, CSSD filed a request for order to modify the
zero-child-support order and establish a new monthly order

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under the uniform state guideline. CSSD alleged a material
change in circumstances based upon mother’s status as a
CalWORKs benefits recipient. (See Fam. Code, § 3680.5, subd.
(b) [local child support authority may seek modification of
support for children to “which assistance is being provided under
the CalWORKs program”]; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11200 et
seq.)1
At various hearings between September 2022 and June
2023, mother and father testified about CSSD’s requested
modification. The record does not contain reporter’s transcripts
from these hearings.2 The hearings were continued to July 7,
2023.
Prior to the continued hearing, parents filed witness and
exhibit lists and income and expense declarations. Father
identified himself, mother, and two other persons as potential
witnesses and listed more than 30 supporting documents in his
exhibit list. Mother identified herself, father, and one additional
person as potential witnesses and listed more than 15 supporting

1 “The CalWORKs program, often described as ‘welfare-to-work,’
provides benefits to families with minor children where the parents are
unable to provide their support. To maintain the benefits, the
recipient must participate in designated activities, a process which
begins with an unsuccessful job search or a determination that a
search would not be successful. After assessment of the participant, a
specific program and menu of services is designed; failure to
participate can result in the loss of plan benefits. Broadly stated, the
goal of the program is to achieve the ability of the parent to provide
support.” (Mendoza v. Ramos (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 680, 686
(Mendoza).)
2 Minute orders from hearings on CSSD’s “Notice of Motion
(Modification) – Child Support” in September 2022, March and June
2023 state: “The Petitioner, Respondent are sworn and testify.”

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exhibits. The record includes parents’ exhibit lists but does not
include the exhibits themselves. Mother supported her income
and expense declaration with paystubs, W2s, profit and loss
statements, and Employment Development Department (EDD)
records. Father attached no supporting documentation to his
income and expense declaration.
Father represented himself at the continued hearing on
July 7, 2023, which spanned nearly seven hours. He testified
about his yearly income and expenses, and did not object to the
court’s use of his testimony to update the uniform state guideline
formula calculation for monthly child support. After listening to
the parties, the court granted CSSD’s modification request and
ordered father to pay $1,144 in monthly child support to the
County. This amount reflected updated guideline calculations
made during the hearing and memorialized in “CSSD Exhibit 1,”
which the court ordered filed during the hearing. Father timely
appealed.

DISCUSSION
Father contends no evidence supports the modification
order because “[n]o evidence was admitted at trial” and none of
the exhibits “were ever authenticated by sworn testimony or
declarations.” Father also contends the court violated his right to
due process by declining his request to cross-examine mother.
Mother disputes these contentions on the merits and
argues father mischaracterizes the record, fails to support
statements of fact with citations to the record, and fails to adhere
to the relevant standard of review. We agree with mother.

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A. Additional Background
At the continued hearing on CSSD’s modification request
on July 7, 2023, father began by referring to what happened the
“last time we were in.” He expressed dissatisfaction with a ruling
the court had previously made concerning financial documents
that allegedly called into question mother’s credibility about her
stated income. The court attempted to refocus the parties on
what was supposed to occur going forward on July 7. It
summarized the procedural history of the case, acknowledged
filings by the parties in anticipation of the hearing, and educated
the parties about its role as gatekeeper of evidence. The court
explained it would decide the relevance of filed documents and
was not bound to rely on everything submitted.
The court inquired if the parties would call witnesses listed
on their witness lists. In response, parents stated the non-party
witnesses identified in their lists would not be called. The court
replied, “All right, so no witness[es]. Again, . . . I only need very
limited information so that I can complete my calculation” for
child support. Following CSSD’s preliminary discussion of
parents’ financial information and “undisputed” 50/50 timeshare
(father himself stated “we have joint custody”), the court shifted
to father’s income and expenses.
Representing himself, father verified his annual gross
income in 2022 ($191,585.74). He also argued he was entitled to
deductions for childcare and other expenses, relying in part on
various exhibits he lodged with the court. Counsel for mother
and CSSD scrutinized the exhibits and questioned father about
his childcare expenses. The court granted father’s requests to
deduct various childcare expenses but denied his add-on request
to deduct various payments he made to his sister. Following

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additional argument by father on this request, the court found
his “testimony not credible” and again denied the add-on request.
The court then addressed mother’s income and expenses.
Mother’s counsel verified mother was a CalWORKs and EDD
benefits recipient and was temporarily employed. The court
discussed various supporting documents before deciding to base
mother’s income upon her 2022 tax returns. Father objected “for
the reason that there is income through the bank statements that
were provided to me.” Father asked the court to investigate “a lot
of cash deposits” that were not included in mother’s income and
expense declaration or tax return. The court declined, noting
that under Mendoza, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th 680, it is against
public policy to impute income to a CalWORKs recipient. In
addition, the court found father had “exhausted this argument”
at a previous hearing. Ultimately, the court found mother’s
annual gross income in 2022 was $17,112.
After the court announced its calculation, father accused
mother of lying and stated he was “precluded from a meaningful
cross-examination on [mother’s] income.” Father argued the
evidence was hearsay and unauthenticated. Father then asked
the court, “So when do I get to cross[-]examine [mother]?” The
court responded, “Cross[-]examine her about what?” He replied,
“The whole issue. I have a right to cross[-]examine her on her
income” and whether mother “is able to work. She can get a job
at [T]arget. She can get a job at Mc[D]onald’s.” The court stated,
“[W]e discussed that together,” and denied the request.

B. Forfeiture of Appellate Contentions
An appellant bears the burden to demonstrate, on the basis
of a sufficient record, reversible error in the trial court’s decision.

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(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) “‘“A necessary
corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for
meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the
trial court should be affirmed.’” [Citation.]” (Ibid.; see also Cal.
Rules of Court, rules 8.120(a)-(b), 8.140(b)(1).)
The appellant must also summarize all significant evidence
in the record with appropriate citations and must support all
contentions with citations to relevant legal authority. (Schmidlin
v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 738; see Cal.
Rules of Court, rules 8.204(a)(1)(C), 8.204(a)(2)(C).) The failure
to present a complete and accurate evidentiary record and cogent
legal argument forfeits the appellant’s contentions on appeal.
(Lee v. Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721; Foust v. San Jose
Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187.)
Father’s appellate brief violates these rules in several
respects. First, his brief does not set forth all material evidence
on the issues he purports to raise. “The significant facts are not
simply the facts favoring the appellant” (Perry v. Kia Motors
America, Inc. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1088, 1096) but are “‘the
critical facts (including the evidence), free of bias; and likewise as
to the applicable law.’” (Hjelm v. Prometheus Real Estate Group,
Inc. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1166.) As father failed to provide
material facts, he has provided an incomplete and inaccurate
portrayal of the case, forfeiting his sufficiency of evidence
contention on appeal.
Second, father has failed to procure an appellate record
with documents lodged with and considered by the trial court.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.120(a).) “To the extent the court
relied on documents not before us, our review is hampered. We
cannot presume error from an incomplete record.” (Christie v.

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Kimball (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1412; see also, Osgood v.
Landon (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 425, 435 [an appellant may not
ignore or fail to present “‘portions of the proceedings below which
may provide grounds upon which’” affirmance may be made].)
For instance, the appellate record does not include transcripts
from prior hearings on CSSD’s modification request. Nor does it
include the documentary evidence which, according to father,
casts doubt on mother’s stated income and expenses. The
insufficient record prevents proper analysis and thus results in
the forfeiture of father’s appellate contentions.
Third, both contentions raised by father are conclusory and
unsupported by cogent legal argument or citations to the
appellate record. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)
We treat these issues forfeited, as father has not provided
“‘meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority
and citations to facts in the record that support the claim[s] of
error.’ [Citation.]” (Singh v. Lipworth (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th
813, 817.) Reciting general principles from clearly inapposite
cases does not adequately preserve an issue on appeal. (See Said
v. Jegan (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1384-1385.)

C. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Modification Order
1. Governing Law
Were we to exercise our discretion to consider father’s
arguments, we would reject them.
As a local child support agency, CSSD must “take
appropriate action . . . to establish, modify, and enforce child
support . . . orders if the child is receiving public assistance.”
(Fam. Code, § 17400, subds. (a)(1), (h).) “‘Public assistance’
means any amount paid” under CalWORKs for the benefit of any

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dependent child or the caretaker of the child. (Id., § 17000, subd.
(j); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11200; see also fn. 1, ante.) Public
enforcement of child support rests upon “‘the most fundamental
obligations recognized by modern society’” that every parent “has
the duty to support his or her minor children.” (County of Los
Angeles v. Christopher W. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 827, 833.) This
duty “is based in part on the state’s interest in seeing that the
child does not become a public charge [citation], and the policy
that those who are ‘directly responsible’ for the child’s existence
should ordinarily bear the burden of support [citation].” (Ibid.;
see Crider v. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 227, 231-232
[public enforcement of support rights “alleviate[s] the burden on
taxpayers and ensure that, as the number of needy children rise,
benefits to them will not be reduced”].)
Alongside local child support agencies, the California
Department of Child Support Services (DCSS) enforces child
support orders and administers the Title IV-D state plan for
securing child support. (See Fam. Code, §§ 17200, 17202, subd.
(a), 17303, 17304, subd. (b); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 654(3).) In this
role, DCSS and CSSD may intervene in any proceeding involving
child support. (Fam. Code, § 17500, subd. (a); see id., §§ 3680.5,
subd. (a), 17202, subd. (b), 17304, 17400, subd. (k), 17404, subd.
(a).)
California has adopted a statewide uniform child support
guideline, which places children’s interests as the state’s top
priority. (In re Marriage of Macilwaine (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th
514, 528 (Macilwaine); see also Fam. Code, §§ 4050-4070.)
Guideline child support, calculated pursuant to the formula set
forth in section 4055, is presumed to be correct. (Fam. Code,
§§ 4052, 4053, subd. (k); Macilwaine, supra, at p. 528.) “That

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presumption ‘affect[s] the burden of proof’ and may be rebutted
by admissible evidence showing that application of the formula
would be unjust or inappropriate in the particular case,
consistent with the principles set forth in section 4053 . . . .”
(Macilwaine, supra, at p. 528.) These guidelines apply when a
material change of circumstances warrants modification of an
existing support order. (In re Marriage of Schopfer (2010) 186
Cal.App.4th 524, 532.)3
Where, as here, an appeal is taken from an order modifying
child support, we review the order for abuse of discretion and
reverse only upon a showing of prejudicial error. (In re Marriage
of Rodriguez (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 625, 633 (Rodriguez).) “In
conducting our review for an abuse of discretion, we determine
‘whether the court’s factual determinations are supported by
substantial evidence and whether the court acted reasonably in
exercising its discretion.’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Bodo
(2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 373, 384.) “As long as the trial court
exercised its discretion along legal lines, its decision will be
affirmed on appeal if there is substantial evidence to support it.”
(Rodriguez, supra, at p. 633.)

2. Analysis
Father does not dispute that CSSD Exhibit 1, generated
during the continued hearing, applied the statewide uniform
child support guideline formula. This formulation computed a

3 Stipulated agreements for child support below the guideline
formula are invalid whenever local agencies provide services under
Family Code section 17400 and do not affirmatively join the stipulated
agreement. (Fam. Code, § 4065, subd. (c); see In re Marriage of Lambe
& Meehan (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 388, 393-394.)

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monthly child support obligation ($1,144) from monthly tax and
income information for mother and father in tax year 2022;
monthly childcare deductions requested by father; monthly
receipt of mother’s public assistance and unemployment
compensation according to documents filed or lodged with the
court; and an undisputed 50/50 support apportionment for shared
custodial time.
Instead of disputing these figures, father contends his and
mother’s income were never “supported by any testimony or
authenticated exhibits.” Father furnishes no authority in
support of this contention. The single case on which he relies,
Estate of Horman (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 796, does not address
family law proceedings or the form or authentication of evidence
at such proceedings. (See id. at pp. 808-809 [trial court abused
discretion in declining to reopen heirship proceeding to present
“new evidence inasmuch as the additional evidence might well
have, and probably would have, rendered a different result upon
further hearing”].)
Father’s contention is also contrary to the law. “Code of
Civil Procedure section 2009 . . . allows a motion hearing to be
decided based on declarations.” (In re Marriage of George &
Deamon (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 476, 483 (Deamon).) “‘While
[Family Code] section 217 requires the court to receive “relevant”
testimony that is “within the scope of the hearing when offered by
the parties [citation], it does not foreclose the parties from
submitting evidence through other means, such as declarations,
pleadings, etc.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
Father provides this court no reason to question the lower
court’s reliance on documentary evidence or the parties’
representations at the hearing. That father’s testimony was

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unsworn does not change its admissibility. “Unsworn testimony
does not constitute a nullity.” (Richard M. v. Superior Court
(1971) 4 Cal.3d 370, 377.) Whenever a witness “‘is permitted to
testify without having been previously sworn and that fact is
known at the time, the defect must be taken advantage of at
once, and a failure to do so is such acquiescence in the testimony
as will preclude objection after verdict.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
Such is the case here. Absent any intervention by father to be
sworn in before testifying, he cannot now disclaim his own
testimony.
On these facts, we conclude the trial court properly
considered the declarations, supporting documents and exhibits,
and father’s undisputed testimony to adjudicate CSSD’s
modification request. (See In re Marriage of D.H. & B.G. (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 586, 602; e.g., In re Marriage of Calcaterra &
Badakhsh (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 28, 34-36 [court properly
considers gross income listed on recent tax return, income listed
on loan application, and testimony by father at modification
hearing].) Substantial evidence supports its findings.

D. Cross-Examination of Mother
Father next contends the court erred by declining his
request to cross-examine mother, which he avers prevented him
from exploring the issue of mother’s income. In support of his
argument, he cites without elaboration two Supreme Court
decisions that address cross-examination in other contexts—
Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400 and Greene v. McElroy
(1959) 360 U.S. 474. Although father does not describe the facts
of either case, the former involved a robbery trial; the latter
involved a federal administrative hearing not explicitly

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authorized by Congress or the President. Father fails to show
how either case applies in this child support matter.
Based on our independent review of the case law, we find
guidance from Deamon, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th 476. In that case,
a family court held a hearing on a motion for sanctions with
supporting declarations filed by a former husband (Deamon)
against his former wife (George). (Id. at pp. 479-480.) George
appeared at the hearing, representing herself in propria persona;
Deamon did not physically appear but was represented through
counsel. (Id. at p. 479.) George objected that Deamon was not
present, citing Family Code section 217 and arguing Deamon’s
declaration was insufficient. (Id. at p. 480.) The hearing
proceeded and the family court granted the motion. (Ibid.)
On appeal, our colleagues in the Fourth Appellate District
recognized that absent a stipulation of the parties or a finding of
good cause, Family Code section 217 required live, competent
testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing.
(Deamon, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 483.) It observed, however,
that George had not served a notice requiring Deamon to attend
the hearing for purposes of cross-examination about his
declaration. (Id. at p. 482.) It further concluded “that the family
court’s failure to make an express finding of good cause to refuse
Deamon’s live testimony could not have had a prejudicial impact
on the outcome” of the hearing. (Id. at p. 484.) The court found
prejudicial error lacking because “George has not explained how
her ability to cross-examine Deamon would have had any bearing
on the outcome of the family court’s ruling on the sanctions
motion.” (Id. at p. 485, fn. 9; see also In re Marriage of Cohen
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 574, 582 [refusal of live testimony subject
to harmless error review].)

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In this case, father failed to provide transcripts of the prior
hearings on CSSD’s modification request, which appear to have
included testimony from the parties and dealt with evidentiary
issues. As a result, this court is denied the ability to fully assess
the proceedings below. Further, as mother correctly notes, father
provides no discussion on how cross-examination would alter his
monthly support obligations. He does not address Mendoza or
the lower court’s refusal to impute income to mother. (See
Mendoza, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 686 [imputing income on
CalWORKs recipient “would be contrary to public policy”].) He
does not proffer any testimony he would elicit on cross-
examination bearing upon mother’s income or public benefit
qualification. He does not mention, let alone cite, any evidence
that contradicts the court’s findings about her income.4 The
family court had “wide latitude” to limit cross-examination to
avoid harassment, prejudice, or unduly repetitive or marginally
relevant interrogation. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th
1359, 1385-1386.) We presume neither error nor prejudice from
nonexistent argument and a silent record.

4 Below, father sought to increase mother’s income and questioned
her qualifications for public benefits based on “a lot of cash deposits”
and “expenses” appearing in her financial documents. Father’s
appellate brief does not discuss these deposits or expenses and does not
direct us to the appellate record for support.

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DISPOSITION
The modification order is affirmed. Respondents are
awarded costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

MORI, J.

We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

TAMZARIAN, J.

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