CourtListener 10643796•Weiss v. Horowitz CA2/2
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Filed 7/29/25 Weiss v. Horowitz CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
MARVIN H. WEISS, B338211
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23SMCV05467)
PHILIP M. HOROWITZ,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, H. Jay Ford, III, Judge. Affirmed.
Marvin H. Weiss, in pro. per.; and Law Offices of Marvin H.
Weiss for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Venable, Ben D. Whitwell and Melissa C. McLaughlin for
Defendant and Respondent.
______________________________
Plaintiff and appellant Marvin H. Weiss (Weiss) appeals
from the trial court’s order granting the motion of defendant and
respondent Philip M. Horowitz (Horowitz) to quash service of
summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm.1
BACKGROUND
I. The Complaint
On November 17, 2023, Weiss filed a verified complaint
asserting causes of action for libel, intentional interference with
contractual relations, and negligence against Horowitz and
Venable LLP (Venable).2
The complaint alleged the following:
Weiss is an attorney licensed to practice in California and
New York. Venable, a law firm, entered into a retainer
agreement in 2018 and a revised retainer agreement in 2020 with
Elliot B. Lander, Mark Berman, Sean Berman, and Cell Surgical
Network Corporation (collectively FDA Defendants), who were
Weiss’s “long-held clients[.]”
The FDA Defendants retained Venable to defend them in a
federal action brought by the United States Food and Drug
Administration (FDA Lawsuit). Thomasina Poirot (Poirot) was
one of the Venable attorneys working on the matter. Venable
was later replaced by a different law firm to represent the FDA
Defendants in the FDA Lawsuit.
In March 2022, the FDA Defendants were sued in the State
of Washington (Washington Lawsuit), based on the alleged
1 We hereby grant Weiss’s motion for judicial notice filed on
May 27, 2025. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
2 Venable is not a party to this appeal.
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negligence of Tami Meraglia (Meraglia), an affiliate of Cell
Surgical Network Corporation, and others. Venable, through
Poirot, improperly undertook the representation of Meraglia
without the informed consent of the FDA Defendants. Meraglia’s
interests “were initially potentially and eventually actually
adverse to the interests of the FDA Defendants[.]”
Poirot misled Weiss to believe that the plaintiff in the
Washington Lawsuit was “the common enemy” of Meraglia and
the FDA Defendants. Weiss sent Poirot letters in March and
April 2022 regarding her misconduct. Weiss also exchanged
letters with Venable’s firm counsel, G. Stewart Webb, Jr., in May
2022 regarding the representation of Meraglia.
Horowitz is an attorney and partner at Venable. On
November 21, 2022, Horowitz “improperly communicated” with
some of the FDA Defendants, writing in an e-mail: “I’ve attached
a copy of Stewart Webb’s letter to Marvin Weiss on May 24, 2022,
which addresses Mr. Weiss’ groundless assertions.” Horowitz
made this false statement knowing that Weiss represented the
FDA Defendants.
Relevant to jurisdiction, the complaint alleged that
Horowitz is “an attorney at law duly licensed by the State of
California” and, at all relevant times, “maintain[ed] business
offices in” and “resid[ed]” in Los Angeles County.
II. Horowitz’s Motion to Quash Service of Summons
On February 1, 2024, Horowitz filed a motion to quash
service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. Horowitz
argued that the trial court lacked general jurisdiction over him
because he was domiciled in Florida, not California. The court
also lacked specific jurisdiction because the allegedly defamatory
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e-mail sent by Horowitz on November 21, 2022, was insufficient
to establish his purposeful availment of California.
In support, Horowitz submitted a declaration in which he
averred that he was a partner assigned to Venable’s Washington,
DC office; he had never been assigned to Venable’s Los Angeles
office. He was licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia
and Virginia; he had never been licensed to practice in California.
He was domiciled in Naples, Florida, where he had resided since
2016. He had never resided in California, been employed in
California, registered to vote in California, held a California
driver’s license, or owned real estate in California.
Regarding the November 21, 2022, e-mail, Horowitz
declared that he had sent it to “Venable’s former clients from the
FDA Lawsuit” in his capacity “as the chair of the Accounts
Receivable Steering Committee to engage in collection efforts on
behalf of Venable when clients or former clients have outstanding
unpaid invoices.” Horowitz had not been involved in the FDA
Lawsuit or the Washington Lawsuit.
III. Weiss’s Opposition
In his opposition to the motion to quash, Weiss conceded
that he “was mistaken in his belief that H[orowitz] was domiciled
and licensed to practice law in California.” He also “recognize[d]
that H[orowitz]’s contact with California likely [wa]s not
sufficiently ‘substantial, continuous, and systematic’ to support
the . . . assertion of general personal jurisdiction.”
Weiss argued that the trial court nevertheless possessed
specific jurisdiction over Horowitz because Horowitz had
communicated directly to California residents with the intent to
harm the professional reputation of Weiss, a California resident.
4
In the event the trial court found the facts insufficient to
assert specific jurisdiction, Weiss requested a continuance of the
motion to quash hearing to conduct jurisdictional discovery.
“Such discovery would include inquiries regarding H[orowitz]’s
knowledge of V[enable]’s prior representation of [the FDA
Defendants], the extent of his presence in V[enable]’s California
offices, the extent of his involvement in collection efforts in
California, and other indicia of his contacts in California.”
In an accompanying declaration, Weiss averred that
Horowitz’s e-mail strained Weiss’s relationship with his clients
and caused the clients to question their confidence in Weiss’s
judgment. Weiss also stated that he was “informed and
believe[d] that H[orowitz] conduct[ed] extensive and pervasive
collection efforts on behalf of V[enable] in California.”
IV. The Trial Court’s Ruling
Following a hearing, on April 18, 2024, the trial court
granted Horowitz’s motion to quash service of summons. The
court observed that Weiss had “not argue[d] or submit[ted] any
evidence to demonstrate that the [c]ourt ha[d] general
jurisdiction over” Horowitz.
As for specific jurisdiction, the trial court concluded that
Weiss had not met “his burden on the purposeful availment
prong to show that [Horowitz] expressly aimed or targeted his
conduct toward California, with the knowledge that this
intentional conduct would cause harm in the forum.” Further,
Weiss’s “conclusive[]” statement that “Horowitz’s communication
‘harmed Weiss’s reputation with his clients’” was “not enough to
support specific jurisdiction for a defamation cause of action . . . .”
The trial court denied Weiss’s request for jurisdictional
discovery, concluding that he had “fail[ed] to identify specific
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areas of inquiry he would pursue in either a general or specific
jurisdictional inquiry as to Horowitz . . . .”
V. Appeal
This timely appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the Motion to Quash
A. Standards of review
“When a defendant challenges jurisdiction through a
motion to quash, the plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate
facts, as to each nonresident defendant, justifying the exercise of
jurisdiction by a preponderance of evidence. [Citation.]”
(Strasner v. Touchstone Wireless Repair & Logistics, LP (2016)
5 Cal.App.5th 215, 221–222 (Strasner).)
On appeal, we independently review the trial court’s legal
conclusions bearing on personal jurisdiction. (Rivelli v. Hemm
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 380, 393.) “If the facts giving rise to
jurisdiction are conflicting, we will not disturb the trial court’s
express or implied factual determinations where supported by
substantial evidence. [Citation.] ‘When no conflict in the
evidence exists, however, the question of jurisdiction is purely
one of law and the reviewing court engages in an independent
review of the record.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
B. Relevant law
California courts “may exercise jurisdiction on any basis
not inconsistent with the” federal or state Constitution. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) “Federal constitutional principles require
that a nonresident defendant have sufficient ‘“‘minimum
contacts’”’ with California to justify the exercise of personal
jurisdiction. [Citations.] ‘The concept of minimum contacts
embraces two types of jurisdiction—general and specific.’
6
[Citation.]” (ParaFi Digital Opportunities LP v. Egorov (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 124, 134 (ParaFi).)
1. General jurisdiction
If an out-of-state defendant’s contacts with California “are
substantial, continuous, and systematic, the defendant may be
subject to California’s general jurisdiction. [Citation.]” (Gilmore
Bank v. AsiaTrust New Zealand Ltd. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th
1558, 1568 (Gilmore).) “General jurisdiction subjects an out-of-
state defendant to suit in a forum state by anyone irrespective of
the subject matter of the lawsuit. [Citation.]” (Jacqueline B. v.
Rawls Law Group, P.C. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 243, 252
(Jacqueline B.).)
2. Specific jurisdiction
“If general jurisdiction is not established, a nonresident
defendant may still be subject to California’s specific
jurisdiction . . . . [Citation.]” (Gilmore, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1568.) Specific jurisdiction hinges on “the ‘“relationship among
the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”’ [Citations.]”
(Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 269
(Pavlovich).)
Three requirements must be met for a California court to
exercise specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.
(Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.) “First, the defendant
must have purposefully availed itself of the state’s benefits.
Second, the controversy must be related to or arise out of the
defendant’s contacts with the state. [Citation.] Third,
considering the defendant’s contacts with the state and other
factors, California’s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant
must comport with fair play and substantial justice. [Citation.]”
(Gilmore, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1568.) The plaintiff “bears
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the initial burden of establishing the first two elements by a
preponderance of the evidence, and if the plaintiff does so, the
out-of-state defendant then bears the burden of convincing the
court why the exertion of personal jurisdiction would not comport
with fair play and substantial justice. [Citations.]”
(Jacqueline B., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 253.)
In intentional tort cases, including libel and business torts,
courts apply “an ‘effects test’ to assess the purposeful availment
requirement. [Citation.]” (Strasner, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at
p. 227, fn. omitted; see also Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at
pp. 269–270.)3 “Under the effects test, specific personal
jurisdiction ‘“may be exercised over a defendant who has caused
an effect in the forum state by an act or omission occurring
elsewhere.”’ [Citations.]” (ParaFi, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at
p. 138.) “[A] plaintiff must show the defendant committed an
intentional act, expressly aimed at or targeting the forum state,
with the knowledge that his act would cause harm in the state.
[Citations.]” (Strasner, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.)
C. Analysis
Applying these legal principles, we conclude that Weiss
failed to meet his burden of establishing, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that Horowitz purposely availed himself of
California’s benefits. Because specific jurisdiction is defeated on
this basis alone, we need not address whether Weiss’s claims
relate to or arise out of Horowitz’s forum-related contacts or
whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be fair. (See Omeluk v.
3 The effects test is sometimes referred to as the “‘purposeful
direction’ test” (Strasner, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 227, fn. 2) or
“the ‘Calder effects test’ derived from Calder v. Jones (1984)
465 U.S. 783” (Casey v. Hill (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 937, 965).
8
Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S (9th Cir. 1995) 52 F.3d 267, 270
[“If any of the three requirements is not satisfied, jurisdiction in
the forum would deprive the defendant of due process of law”];
Safieddine v. MBC FZ, LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1099
[“We need only consider purposeful availment”].)4
The parties agree that the purposeful availment prong in
this case is properly analyzed under the effects test. Under the
effects test, Weiss was required to show that Horowitz
“committed an intentional act, expressly aimed at or targeting”
California, “with the knowledge that his act would cause harm
in” California. (Strasner, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 228; see also
Yue v. Yang (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 539, 547 (Yue) [“The
defendant must expressly aim or target his conduct toward
California, with the knowledge that his intentional conduct
would cause harm in the forum”].)
The intentional wrongful act alleged in the complaint is the
transmission of Horowitz’s November 21, 2022, e-mail to some of
the FDA Defendants, in which Horowitz referred to “groundless
assertions” made by Weiss, the FDA Defendants’ attorney.
Although the verified complaint alleges that one of the FDA
Defendants, Cell Surgical Network Corporation, is “a California
Corporation,” the record contains no evidence that the individual
recipients of the e-mail (apart from Weiss himself) were domiciled
in California or received the e-mail while located in California.
4 On appeal, Weiss does not challenge the trial court’s
finding that he had failed to establish a basis to assert general
jurisdiction over Horowitz. Accordingly, Weiss has forfeited any
claim of error in that respect. (See Jones v. Superior Court (1994)
26 Cal.App.4th 92, 99 [“Issues do not have a life of their own: if
they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to
authority, we consider the issues waived”].)
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The evidence is thus insufficient to establish that the e-mail was
“expressly aimed at or target[ed]” California. (Strasner, supra,
5 Cal.App.5th at p. 228.)
But even if we were to assume that the FDA Defendants
were Californians who received the communication in California,
we would still conclude that the content of Horowitz’s
November 21, 2022, e-mail is not sufficiently California-focused
to create a substantial connection between Horowitz and
California. (See ParaFi, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 138 [“under
the effects test, specific jurisdiction lies ‘only if [the defendant’s]
suit-related conduct creates a substantial connection with that
state’”].) The assertions described as “groundless” by Horowitz in
the e-mail relate to Venable’s representation of Meraglia, a third
party, in litigation in Washington state court and Venable’s
former representation of the FDA Defendants in a federal court
action.
Our conclusion is unaffected even if we credit Weiss’s
assertion that he suffered reputational harm with his California
clients,5 because “merely asserting that a defendant knew or
should have known that his intentional acts would cause harm in
the forum state is not enough to establish jurisdiction under the
effects test. [Citations.]” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at
5 This assumption renders moot Weiss’s argument that the
trial court erred in finding that his declaration regarding the e-
mail’s effect on his relationship with the FDA Defendants lacked
foundation. (See ParaFi, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 135 [“[O]n
appeal from an order granting a motion to quash, the court’s
ruling ‘must be affirmed even if “‘given for a wrong reason. If
right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be
sustained regardless of the considerations which may have
moved the trial court to its conclusion.’”’ [Citations.]”].)
10
pp. 270–271.) “The proper question is not where the plaintiff
experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the
defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful
way.” (Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277, 290.) Given the lack
of other connections to California, any harm suffered by Weiss in
California is “‘too unfocused to justify personal jurisdiction.’
[Citation.]” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 272.)
The two cases upon which Weiss relies heavily—Yue,
supra, 62 Cal.App.5th 539 and Moncrief v. Clark (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 1000 (Moncrief)—do not compel a different
result.
In Yue, the suit-related conduct of the defendant, a
Canadian resident, created a substantial connection with
California sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction. (Yue,
supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 542–543, 547–548.) The defendant
had communicated directly with the plaintiff, a known California
resident, and posted on “a website owned and operated by
a[nother] California resident that had a California audience.”
(Id. at p. 547.) Not only did the “plaintiff offer[] uncontradicted
evidence . . . that California residents read the allegedly
defamatory postings” (id. at p. 549), but the “posts had a
California focus” (id. at pp. 547–548) in that they “repeatedly
referred to California, suggested California criminal liability, and
threatened a California visit by” the defendant (id. at p. 549).
Specifically, the defendant “threatened to ‘bully’ [the] plaintiff in
California and communicated his plan to travel to San Francisco.
[The defendant] also announced that he had ‘arrived in
California’ and urged his ‘collaborators’ to join him.” (Id. at
p. 548.) Here, in contrast, Horowitz’s e-mail contained no such
California-focused statements.
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In Moncrief, the Court of Appeal found purposeful
availment where an out-of-state attorney made allegedly false
representations to a California-based attorney to induce the
purchase of farm equipment by the California attorney’s
California client. (Moncrief, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1003,
1006–1007.) The out-of-state attorney’s “representations were
made with the sole purpose of facilitating the sale . . . .” (Id. at
p. 1007.) Unlike here, the out-of-state attorney intentionally and
directly targeted a Californian to induce a transaction affecting
California. Having obtained a specific benefit related to
California, the out-of-state attorney should have anticipated
being sued there. The same cannot be said of Horowitz, who did
not avail himself of California’s benefits.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying
Jurisdictional Discovery
Weiss also challenges the trial court’s denial of his request
for a continuance to conduct jurisdictional discovery.
“Because plaintiffs bear the burden of showing facts
justifying the existence of jurisdiction in California, they are
‘entitled to an opportunity’ to conduct relevant discovery.
[Citation.] But ‘to prevail on a motion for a continuance for
jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff should demonstrate that
discovery is likely to lead to the production of evidence of facts
establishing jurisdiction.’ [Citation.] A ruling on a request for
jurisdictional discovery ‘lies in the trial court’s discretion’ and
will not be disturbed on appeal ‘unless we find a manifest abuse
of that discretion.’ [Citation.]” (ParaFi, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 141–142.)
Weiss identified the following lines of inquiry he would
pursue if allowed to conduct discovery: (1) “H[orowitz]’s
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knowledge of V[enable]’s prior representation of [the FDA
Defendants]”; (2) “the extent of [Horowitz’s] presence in
V[enable]’s California offices”; (3) “the extent of [Horowitz’s]
involvement in collection efforts in California”; and (4) “other
indicia of [Horowitz’s] contacts in California.”
We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion because
discovery into these matters “would not likely produce facts
supporting California’s exercise of jurisdiction, either general or
specific.” (ParaFi, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 143.) The trial
court could reasonably conclude that Horowitz’s knowledge of his
firm’s former representation of the FDA Defendants, his presence
in the firm’s California offices, or his involvement in collection
efforts in California—no matter how extensive—would not likely
support jurisdiction. (See Beckman v. Thompson (1992)
4 Cal.App.4th 481, 486–487 [no abuse of discretion in denying
request for continuance to conduct jurisdictional discovery into
whether the defendant “was engaged in ‘substantial lending
activities in California[,]’” because it was not “likely to produce
evidence of additional California contacts by [the defendant]
relating to this transaction”].)6
6 Weiss’s reliance on Hall v. LaRonde (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th
1342 and West Corp. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th
1167 is unavailing. Neither case analyzed jurisdictional
discovery.
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DISPOSITION
The order granting the motion to quash service of summons
is affirmed. Horowitz is entitled to his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, J.
CHAVEZ
________________________, J.
RICHARDSON
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