In re Hunter V.

CourtListener 10644606Calctapp30 de jul. de 2025

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Filed 7/3/25; Modified and Certified for Pub. 7/30/25 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re HUNTER V. et al., B339028
Persons Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No.
24CCJP00129)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and
Respondent,

v.

JUSTIN J.,

Defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Tiana J. Murillo, Judge. Reversed in part and
remanded with directions.
Donna B. Kaiser, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________

Justin J. (Father) appeals from a jurisdiction finding and
disposition order declaring his children, Hunter V. and B.V.,
dependents of the juvenile court after the court sustained a
petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1) and (j).1 Father contends the court violated
his statutory and due process rights to be present at the
jurisdiction and disposition hearings, as well as his due process
right to adequate notice of the amended allegations in the
dependency petition. He further argues the errors were
prejudicial. We agree there was prejudicial error and reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Dependency Petition and Detention Hearing
On January 10, 2024 the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a petition
under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), alleging Desire V.
(Mother) had an extensive history of substance abuse that
interfered with her ability to provide regular care and
supervision to Hunter and B.V. and Mother left the children in

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

2
the care of the maternal uncle without making an appropriate
plan for the children’s ongoing care and supervision. The petition
also alleged Mother’s five older children had previously been
declared dependents of the juvenile court and received permanent
placement services due to her substance abuse. The petition
alleged Father had an extensive criminal history, including
convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, domestic abuse, and
possession of drug paraphernalia, and he was currently
incarcerated on a felony murder charge. The petition alleged
Father’s criminal history placed the children at risk of serious
physical harm.
The Department was unable to reach Father prior to the
detention hearing. It reported Father had been incarcerated
since early September 2023. The Department social worker
attempted to call and visit the facility where Father was in
custody but was denied access in part because the social worker
had expired credentials. The social worker submitted a request
to the detention center to have Father transported to the
detention hearing.
At the detention hearing held on January 11, 2024, neither
Father nor Mother (who had been arrested in early January)
were transported to court for the hearing. The juvenile court
directed two attorneys who were at the hearing potentially to
represent Father and Mother to serve as friends of the court on
their behalf. The court detained the children and ordered
monitored visitation for both parents.

B. The Jurisdiction Hearing
Prior to the jurisdiction hearing the Department reported
Hunter and B.V. were placed with their maternal aunt and uncle.

3
Mother remained incarcerated after pleading no contest in
January 2024 to robbery; she was sentenced to two years in state
prison.
Father also remained incarcerated, and the Department
social worker was able to reach him by telephone prior to the
jurisdiction hearing. Father told the social worker he did not
know Mother had left the children with maternal uncle and was
surprised she would leave them without indicating where she
was going or when she would return. He was angry and hurt by
Mother’s behavior. Father did not know Mother had been
arrested. Father had written to Mother multiple times since he
was incarcerated, but he only received one letter from her.
Father became emotional and cried while speaking to the social
worker. He asked how the children were doing and said he would
do anything to get his children back. Father had no concerns
about the children being in maternal uncle’s care. When asked
whether there were other relatives he would consider for
placement, Father said he would consider the paternal
grandmother, paternal great-grandmother, and his ex-wife (the
mother of his older children).
Mother was arraigned on the petition on February 8, 2024.
The attorney acting as a friend of the court on behalf of Father
stated she had not yet been able to make contact with Father.
The juvenile court reviewed Mother’s parentage questionnaire in
which Mother stated Father was not present at B.V.’s birth,
Father did not sign the birth certificate, and the parents were not
married when B.V. was born.2 However, Mother indicated she

2 The record on appeal does not contain Mother’s parentage
questionnaire for Hunter.

4
and Father were living together at the time of B.V.’s conception
and birth and Father held himself out as B.V.’s father.
Nonetheless, the court stated that, “without information from
dad, I’m not willing to find him presumed today on the basis of
this fairly limited information.” The court found Father was the
alleged father of the children.
The juvenile court set the jurisdiction hearing and Father’s
arraignment for February 22, 2024. However, neither Mother
nor Father was transported to court on that date. Father’s
absence was due to a hearing in his criminal matter on the same
day. The court continued the jurisdiction hearing and
arraignment “to give the parents one more opportunity to be in
court.”
Mother and Father again were not transported to court for
the continued hearing on March 25, 2024. The court explained
that the courtroom bailiff “represented to the court based on
calling downstairs after [the custody bus] arrived that
[Father] . . . was a missout because he refused . . . to be
transported.” The court granted the request of Mother’s counsel
for a continuance of the jurisdiction hearing, but stated, “You all
are aware there is a point at which I have to continue balancing
the children’s interest to have their matter heard against . . . the
parents’ right to be present. That is always balanced against the
children’s interest in having their matter resolved.”
The jurisdiction hearing was held on April 12, 2024 without
the presence of Mother and Father, who were both incarcerated.
Mother’s counsel requested a continuance because Mother stated
she wanted to participate by teleconference. Counsel for the
Department requested a continuance with respect to Father
because “we don’t have any documentation with [Father’s]

5
indication—indicating that he does not want an attorney or if he
does want an attorney or if he understands that.” The court
directed the bailiff to call the facility where Father was housed to
find out why he had not been transported. After a break in the
hearing the bailiff reported, “I was told by the staff over there at
the location where [Father is] housed, they stated he refused [to
be transported] because, quote, ‘He wasn’t able to do shit about
it.’” An attorney filling in for the friend of the court assigned to
Father reported that counsel had tried multiple times to contact
Father but had been unable to reach him.
The court denied the requests for a continuance of the
jurisdiction hearing and took Father’s arraignment off calendar.
The court found notice to both parents was proper and stated, “I
am balancing mom’s due process interest with the children’s right
to have the matter heard. . . . Because mom has counsel, and I
can be reasonably assured that he can represent her interests in
her absence, the request for continuance is denied.” The court
did not address Father’s due process rights or the fact he was not
represented by counsel.
After hearing argument from counsel for Mother, the
children, and the Department, the juvenile court amended the
petition by interlineation to change the allegations that Mother
was a “current” abuser of marijuana to state she was a “recent”
abuser of marijuana. The court sustained the allegations with
respect to Mother as amended by interlineation.
The juvenile court found as to Father that the Department
had not met its burden to show that Father’s “criminal history in
and of itself just automatically puts his kids at risk.” However,
the court stated, “[T]he evidence supports that dad is
incarcerated and is unable to parent his children or otherwise

6
make an appropriate plan here. I think the Department has
proven that, and I’m noting—I’m taking into account not just that
dad was properly noticed, but the fact he also refused to be
transported to court twice.” Accordingly, the court struck the
language in the allegation against Father and replaced it with
“[Father] is incarcerated and is unable to parent his children or
make an appropriate plan.” The court sustained the allegation as
amended.

C. The Disposition Hearing
Mother and Father were not present at the May 10, 2024
disposition hearing. Father was represented by counsel, who
requested a finding that Father was the presumed father based
on a statement regarding parentage for Hunter filed the day of
the hearing. In the statement, Father checked boxes indicating
he believed he is Hunter’s father and Hunter lived with him from
birth until Father’s arrest in September 2023. Father wrote he
told “[e]veryone” Hunter was his child and that “I was involved in
every waking day of my children’s lives until my incarceration in
2023.” Father provided housing, food, clothes, and all essentials
for his children. Father stated the children were bonded to the
paternal great-grandmother with whom the family had resided.
The juvenile court asked counsel whether Father had “additional
information about how he held himself out, the nature of the
support he provided, et cetera?” Counsel reiterated Father had
provided “essential needs for housing, food, [and] clothing.”
Mother’s counsel joined in the request that Father be found the
presumed father, noting Mother had told the attorney that
“Father had been involved in the children’s lives, had held
himself out and had been providing for them as he could

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throughout their lives.” The court declined to grant Father
presumed status.
Both Mother’s and Father’s counsel requested a
continuance of the disposition hearing. Mother’s counsel
explained Mother wished to be present and it was not clear why
she had not been transported to court. Father’s counsel likewise
stated Father wanted to be there, but he had a conflicting
criminal court hearing that day. Counsel also noted Father had
not submitted a signed waiver of his right to be present. The
court declined to grant a continuance, reiterating its earlier
statement that it must balance the parents’ rights to be present
with the children’s rights to have the matter resolved.
The juvenile court declared Hunter and B.V. dependents of
the court, removed them from Father’s and Mother’s custody, and
ordered reunification services for Father and Mother.3 Father
timely appealed.4

3 Father requests we take judicial notice of the minute orders
for the November 21, 2024 six-month review hearing at which the
juvenile court found continued jurisdiction was necessary and
ordered additional reunification services for the parents. We
deny the request because the minute orders are not relevant to
our resolution of this appeal.
4 On March 27, 2025 the Department filed a letter brief
stating it is not a proper respondent because it requested the
juvenile court continue the jurisdiction hearing due to Father’s
absence and did not object to a continuance of the disposition
hearing. Mother’s counsel and minors’ counsel likewise
submitted letters stating their clients were not the proper
respondents in the appeal.

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DISCUSSION

A. Father’s Appeal Is Not Moot
Father does not challenge the jurisdiction findings as to
Mother, and she is not a party to this appeal. Accordingly, we do
not disturb the juvenile court’s order asserting dependency
jurisdiction over Hunter and B.V., or the disposition as to
Mother, which she has not separately appealed. (See In re D.P.
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283 [“[T]he principle that ‘[d]ependency
jurisdiction attaches to a child, not to his or her parent’ [citation]
means that ‘“[a]s long as there is one unassailable jurisdictional
finding, it is immaterial that another might be inappropriate.”’”].)
Nevertheless, where, as here, “a parent has demonstrated a
specific legal or practical consequence that will be averted upon
reversal, the case is not moot, and merits review is required.”
(In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283.) Father contends the
court erred in conducting the jurisdiction and disposition
hearings in his absence. Because reversal would require the
court to hold a new jurisdiction hearing for Father, thus allowing
him to defend against the allegation in the petition, we can grant
effective relief, and the appeal is not moot. (Id. at p. 277 [“[A]
case is not moot where a court can provide the plaintiff with
‘“effect[ive] relief.”’].)

B. The Juvenile Court Violated Father’s Due Process Right to
Notice of the Amended Allegations Against Him
“Since the interest of a parent in the companionship, care,
custody, and management of his [or her] children is a compelling
one, ranked among the most basic of civil rights [citations], the
state, before depriving a parent of this interest, must afford [the
parent] adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.” (In re

9
B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 688-689; accord, In re I.S. (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 918, 926-927.) “‘[A] parent whose child may be
found subject to the dependency jurisdiction of the court enjoys a
due process right to be informed of the nature of the hearing, as
well as the allegations upon which the deprivation of custody is
predicated, in order that he or she may make an informed
decision whether to appear and contest the allegations.’
[Citation.] ‘Notice of the specific facts upon which the petition is
based is necessary to enable the parties to properly meet the
charges.’” (In re I.S., at p. 927.)
“A juvenile court may amend a dependency petition to
conform to the evidence received at the jurisdiction hearing to
remedy immaterial variances between the petition and proof.
[Citations.] However, material amendments that mislead a party
to his or her prejudice are not allowed.” (In re I.S., supra,
67 Cal.App.5th at p. 927; accord, In re Jessica C. (2001)
93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1041-1042 [“If a variance between pleading
and proof . . . is so wide that it would, in effect, violate due
process to allow the amendment, the court should, of course,
refuse any such amendment.”].) Accordingly, where the amended
petition incorporates the same “basic allegation” as the original
petition but changes only details of the conduct alleged, the
amendment does not violate a parent’s due process rights. (In re
Jessica C., at p. 1042 [amendment of allegation from “penetrated”
to “touched” was not error because the “basic allegation was
there, and any variance between ‘touching’ and ‘penetrating’
could not have misled [father] to his detriment”]; accord, In re
Andrew L. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 683, 689 [juvenile court did not
err in amending allegation in petition by striking diagnosis of
subdural hematoma and leaving allegation of other detrimental

10
conditions that had been alleged and proved].) However,
amendment is improper when “based on a factual and legal
theory not at issue in the original petition.” (In re G.B. (2018)
28 Cal.App.5th 475, 487; accord, In re I.S. at pp. 921, 929
[allegation mother failed to protect child from abuse could not
properly be amended to allege emotional abuse, which “sought to
establish jurisdiction over [child] under a different legal theory”].)
The juvenile court’s amendment to the petition in this case
did not incorporate the same basic allegation as the initial
petition. The original petition alleged, pursuant to section 300,
subdivision (b)(1), that Father’s criminal history placed the
children at risk of serious physical harm. The amended petition
did not allege Father posed a safety risk to the children, and
instead alleged he was unable to parent the children due to his
incarceration and that he was unable to make an appropriate
plan for their care. The amended allegation therefore seeks to
establish jurisdiction under a completely different set of facts and
a different legal theory.5 Thus, Father had no notice he would be
charged with failing to make an appropriate plan for his children.
Accordingly, the court violated Father’s due process rights by
amending the petition as to Father without providing him notice
and an opportunity to be heard.

5 We also note that a parent’s incarceration and inability to
arrange care for a child is specifically enumerated as a basis for
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (g), not
subdivision (b)(1).

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C. The Juvenile Court Also Violated Father’s Statutory Right
To Be Present at the Jurisdiction Hearing
Penal Code section 2625, subdivision (d), states in part:
“[A] petition to adjudge the child of a prisoner a dependent child
of the court pursuant to subdivision (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (i), or
(j) of Section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code may not be
adjudicated without the physical presence of the prisoner or the
prisoner’s attorney, unless the court has before it a knowing
waiver of the right of physical presence signed by the prisoner or
an affidavit signed by the warden, superintendent, or other
person in charge of the institution, or a designated representative
stating that the prisoner has, by express statement or action,
indicated an intent not to appear at the proceeding.” The
Supreme Court in In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 622
(Jesusa V.), held the word “or,” as used in the phrase “physical
presence of the prisoner or the prisoner’s attorney,” must be given
its “conjunctive meaning.” Thus, the Court held “the statute
requires both the prisoner and the prisoner’s attorney be
present.” (Ibid.)
The juvenile court violated Father’s statutory right to be
present at the jurisdiction hearing. The court elected to conduct
the jurisdiction proceeding in Father’s absence despite the lack of
a signed waiver by Father, a warden’s affidavit indicating Father
refused to attend (or affidavit from another individual specified
under Penal Code section 2625, subdivision (d)), or the presence
of counsel for Father. This decision is particularly troubling
given that counsel for the Department requested a continuance
on Father’s behalf because he had not submitted a signed waiver
stating he did not wish to be present.

12
In addition, there is nothing in the record to support a
finding it was necessary to proceed immediately to adjudicate the
petition. At the time of the jurisdiction hearing in April 2024 the
children had been detained and placed with their maternal aunt
and uncle for three months. A continuance would have been
possible while ensuring the disposition hearing took place within
six months of the children’s detention as required by section 352,
subdivision (b). (See D.E. v. Superior Court (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 502, 513 [“[A]ny conflict between section 352 and
Penal Code section 2625 must be resolved in favor of section 352
and its underlying policies. . . . The parents’ rights, whether to
participate in critical dependency proceedings or to obtain
necessary reunification services, cannot be used to delay the
dependency proceedings when a statute provides an absolute
maximum limit on the time within which a particular hearing
must take place.”].) Further, because both parents were
incarcerated, an additional continuance would not have delayed a
potential return of the children to their parents’ home.
The juvenile court was correct that a court must “give
substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution of his
or her custody status” (§ 352, subd. (a)(1).), and further,
“continuances are disfavored in dependency cases.” (In re
Andrew M. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 803, 810, fn. 4; see § 352,
subd. (a)(1) & (2) [“a continuance shall not be granted that is
contrary to the interest of the minor” and a [“[c]ontinuance shall
be granted only upon a showing of good cause and only for that
period of time shown to be necessary by the evidence presented at
ta he hearing on the motion for the continuance”].) But the
Supreme Court has made clear that it is in the minor’s best
interests to have his or her parents present at the jurisdiction

13
hearing. As the Supreme Court explained in In re Christopher L.
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, 1076, “Not only are the stakes for the
parent weighty, but also ‘it is implicit in the juvenile dependency
statutes that it is always in the best interests of a minor to have
a dependency adjudication based upon all material facts and
circumstances and the participation of all interested parties
entitled to notice.’ [Citation.] The right to counsel and
participation not only protects the parent’s interests but also
ensures that the juvenile court has the fullest picture of the
relevant facts before disposing of a dependency petition.” Thus,
the juvenile court’s “failure . . . to appoint counsel or provide for
Father’s presence at the combined jurisdiction and disposition
hearing” was “quite serious” (but not structural) error. (Ibid.)
In this case, where there was no evidence a continuance
would have been contrary to the children’s best interests other
than their general interest in a prompt resolution, the juvenile
court violated Father’s statutory right to be present under Penal
Code section 2625 at the jurisdiction hearing.

D. The Juvenile Court’s Error in Failing To Advise Father of
the Amended Allegations Was Prejudicial
We are not aware of any published cases addressing
whether the failure to provide a parent notice of an amended
allegation is reviewed for state law error under People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 835 (Watson) or the more stringent
standard for federal constitutional error under Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman). However, where a
parent receives no notice of the petition, we review the due
process violation under the Chapman standard. (See In re J.H.
(2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 174, 183 [applying Chapman to due
process violation based on failure to give father notice, but

14
finding error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt]; In re
Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 193 [“In dependency
proceedings, due process violations have been held subject to the
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of prejudice.”]; but
see In re A.J. (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 652, 665-666 [declining to
decide which standard applied but concluding lack of notice and
denial of legal representation constituted prejudicial error under
either Watson or Chapman].)6 Given that the amended petition
alleged entirely different allegations against Father in violation
of his right to due process, the error is akin to a failure to provide
any notice, which we review under Chapman. Accordingly, we
reverse unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. (Chapman, at p. 24; see J.H., at p. 183.)
Father argues on appeal that the error in failing to give
him notice of the amended allegations was prejudicial because
had he been given notice of the allegations (and appeared at the
jurisdiction hearing), he could have defended against the
amended allegations in the petition. We agree. The record
reflects that Father named several relatives who could care for
the children, one of whom the children had lived with previously.

6 By contrast, the Supreme Court in Jesusa V., supra,
32 Cal.4th at pages 624 to 625 held a state law harmless error
analysis under Watson applies to a statutory violation of Penal
Code section 2625. Because we conclude the juvenile court’s
failure to provide Father with notice of the amended allegations
was prejudicial error under Chapman, requiring reversal, we do
not reach whether the violation of his statutory right to be
present at the jurisdiction hearing was prejudicial or whether his
absence violated his due process rights. We likewise do not reach
whether Father was denied a meaningful opportunity to qualify
for presumed father status.

15
In addition, Father could have argued that at the time he was
incarcerated in September 2024, the children were living with
Mother and the family was stable. It was not until Father was
incarcerated that Mother began to exhibit the behavior that
brought the family to the attention of the Department. Further,
Father was unaware that the children needed a plan of care until
this proceeding was commenced. We recognize Father twice
refused to be transported to court and allegedly said he did not
want to attend the hearing because he “wasn’t able to do shit
about it.” But we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that had
Father been informed about the amended allegations (as to which
he had a defense), he would not have appeared at the jurisdiction
hearing and successfully defended against those allegations.
Accordingly, the juvenile court’s errors were not harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt under Chapman.

DISPOSITION

The jurisdiction finding and disposition order as to Father
are reversed. The juvenile court is directed to conduct
arraignment, jurisdiction, and disposition hearings with Father
present unless, if Father is still incarcerated, Father provides a
signed waiver, or the juvenile court receives an affidavit signed
by the warden, superintendent, other person in charge of the
institution, or designated representative, in accordance with

16
Penal Code section 2625, subdivision (d). At these hearings, the
court is to consider the family’s current circumstances.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.

17
Filed 7/30/25
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re HUNTER V. et al., B339028
Persons Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No.
24CCJP00129)

ORDER MODIFYING
LOS ANGELES COUNTY OPINION AND
DEPARTMENT OF CERTIFYING
CHILDREN AND FAMILY OPINION FOR
SERVICES, PUBLICATION
(NO CHANGE IN
Plaintiff and APPELLATE
Respondent, JUDGMENT)

v.

JUSTIN J.,

Defendant and
Appellant.

THE COURT:

The above-entitled opinion filed on July 3, 2025 is modified
as follows:
In the first paragraph on page 2, delete the last two
sentences that read: “He further argues the errors were
prejudicial. We agree there was prejudicial error and reverse.”

Following the first paragraph on page 2, add a second
paragraph that reads:

We agree with Father that the juvenile court
violated his due process rights by failing to give him
notice of the amended allegations in the petition that
were based on a different set of facts and legal theory
from the initial petition. The court also violated
Father’s statutory right to be present at the
jurisdiction hearing by holding the hearing without a
written waiver from Father or affidavit from the
prison warden or other designated individual under
Penal Code section 2625, subdivision (d). We
evaluate the court’s violation of Father’s due process
right to notice of the amended allegations for
harmlessness under the standard for federal
constitutional error set forth in Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).
Because the error was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, we reverse.

On page 14, in the first paragraph under subheading D,
replace the words “Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24
(Chapman)” with “Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24,” so the
sentence reads: “We are not aware of any published cases
addressing whether the failure to provide a parent notice of an

2
amended allegation is reviewed for state law error under People
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 835 (Watson) or the more
stringent standard for federal constitutional error under
Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24.”
The opinion was not certified for publication. It now
appears the opinion meets the standards for publication specified
in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the
standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court,
rule 8.1105(c); and
ORDERED that the words “Not to be Published in the
Official Reports” appearing on page 1 of said opinion be deleted
and the opinion herein be published in the Official Reports.
There is no change in the appellate judgment.

MARTINEZ, P. J. FEUER, J. STONE, J.

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