CourtListener 10641248•People v. Morales CA2/8
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Filed 7/25/25 P. v. Morales CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B337929
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA223547-01)
v.
MAURICIO MORALES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
Ava R. Stralla, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
This is an appeal pursuant to People v. Wende (1979)
25 Cal.3d 436. Finding no error, we affirm.
On October 22, 2002, the People charged appellant
Mauricio Morales with two counts of attempted murder in
violation of Penal Code1 sections 664 and 187, subdivision (a),
and one count of assault with a firearm in violation of
section 245, subdivision (a)(2). Firearm and great bodily injury
enhancements were also alleged. (§§ 12022.53, subdivisions (b)–
(d), 12022.55.) It was further alleged Morales had suffered one
prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5,
subdivision (b).
On March 18, 2003, a jury found Morales guilty of one
count of attempted murder and found true Morales personally
and intentionally discharged a handgun causing great bodily
injury to the victim, personally and intentionally discharged a
handgun, personally used a handgun within the meaning of
section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) through (d), and inflicted great
bodily injury by personally discharging a firearm from a motor
vehicle in violation of section 12022.55. The jury acquitted
Morales of the other two counts.
On May 13, 2003, the trial court sentenced Morales to state
prison for an aggregate term of 33 years to life. The sentence
consisted of the midterm of seven years for the attempted murder
plus an additional 25 years to life for discharge of the firearm
causing great bodily injury plus one year for the prior prison
term.
1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
On February 9, 2023, the trial court recalled Morales’s
sentence upon being notified by the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation that his sentence included one
year for a prior prison term under section 667.5, subdivision (b).
This rendered Morales eligible for full resentencing pursuant to
sections 1172.7, subdivision (d)(2) and 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2).
The court appointed counsel for Morales and set a resentencing
date for May 2, 2023.
On May 2, 2023, the court gave the People a copy of
Morales’s C-File from the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation to copy for the defense. It ordered the original
file returned to the court after copying.
The resentencing hearing was continued several times. On
March 18, 2024, Morales through counsel filed a comprehensive
motion for full resentencing. Morales asked the court to reduce
the total sentence to 12 years, which included striking the one-
year prison term prior as well as the 25 years-to-life sentence for
the firearm enhancement. The motion noted Morales had been
incarcerated for 21 years and had spent the last eight years
“dedicated to improving himself and avoiding disciplinary
missteps.” The motion also asked the court to note Morales’s
troubled youth and that Morales’s family continued to support
him “in every possible way.”
At the resentencing hearing on March 20, 2024, the People
argued that the court retained discretion to preserve the gun
enhancement sentence “when public safety is impacted.” They
contended the shooting of two rival gang members “in the chest”
was an unprovoked attack based on gang membership and
rivalry and asked the court to retain the gun enhancement.
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The trial court recited that Morales “was a gang member.
He went to a rival gang territory hunting, shot the victim in the
chest, the victim ran, and defendant continued shooting multiple
shots. [¶] As far as the C-File is concerned, he’s had incidents of
fighting, causing a major disruption, again fighting, fighting
again, attempting to smuggle in contraband, one incident of
tickling another inmate, which I don’t understand. [¶] And
there’s a 2019 incident with a vape pen and a cellphone. This is
all—the 1-year prior that was imposed is stricken. That doesn’t
end the matter.”
The trial court then declined to strike or reduce the
sentence for the firearm enhancement because it would not be in
the interest of justice to do so. The trial court found Morales’s
youth (23 years old) at the time of the offense was not a
contributing factor to the crime and “the circumstances of the
crime, particularly that a firearm was used, warranted the
midterm.” The trial court also found childhood trauma was not a
factor relating to the commission of the offense. It declined to
dismiss the enhancement because doing so would endanger
public safety. Morales filed a timely notice of appeal.
On April 21, 2025, counsel for Morales filed an opening
brief pursuant to People v. Wende, asking this court to
independently review the record for error. That same day we
notified Morales that a no-issue brief had been filed on his behalf
by counsel. We advised Morales of his right to file a
supplemental brief on issues he wants the court to consider.
On May 16, 2025, Morales filed a supplemental brief. He
contends: 1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel in that she failed to investigate or mention his childhood
trauma as a possible ground for resentencing; 2) the result would
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have been different had the trial court been presented with
Morales’s childhood trauma; 3) trial counsel was ineffective
because she did not argue Morales’s youth as a mitigating factor
at resentencing; 4) he was deprived of a “full” resentencing
hearing as opposed to invalidation of only the prison prior; 5) the
trial court made no reference to section 1172.75, subdivisions (a)
and (d)(1) through (4) which shows the trial court failed to
exercise the discretion vested in it by law; 6) the trial court cited
section 12022.53, subdivision (b) when imposing a consecutive
sentence of 25 years to life which is the incorrect citation for a
25 years-to-life sentence, invalidating the sentence imposed;
7) the trial court was under a misimpression of fact when it
stated Morales “went to a rival gang territory hunting” as there is
no evidence to support this impression; 8) the trial court was only
permitted to find a risk to public safety if it found Morales would
in the future commit a superstrike, not any other violent felony;
9) mere recitation of the circumstances of the crime absent
articulation of a rational nexus between those facts and current
dangerousness failed to provide the required modicum of
evidence to show a risk to public safety.
DISCUSSION
A defendant serving a term for a judgment that includes a
non-invalid enhancement is entitled to resentencing. (§ 1172.75,
subds. (a), (c).) Subdivision (d) specifies: “Resentencing pursuant
to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one
originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed
enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public
safety. Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a
longer sentence than the one originally imposed.” (Id., subd.
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(d)(1).) The trial court must “apply the sentencing rules of the
Judicial Council” as well as “any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.”
(Id., subd. (d)(2).) In addition, the court may “consider
postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the
disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant
while incarcerated, evidence that reflects either age, time served,
and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the
defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects
that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so
that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of
justice.” (Id., subd. (d)(3).)
We find no error. The full resentencing memorandum
prepared by trial counsel addressed Morales’s childhood trauma
and his youth as a mitigating factor at resentencing. The
memorandum presents interviews with Morales’s brother, father,
and sister-in-law about Morales suffering bullying, isolation, and
physical attacks as a child because of his slight physical stature
and timid, awkward, and shy demeanor.
Neither was Morales deprived of a full resentencing
hearing. As the record reflects and as set out above, the trial
court was aware that striking the one-year sentence for the prior
prison term was not the only issue before it. Specifically, after
striking the one-year term, the trial court commented, “That
doesn’t end the matter” and went on to consider whether to
reduce the seven-year sentence and the 25-year term for the
firearm enhancement, expressly mentioning the factors of
childhood trauma and age at the time of the offense. Morales
was entitled to be considered for full resentencing under section
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1172.75, subdivision (d). (People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th
1050, 1054–1055 [in resentencing under 1172.75, subdivision (d),
the trial court must apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial
Council as well as any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentence and to promote uniformity of sentencing].)
The trial court demonstrated it was well aware of its discretion
under the statute to reduce the aggregate sentence and expressed
its rationale for refusing to do so.
Further, Morales is correct that the Reporter’s Transcript
miscites the firearms subdivision (it stated (b) instead of (d))
when sentence was reimposing). This does not invalidate the
sentence. The trial court clearly stated it was reimposing the
term of 25 years to life, as is confirmed by the minute order and
abstract of judgment. That the trial court may have orally
miscited the applicable subdivision does not cast a cloud over the
trial court’s sentencing intentions given that the court expressly
stated the number of years it was imposing for the enhancement
and why it was not inclined to depart from the original, same
sentence. Alternatively, Morales failed to bring this to the trial
court’s attention at resentencing, so the issue is waived. (People
v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351–353 [to preserve the issue on
appeal, defendant must bring to the trial court’s attention errors
occurring at sentencing so they can be corrected].)
Finally, there is no evidence in this record of the facts
giving rise to the attempted murder conviction. Whether the
trial court was under a misimpression that Morales “went to rival
gang territory hunting” for rival gang members cannot be
established by Morales’s bare assertion that there was no
hunting involved. And whether Morales was “hunting” does not
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outweigh the other aggravating factors (which Morales does not
challenge) that the trial court noted in reimposing the original
sentence, to wit, that he knew the victim was from a rival gang,
chased the victim, shot at him multiple times, and created
serious disruptions and rule violations while in custody.
Morales incorrectly asserts that a risk to public safety can
only be established if the trial court finds he would, in the future,
commit a superstrike. Risk of commission of a superstrike is a
requisite factor to be addressed for mental health diversion under
section 1001.36, not for resentencing under section 1172.75.
(People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149 [defendant
who poses unreasonable risk of committing a superstrike is not
eligible for mental health diversion under section 1001.36,
subdivision (c)]; People v. Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1055
[resentencing under section 1172.75 shall result in a lesser
sentence unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety].).)
We find the court did articulate a nexus between the facts
and the sentence imposed. However, because Morales failed to
ask the trial court to be more specific at the time of the
resentencing, Morales cannot do so now for the first time on
appeal. (People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 352–353
[defendant cannot argue for the first time on appeal that the trial
court failed to state reasons for its sentencing decision].)
We have examined the record and are satisfied Morales’s
counsel fully complied with her responsibilities and no arguable
issues exist. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 109–110;
People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441.)
On this record alone, Morales does not demonstrate
prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel.
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
VIRAMONTES, J.
RUBIN, J.*
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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