CourtListener 10645570•In re A.R. CA2/2
Texto completo
Filed 7/31/25 In re A.R. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re A.R., a Person Coming B338341
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24CCJP00983)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JESSICA M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Brett Bianco, Judge. Affirmed.
Rita Himes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jane Kwon, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jessica M. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court judgment
asserting jurisdiction over her son A.R. (born February 2024) and
a dispositional order removing him from her custody. Mother
challenges the jurisdictional findings under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b) involving
her behavior.1 Further, mother argues a lack of clear and
convincing evidence that no reasonable means were available to
prevent or eliminate the need for removal. We find no error and
affirm the judgment, jurisdictional findings and challenged
dispositional order in full.
COMBINED FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
Initial removal and investigation
On March 25, 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging
domestic violence in the home of mother and her newborn baby,
A.R. The caller reported mother disclosed someone in the home
“gets upset, punches holes in the wall, and breaks things.” The
caller also reported mother had not taken the baby to the doctor.
The caller had observed mother and the baby in the home and
reported mother filled up a baby bottle and propped it up in the
bassinet then walked away, without ensuring the baby was able
to feed. During the time the caller was with mother and child,
mother did not touch the baby.
On March 26, 2024, DCFS received a second referral. The
caller reported David R. (father) had disclosed that on the prior
evening when A.R. was crying, mother responded by “getting
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2
upset and shaking the baby.”2 It was reported mother shook the
baby “a little.”
On March 26, 2024, a DCFS social worker went to mother’s
home. Mother appeared confused as to why anyone would be
concerned about the safety of the baby and then displayed an
inability to properly hold A.R. Despite the social worker’s
prompts, mother failed to provide support for A.R.’s head and
neck. The baby cried throughout the interview. Mother
attempted to feed A.R., but the bottle was nearly empty, and he
was sucking air. The social worker prompted mother to make a
new bottle. Mother continued to hold A.R. by the waist at her hip
and failed to support his head. The social worker had to
intervene and hold the child while mother prepared the bottle.
After the baby was fed, mother laid him on the bed. When the
social worker inquired as to whether mother would burp the
baby, mother responded, “He burps on his own.”
Mother told the social worker she lived with father.
Though they were homeless during mother’s pregnancy, they just
moved into the apartment two months earlier. Mother was
receiving “Section 8” housing assistance and help from Saint
John’s Outreach church. Mother denied receiving prenatal care.
During this conversation law enforcement arrived. Mother
stated, “I can’t be arrested, I have to go to a concert.” Mother
continued to reiterate she needed to go to a concert, but provided
no details.
Mother admitted having received a diagnosis of bipolar
disorder but was not seeing a therapist or taking medication at
that time. Mother stated her therapist quit, and she stopped
taking medication when she stopped therapy. Mother stated she
2 Father is not a party to this appeal.
3
felt stressed and had not slept in two days, adding she sometimes
cries for 30 minutes. When she feels this way, she takes Tylenol.
Mother admitted she and father sometimes argue. Mother
first described their arguments as yelling and name-calling,
including father calling her “retarded” when she does not know
how to soothe the child or does not clean properly. Mother then
disclosed that during the previous week, after yelling at her for
not cleaning the kitchen properly, father grabbed her by the neck.
Mother admitted to being afraid of father and of his return home
due to his aggressive behavior and verbal abuse. Mother denied
ever calling law enforcement due to father’s behavior.
The social worker noticed A.R.’s right eye was swollen,
crusted, and red, with yellow discharge coming out. When asked
about the baby’s eye, mother said she brought it up to the doctor
the week before at the Venice Family Clinic. The baby was
prescribed antibiotics, but mother did not know where to go to get
the medication. Therefore, the infant’s eye was not treated.
Mother denied returning to the health clinic and shaking A.R.
The social worker informed mother A.R. needed to be seen
by a doctor. Mother agreed but became visibly upset. Mother
began making calls, and when no one answered, mother asked
the social worker, “what did you do to my boyfriend, he’s not
answering my calls.” Mother began threatening the social
worker by saying she “better leave.” Mother then sat on her bed
and scrolled through social media.
The social worker asked mother to prepare A.R. to be taken
to the doctor, observing his diaper was full. Mother stated she
changed the diaper “10 minutes ago,” and refused to assist the
social worker in finding clothes for A.R. Though mother did not
get off her phone, she did point to the bassinet for the social
worker to look for clothes for A.R. The social worker observed
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five dirty onesies in the bassinet, covered in dog hair. A few of
the suits were wet around the diaper area and smelled of urine.
The social worker asked mother if there were clean clothes for the
baby and mother said “no.”
The social worker asked mother if she planned to ride in
the ambulance taking the baby to the hospital. Mother
responded, “No, you can go.” The social worker continued to
encourage mother to accompany A.R. to the hospital; mother
continued to respond in the negative. Mother said, “no, because
you are going to think you run my place,” and “why would I go in
the ambulance with all those men.” Mother also stated she
needed to stay with her dog and that “the people in the
ambulance kill people.” Overall, mother continued to make
statements that made no sense and refused to go with A.R. in the
ambulance.
Mother did not want to engage further with the social
worker and asked the social worker to leave her home.
A different social worker continued the interview with
mother, who confirmed father was the father of the child and had
signed the birth certificate. Mother informed the social worker
her ex-boyfriend had recently arrived at the home unannounced
several times and called her names such as fat and retarded, and
threatened to “choke [her] out.” Last week, the ex-boyfriend
arrived at the home and began by calling her “retarded” due to
the way she was cleaning, and eventually “had one of his
tantrums” and choked her. Mother denied contacting law
enforcement after this incident.
Mother stated she had been diagnosed with postpartum
depression, but was unable to describe the symptoms she
experienced. Mother stated she currently takes Tylenol and used
to take Risperidone for bipolar disorder. The last time she took
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her medication was “a long time ago.” Mother reiterated she had
not slept in two days and was unable to identify a therapist,
psychiatrist, or pharmacy for her medication.
The social worker heard mother make paranoid statements,
have lateral thinking, abruptly change topics, and not to be
oriented to time and place. Mother denied understanding the
severity of A.R.’s condition and declined to join the team at the
hospital. When the social worker asked mother if she would like
to meet the team at Harbor UCLA hospital, mother responded,
“No, I don’t want to leave my dog and have people come into my
home.” Mother was unable to identify the individuals she was
fearful would enter her home.
The social worker met the apartment manager at the
referral address and inquired about the family. The manager
stated the family had been living there for about two months.
Recently, he had to speak with the family as he received noise
complaints late at night. He denied having any concerns for child
abuse or neglect. A neighbor, who wished to remain anonymous,
reported mother and father were always arguing, but denied
observing or hearing any physical altercations.
The social worker who accompanied A.R. to the hospital
telephoned mother to see if she had any recommendations for
soothing the baby, as he was inconsolable. Mother denied having
solutions. When the social worker asked if mother would like to
speak to the baby to assist in soothing him, mother declined. The
social worker encouraged mother to come to the hospital, but
mother continued to decline, stating, “I don’t want to come and be
arrested.” When the social worker asked why mother would be
arrested, mother said she had not hurt her baby, instead it was
her ex-boyfriend.
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A.R. showed no immediate signs of neurological or gross
motor deficits. A head CT scan disclosed no immediate concerns.
There were no obvious or suspicious signs of head trauma
associated with shaken baby syndrome.
The emergency room doctor also denied seeing signs of
trauma upon an initial external exam. A.R. was active, crying,
with drainage from his eye. A.R. did not have initial injuries
typical of being shaken.
Field interviewers with RAND Corporation
Tieryn Bills was a field interviewer for RAND Corporation.
She knew father through his participation in a longitudinal
public health study being undertaken by her employer. She had
known father for about a year, and met with him about once a
month.
Bills reported father had disclosed domestic violence in the
relationship between him and mother during and after her
pregnancy. Father described the domestic violence as “throwing
things” and yelling. Father admitted hitting mother during and
after her pregnancy, but did not describe how. Bills reported
father told her mother was upset with the child the other night
and shook the baby “a little.” Father provided no further details
on the incident. Bills interviewed father approximately once a
month, and father admitted using “acid, mushrooms, codeine,
PCP and marijuana” within the last three months. Father
disclosed he had PTSD but revealed no other diagnosis. Bills
stated father is paranoid and sometimes makes statements
regarding being afraid of spirits. Father disclosed he had not
taken A.R. for medical care since his birth.
Sally Nowak was a field interviewer for RAND Corporation.
She had worked in that capacity for two years and had come to
know mother “as part of a year long longitudinal study about
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former foster youths that were experiencing homelessness.” The
survey involved tracking these individuals’ path to housing.
Nowak had been interviewing mother every month for a year and
also knew mother from a previous job she had at an organization
called “Safe Place for Youth” (SPY). Including her knowledge of
mother at SPY, Nowak had known mother since 2018 or 2019.
Mother had disclosed domestic violence to Nowak, including
“breaking and throwing things.” In addition, mother had a
history of being aggressive. She was seen kicking, punching, and
hitting her prior partner at the SPY drop-in center. Nowak
visited mother two weeks after A.R.’s birth. During the one-half
hour visit, mother did not pick up, hold, or touch A.R. at all.
When A.R. cried, mother propped up a bottle on a blanket to feed
the infant. Mother did not pick up the baby even after Nowak
told mother there was a choking hazard and directed her to pick
up the child.
Initial detention
On March 27, 2024, a Harbor UCLA social worker reported
A.R. had no signs of child abuse or neglect and could be
discharged. No parent had visited A.R. in the hospital.
On March 27, 2024, mother confirmed she had not visited
A.R. in the hospital. She was on her way to Las Vegas because
she did not believe she would be able to see the child. When the
social worker questioned mother’s decision to go to Las Vegas,
mother hung up the phone. Due to the parents’ failure to pick up
A.R. at the hospital, he was placed in foster care with a resource
family.
In its March 29, 2024 detention report, DCFS explained the
reasonable efforts made to prevent or eliminate the need for
A.R.’s removal from the home. DCFS set forth the preplacement
preventative services that were provided, including case
8
management; interviews of all parties and assessment of the
child; initiation of a CLETS request; making and returning calls
regarding the status of the case to all interested parties; and
explanation of the court process and date, time, location and
directions to the court hearing to all interested parties. DCFS
suggested providing referrals to mother and father for services,
which could prevent the need for further detention, including
domestic violence, anger management, parenting classes,
individual therapy, psychiatric assessment, and drug and alcohol
programs.
Petition and detention hearing
On March 28, 2024, DCFS filed a section 300 petition
alleging mother physically abused A.R. by shaking him, and
father failed to protect the child; the parents had a history of
engaging in violent altercations; mother had unaddressed mental
and emotional problems; and father had substance abuse issues.
The detention hearing took place on March 29, 2024. The
juvenile court found father was A.R.’s presumed father; DCFS
made reasonable efforts to prevent the child’s removal; and there
were no services available to prevent the child’s continued
detention. The court removed A.R. from parental custody and
ordered monitored visits for the parents. The court ordered
DCFS to provide the parents with appropriate low cost or no cost
referrals and a written visitation schedule.
Continued investigation
On April 10, 2024, a dependency investigator (DI)
interviewed mother in person, at the family home, with father
present. Mother displayed some difficulty in understanding parts
of the interview and disclosed having an intellectual disability.
Mother reported being diagnosed with a learning disability as a
child and being partially deaf. Mother denied shaking or abusing
9
A.R. Mother stated it was dangerous for them to live on the
second floor due to the stairs, explaining, “When we use the
stroller, the baby’s bouncing up and down when we use the
stairs.” The DI explained the baby should be taken out of the
stroller and carried up the stairs separately from the stroller
instead of pushing the stroller up and down the stairs with the
baby inside. Mother responded, “Oh, okay.”
Mother denied violent altercations with father, claiming
disagreements and arguments, but they never hit each other or
threw things at each other.
Mother confirmed her mental health diagnosis but said she
ran out of her medications and had not yet obtained a refill. She
was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and attention deficit
disorder. She was prescribed risperidone, fluoxetine, and
Vyvanse. Mother reported feeling depressed since A.R. was
removed and had an upcoming appointment at Venice Family
Clinic on April 16, 2024. She also confirmed she would provide a
printout of her new medication list to the DI.
Mother said her ex-boyfriend in Missouri was abusive and
their relationship ended in 2019 after three months when he
strangled her. Mother denied her ex-boyfriend ever came to Los
Angeles or her home. Mother denied any alcohol or drug abuse
by father. She knew father had a history of drug use but said he
now only used marijuana at the beach, never in the home.
On April 10, 2024, the DI interviewed father in mother’s
presence. Father walked around the house doing chores during
the interview. He spoke clearly but regularly paused after
questions to make a face or laugh before continuing his
statements. Father appeared to the DI to be under the influence
due to his flushed face, lack of eye contact, and manner of speech.
He later admitted to using marijuana earlier that morning.
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Father disclosed having been in special education classes as a
minor.
Father denied mother shook A.R., and believed the
allegation had to do with the stairs. Father also denied the
domestic violence allegations. Father said there were no fights
between him and mother. The neighbors did not like them
because they were new and talked loudly. Father said mother
could not hear in one ear, so she did not know how loud she was
at times.
Father was not concerned with mother’s ability to care for
A.R., saying he would protect A.R. by “us[ing] [his] clairvoyance
to stop it before it occurs.” Father had not noted any mental
health problems in mother other than depression since A.R.’s
detention. Father disputed the drug allegations and stated he
smoked between three and one-half and four grams of marijuana,
with a maximum of five to seven grams of marijuana,
approximately every other day. He smoked when he needed a
break, and he did it at the beach where he worked out, never in
the home.
On April 13, 2024, A.R.’s caregivers reported having no
concerns except the parents had not reached out to ask about
A.R. since his placement.
On April 25, 2024, the DI interviewed maternal great-
grandmother Lori M. Lori reported she had “lots of concerns”
about mother, that mother had a lot of mental health issues, and
“there is no way that she can take care of a baby.” Lori was
unsure if mother had developmental delays, but reported mother
could barely take care of herself.
On May 7, 2024, DCFS received a report of a related
referral dated February 7, 2024, that mother had left Indiana for
Los Angeles. Mother had been adopted as a minor and kept in
11
touch with her biological mother, Melanie L. Mother was
reported to be mentally unstable, and the matter was referred to
“Community Prevention Linkage.” Father too was a prior
dependent who aged out of the foster care system in 2017.
Father had a criminal history from 2019 to 2024 involving
obstruction of a peace officer, battery, and battery with serious
bodily injury.
On May 9, 2024, mother told the DI she did not have a
psychiatrist and had not refilled her prescriptions.
The social worker informed the DI mother struggled with
lucidity, and both parents minimally engaged with A.R.
On May 10, 2024, the DI met with mother and obtained a
release of information form for Venice Family Clinic and the
Department of Mental Health. The DI assisted mother in calling
mental health providers to link her to a psychiatrist and
therapist. Mother obtained an in-person intake appointment for
May 21, 2024, at Augustus Hawkins Mental Health Center, along
with a bus pass from the social worker. Mother informed the DI
she had been diagnosed with an intellectual disability in her
youth but did not know if she still had it. She also had seizures
as a foster youth.
Both mother and father were open to receiving
developmental assessments and supportive services. The DI
assisted mother and father with filling out Regional Center
intake applications.
On May 21, 2024, mother’s case manager from SHEILDS
for Families Healthy Start Program reported having been
unsuccessful in assessing mother for their program because
mother could not comprehend basic questions, easily lost focus,
and ranted about unrelated topics.
12
From May 21 to 24, 2024, the parents reported receiving
disturbing and violent threats from father’s ex-girlfriend. The DI
and social workers repeatedly recommended the parents file
police reports, change the locks to their home, avoid areas the ex-
girlfriend frequented, and consider filing for a restraining order.
Father repeatedly minimized the situation and said police and
court interventions were not necessary. The parents were not
willing to take any actions to protect themselves.
The social worker who monitored the parents’ visits with
A.R. continued to be concerned with the parents’ engagement
with A.R. They required extensive encouragement and modeling
as to how to appropriately interact with A.R., including how to
hold, soothe, and bond with him. The parents also required many
redirections because they would engage with the social worker
instead of the child.
During a May 3, 2024 visit, father exhibited limited
parental knowledge. When mother was asked if she wanted to
hold A.R., she responded, “no, give him to [father].” Mother did
not hold the baby during the visit and did not understand that
A.R. was too young to talk or eat solid foods. The parents
bickered for several minutes during the visit, and the social
worker ended the visit early for fear of escalation.
During a May 17, 2024 visit, mother could not hold the
baby properly even after the social worker explained the baby’s
muscles were not strong enough for him to support himself.
Mother declined to adopt the social worker’s suggestions for
soothing him, and failed to engage with the infant when he
became fussy. The social worker modeled soothing techniques
then returned the baby to mother. Mother constantly checked
her phone while holding the baby and ended the visit early upon
father’s arrival. During father’s visit, father failed to properly
13
support the infant’s head and made minimal efforts to engage
with the child. Father was unable to calm A.R. and handed him
to the social worker. Father informed the social worker mother
gave random people their address, and those people broke into
their apartment, stole father’s cell phone, and were trying to steal
A.R. Father did not like going home until late because mother
did not know how to clean the apartment and did not understand
when he tried to teach her.
Between April 16 and May 11, 2024, mother had three in-
person visits with A.R. and father had four.
DCFS noted mother and father had limited social
connections, and both reported only having each other. Father
had limited contact with his family; the paternal grandmother
was deceased; and paternal grandfather was deported when
father was younger. Mother did not have a relationship with her
adoptive parents and had limited contact with her biological
family.
Jurisdiction and disposition hearing
The jurisdiction and disposition hearing was held on
May 31, 2024. Mother and father were present on WebEx and
were represented by counsel. The court took judicial notice of the
file, admitted exhibits, and heard testimony.
Bills testified she had known father for about a year and
met with him monthly. Father reported domestic violence with
mother both before and after her pregnancy. Father did not
describe the domestic violence, but did say he was hitting mother.
During their meeting in March, father reported mother had
shaken the baby a little. Father did not elaborate what “shaking
a little” meant, but he said mother was frustrated. Father also
disclosed drug use.
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Nowak also testified. She had known mother since 2018 or
2019 while she was a counselor at SPY. While at SPY, mother
and father got into a physical altercation and were asked to
leave. During their March 2024 meeting, mother said “things
[get] broken in the[ir] apartment” during arguments. Mother did
not specify who breaks things. Nowak reported mother had “a
history of being timed-out for violence with . . . just not with
current partners but with other friends or partners as well . . . .”
After hearing argument, the juvenile court sustained the
following allegations:
a-1, b-1: “On a prior occasion, the child[’s] . . . mother . . .
physically abused the two month old child by shaking the child.
Such physical abuse was excessive and caused the child
unreasonable pain and suffering. The child’s father . . . knew of
the physical abuse of the child by the mother and failed to protect
the child. . . . Such physical abuse of the child by the mother and
the father’s failure to protect the child endanger the child’s
physical health and safety and place the child at risk of serious
physical harm, damage, danger, physical abuse and failure to
protect.”
a-2, b-3: “The child[’s] . . . mother . . . and father . . . have a
history of engaging in violent altercations. On prior occasions,
the father struck the mother, during the mother’s pregnancy with
the child. On prior occasions, the mother and father broke and
threw objects in the child’s home. Such violent conduct on the
part of the mother and the father endangers the child’s physical
health and safety, creates a detrimental home environment and
places the child at risk of serious physical harm, damage and
danger.”
b-2: “The child[’s] . . . mother . . . has mental and emotional
problems, including a diagnosis of Bi-Polar Disorder, which
15
render the mother incapable of providing regular care of the
child. The mother failed to regularly take the mother’s
psychotropic medication, as prescribed. Such mental and
emotional problems on the part of the mother endanger the
child’s physical health and safety and place the child at risk of
serious physical harm, damage and danger.”
The court also sustained an allegation concerning father’s
drug use.
In sustaining the physical abuse counts, the court noted
“[t]he physical abuse is evident from the evidence in that mother
was resorting to shaking the child out of frustration.” The court
did not believe the parents’ explanation the child was “jostled
around while in the stroller going up and down the stairs,”
describing the court’s view of that evidence as “an excuse.”
The court found DCFS made reasonable efforts to prevent
removal and there were no services available to prevent further
detention. The court removed A.R. from parental custody and
ordered reunification services for the parents.
The court noted “we should have a Regional Center referral
for both mother and father on their case plan,” as well as “730
evaluations for the parents.” The court stated, “This is going to
require a significant amount of effort on [DCFS’s] part to provide
the parents with supportive service and essentially hold them by
the hand and walk them to those programs and help them with
what they need to do.” The court specified mother’s case plan
would include a domestic violence program for victims, at which
point mother interrupted the court, stating, “I’m not a victim.”
The court muted mother’s microphone. The parents were granted
monitored visitation.
The court found by clear and convincing evidence “it
wouldn’t be appropriate to have the child in [the parents’] care at
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this time until we get these issues addressed and get a better
understanding of the capacity of the parents to be parents and
protective of the child.”
On June 3, 2024, mother filed her notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the two jurisdictional findings involving her, as well
as the juvenile court’s finding DCFS made reasonable efforts to
prevent A.R.’s detention and no reasonable means existed to
avoid A.R.’s continued detention and removal. We discuss each
issue separately below and conclude the record supports the
juvenile court’s findings.
I. Substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional
findings
A. Mootness
Mother acknowledges she does not challenge all of the
jurisdictional findings made by the juvenile court. Mother also
acknowledges “where there are multiple findings against one
parent[,] the validity of one finding may render moot the parent’s
attempt to challenge the others.” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
266, 284 (D.P.).) However, mother argues her jurisdictional
challenges are not moot because she was likely referred to a
Child Abuse Central Index (CACI) listing based on the
underlying allegations, and reversal of the findings would assist
her in getting the CACI listing removed. Mother cites D.P.,
supra, at page 279, in which the court acknowledged inclusion in
CACI can affect a parent’s employment, state licensing, volunteer
opportunity prospects, and may adversely affect the parent in
future dependency proceedings.
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DCFS acknowledges mother’s mootness argument and does
not oppose review of mother’s arguments on the merits. For this
reason, we exercise our discretion to decide mother’s
jurisdictional challenges on the merits without addressing the
mootness issue.3 (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 285.)
B. Applicable law and standard of review
Section 300, subdivision (a), authorizes jurisdiction if a
child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk the child will
suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the
child by the child’s parent.
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), authorizes jurisdiction if a
child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk the child will
suffer, serious physical harm or illness as a result of any of the
following: (A) the failure or inability of the child’s parent or
guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child; (B) the
willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent or guardian to
adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the
custodian with whom the child has been left; (C) the willful or
negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child
3 Mother has filed a request for judicial notice of DCFS’s
answer brief in the matter of In re S.R., review granted
September 11, 2024, S285759 (answer filed Mar. 6, 2025).
Mother argues the brief demonstrates DCFS’s misunderstanding
of when juvenile dependency jurisdictional findings establish
conduct that is reportable to CACI. Because DCFS does not
oppose review of mother’s arguments on the merits, and does not
challenge mother’s position that inclusion on the CACI could
create prejudice in the future, we hereby deny mother’s request
for judicial notice. (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger
& Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6 [judicial notice
should only be granted of items that are necessary, helpful, and
relevant on appeal].)
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with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment; or (D)
the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for
the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness,
developmental disability, or substance abuse.
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the jurisdictional findings is reviewed for substantial evidence.
(In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) This court must draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings,
review the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile
court’s determinations, and recognize that issues of fact and
credibility are within the province of the trial court. (In re Cole L.
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 602 (Cole L.).) To be substantial,
evidence “‘must be of ponderable legal significance and must be
reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.’” (Ibid.) Where
substantial evidence exists supporting the court’s finding, we
must “affirm the order even if there is other evidence supporting
a contrary finding.” (In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843.)
“Although section 300 requires proof the child is subject to
the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing
[citations], the court need not wait until a child is seriously
abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary
to protect the child. [Citations.] The court may consider past
events in deciding whether a child presently needs the court’s
protection.” (Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at pp. 601–602.)
C. Physical abuse—shaking the baby
Mother first challenges the juvenile court’s a-1 and b-1
jurisdictional finding that mother physically abused A.R. by
shaking him. Mother points out the only evidence to support the
allegation of dangerous shaking was father’s statement to a field
interviewer that mother shook A.R. “a little” when she was
frustrated. However, mother argues, the contrary evidence was
19
substantial. The baby’s examination at the hospital revealed no
signs of trauma or any medical concerns. Mother denied shaking
the baby and explained she understood it was dangerous to do so.
Mother argues that slight shaking out of frustration does not
create a serious risk of harm within the meaning of section 300,
subdivisions (a) or (b)(1). Mother cites cases involving shaken
baby syndrome, all of which involved forceful shaking resulting in
an infant’s death or serious neurological injury. (In re I.I. (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 971, 973 [shaken four month-old twins resulted in
severe brain injuries and one twin’s death]; Los Angeles County
Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2007) 158
Cal.App.4th 1562, 1564 [shaken infant died]; J.N. v. Superior
Court (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 523, 528–529 [shaken 11 month old
was in a coma and on life support]; In re Ashley M. (2003) 114
Cal.App.4th 1, 5 [shaken infant died]; Michael P. v. Superior
Court (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1040 [shaken 21 month old
suffered brain hemorrhaging and died the following day].) In
contrast, mother argues, there is no evidence she shook A.R.
violently or forcefully or that A.R. suffered any injuries. The
substantial evidence is not satisfied by pointing to “‘“isolated
evidence torn from the context of the whole record.”’” (In re I.C.
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 892.) The record here, mother argues, when
considered in its entirety, lacks substantial evidence to support
the physical abuse findings.
The juvenile court relied on substantial evidence in
sustaining the allegations that mother physically abused A.R. by
shaking him. Bills provided evidence that father informed her
that mother became frustrated with the baby and shook him a
little. Father told Bills that mother was upset because the baby
was crying, therefore she shook the baby. The evidence from
Bills, in the form of written testimony taken during interviews
20
and live testimony at the jurisdiction hearing, constitutes
substantial evidence. Father’s minimization of the shaking,
characterizing it as “a little,” does not change the basic fact that
mother became angry with the baby and took out that anger on
the baby by shaking him.
Mother attempts to undermine the evidence by suggesting
there is reason to question the reliability of the parents’
statements to the field interviewers, citing only argument by
mother’s counsel. The juvenile court also heard mother’s
counsel’s arguments during the hearing and declined to adopt
those arguments. Bills testified she had no reason to question
father’s credibility when he told her of the baby shaking. The
juvenile court alone was responsible for making the credibility
determination as to Bills’s testimony. We do not undermine the
juvenile court’s credibility determination, even when contrary
evidence in the record exists. (In re R.V., supra, 208 Cal.App.4th
at p. 843.)
Further, there was evidence the parents made excuses for
any possible injury to the child. Mother first blamed her ex-
boyfriend for injuring A.R. While mother points out her own
statements were confused and erratic at times, and the court
eventually struck mother’s allegations concerning her ex-
boyfriend, this argument only serves to undermine mother’s
denial of the baby shaking. In addition, mother and father both
noted the stairs to their apartment were dangerous, and the baby
could have been jostled as they pulled him up and down the
stairs in the stroller. The trial court did not believe this
testimony, finding it was an “excuse.” This court may not
reweigh the evidence or disturb the juvenile court’s credibility
determinations. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
21
Mother’s argument that A.R. suffered no actual harm from
the shaking does not provide a basis for reversal of the finding.
“It is not necessary for DCFS or the juvenile court to precisely
predict what harm will come to [the child]. Rather, it is sufficient
that [the parents’] choices create a substantial risk of some
serious physical harm or illness.” (In re Travis C. (2017) 13
Cal.App.5th 1219, 1226–1227.) As the cases cited by mother
show, the shaking of a baby can result in serious injury or death.
“‘The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or
injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to
protect the child.’” (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
The juvenile court’s determination that A.R. was at risk of
physical harm due to mother’s shaking him out of frustration was
supported by substantial evidence in the record. Mother failed to
satisfy her burden to show “there is no evidence of a sufficiently
substantial nature to support the court’s findings.” (In re
Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 147.)
D. Perpetration of domestic violence
Mother next challenges the a-2 and b-3 jurisdictional
findings to the extent that they indicate mother personally
perpetrated domestic violence in the home. Mother seeks an
order that the jurisdictional findings should be revised to remove
the language suggesting both mother and father engaged in
violent altercations, broke and threw objects in the child’s home,
and that such violent conduct on the part of both parents
endangers the child’s physical health and safety. Mother argues
there is no evidence in the record that mother endangered A.R.
by perpetrating violence in the home. Mother points out the only
evidence in the record attributed to specific perpetrators were
committed by father or mother’s ex-boyfriend. Mother concedes
there is substantial evidence in the record that the parents
22
argued frequently and had a volatile relationship but argues this
evidence does not support the finding that mother was the
perpetrator of violence. We disagree, and find the evidence
supports a reasonable inference that mother engaged in domestic
violence.
The evidence in the record shows father informed Bills that
there was domestic violence in the home. Bills reported father
had disclosed domestic violence in the relationship between him
and mother during and after her pregnancy. Father described
the domestic violence as “throwing things” and yelling. Father
was not specific as to which party was throwing things, and while
father admitted hitting mother during and after her pregnancy,
his statements did not negate the possibility that mother was
responsible for perpetrating violence.
At the hearing, Nowak testified she had known mother
since 2018 or 2019 while she was a counselor at SPY. While at
SPY, mother and father got into a physical altercation and were
asked to leave the location. During March 2024, mother said
“things [get] broken in the[ir] apartment” during arguments.
Mother did not specify who breaks things. Father admitted
hitting mother, but was also vague about who threw things.
Given the parents’ failure to specify which party was breaking
things, the court was justified in making an inference that
mother was involved in this activity.
In addition, there was evidence that mother had a history
of being aggressive. Nowak reported mother was seen kicking,
punching, and hitting her prior partner at a drop-in center for
SPY, and was asked to leave the location. Mother had “a history
of being timed-out for violence” with friends and partners. From
this evidence, the juvenile court was permitted to draw an
23
inference that the vague references to items being thrown and
broken in the home involved mother.
To the extent mother denied engaging in violence, the
juvenile court was entitled to reject that testimony. During the
initial interviews, mother admitted to the social worker she and
father yelled and called each other names. While she initially
denied physical altercations, mother then described an argument
from one week prior in which father grabbed her by the neck.
Father also admitted to Bills that there was domestic violence
between him and mother, and a neighbor complained the parents
were always arguing. Despite this evidence, both parents later
denied there was any hitting, denied that they threw things, and
denied there was any violence in their relationship. Given the
parents’ changing testimony, the juvenile court was entitled to
reject their denials.
Substantial evidence in the record supports the juvenile
court’s finding that both mother and father were responsible for
domestic violence in the home. In analyzing substantial
evidence, this court must draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence to support the findings, review the record in the light
most favorable to the juvenile court’s determinations, and
recognize that issues of fact and credibility are within the
province of the trial court. (In re Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th
at p. 602.)4 Given the parents’ vague references to things being
4 The juvenile court’s decision to order mother to a domestic
violence program for victims does not undermine the court’s
finding that mother perpetrated domestic violence. Mother was a
victim of domestic violence based on father’s admissions of such
violence. Mother has failed to show an abuse of discretion in the
type of domestic violence program selected by the juvenile court.
(See In re Daniel B. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663, 675.)
24
thrown and broken, combined with mother’s history of violence,
the juvenile court did not err in reasonably inferring mother was
a party responsible for such violence.
II. The court’s reasonable efforts and no reasonable
means findings are supported by substantial
evidence
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court found DCFS
made reasonable efforts to prevent A.R.’s continued detention
and removal and there were no reasonable means to prevent his
continued detention. Mother argues the court did not cite any
specific evidence to support these findings and the record lacks
substantial supporting evidence. Thus, mother argues, the
disposition order must be reversed and remanded to the juvenile
court to hold a new disposition hearing based on current
circumstances. (Citing In re H.B. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 219,
245, 247).
A. Applicable law and standard of review
Under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), a juvenile court may
remove a child from a parent’s physical custody where it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that there is a substantial danger
to the child’s physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being if the child were to be returned home, and
there are no reasonable means to protect the child without
removal from the parents’ custody.
A juvenile court’s dispositional order removing a child from
a parent’s custody is reviewed for substantial evidence. (In re
Hailey T., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 146.) Where, as here, “a
fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the
question before the appellate court is whether the record as a
whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.”
25
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.) In doing so,
we must “give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may
have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in
the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the
evidence.” (Id. at pp. 1011–1012.)
B. Analysis
Considering the record as a whole, substantial evidence
supported the juvenile court’s disposition order removing A.R.
from parental custody and its findings that DCFS undertook
reasonable efforts to prevent removal and no reasonable means
existed to prevent his continued detention.
A.R.’s physical health was in jeopardy when the social
worker arrived at the home for the first time. He had an
untreated eye infection. When asked about the baby’s eye,
mother said she brought it up to the doctor the week before at the
Venice Family Clinic. The baby was prescribed antibiotics;
however, mother did not know where to go to get the antibiotics.
Therefore, the infant’s eye was not treated. Mother denied
following up with the health clinic. Mother repeatedly held the
baby without properly supporting his head and neck, attempted
to feed the child a near-empty bottle, attempted to feed the child
by propping the bottle on a blanket even after being told it was a
choking hazard, and declined to burp the child. The baby’s
clothing was dirty and smelled of urine.
When the social worker informed mother A.R. needed
medical attention, mother declined to accompany the social
worker to the hospital. When law enforcement arrived, mother
expressed concern about being arrested because she had to
attend a concert. Mother denied the severity of A.R.’s condition
and refused to attempt to soothe him while he was in the
hospital. Mother chose to leave for Las Vegas instead of visiting
26
A.R. at the hospital. Ultimately, she never visited A.R. at the
hospital nor did she collect him when he was ready to be
discharged. A.R. was placed in foster care because neither parent
came to the hospital to pick him up.
After A.R.’s initial placement in foster care, individuals
involved in the case continued to express serious concerns about
mother’s ability to parent A.R. Lori M. reported “lots of concerns”
and stated her belief there was no way mother could take care of
the baby due to mother’s mental health issues. Maternal great-
grandmother opined that mother could barely take care of
herself.
A.R.’s caregivers reported minimal contact from mother. In
mid-April 2024, A.R.’s caregivers reported neither mother nor
father had contacted them to ask about the baby since his
placement. Between mid-April and May 2024, mother called
A.R.’s caregiver about five times, but sometimes mother did not
ask about the child.
During visits, mother required constant modeling of how to
properly support A.R.’s head, how to soothe the infant, and how
to bond with him. Mother did not want to hold A.R. at times, and
during visits both mother and father had to be redirected to pay
attention to the baby instead of the social worker. Both parents
demonstrated limited knowledge about child development.
The evidence shows that despite the concerns with mother’s
parenting, DCFS made efforts to prevent A.R.’s detention. When
A.R. was first taken to the hospital, the social worker encouraged
mother to join A.R. The social worker telephoned mother from
the hospital to encourage mother to soothe the baby. Mother
declined. Mother was on her way to Las Vegas when the child
was ready to be picked up from the hospital. Neither mother nor
father picked up the child from the hospital. After A.R. was
27
placed in foster care, DCFS interviewed the parties extensively,
and provided encouragement and modeling to attempt to get the
parents to appropriately parent the child. The DI assisted
mother in calling mental health providers, ensured mother had
transportation to get to her mental health appointment, assisted
the parents in completing their Regional Center applications,
interviewed service providers about mother’s mental health,
monitored the parents’ visits with A.R., made safety
recommendations and modeled appropriate parenting. In spite of
these efforts, DCFS continued to have serious concerns about the
parents’ ability to care for A.R. Where the evidence shows “the
child would be in danger if allowed to reside with the parent” (In
re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 525), continued
detention from the parents is appropriate. The record supports
the juvenile court’s determination that DCFS used reasonable
efforts to reunite A.R. with his parents and that there were no
reasonable means to prevent his continued removal.
In determining A.R. was at risk in his parents’ care, the
juvenile court was permitted to consider A.R.’s very young age.
(In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520, 558 [“It is reasonable for courts
to infer that very young children require a substantial degree of
close supervision.”].) The court noted it would not be appropriate
to place the child in the parents’ care until “we get these issues
addressed and get a better understanding of the capacity of the
parents to be parents and protective of the child.” The court
ordered expert evaluations to determine whether “there are any
issues that would prevent the parents from having the child in
their care and appropriately raising the newborn child in light of
mother’s known mental health issues that were just sustained.”
The juvenile court acted reasonably in maintaining A.R.’s
28
detention until the court was satisfied the infant would be safe in
mother’s care.
Mother points to section 319, subdivision (f)(1), which
provides, “The court shall also make a determination on the
record . . . as to whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent
or eliminate the need for removal of the child from their home . . .
and whether there are available services that would prevent the
need for further detention.” Among the services to be considered
are “case management, counseling, emergency shelter care,
emergency in-home caretakers, out-of-home respite care, teaching
and demonstrating homemakers, parenting training,
transportation, and any other child welfare services . . . .” (Ibid.)
Mother argues such services must be considered at disposition,
and these are precisely the types of services the parents needed.
The juvenile court recognized the parents’ need for services,
noting, “I think we can all agree that it is not going to be
sufficient to hand the parents a list of resources and say ‘go forth
and conquer’ . . . . This is going to require a significant amount of
effort on [DCFS’s] part to provide the parents with supportive
service and essentially hold them by the hand and walk them to
those programs and help them with what they need to do.” The
court was fully informed as to the parents’ needs, and the record
supports the court’s decision that there were no reasonable
means, at the time of the disposition hearing, to eliminate the
need for continued detention. However, the court implemented
appropriate services in an effort to eliminate the need for
detention in the future.
Mother argues referrals to such services should have been
made promptly after the child was detained. (Citing In re H.B.,
supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 246; see § 319, subd. (g) [“If a court
orders a child detained, the court shall . . . order services to be
29
provided as soon as possible to reunify the child and their family,
if appropriate.”].) There is no indication on this record that the
juvenile court was delinquent in ordering services. The parents
made no effort to see the child within the first few weeks of his
detention and managed only sporadic contact thereafter. DCFS
diligently investigated the case and attempted to facilitate visits
between the parents and child. The jurisdiction and disposition
hearing took place approximately two months after A.R.’s initial
detention, during which time DCFS maintained communication
with the parents and attempted to assist them in numerous
ways. “[T]he mere fact that more services could have been
provided does not render [DCFS’s] efforts unreasonable.” (In re
Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 973.)
The evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s
findings by clear and convincing evidence that DCFS made
reasonable efforts to prevent detention, and at the time of the
disposition hearing, there were no reasonable means to prevent
continued detention.
DISPOSITION
The judgment, and subsequent dispositional order, are
affirmed.
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J. RICHARDSON, J.
30
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