CourtListener 10646333•People v. Hernandez CA4/1
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Filed 8/1/25 P. v. Hernandez CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084189
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE420474)
CHRISTOPHER HERNANDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Patricia K. Cookson, Judge. Affirmed.
William D. Farber, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
A. Natasha Cortina and Liz Olukoya, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Christopher Hernandez robbed two loss prevention officers at a Home
Depot store and one at a Macy’s department store. A jury convicted
Hernandez of three robberies and the trial court sentenced him to four years
in prison. On appeal, Hernandez argues the trial court violated Penal Code
section 654 when it imposed concurrent sentences for both Home Depot
robbery convictions.1 Because the robberies involved two separate victims,
the court’s decision to impose both sentences was appropriate under the
multiple victim exception that applies to section 654. Accordingly, the
judgment is affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Around 8:45 p.m., J.T. and B.C. were on duty as loss prevention officers
for Home Depot. J.T. saw Hernandez and was suspicious Hernandez was
shoplifting because he was constantly looking down, looking over his
shoulder, looking to see if someone was watching him, and being “very
furtive.” Hernandez was holding a black backpack and walking towards the
power tools aisle. He had two pieces of merchandise under his arm. J.T.
called B.C. to notify him about Hernandez’s suspicious behavior and B.C.
began watching Hernandez.
In the power tool aisle, Hernandez took a power grinder from the
display rack and put it into his backpack along with the two other electrical
tools he had been carrying under his arm. J.T. followed Hernandez and told
B.C. he was going to wait outside for Hernandez and potentially approach
him. B.C. continued watching Hernandez. Hernandez walked past the
registers and self-checkout, and did not pay for the items in his backpack or
leave the tools anywhere in the store. As Hernandez reached the exit, B.C.
followed behind him and J.T. waited outside the store.
1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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J.T. approached Hernandez at the exit, identified himself as a loss
prevention officer, and asked Hernandez to give him the merchandise. B.C.
went outside to witness the interaction. When Hernandez refused to return
the merchandise, J.T. held on to one side of the backpack and Hernandez
held onto the other side. J.T. told Hernandez if he returned the merchandise,
he could leave, but Hernandez refused. They continued arguing, and after a
minute or two Hernandez yanked the backpack away from J.T. and started
walking away.
J.T. yelled out, “We know who you are, Christopher Hernandez,” then
J.T. turned around to face B.C. B.C. saw Hernandez reach into his bag, and
told J.T., “he’s reaching in.” J.T. understood this to mean Hernandez might
be reaching for a weapon. J.T. then looked back over his shoulder, and saw
Hernandez aggressively walking back towards him holding a gun in his right
hand. J.T. yelled, “he has a gun. He has a gun.” J.T. and B.C., fearing for
their safety, ran into the store and called police. Hernandez then left. B.C.
testified he did not personally see the gun, but that he could not see
Hernandez’s hands from where he was standing.
Several weeks later, around 11:37 a.m., E.S. and P.R. were working as
loss prevention officers for Macy’s. From their camera office, E.S. and P.R.
watched Hernandez on a live closed circuit television carrying an old, empty-
looking bag, making furtive movements, and walking around the store.
Hernandez approached a fragrance counter, picked up two fragrance bottles
used as testers, and put them into his bag. E.S. left the camera office to get
closer to Hernandez. P.R. continued watching Hernandez in the camera room
for another minute or two, and remained in communication with E.S.
Hernandez then exited the store without returning or paying for the
fragrance bottles. In response, E.S. approached Hernandez and identified
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himself as Macy’s security. Hernandez told E.S. he did not have any store
merchandise on him. E.S. asked Hernandez to come back to the loss
prevention office, and Hernandez began running away. E.S. ran after
Hernandez. When E.S. reached Hernandez, he was holding the fragrance
bottles in his right hand and pushed E.S. away with his left hand. By this
time, P.R. had left the camera room and come outside of Macy’s to assist E.S.
The two men were eventually able to detain Hernandez with the help of mall
security, and escorted him back to their office while a bystander called police.
E.S. took the fragrance bottles from Hernandez’s backpack and handed him
over to police officers who had arrived.
Hernandez took the stand in his own defense and admitted committing
both robberies. Hernandez admitted stealing a pair of pliers and the grinder
power tool from Home Depot and said he hoped to sell them to make some
money for food. Hernandez denied having a gun at Home Depot and said J.T.
likely saw a cell phone in his hand. He also admitted taking the fragrance
bottles from Macy’s, and said he hoped to sell them for money.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Hernandez guilty of three
counts of robbery against B.C., J.T., and E.S. (§ 211). In a bifurcated
proceeding, Hernandez admitted, and the court found true, two aggravating
factors: that Hernandez was on probation, mandatory supervision, post
release community supervision, or parole when he committed the crimes (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(4)); and that Hernandez’s prior performance on
parole was unsatisfactory (id., rule 4.421(b)(5)). The prosecutor dismissed
two other aggravating factors (id., rule 4.421(b)(1) & (b)(2)). The court also
found Hernandez in violation of probation in four open Drug Court matters
(§ 1203, subd. (k)) and revoked his probation.
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At a subsequent hearing, the court sentenced Hernandez to four years
in prison, consisting of the middle-term sentence of three years for the
robbery of B.C., a concurrent three-year term for the robbery of J.T., and a
consecutive one-year term (one-third the middle term) for the robbery of E.S.
Hernandez timely appealed from the judgment of conviction.
DISCUSSION
Hernandez’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court violated
section 654 by imposing concurrent sentences for the robbery convictions
related to B.C. and J.T. because both convictions pertain to a singular course
of conduct. The Attorney General responds the sentence was proper because
Hernandez robbed two victims, which falls under an exception to
section 654’s preclusion against multiple punishments.
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides that “[a]n act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished
under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be
punished under more than one provision.” This provision “precludes multiple
punishments for a single act or indivisible course of conduct.” (People v.
Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294.) With respect to whether section 654
applies to preclude multiple punishments, a course of conduct is generally
indivisible if the defendant harbored a single criminal objective the entire
time. (People v. Gaio (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 919, 935.)
“ ‘Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible ... depends on the
intent and objective of the actor.’ [Citations.] ‘[I]f all the offenses were
merely incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating one
objective, defendant may be found to have harbored a single intent and
therefore may be punished only once.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]
However, if the defendant harbored ‘multiple or simultaneous objectives,
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independent of and not merely incidental to each other, the defendant may be
punished for each violation committed in pursuit of each objective even
though the violations share common acts or were parts of an otherwise
indivisible course of conduct.’ ” (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139,
1143.)
Further, and critically here, “ ‘the limitations of section 654 do not
apply to crimes of violence against multiple victims.’ ” (People v. Oates (2004)
32 Cal.4th 1048, 1063, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 696.) Even if the defendant has the
same objective when committing a crime of violence against multiple victims,
multiple punishment is warranted because a defendant who commits an act
of violence “ ‘by a means likely to cause harm to several persons is more
culpable than a defendant who harms only one person.’ ” (Oates, at p. 1063.)
“The trial court has broad latitude in determining whether section 654,
subdivision (a) applies in a given case.” (People v. Garcia (2008) 167
Cal.App.4th 1550, 1564.) “When a trial court sentences a defendant to
separate terms without making an express finding the defendant entertained
separate objectives, the trial court is deemed to have made an implied finding
each offense had a separate objective.” (People v. Islas (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 116, 129.) Such findings will be upheld on appeal if supported by
substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
Here, it is undisputed that Hernandez’s crime involved two victims,
and their testimony showed that his actions caused them both fear and forced
them to run back into the Home Depot store for safety. This allowed
Hernandez to escape with the stolen items. While the trial court sentenced
Hernandez concurrently for the two separate convictions to avoid increased
punishment for the single course of conduct, as discussed, section 654 does
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not preclude separate punishments for each victim. Accordingly, we agree
with the Attorney General that the trial court properly imposed concurrent
sentences for both robbery convictions.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, J.
CASTILLO, J.
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