CourtListener 10645540•Platzner v. Oliver CA2/2
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Filed 7/31/25 Platzner v. Oliver CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
ADAM PLATZNER, B333113
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22SMCV00739)
v.
THOMAS E. OLIVER et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Edward B. Moreton, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Ross LLP, Peter W. Ross and Richard A. Schwartz for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Reed Smith, Kasey J. Curtis, Carla M. Wirtschafter and
Charles P. Hyun for Defendants and Respondents.
____________________
Plaintiff Adam Platzner appeals the trial court’s dismissal
of his lawsuit for breach of contract and related causes of action.
We perceive no error, and we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Adam Platzner “is a successful serial entrepreneur.”1 His
erstwhile friends, Defendants Thomas (Tommy) Oliver and Codie
Elaine Oliver,2 are filmmakers. Tommy is the chief executive
officer and part owner of Defendants T. Edward Oliver, Inc.,
Confluential Films, LLC, Confluential Content, Inc., Confluential
Productions, LLC, Confluential Development, LLC, and the
Confluential Company, LLC (collectively, the Confluential
Entities). Tommy is also the chief financial officer of Defendant
Black Love, Inc., of which Codie is the chief executive officer and
part owner. Defendant Black Love Global, LLC, is another
business entity. Platzner refers to Black Love, Inc., and Black
Love Global, LLC collectively as the Black Love Entities.
Platzner alleged he and the Olivers reached a formal, oral
agreement to work together on July 24, 2019, which the Olivers
later breached. Whether Platzner’s complaints sufficiently
alleged that agreement amounted to an enforceable contract
1 In recounting the background, we accept as true the well-
pleaded facts of Platzner’s second amended complaint to the
extent they do not contradict his earlier complaints. (See Aryeh v.
Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1189, fn. 1
(Aryeh) [we do “not . . . disregard contrary allegations in earlier
complaints to the extent they are pertinent”].)
2 When we refer to Tommy or Codie individually, we will use
their first names, as do the parties, for ease of reference. No
disrespect is intended. We refer to Tommy and Codie collectively
as the Olivers.
2
under California law is the crux of this appeal. We summarize
the complaints separately because some of the relevant factual
allegations have evolved over time.
I. The Original Complaint
Platzner originally filed this action for breach of contract
and related causes in May 2022 against the Olivers and most of
the business entities listed above (excluding Black Love Global,
LLC and Confluential Films, LLC). After those defendants
demurred, Platzner elected to file a first amended complaint.
II. The First Amended Complaint (FAC)
Platzner filed the FAC on March 8, 2023. He sued the same
defendants as in the original complaint and added Confluential
Films, LLC. Platzner also added Black Love Global, LLC as a
defendant in the body of the FAC, but not the caption. He sought
relief for the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract;
(2) breach of fiduciary duty; (3) conversion; (4) money had and
received; (5) quantum meruit; (6) accounting; (7) breach of
implied partnership agreement; (8) breach of implied joint
venture agreement; and (9) breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
The FAC alleged Tommy had sought Platzner’s assistance
in 2014 and 2018 to promote Tommy and his films to Platzner’s
“extensive network of high-level friends and colleagues” and to
introduce the Olivers to some of those contacts. Although
Platzner had previously resisted Tommy’s entreaties to pursue a
business relationship, by January 2019, “Platzner agreed to go
into business with the Olivers”; Tommy and Platzner thus began
discussing a strategy for Tommy to form a new business entity
“to most effectively leverage Platzner’s network of contacts and
access millions of dollars in financing.”
3
The Olivers and Platzner “negotiated a deal over the course
of several months. The Olivers agreed to bring Platzner on as a
partner, with the title Partner and Vice Chairman, and granted
him 15% equity ownership in the new company that would be
called Confluential Content, Inc. and 10% equity ownership in
Black Love. Further, Platzner would have a 50% interest in any
new ventures or entities created with the Olivers. Platzner would
have a seat on the board of Confluential Content and a modest
salary. Platzner was also entitled to an Executive Producer credit
on each of the projects the Confluential Entities released. [¶] . . .
Platzner accepted these terms by a handshake with . . . the
Olivers present on July 24, 2019.”
After the parties made that oral agreement, they “clearly
memorializ[ed] their respective rights and obligations pursuant
to the handshake deal in an email dated July 26, 2019.” The FAC
defines that e-mail memorialization as “the ‘2019 Agreement.’ ”
The parties, in a one-page bulleted list, “confirmed the following
terms–covering all of the material terms–verbatim:
“• ‘Parties: Adam Platzner or his loan out company and
Tommy & Codie Oliver, for all companies described
below.
“• ‘Term: 3 years. Extensions on mutual consent.
“• ‘Title: Partner & Vice Chairman with Executive
Producer credit (subject to network/studio approval)
on all projects.
“• ‘Base Salary: $300,000 per year[.]
“• ‘Expenses reviewed monthly, but not to exceed $3,000
per month w/o prior approval[.]
“• ‘15% Equity ownership in the new Confluential
entity [Confluential Content, Inc.,] and 10%
4
Equity ownership in Black Love Productions &
Black Love X.
“• ‘Equity fully vested upon first day of
employment as follows, 5% Confluential and
2.5% for Black Love entities.
“• ‘The balance will vest quarterly after a 1-year
cliff.
“• ‘Equity in a given company fully vests on sale
of said company regardless of when that
occurs[.]
“• ‘All Equity ownership to be provided in a tax
advantaged method[.]
“• ‘Bonus (Trust)
“• ‘Expectation is $0 bonus for at least the first
two years[.]
“• ‘New Ventures
“• ‘All new ventures are 50/50 as between Tommy
and [Platzner], investor’s share comes off the
top.
“• ‘Terms of compensation to be agreed upon at
the time of formation.
“• ‘Benefits
“• ‘[H]ealth insurance.’ ” (Original boldface.)
“The parties agreed that the terms laid out in their email
correspondence reflected the correct terms of their agreement.”
Afterward, Platzner moved to Los Angeles and began
working with the Olivers. The Olivers publicly referred to him as
their “ ‘partner.’ ” Nevertheless, trouble arose when Platzner
quarantined with his family in Florida in mid-2020. Tommy
5
claimed “Platzner was not performing his duties, even though
(i) Tommy had previously approved Platzner’s move, (ii) there
was no in-person interaction required at that time, and (iii)
location was never a term of any agreement.” Tommy reduced
Platzner’s salary and his health insurance stipend.
Despite those difficulties, “Platzner worked diligently” to
identify “potential partners” to provide “operational financing” for
the launch of Confluential Content, Inc., and he successfully
contributed to obtaining important equity investments.
Nevertheless, the business relationship between Platzner and the
Olivers deteriorated, with the Olivers ultimately “refus[ing] to
recognize Platzner’s interest in the Confluential Entities,”
“tak[ing] his equity interest for themselves,” and “refus[ing] to
pay Platzner the compensation [they] owed him.”
III. The FAC Is Dismissed with Leave to Amend
Defendants demurred to the FAC, and the trial court
dismissed many of Platzner’s causes of action with leave to
amend. As relevant to this appeal, the court concluded “the July
2019 email should be understood to be at most, an unenforceable
agreement to agree.”3 At defendants’ request, the trial court took
judicial notice of e-mail correspondence between Platzner and
Tommy on July 25 and 26, 2019. The correspondence comprised
three e-mails: (1) a July 25 e-mail from Platzner to Tommy; (2) a
July 26 e-mail reply from Tommy to Platzner; and (3) a July 26
further e-mail reply from Platzner to Tommy. The FAC expressly
3 That reasoning was the foundation to dismiss, inter alia,
the causes of action for breach of contract, money had and
received, and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, which are the only causes remaining at issue in this
appeal.
6
quoted the July 26 e-mail from Tommy. The court identified
language in those e-mails indicating “the parties contemplated a
final agreement to be drafted by lawyers,” and that “agreement
was never memorialized.” Even though the trial court determined
no contract had been created, it allowed Platzner’s quantum
meruit cause of action against the Olivers to proceed.
IV. The Second Amended Complaint (SAC)
On June 9, 2023, Platzner filed his SAC. He named as
defendants all the individuals and entities named in the FAC. He
dropped his cause of action for an accounting but otherwise re-
alleged the same causes of action.
The SAC made many of the same factual allegations
regarding the parties’ relationship and the alleged breach, but
included new allegations regarding the contract terms. We will
not attempt to identify the myriad differences between the FAC
and the SAC, but we highlight a few. Although the SAC
continued to allege the parties reached a formal, oral agreement
on July 24, 2019, it largely abandoned the FAC’s reliance on the
parties’ July 2019 e-mail correspondence as a source of the
material terms of the contract. The SAC now alleged the parties
merely “put several of the terms that would govern Platzner’s
employment relationship (in addition to a few non-material
terms) in writing” in the July 26 e-mail exchange. The SAC
alleged the July 24, 2019, oral agreement (rather than the e-mail
memorialization) was “the ‘2019 Agreement.’ ” The SAC further
alleged “the parties agreed that the 2019 Agreement [e.g., the
oral agreement] took immediate effect.”
The list of material terms of the 2019 Agreement in the
SAC did not quote from and was not premised upon the parties’
July 2019 e-mail correspondence. There were several important
7
differences between the material terms alleged in the FAC and
the SAC.
First, although the new list included several terms that had
also appeared in the FAC,4 it omitted some terms the FAC had
previously alleged were material. For example, the new list did
not include the “ ‘Benefits,’ ” “ ‘Base Salary,’ ” or “ ‘Bonus’ ”
Platzner would receive. And while the FAC had alleged the
“ ‘Parties: Adam Platzner or his loan out company and Tommy &
Codie’ ” was a material term, the SAC now identified as a
material term “[t]he parties to the agreement were Adam
Platzner on the one hand and Tommy and Codie . . . on the other
hand.”
Second, the SAC added new material terms to the list that
had not appeared in the FAC, including: (1) “Platzner would
move to Los Angeles, California”; (2) “Platzner would devote his
time to attract capital and investment opportunities on behalf of
the existing Confluential business enterprise as well as Black
Love”; (3) “Platzner would sit on the board of directors of
Confluential Content[, Inc.]”; and (4) “the [oral] agreement would
immediately take effect while the long form contract was being
prepared” by the Olivers’ lawyer.
V. The SAC Is Dismissed
Defendants again demurred to all causes of action. The
trial court dismissed without leave to amend the causes of action
at issue in this appeal (breach of contract, money had and
received, and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
4 For example, Platzner’s equity stakes in several business
entities and new ventures.
8
dealing).5 After taking judicial notice of the July 2019 e-mails,
the original complaint, and the FAC, the trial court ruled the
SAC was a sham pleading. It reasoned the allegations of the SAC
were inconsistent with the earlier allegations of both the original
complaint and the FAC “that the July Emails represent the
agreement and included all material terms.” The court therefore
“read [that] original defect into the SAC . . . and disregard[ed] the
new and contradictory terms.” Because the court had already
determined the July 2019 e-mails were “an unenforceable
agreement to agree,” it dismissed the causes of action based upon
the alleged contract without leave to amend.
Rather than amending his remaining causes of action or
proceeding on the quantum meruit claim, Platzner voluntarily
requested his SAC be dismissed with prejudice. Judgment was
entered on November 9, 2023. Platzner timely appealed. (See Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(A), (d)(1).)
5 Likewise, it dismissed without leave to amend the
conversion cause of action against all defendants, and the
following causes against the Black Love Entities and Confluential
Entities: (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) breach of implied
partnership agreement; and (3) breach of implied joint venture
agreement.
The causes of action against the Olivers for breach of
fiduciary duty, breach of implied partnership agreement, and
breach of implied joint venture agreement were dismissed with
leave to amend. The trial court allowed the quantum meruit
claim against the Olivers to proceed.
9
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Properly Took Judicial Notice of the
July 2019 E-mail Correspondence
Platzner argues the trial court should not have taken
judicial notice of the three July 2019 e-mails because his July 26
e-mail was not referenced in the FAC.6 A trial court’s decision to
take judicial notice is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (See In re
Social Services Payment Cases (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1249,
1271.) Abuse occurs when a court exercises its discretion “ ‘ “in an
arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in
a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Williams (2013)
58 Cal.4th 197, 270–271.) Under that standard, “as long as there
exists ‘a reasonable or even fairly debatable justification . . . for
the [trial court’s decision], such action will not be here set
aside.’ ” (Gonzales v. Nork (1978) 20 Cal.3d 500, 507.)
A court may take judicial notice of “written instruments
[that] are the foundation of a claim or defense and are
incorporated in a pleading.” (Columbia Casualty Co. v.
Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 457, 468; see
Salvaty v. Falcon Cable Television (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 798,
800, fn. 1 [where the complaint “referred repeatedly to the
agreement,” the defendants “were entitled to present the trial
court with the complete document”]; cf. Johnson Rancho etc. Dist.
v. County of Yuba (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 681, 684 [judicial notice
inappropriate where “the written instrument was [not] made a
part of the complaint”].) Platzner essentially concedes a court
6 Defendants argue Platzner forfeited this argument by
failing to oppose their request for judicial notice. For purposes of
this opinion, we assume he adequately preserved his challenge by
objecting at oral argument in the trial court.
10
may judicially notice a document “ ‘referenced in the complaint,’ ”
but argues his “July 26, 2019[,] response to Tommy[]” was not so
referenced.7
We disagree. The trial court’s decision to judicially notice
the e-mails because they were “referenced in the [FAC]” was not
arbitrary, capricious, or absurd. On the contrary, the FAC
expressly quoted from Tommy’s July 26 e-mail, which was itself a
response to Platzner’s July 25 e-mail. The FAC further alleged
Platzner and Tommy: (1) “clearly memorializ[ed] their respective
rights and obligations . . . in an email dated July 26, 2019,” and
defined that as “the ‘2019 Agreement’ ”; (2) “confirmed the
following terms” quoted from Tommy’s e-mail; and (3) “agreed
that the terms laid out in their email correspondence reflected
the correct terms of their agreement.” For Platzner and Tommy
to “memorializ[e] their respective rights and obligations . . . in an
email dated July 26, 2019,” each must have written e-mails on
that date. The FAC plainly alleges “Platzner . . . confirmed” the
terms of Tommy’s e-mail–e.g., by his July 26 e-mail response.
The FAC expressly referenced the parties’ July e-mail
correspondence, and the trial court properly took judicial notice of
them.8
7 Platzner has not argued his July 25 e-mail was not
referenced in the FAC, so we do not address that issue. (See Doe
v. California Dept. of Justice (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1115
[“An appellant . . . forfeits an issue by failing to raise it in his or
her opening brief.”].)
8 When the trial court considered the demurrer to the SAC, it
properly noticed the FAC (and the July 2019 e-mails, which were
referenced therein). Platzner does not argue otherwise.
11
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Dismissing the FAC
Before we analyze the trial court’s ruling dismissing the
SAC, we first consider its dismissal of the FAC, which is
incorporated into the dismissal of the SAC. The trial court
dismissed Platzner’s contract-based causes of action pled in the
FAC because it determined they failed to adequately plead the
parties mutually consented to all material terms of the alleged
contract as a matter of law. (See Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc. (2006)
141 Cal.App.4th 199, 213 (Bustamante) [no enforceable contract
where the parties had only “an ‘agreement to agree’ ” because of a
lack of mutual consent].)
As an initial matter, we address Platzner’s repeated
assertions the trial court misidentified the relevant contract as
the July 2019 e-mails. There was no error. First, the FAC
expressly defined the “ ‘2019 Agreement’ ” as the “email dated
July 26, 2019” which “clearly memorializ[ed] [the parties’]
respective rights and obligations pursuant to the handshake
deal.” Platzner had therefore alleged the July 2019 e-mails were
coextensive with the July 24 oral agreement. Second, in its later
order dismissing the SAC, the trial court confirmed it understood
Platzner had consistently alleged the contract was an oral
agreement reached on July 24, 2019. Because Platzner’s FAC
alleged “the terms laid out in [the parties’] email correspondence
reflected the correct terms of their agreement,” it was
appropriate for the trial court to analyze the terms of the e-mail
correspondence as reflecting the terms of the July 24, 2019, oral
agreement.
A. Standard of Review
Orders sustaining a demurrer are reviewed de novo.
(Coastside Fishing Club v. California Resources Agency (2008)
12
158 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1190.) “[W]e may affirm on any ground
supported by the record . . . .” (Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Los Angeles (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 953, 960 (Doe).)
“We must accept as true all ‘well-pleaded facts’ in the
complaint, but need not accept allegations containing ‘legal
conclusions,’ ‘adjectival descriptions’ [citation] or ‘unsupported
speculation.’ ” (Doe, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 960; Aryeh,
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1189, fn. 1 [“we accept as true the well-
pleaded facts in the operative complaint”].)
“We also accept as true all materials properly ‘ “subject to
judicial notice,” ’ and disregard any allegations in the operative
complaint inconsistent with the judicially noticed facts.” (Smyth
v. Berman (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 183, 191 (Smyth).)
Nevertheless, “ ‘ “[a] demurrer is simply not the appropriate
procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts,” ’ ” so
judicially noticed documents are dispositive “ ‘only . . . where
there . . . cannot be a factual dispute concerning that which is
sought to be judicially noticed.’ ” (Panterra GP, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 697, 710–711.)
B. A Contract Requires the Parties’ Mutual
Consent to All Material Terms
In considering a demurrer, a court must “determine
whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action . . . .” (American Employers Group, Inc. v. Employment
Development Dept. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 836, 844 (American
Employers Group).) “[F]or breach of contract, a party must plead
the existence of a contract, his or her performance of the contract
or excuse for nonperformance, the defendant’s breach and
resulting damage.” (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999)
13
74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.)9 The trial court properly concluded
Platzner’s FAC failed to allege the July 24, 2019, oral agreement
amounted to a contract under California law.
All contracts require mutual consent by the contracting
parties. (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998)
60 Cal.App.4th 793, 811 (Weddington Productions) [mutual
consent is an essential element of a contract]; see also Civ. Code,
§§ 1550, 1565.) “The concept of mutual consent” encompasses a
broad “range of specific issues, including whether the parties
consented to all material . . . terms and whether those terms
‘were reasonably well defined and certain.’ ” (Eagle Fire & Water
Restoration, Inc. v. City of Dinuba (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 448,
468 (Eagle Fire); see also ibid. [defining material term].) If the
parties fail “to reach a meeting of the minds on all material
points,” an enforceable contract is not formed “even though the
parties have orally agreed upon some of the terms, or have taken
some action related to the contract.” (Banner Entertainment, Inc.
v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 348, 359, italics omitted.)
Likewise, if the parties made only “an ‘agreement to agree,’ ”
there is no mutual consent and therefore no enforceable contract.
(Bustamante, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 213.)
We evaluate mutual consent “ ‘under an objective standard
applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the
parties, i.e., the reasonable meaning of their words and acts.’ ”
9 The other causes of action at issue on appeal are derivative
of breach of contract. (See Smith v. International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1637, 1644, fn. 3
[breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing]; McBride v.
Boughton (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 394 [money had and
received].) Platzner does not argue otherwise.
14
(Bustamante, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 208.) If the allegations
of the complaint and the judicially noticed facts “admit[] of more
than one inference, it is for the trier of fact to determine whether
the contract actually existed.” (Ibid.) “But if the material facts
are certain or undisputed, the existence of a contract is a
question for the court to decide.” (Ibid.; see also Smyth, supra,
31 Cal.App.5th at p. 195 [court can resolve parties’ intent when
the complaint and judicially noticed documents “point[ed] to one
conclusion”].)
Platzner argues the trial court could not interpret what the
parties meant by their e-mails. While a court cannot “construe
[an] ambiguous [contract] in a manner contrary to the plaintiff’s
interpretation as alleged in the complaint,” (Fremont Indemnity
Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 115
(Fremont)), the trial court did not do so here. The FAC expressly
alleged “the terms laid out in their email correspondence
reflected the correct terms of their agreement” and defined the
“ ‘2019 Agreement’ ” as the e-mail correspondence. Platzner
“relied on the [e-mails] as the basis for his cause of action but
failed to allege any special meaning.” (Id. at p. 118.) The trial
court therefore appropriately examined the e-mails to determine
if they supported or contradicted the conclusory allegation that
an enforceable contract had been formed. (Legg v. Mutual Benefit
Health & Accident Assn. (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 482, 488 [“ ‘a
complaint otherwise good on its face is nevertheless subject to
demurrer when facts judicially noticed render it defective. . . .
“The theory is that the pleader should not be allowed to bypass a
demurrer by suppressing facts which the court will judicially
notice” ’ ”].)
15
Because the FAC and the July 2019 e-mails point to only
one conclusion–the parties did not mutually consent to all alleged
material terms of the oral agreement–the trial court correctly
sustained the demurrer.
C. The FAC Pled Certain Terms Were Material
A term is material to a contract when it is “essential to the
existence of an enforceable agreement,” and that “ ‘depends on its
relative importance to the parties and whether its absence would
make enforcing the remainder of the contract unfair to either
party.’ ” (Eagle Fire, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 468.) Here, the
FAC expressly alleged “all of the material terms” of the 2019
Agreement in a one-page bulleted list. The list quoted a number
of items from the July 2019 e-mails, including the identities of
the contracting “ ‘Parties,’ ” the “ ‘[t]erms of [Platzner’s]
compensation’ ” from any “ ‘New Ventures’ ” to be formed, and the
employment “ ‘Benefits’ ” (“ ‘health insurance’ ”) Platzner would
receive. The list did not include any of Platzner’s obligations or
duties.
Because we must accept the allegations of the FAC as true
when considering a demurrer (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at
p. 1189, fn. 1), we accept the list in the FAC “cover[ed] all of the
material terms” of the alleged contract. The trial court correctly
did likewise. Thus, we reject Platzner’s belated attempts to
recharacterize some of those terms10 now as immaterial.
10 For example, the terms of Platzner’s compensation for new
ventures and the term relating to his “[e]mployment benefits.”
16
D. The July 2019 E-mails Show the Parties Did
Not Mutually Consent to All Material Terms
The trial court determined the July 2019 e-mails showed
the parties had not reached a final agreement and instead
“contemplated a final agreement to be drafted by lawyers.” The
court pointed out Platzner characterized the items listed in his
July 25 e-mail as “ ‘an outline of what we discussed’ which he
hoped ‘would be helpful to [Tommy’s] lawyer.’ ” The court noted
that in the same e-mail, Platzner expressly acknowledged certain
terms “were to be ‘agreed upon at the time of formation’ and
‘negotiated in the final agreement.’ ” When Tommy made changes
to the proposed list in the July 26 e-mail response, Platzner
“responded that he ‘look[ed] forward to putting the agreement in
place.’ ”
In reviewing the trial court’s conclusion, our task is not to
consider individual phrases from the agreement in isolation.
Rather, we read the allegations of the complaint and the
judicially noticed facts as whole, in context, and give them a
reasonable construction. (See American Employers Group, supra,
154 Cal.App.4th at p. 844 [“We . . . give the complaint a
reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and considering
its parts in context.”]; Smyth, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 191
[“[w]e . . . accept as true all materials properly ‘ “subject to
judicial notice” ’ ”].) We are therefore unpersuaded by Platzner’s
argument that isolated phrases from the July 2019 e-mails,
standing alone, could possibly be construed in a manner
consistent with the existence of a contract.
On the contrary, considering the FAC and the judicially
noticed e-mails, we agree with the trial court that Platzner did
not sufficiently allege the parties mutually consented to the same
17
material terms in the July 24 oral agreement. First, Platzner’s
July 25 e-mail describing his list of the agreement’s terms as an
“outline” to help the Olivers’ lawyer “evidences an expectation
that the terms set forth in the [e-mail] were subject to [the
attorney’s] approval.” (Beck v. American Health Group Internat.,
Inc. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1555, 1563, overruled by statute on
other grounds as stated in Epic Medical Management, LLC v.
Paquette (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 504, 516.) That is reinforced by
Platzner’s e-mail on July 26 stating he “[l]ook[ed] forward to
putting the agreement in place,” plainly indicating an agreement
was not yet in place. (See ibid.)
Second, Platzner’s own e-mail on July 25 shows he did not
believe the parties had reached a “final agreement,” because he
expressly anticipated negotiations would continue as to certain
unsettled terms until the final agreement was reached.
Specifically, he wrote his “[f]ull benefits package [was] to be
negotiated in the final agreement.” As we have explained, the
FAC pled that Platzner’s “ ‘Benefits’ ” were a material term of the
parties’ agreement. That Platzner stated on July 25 no final
agreement had been reached on that allegedly material term
undermines the FAC’s contrary (and conclusory) allegation the
parties made a binding oral contract on July 24.11
11 Platzner points out that in the same July 25 e-mail, he told
Tommy “ ‘Glad we figured it out,’ ” and he argues that implies the
parties believed “the material terms [of the agreement] had been
settled.” Even if that individual statement could be ambiguous in
some circumstances, it is not ambiguous here in light of the
FAC’s allegations and the rest of the e-mail correspondence
indicating the parties had not finalized all material terms.
18
Platzner argues his statement on July 26 that he “look[ed]
forward to putting the agreement in place” was “merely related to
formal documentation, and that he very much understood the
deal to have already been finalized.”12 We agree with Platzner
that “when the respective parties orally agree upon all of the
terms and conditions of an agreement with the mutual intention
that it shall thereupon become binding, the mere fact that a
formal written agreement to the same effect is to be prepared and
signed does not alter the binding validity of the oral agreement.”
(Columbia Pictures Corp. v. De Toth (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 620,
629, italics added.) But here, the July 2019 e-mails show the
parties had not “agree[d] upon all of the terms and conditions” in
the oral agreement, let alone they did so “with the mutual
intention that [the agreement] bec[a]me binding.” (Ibid.)
Moreover, as we explain in further detail in part E., post, the
FAC alleges material terms of the agreement remained
undecided at the time of the July 2019 e-mails. That also
supports the conclusion the oral agreement on July 24 was not
final.
E. The FAC Itself Alleges Some Material Terms
Were Not Finalized
The trial court partially premised its conclusion the parties
had reached an “agreement to agree” on “certain compensation
terms” in the agreement that had not been finalized. We agree
that on the face of the complaint, material terms of the
agreement had not been finalized.
12 Platzner’s FAC did not mention that statement and did not
allege it related only to “formal documentation.”
19
First, as of July 26, the parties to the contract were still
undecided: it had not been determined whether the Olivers were
contracting with Platzner himself “or his loan out company.” That
plainly undermines Platzner’s claim an enforceable oral contract
had been reached on July 24. Platzner does not dispute that the
identity of the parties to a contract is material–nor could he,
particularly when he expressly pled the “ ‘Parties’ ” was among
“the material terms.” (See Weddington Productions, supra,
60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 812–813 [“ ‘[t]he material terms of a loan
include the identity of the lender and borrower’ ”].)
Platzner’s primary response is we cannot consider that
uncertain term because Defendants did not identify it in their
demurrer. We disagree. While Platzner is correct an appeals
court “will affirm the judgment if proper on any grounds stated in
the demurrer,” (Shaw v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 740, 754), that refers to “[t]he grounds . . . listed
in Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, including . . . the
failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action”
(Fremont, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 111). That Defendants
may not have highlighted that uncertain contract term does not
prevent us from considering it in affirming the trial court’s
dismissal. (See Doe, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 960 [“[W]e may
affirm on any ground supported by the record. . . .”].)
In the alternative, Platzner argues the uncertainty in
identifying the contracting parties is irrelevant because he
“envisioned an amendment” to replace himself with his loan out
company. But in reviewing a demurrer, we review the well-
pleaded facts of the operative complaint and the judicially noticed
facts, and Platzner has not identified where he alleged this
understanding about an amendment. (See Doe, supra,
20
247 Cal.App.4th at p. 960.) Platzner also argues he can “enforce
the agreement as a third party beneficiary,” but we fail to see
how that is relevant to whether the identity of the parties was
uncertain in July 2019.
Second, as of July 26, the parties had not yet agreed upon
Platzner’s “ ‘[t]erms of compensation’ ” for any “ ‘[n]ew
[v]entures.’ ” As we have already explained, the FAC alleged that
was a material term of the contract.
Platzner argues the agreement was simply “ ‘preliminary’ ”
and thus “enforceable notwithstanding the absence of a term or a
promise to further negotiate.” He relies upon Herman v. County
of Los Angeles (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 484, 488, for the notion
parties may agree “to cross certain bridges when they are
reached,” but that case does not help Platzner. There, the parties
had agreed “if an MTA officer was not hired by the County as a
deputy sheriff the parties would meet and reach a mutual
agreement on the placement of such a person in some other
employment.” (Ibid.) They had also “agreed that if they could not
reach accord on the placement of a former MTA officer after a
good faith effort to the resolve the dispute[,] they would submit
the matter to mediation.” (Ibid.) The court determined that was a
sufficiently definite agreement to be enforceable, unlike one in
which the parties “reserved for future agreement the question of
what to do with former MTA police officers who did not pass the
sheriff’s personnel review process.” (Ibid.) Platzner does not
explain why his agreement, which left the “[t]erms of
compensation to be agreed upon,” is sufficiently similar to the one
reached in Herman. On the contrary, we see dispositive
distinctions: the provision here neither cabins the scope of the
21
parties’ future negotiations nor provides next steps if and when
those negotiations are unsuccessful.
Platzner’s citation of Wong v. Di Grazia (1963) 60 Cal.2d
525, also does not assist him. The Supreme Court there noted
that “[a] minor possible ground of disagreement in an otherwise
complete agreement will not render the agreement uncertain.
‘Where the matters left for future agreement are unessential,
each party will be forced to accept a reasonable determination of
the unsettled point. . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 539.) Because Platzner alleged
his compensation from new ventures was a material term of the
contract, it was plainly not “unessential.”
Those examples, apparent on the face of the FAC, show
material terms of the alleged agreement remained undecided,
and they further support the trial court’s conclusion the parties’
July 24 oral agreement was not final.13
13 Although not raised by the parties, we also note the FAC’s
list of “all of the material terms” omits any mention of Platzner’s
contractual obligations. While other parts of the FAC allege he
agreed to “position[] Confluential Content to raise critical
financing and obtain access to reputable filmmakers and studios,”
the FAC does not allege those are material terms of the July 24
agreement. That further underscores the trial court’s conclusion
the July 24 agreement was unenforceable. (See Bustamante,
supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 209 [“ ‘[i]f . . . a supposed “contract”
does not provide a basis for determining what obligations the
parties have agreed to, . . . there is no contract’ ”].)
Platzner’s later amendment adding as material terms his
purported obligations (to “move to Los Angeles” and “devote his
time to attract capital and investment opportunities”) suggests he
recognized the FAC’s deficiency in that regard.
22
F. Considered as a Whole, The FAC and the
July 2019 E-mails Are Susceptible of Only One
Reasonable Interpretation
Platzner argues the trial court wrongly “concluded [the e-
mails] supported only one possible interpretation–namely, that
the oral agreement was not . . . binding, and that there were
material terms of the alleged agreement that remained under
negotiation.” For all the reasons we just discussed, we disagree.
The FAC itself pled the material terms of the contract, and some
of those material terms had not been finalized. Moreover,
considering the FAC and the e-mails together as a whole and in
context, they lead only to the conclusion the parties had not
mutually consented to all the material terms at the time of the
alleged oral agreement on July 24. (Cf. Hudson v. County of Los
Angeles (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 392, 410–411 [“the court erred in
granting judgment on the pleadings” because there were several
reasonable interpretations of the agreements at issue].) Because
the FAC failed to plead an enforceable contract, the relevant
causes of action were properly dismissed.
III. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Dismissing the SAC
Without Leave to Amend the Relevant Causes of
Action
The trial court later dismissed the SAC after concluding it
“[was] a sham pleading.” It found “a stark inconsistency between
[Platzner’s] allegation in his prior complaints that the July
emails ‘confirmed all material terms’ and the allegation in the
SAC that the July emails merely confirmed some of the terms of
the parties’ agreement.” We agree, and we conclude the dismissal
was appropriate.
23
A. Standard of Review
While we review de novo the trial court’s sustaining of a
demurrer, we review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s
denial of leave to amend. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311,
318.)
B. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded the SAC
Was a Sham Pleading That Failed to State a
Cause of Action
“[T]he ‘sham pleading’ doctrine . . . prevents the abuse of
process that would arise if parties could circumvent prior adverse
rulings by pleading the underlying facts in the alternative.”
(Smyth, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 195.) In that regard, a
plaintiff “ ‘may not omit harmful allegations . . . from previous
complaints’ ” in an amended complaint. (Ibid.) “Unless the
plaintiff provides a ‘plausible’ explanation for dropping the
harmful allegations (such as the need to correct a mistaken
allegation or to clarify ambiguous facts), the trial court will take
judicial notice of the harmful allegations and disregard the new
and contrary allegations.” (Ibid.)
Platzner argues the trial court erred in concluding two
types of allegations in the SAC contradicted the FAC and original
complaint: (1) “the parties had agreed that, in furtherance of
[Platzner’s] services, [Platzner] would move to Los Angeles and
devote his time to attract[ing] capital and investment
opportunities”; and (2) “the parties agreed that the [July 24 oral
agreement] took immediate effect,” even though the parties
“expected that ancillary terms and boilerplate provisions would
be included” in a written agreement to be signed at a later date.
With regard to Platzner’s own obligations under the July 24
oral agreement, Platzner first argues the SAC merely clarified
24
how he would secure investment capital for the business venture
“by moving to Los Angeles and devoting his time to that
endeavor,” and that “is fully consistent with [his] allegations in
the [FAC].” But the trial court properly determined those new
allegations directly contradicted both the FAC and the original
complaint, which expressly alleged “all of the material terms” of
the oral agreement in a bulleted list.14 Platzner’s newly minted
allegations that his move to Los Angeles and his efforts to obtain
investment capital were also material terms of the parties’ oral
agreement are “factually inconsistent” with both the original
complaint and the FAC. (Smyth, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 196.)
They might be consistent with the FAC if they were immaterial–
but the SAC expressly alleged otherwise.15 Platzner’s repeated
characterization of those contradictory allegations as merely
“clarifying” does not make them so.
Platzner’s argument with regard to the second new
allegation, that the parties agreed that their July 24 oral
agreement was enforceable even if they never entered into the
contemplated long-form written agreement, is that he was not
required to and did not include it in the FAC, but it was
nevertheless consistent with the FAC. That is, he argues, the new
allegation “expressly stated what he already implied in the
14 The SAC also contradicted the original complaint and FAC
in alleging the July 2019 e-mails contained “several of the terms
that would govern Platzner’s employment relationship (in
addition to a few non-material terms).”
15 While not pointed out by the parties, we note the FAC had
also alleged “location was never a term of any agreement,”
reinforcing the trial court’s conclusion that Platzner’s new
allegation was inconsistent.
25
[FAC].” But we fail to see how this term was implied in the FAC,
particularly given that the FAC alleged the e-mail
correspondence contained “all of the material terms” and
“reflected the correct terms of their [July 24 oral] agreement,”
and yet omitted that subsequently added term. Moreover,
because those judicially noticed e-mails and the FAC’s allegations
demonstrated the parties had merely agreed to agree, the court
properly concluded no oral contract had been formed. Platzner’s
conclusory allegation in the SAC “that the [oral] [a]greement
itself took immediate effect” cannot overcome the specific factual
allegations of his prior pleadings and the judicially noticed
documents. (See Smyth, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 195; see also
Doe, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 960.)
C. The Trial Court Properly Dismissed the
Relevant Causes of Action Without Leave to
Amend
“If there is a reasonable possibility that the defect in a
complaint can be cured by amendment, it is an abuse of
discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Hendy
v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742 (Hendy).) Nevertheless, “[t]he
burden is on the plaintiff . . . to demonstrate the manner in which
the complaint might be amended.” (Ibid.; see Siskiyou Hospital,
Inc. v. County of Siskiyou (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 14, 53–54 [to
carry his burden, the plaintiff must state new facts he will
allege].)
Here, while Platzner asserts the general principle that
leave to amend should be granted if amendment is possible, he
does not explain how he would or could amend the SAC to
salvage his causes of action. He has therefore not carried his
burden to demonstrate amendment is possible. (See Hendy,
26
supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 742–743 [the plaintiff did not meet his
burden where he failed to inform trial court of factual basis for
suggested amendment and failed to explain why he made a
contradictory allegation in prior complaint].) The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in dismissing the relevant causes of
action without leave to amend.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are entitled to costs
on appeal. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)–(2).)
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
LUI, P. J.
CHAVEZ, J.
27
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