CourtListener 10645565•People v. Sanders CA2/1
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Filed 7/31/25 P. v. Sanders CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B339931
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA004363)
v.
PHILLIP CONRAD SANDERS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lauren Weis Birnstein, Judge. Affirmed.
Phillip Conrad Sanders, in pro. per.; Randy S. Kravis,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
Appellant Phillip Conrad Sanders appeals from an order
denying his petition filed under Penal Code section 1172.6
(former section 1170.95).1 After his appointed appellate counsel
filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
attesting he could find no arguable issues, Sanders filed a
supplemental brief. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Sanders Is Convicted of Murder
In 1991, an information charged Sanders with conspiracy to
commit murder, murder, and grand theft of personal property.3
The conspiracy account alleged eight overt acts, one of which was
that “Phillip Sanders did shoot and kill victim Melvin
Thompson.” The murder count additionally alleged the murder
was committed for financial gain. In 1992, a jury convicted
Sanders of both conspiracy to commit murder and murder and
found true the special circumstance that the murder was
committed for financial gain. Sanders appealed his conviction,
and we affirmed it in People v. Sanders (Oct. 10, 1995, B076428)
[nonpub. opn.] (Sanders I).
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered as
1172.6 without substantive change. (People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 708, fn. 2.) For clarity, we use the current statutory
numbering.
2 We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history
relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
3 The theft count was dismissed.
2
B. Sanders Petitions for Resentencing
In January 2022, Sanders filed a form petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6, checking the boxes next to the
preprinted allegations stating a case for relief and requesting
appointment of counsel.
In August 2022, the People filed an opposition to Sanders’s
petition, arguing he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law
“because he either was the actual killer or had the intent to kill
the victim as proven by the verdicts in this case. If the evidence
did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner had the
intent to kill, then the jury could not have found him guilty of
conspiracy to commit murder. If the evidence did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was either the actual
killer or had the intent to kill, then the jury could not have found
true the special circumstance. The Petitioner was convicted
under a theory of actual malice and not ‘imputed malice.’ ”
Attached to the People’s opposition were the jury
instructions from the underlying case. Included in the
instructions were:
CALJIC 3.00, which provided in pertinent part: “The
persons concerned in the commission of a crime who are regarded
by law as principals in the crime thus committed and equally
guilty thereof include: [¶] 1. Those who directly and actively
commit the act constituting the crime, or [¶] 2. Those who aid and
abet the commission of the crime. [¶] A person aids and abets
the commission of a crime when he or she, [¶] (1) with knowledge
of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, and [¶] (2) with the
intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the
commission of the crime, by act or advice aids, promotes,
encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”
3
CALJIC 6.10, which provided in pertinent part: “A
conspiracy to commit murder is an agreement entered into
between two or more persons with the specific intent to agree to
commit the public offense of murder, followed by an overt act
committed in this state by one or more of the parties for the
purpose of accomplishing the object of the agreement.”
CALJIC 6.11, which provided in pertinent part: “A member
of a conspiracy is not only guilty of the particular crime that to
his or her knowledge his or her confederates agreed to and did
commit, but is also liable for the natural and probable
consequences of any crime or act of a co-conspirator to further the
object of the conspiracy, even though such crime or act was not
intended as a part of the agreed upon objective and even though
he or she was not present at the time of the commission of such
crime or act. [¶] You must determine whether a defendant is
guilty as a member of a conspiracy to commit the originally
agreed upon crime or crimes, and, if so, whether the crime alleged
in Count 1 was perpetrated by a coconspirator in furtherance of
such conspiracy and was a natural and probable consequence of
the agreed upon criminal objective of such conspiracy.”
CALJIC 8.10, which provided in pertinent part: “The
defendants are accused in Count 2 of the Information of having
committed the crime of murder, a violation of Penal Code Section
187. [¶] . . . [¶] In order to prove such crime, each of the
following elements must be proved: [¶] 1. A human being was
killed. [¶] 2. The killing was unlawful, and [¶] 3. The killing
was done with malice aforethought.”
4
There were no instructions on felony murder. Other than
noted above (and in CALJIC 6.164), there were no instructions
involving “natural and probable consequences.”
In July 2024, the court denied Sanders’s petition, finding
him ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Sanders timely
appealed.
C. Requests for Judicial Notice
In January 2025, we granted the People’s request to take
judicial notice of the record on appeal in Sanders I, supra,
B076428.
In June 2025, Sanders requested we take judicial notice of:
(1) an unsigned pleading entitled “Petitioner’s Reply to
Respondent’s Informal Response to Resentencing Petition”; and
(2) the cases of People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328 and
People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457. We deny his request
because: (1) a signed version of the pleading is already in the
appellate record; and (2) we have no need to judicially notice the
case law of this state, especially when Sanders does not cite this
case law in his supplemental brief.
4 CALJIC 6.16 provided: “Where a conspirator commits an
act which is neither in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy
nor the natural and probable consequence of an attempt to attain
that object, he or she alone is responsible for and is bound by that
act, and no responsibility therefor attaches to any of his or her
confederates.”
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DISCUSSION
A. Relevant Law
Effective January 1, 2019, the law changed as to the “felony
murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with
the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Sen. Bill 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 1, subd. (f).) As amended, the law provides that except for
first degree felony murder, “to be convicted of murder, a principal
in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); People v. Eynon (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 967, 974.) In other words, “[a] person’s culpability
for murder must be premised upon that person’s own actions and
subjective mens rea.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (g).)
“A person convicted of . . . murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime, . . . may file a petition with the court
that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder . . .
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
counts when all of the following conditions apply: [¶] (1) A
complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime . . . . [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of murder . . .
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following a trial . . . . [¶] (3) The petitioner could not presently be
convicted of murder . . . because of changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
A superior court may “consider the record of conviction to
determine whether ‘the petitioner makes a prima facie showing
that he or she is entitled to relief.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 957.) Although the court “ ‘should not reject the
petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without
first conducting an evidentiary hearing,’ ” “ ‘if the record,
including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting
the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified
in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 971; see also People v. Mares (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 1158, 1161 [“a trial court can properly deny a
petition at the section 1172.6, subdivision (c) prima facie hearing
by relying on a record of a conviction that unambiguously
precludes a conclusory assertion that the petitioner could not be
convicted today because an accomplice liability theory of murder
was invalidated”]; People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965,
968 [“trial court should accept the assertions in the [section
1172.6] petition as true unless facts in the record conclusively
refute them as a matter of law”].) The “record of conviction”
includes “admissible trial evidence,” “the court’s instructions to
the jurors,” and “the parties’ closing arguments.” (People v. Ervin
(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 102.)
We review de novo the legal question of whether Sanders is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (People v. Bodely (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.)
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B. Analysis
Sanders argues the superior court erred in finding him
ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the jury was
instructed “that they could find Appellant guilty based on the
natural probable consequences theory of imputed malice.”
Sanders quotes no specific instruction he contends permitted
such a finding but the page in the record to which he cites
contains the following instruction: “A member of a conspiracy is
not only guilty of the particular crime that to his or her
knowledge his or her confederates agreed to and did commit, but
is also liable for the natural and probable consequences of any
crime or act of a co-conspirator to further the object of the
conspiracy, even though such crime or act was not intended as a
part of the agreed upon objective and even though he or she was
not present at the time of the commission of such crime or act.”
Presumably, Sanders contends that, based on this instruction,
the jury could have found him guilty of murder because he was
guilty “not only . . . of the particular crime that to his or her
knowledge his or her confederates [in the conspiracy] agreed to
and did commit,” but also any other crimes that were a “natural
and probable consequences” of crimes committed by the co-
conspirators to “further the object of the conspiracy.”
The problem with Sanders’s argument is that the “object of
the conspiracy” with which he was charged was murder. The jury
self-evidently could not have found him guilty of murder as a
natural and probable consequence of committing actions in
furtherance of murder. (See People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8
Cal.5th 548, 645 [“Beck and Cruz were charged with conspiracy
to murder, not conspiracy to commit a lesser crime that resulted
in murder. There is thus no possibility they were found guilty of
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murder on a natural and probable consequences theory”]; People
v. Medrano (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 177, 184 [“First degree murder
was the object of the conspiracy, not the natural and probable
consequence of an act committed to further the object of the
conspiracy”].)5 Additionally, “[c]onspiracy to commit murder may
be based only on express malice, i.e., an intent to kill.” (Beck and
Cruz, at p. 642.) By finding Sanders guilty of conspiracy to
commit murder, the jury necessarily found Sanders possessed an
intent to kill.
Moreover, the jury convicted Sanders on a separate count of
murder. In doing so, they necessarily found he directly
committed murder or aided and abetted the commission of
murder. If the jury found he committed murder, the jury
5 Thus, Sanders’s reliance on People v. Curiel (2023) 15
Cal.5th 433 is misplaced. In Curiel, our high court held the
defendant was not ineligible as a matter of law for section 1172.6
relief because the jury had been instructed it could find the
defendant “guilty of murder under the theory of aiding and
abetting [based on] natural and probable consequences” if it
found “[1] the defendant is guilty of disturbing the peace or of
carrying a concealed firearm by a gang member; [2] during the
commission of the crime of disturbing the peace or of the crime of
carrying a concealed firearm by a gang member the crime of
murder was committed; and [3] under all the circumstances a
reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have known
that the commission of murder was a natural and probable
consequence of the commission of the crime of disturbing the
peace or of the crime of carrying a concealed firearm by a gang
member.” (Id. at p. 446.) Based on this instruction, “the jury was
required to find only that Curiel knew that Hernandez intended
to commit one of the underlying target offenses and that Curiel
intended to aid him in that offense, not murder.” (Id. at p. 468.)
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necessarily found Sanders acted with malice aforethought. If
they found he aided and abetted murder, they necessarily found
he had “knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator,”
and “with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or
facilitating the commission of the crime, by act or advice aid[ed],
promote[d], encourage[d] or instigate[d] the commission of the
crime.” (See People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 848 [“Senate
Bill 1437 does not eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability
for murder because a direct aider and abettor to murder must
possess malice aforethought”].) In either instance, the jury found
Sanders acted with malice aforethought.
Sanders failed to demonstrate he “could not presently be
convicted of murder . . . because of changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019.” The superior court did not err
in finding him ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
DISPOSITION
The court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
WEINGART, J.
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