Weaklend v. Weaklend CA4/1

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Filed 7/30/25 Weaklend v. Weaklend CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

HEATHER CAROL WEAKLEND, D086167, D086168

Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. FLRI1900094)

DEVON DANIEL WEAKLEND,

Appellant.

CONSOLIDATED APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of
Riverside County, Jay Kiel and Natalie Lough, Judges. Affirmed in part and
reversed in part.

Claery & Hammond and Kai W. Lucid for Appellant.
James Alex Karagianides for Respondent.
In this pending marital dissolution action, Devon Daniel Weaklend
(Husband) appeals from two family court orders denying his request for
attorney fees from Heather Carol Weaklend (Wife) under Family Code
section 2030.1 He first appeals an order issued on April 5, 2024 (the April

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
order, D086167, the first appeal), claiming the family court committed
reversible error because (1) it failed to make required findings under
section 2030, and (2) substantial evidence does not support its finding that no
disparity existed regarding the parties’ ability to pay attorney fees. He
appeals another order issued on September 19, 2024 (the September order,
D086168, the second appeal), claiming the court erred by: (1) failing to make
findings required under section 2030; (2) finding his attorney’s billing was
unreasonable; and (3) impliedly finding no disparity between the parties’
ability to pay attorney fees.2 With respect to the September order, Wife
contends the family court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the matter due to the
pending appeal of the April order.
We affirm the April order because Husband failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating reversible error. We reverse the September order because the
family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue this order.
GENERAL FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The couple married in November 2008 and have two children. Wife
filed a petition for dissolution in 2019, but a judgment of dissolution has not
yet been entered. The couple share joint legal and physical custody of the
children. The family court ordered Wife to pay monthly child support of $165
but did not order either party pay spousal support.
DISCUSSION
I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Section 2030 authorizes the family court to order one spouse in a
marital dissolution proceeding to pay all or some of the attorney fees and
costs of the other spouse. (§ 2030, subd. (a)(1).) The statute is intended to

2 After both appeals were fully briefed, they were consolidated for oral
argument and decision, and subsequently transferred to this division.
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give each spouse a fair chance to secure effective legal representation. (In re
Marriage of Keech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 860, 866.) The family court must
make explicit findings, either orally on the record or written, on three specific
questions: (1) whether an award of attorney fees and costs is appropriate;
(2) whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel; and
(3) whether one party is able to pay for legal representation of both parties.
(§ 2030, subd. (a)(2); In re Marriage of Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025,
1050.) “If the findings demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay, the
court shall make an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs.” (§ 2030,
subd. (a)(2).) The failure to make explicit findings on these questions is
reversible error if there is prejudice—that is, if “there is ‘a reasonable
probability that in the absence of the error, a result more favorable to the
appealing party would have been reached.’ ” (Morton, at p. 1051.)
In making an attorney fee award under section 2030, the court is
guided by section 2032, which provides it may award attorney fees when
doing so is just and reasonable considering the parties’ relative
circumstances. (§ 2032, subd. (a).) In making this determination, the court
considers whether the award is necessary to allow each party, as much as
practicable, to present their case effectively. (Id., at subd. (b).) The parties’
financial resources are one of several factors the court weighs when equitably
allocating the overall litigation costs (ibid.), it may also consider the other
party’s trial tactics (In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295,
1314). We review an award of attorney fees under the Family Code using the
abuse of discretion standard. (In re Marriage of Turkanis & Price (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 332, 345.) “ ‘[T]he family court has considerable latitude in
fashioning or denying an attorney fees award’ ” (In re Marriage of Sharples
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 160, 165), and we affirm “unless no judge reasonably

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could make the order.” (In re Marriage of Rosen (2002) 105 Cal.App.4th 808,
829.)
If a court reporter is not present during court proceedings, and there is
no record of what occurred, it is often impossible for an appellate court to
review alleged trial court errors. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
608.) This is because appellate courts presume that the court’s judgment is
correct, and it is the appellant’s responsibility to provide a sufficient record
showing an error that warrants reversal. (Id. at pp. 608–609.) “To put it
another way, it is presumed that the unreported trial testimony would
demonstrate the absence of error.” (Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973,
992.) An appellant who fails to include a transcript of the court proceedings
is barred from claiming that the judgment was not supported by sufficient
evidence. (Ibid.)
II. APPEAL OF THE APRIL ORDER
A. Background
On November 20, 2023,3 Husband filed a request for order (RFO)
seeking $170,000 in attorney fees.4 Wife’s November 2023 income and
expense declaration revealed average monthly income of about $7,859 and
estimated monthly expenses of about $6,291. Wife’s adjusted gross income,
as stated in her 2022 tax returns, was over $586,000, while Husband worked
part-time and made $25 an hour. He requested that Wife pay his attorney

3 Undesignated date references are to 2023.
4 Husband filed a similar RFO on November 13, 2023. That RFO is not
in the record and is not addressed in Husband’s opening brief. The family
court issued two minute orders on April 5, 2024, addressing each RFO.
Husband’s failure to address the April order regarding the November 13 RFO
in his opening brief forfeits any challenge regarding the November 13 RFO.
(Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah Ins.
Exchange (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 971, 982 (Dameron).)

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fees. Husband’s counsel filed a declaration stating Husband owed a balance
of $95,093.82, and he anticipated Husband would incur at least an additional
$75,000 in attorney and paralegal fees.5
In February 2024, Wife filed a joint response to the November 13 and
November 20 RFOs. She claimed that for almost the entire the duration of
the marriage from 2009 through 2019, Husband earned between $60,000 and
$120,000 a year and she previously presented the court with information that
Husband willfully terminated his employment where his salary would have
been $80,000 a year. She also claimed her tax returns did not indicate her
true income, Husband knew this, and was deliberately mischaracterizing the
funds and misleading the court. Wife also noted that at the November 20
hearing the court ruling the disputed financial issues would be decided at
trial.
The family court issued the April order which incorporated a minute
order for the November 20 RFO. This minute order noted the hearing was
not reported. After hearing the issues, the court denied Husband’s request
for attorney fees, stating it read and considered the November 20 RFO and
testimony. It also ordered Husband’s counsel to prepare the order after
hearing.
B. Analysis
Husband first contends the April order must be reversed because the
family court failed to make the specific findings required by section 2030

5 Husband also argued in his November 20 RFO that Wife: (1) breached
her fiduciary duties by failing to disclose her true income; (2) should be
ordered to provide Husband with her undisclosed assets; and (3) should be
sanctioned. Husband did not argue these issues in his opening brief and
forfeited them. (Dameron, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 982.)
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when it denied his attorney fees request. The court’s minute order on the
November 20 RFO stated:
“Parties sworn en masse.
“At 09:12 AM the following proceedings were heard:
“Issues discussed with the Court.
“Court makes the following order(s):
“Court has read and considered RFO filed on 11/20/23 and
testimony.
“Court denies respondents request for attorney fees-
FC2030.
“Court finds breach of fiduciary duties is a trial issue.
“Respondent’s counsel to prepare Order After Hearing.
“Minute entry completed.”

Husband is correct that the family court failed to make the required
findings in writing. However, in the absence of a reporter’s transcript, there
is no way to determine whether it made those required findings orally. This
omission alone undermines Husband’s claim. Compounding the problem, the
court directed Husband’s counsel to prepare the order after hearing—an
opportunity to address any missing findings. Yet no proposed order from
Husband appears in the record. Instead, Wife submitted a proposed order,
stating the court found no income disparity. Without a reporter’s transcript,
there is no way to determine whether the court addressed the other two
mandatory findings: whether an attorney fee award to Husband was
appropriate and whether Wife had the ability to pay for both parties. (§ 2030,
subd. (a)(2).)
We recognize that not all litigants can afford a court reporter. But the
Rules of Court explicitly provide an alternative: a settled statement.
(Randall v. Mousseau (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 929, 933; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.137.) Husband did not pursue this option. That failure leaves this
court with no adequate record for meaningful review.

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In his reply brief, Husband attempts to sidestep this problem by
claiming the documents attached to his RFO establish an income disparity
and prove Wife misrepresented her finances. He concedes Wife explained
below that the money reported on her tax returns was not her personal
income but was instead used by her employer to pay her taxes, with the
remainder invested in a corporate equity account. Wife asserted that
Husband was fully aware of this arrangement, having filed joint tax returns
during the marriage, and accused him of deliberately misrepresenting the
facts. Yet, without a transcript or settled statement, we cannot evaluate the
court’s credibility determinations or its rationale for denying the RFO.
Husband’s insistence that his documentary evidence alone supports an
attorney fee award disregards the trial court’s express finding that it relied
on sworn testimony in reaching its decision. Given the extensive
documentation Husband submitted, the only conclusion is that the court
found Wife’s explanation credible. This Court does not reweigh evidence or
second-guess credibility findings. (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1,
12.)
Finally, Husband contends the court abused its discretion in finding no
income disparity, arguing the evidence required a different result. In effect,
he asserts that substantial evidence compelled the court to grant his request
under section 2030. But in reviewing such a claim, an adequate appellate
record must include all evidence presented on the issue. Husband’s “[f]ailure
to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved
against [him].” (Barak v. The Quisenberry Law Firm (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th
654, 660.)
In sum, Husband’s failure to provide a complete and adequate record—
either through a reporter’s transcript or a settled statement—precludes

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meaningful appellate review of his claims. Without a reliable account of the
proceedings, we must presume the family court acted within its discretion,
properly considered the evidence before it, and made the required findings.
Accordingly, Husband has not met his burden to demonstrate reversible
error, and the April order must be affirmed.
III. APPEAL OF THE SEPTEMBER ORDER
A. Background
In July 2024, Husband filed a RFO seeking a change in child support
and attorney fees, again claiming Wife was manipulating her income. He
requested $160,000 in attorney fees under section 2030. In her response,
Wife noted that Husband appealed the April order and asserted the family
court was divested of jurisdiction over the attorney fees issues until that
appeal was finalized. Her responsive declaration denied Husband’s claims
that she has not been forthcoming about her income, her taxes are the same
as when she was married and stated her tax consultant would testify at trial.
The court heard the matter on September 19, 2024. As relevant here, the
court found no change in circumstance and denied Husband’s request for
attorney fees without prejudice. It also found the hourly rate charged by
Husband’s counsel to be reasonable but the office billing not reasonable.
B. Analysis
Wife argued to the family court that it lacked jurisdiction to grant
Husband’s July 2024 RFO because of Husband’s pending appeal of the April
order. She renews this argument on appeal and asserts the court’s statement
that it found no change in circumstances suggests the court viewed the
July 2024 RFO as the functional equivalent of a motion for reconsideration.
Husband contends Code of Civil Procedure section 916 is inapplicable

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because his July 2024 RFO is distinct from the April order and does not
substantially affect the April order.
Generally, “the filing of a notice of appeal deprives the trial court of
jurisdiction of the cause and vests jurisdiction with the appellate court until
the reviewing court issues a remittitur.” (In re Anna S. (2010) 180
Cal.App.4th 1489, 1499, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 916, subd. (a).) While the
appeal is pending, the trial court lacks authority to enforce, vacate, or modify
the judgment or order under review. (Elsea v. Saberi (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th
625, 629.) The automatic stay applies not only to the order itself, but also to
“the matters embraced therein or affected thereby.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 916,
subd. (a).) To determine whether a subsequent proceeding is embraced in or
affected by the pending appeal, courts assess the relationship between the
issues raised in the appeal and the subsequent proceeding and whether the
latter would interfere with or contradict a potential outcome on appeal.
(Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 189–190.)
This is precisely the case here. In his November 20 RFO, which is the
subject of his first appeal, Husband requested $170,000 in attorney fees—
$95,093.82 for unpaid fees and $75,000 in anticipated fees. That request was
supported by billing records covering services from September 2023 to
November 8, 2023. In his July 2024 RFO—the subject of this second
appeal—Husband sought $160,000 in fees, again supported by billing records
from the same September-to-November timeframe, with the addition of
statements through November 28. The overlap in billing records and the
similarity of the relief sought demonstrate that the July 2024 RFO is not
independent of the earlier request but rather intertwined with the same
underlying claims. If Husband were to prevail in his first appeal, it could
render the second request moot or alter the legal and factual landscape on

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which the July RFO is based. Allowing the family court to rule on the
July 2024 RFO while the first appeal was pending also risked inconsistent
outcomes.
Because the July 2024 RFO was affected by the April order that was
already on appeal, Code of Civil Procedure section 916 stayed the family
court’s jurisdiction over the July RFO. The family court therefore lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to issue the September order, rendering it void.
(Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1228,
1239.) Our jurisdiction extends only to reversing void trial court actions.
(Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 701.)
Accordingly, the September order must be reversed.
DISPOSITION
The April order is affirmed. The September order is reversed because
the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue it. Respondent is
entitled to her costs on appeal.

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

CASTILLO, J.

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