CourtListener 10640491•People v. Sims CA2/8
Texto completo
Filed 7/24/25 P. v. Sims CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B335875
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA059763)
v.
JERMAYNE LAMAR SIMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge. Affirmed with
directions.
Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
In 2014, a jury convicted Jermayne Lamar Sims of two
counts of assault with a deadly weapon and several other
felonies, and it found true multiple sentencing enhancements.
The court sentenced Sims to over 22 years in prison, including
the upper four-year term for one of Sims’s assault convictions.
In 2023, the court recalled Sims’s sentence and resentenced
him to 19 years in prison under Penal Code1 section 1172.75,
striking three 1-year prior prison term enhancements while
reimposing the upper four-year term for the assault with a deadly
weapon conviction. On appeal, Sims argues the court erred when
it reimposed the upper term for his assault conviction because:
(1) it relied on several aggravating sentencing factors that were
not properly proven under section 1170, subdivision (b)(2); and
(2) the lower term was the presumed sentence for his assault
conviction. Sims also contends the court abused its discretion
when it denied his request to dismiss his prior strike conviction
and miscalculated his custody credits. We reject Sims’s first
three contentions but agree that the court failed to properly
calculate his custody credits. We therefore remand the matter
with directions for the court to determine the number of days
that Sims has spent in actual custody and to prepare an amended
abstract of judgment that reflects his total custody credits. In all
other respects, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In February 2014, the People charged Sims with one count
of inflicting corporal injury on the mother of his child (§ 273.5,
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
subd. (a); count 1), two counts of assault with a deadly weapon
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1); counts 2 and 3), one count of misdemeanor
vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a); count 4), one count of stalking
(§ 646.9, subd. (b); count 5), one count of criminal threats (§ 422,
subd. (a); count 6), two counts of felony vandalism (§ 594,
subd. (a); counts 7 and 8), and one count of dissuading a witness
from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b); count 9). As to counts
1, 2, 3, and 5, the People alleged that Sims served three prior
prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), suffered a prior strike conviction
(§§ 667, subd. (c), 1170.12, subd. (c)), and suffered a prior serious
felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)).
In May 2014, a jury convicted Sims of two counts of assault
with a deadly weapon (counts 2 and 3), one count of stalking
(count 5), one count of criminal threats (count 6), and one count of
felony vandalism (count 7). The court sentenced Sims to 22
years, eight months in prison, including the upper term of four
years for count 2, doubled to eight years under the “Three
Strikes” Law, plus five years for the prior serious felony
conviction enhancement and three years for the three prior
prison term enhancements. The court awarded Sims 292 days of
presentence custody credits.
In 2022, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) referred Sims’s case for resentencing
under section 1172.75. The court appointed counsel to represent
Sims and scheduled a resentencing hearing.
Sims filed a resentencing motion. He asked the court to
strike his prior strike conviction, all three prior prison terms, and
his prior serious felony conviction, and to reduce count 2, the
principal term for his sentence, to either the low or middle term.
Sims argued, among other things, that after the Legislature
3
enacted Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), which
amended sections 1170 and 1170.1, the court could not reimpose
an upper term sentence unless the aggravating circumstances
supporting imposition of that term were stipulated to by the
defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of
fact.
Sims presented evidence of his rehabilitation efforts while
in prison. Sims submitted certificates of completion from prison-
offered victim awareness, domestic violence, anger management,
and Alcoholics Anonymous programs, as well as several letters
commending Sims for his behavior in prison.
Sims also submitted his handwritten letter, in which he
recounted being raised in a violent home with a mother, aunt,
uncle, and cousins who used hard drugs. The adults in the home
physically abused Sims and his younger sister when they did not
have access to drugs. Around the age of 10, Sims left his family’s
home and was homeless for about six months. Eventually, Sims
started living in group homes, where he was exposed to more
violence.
Sims claimed that due to the nature of his childhood, he
only cared about himself for much of his life, including after he
was arrested for the underlying offenses. After his mother died
while he was in custody, Sims decided to turn his life around and
make amends to the people he hurt through his criminal conduct.
He has since dedicated his life to changing the way people look at
him, including through his participation in prison-offered self-
help classes.
In November 2023, the court held a resentencing hearing.
The court struck Sims’s three prior prison term enhancements,
while denying his request to strike his prior convictions.
4
The court sentenced Sims to 19 years in prison, including the
upper four-year term for count 2.
Sims appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. The court did not err when it reimposed Sims’s upper
term sentence for count 2
Sims contends the court violated section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2), when it reimposed the upper four-year term for
his assault with a deadly weapon conviction in count 2 because it
relied on facts that he did not stipulate to and that the jury did
not find true beyond a reasonable doubt. As we explain,
section 1170 subdivision (b)(2)’s burden of proof requirement does
not apply to resentencing proceedings under section 1172.75
where, as here, the defendant was originally sentenced to an
upper term. The court, therefore, did not err when it reimposed
an upper-term sentence at Sims’s resentencing hearing.
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 567 amended
section 1170, subdivision (b), to make the middle term the
presumptive determinate sentence. (People v. Lynch (2024)
16 Cal.5th 730, 742 (Lynch).) Now, courts may not impose an
upper term sentence in the first instance unless aggravating
circumstances justify that term and the facts underlying any
such circumstance, other than a prior conviction, “have been
stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2)–(3); Lynch, at p. 742.)
Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) also went into
effect on January 1, 2022, and it created what is now
section 1172.75. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3 [creating former
§ 1171.1]; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12 [renumbering former § 1171.1
5
to section 1172.75].) That statute renders legally invalid any
prior prison term enhancement imposed before January 1, 2020,
unless the enhancement was imposed for a prior sexually violent
conviction, and it creates a resentencing procedure for defendants
who are currently serving sentences that include a prior prison
term enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subds. (a)–(c).) Once the trial
court confirms that the underlying judgment includes an invalid
prior prison term enhancement, the court must “recall the
sentence and resentence the defendant.” (Id., subd. (c).)
A defendant who is eligible for relief under section 1172.75 is
“entitled to a ‘ “full resentencing.” ’ ” (People v. Rogers (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 340, 354.)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d), provides instructions for
resentencing. The court must appoint counsel to represent the
defendant. (Id., subd. (d)(5).) The court may not impose a
sentence longer than the one originally imposed, and the court
must impose a lesser sentence than the original unless it “finds
by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence
would endanger public safety.” (Id., subd. (d)(1).) The court also
must “apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and
apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide
for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences
and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (Id., subd. (d)(2).)
In addition, the court is permitted to “consider postconviction
factors” that speak to whether continued incarceration remains
in the interest of justice, such as the defendant’s physical
condition and records of discipline and rehabilitation while
incarcerated. (Id., subd. (d)(3).) Finally, “[u]nless the court
originally imposed the upper term, the court may not impose a
sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are
6
circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term
of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have
been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (Id., subd. (d)(4).)
Sims argues the court was required to comply with
section 1170, subdivision (b)(2)’s requirement that any fact, other
than a prior conviction, that a court relies on to impose an upper
term sentence must be stipulated to by the defendant or found
true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury. According to Sims,
the court violated the Sixth Amendment when it relied on several
aggravating sentencing factors that were not properly proven
under section 1170, subdivision (b). We disagree.
Sims’s recall of sentence and resentencing were triggered
by section 1172.75, because his original sentence included now-
invalid prior prison term enhancements. (Id., subd. (c).) Sims’s
resentencing, therefore, was governed by section 1172.75,
subdivision (d).
Two recent decisions have addressed whether trial courts
are required to comply with section 1170, subdivision (b)(2)’s
burden of proof requirement under section 1172.75 when
resentencing a defendant who was originally sentenced to an
upper term. (See People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 455 (Brannon-Thompson); People v. Gonzalez
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312 (Gonzalez).)2 Those decisions are
split.
2 We asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs
addressing how section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) should be
7
In Brannon-Thompson, the Third District held that
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) is an exception to section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2)’s burden of proof requirement for the
imposition of an upper term sentence. (Brannon-Thompson,
supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 466–467.) The court noted that it
is evident from the statute’s plain language that “the Legislature
intended the new burden of proof amendments to section 1170,
subdivision (b) apply only if the trial court is imposing the upper
term for the first time at a section 1172.75 resentencing.”
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) is, the court held, “an
exception to the general rule that the trial court must apply
ameliorative changes in the law at a section 1172.75
resentencing.” (Brannon-Thompson, at pp. 466–467.)
In Gonzalez, the Sixth District held that section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2)’s burden of proof requirement applies when
reimposing an upper term at a section 1172.75 resentencing
hearing. The court found that section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4),
is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.
(Gonzalez, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at pp. 328–329.) Although the
court agreed with Brannon-Thompson that the provision’s plain
language could be read as an exception to section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2)’s burden of proof requirement for defendants
who were originally sentenced to an upper term, the court
concluded that section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), could also be
read to limit the reimposition of an upper term sentence to only
those defendants. (Gonzalez, at p. 329.) Under that reading, the
court explained, the first clause of the statute defines the narrow
interpreted considering Brannon-Thompson, Gonzalez, and
Lynch. Both parties filed supplemental briefs.
8
class of defendants eligible for an upper term sentence—i.e., only
those who were originally sentenced to such a term—while the
second clause incorporates section 1170, subdivision (b)(2)’s
burden of proof requirement, which must be applied before the
court may reimpose an upper term sentence. (Gonzalez, at
p. 329.)
Gonzalez adopted the second interpretation of
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4). The court looked to
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2), which requires courts to
“ ‘apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or
provide judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and . . . promote uniformity of sentencing.’ ” (Gonzalez,
supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 329, italics omitted.) Because
Senate Bill No. 567’s amendment of section 1170, subdivision (b)
was a “change in law,” the court reasoned, section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(2) requires courts to follow section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2)’s burden of proof requirement before
reimposing an upper term sentence under section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(4). (Gonzalez, at p. 329.)
Gonzalez also looked to the California Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Lynch. To interpret section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(4), as an exception to section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2)’s burden of proof requirement, Gonzalez
explained, “would run afoul of the Sixth Amendment implications
identified” in Lynch. (Gonzalez, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at
p. 330.) As Lynch held, “ ‘[t]he aggravating facts that would
“justify” an upper term sentence [citation] are the same facts that
“expose” the defendant to imposition of that sentence in the trial
court’s discretion. [Citation.] Stated another way, under [section
1170, subdivision (b)(2),] the aggravating facts used to “justify”
9
an upper term sentence are “necessary to [its] imposition,”
[citation], and effectively function like elements of a crime.’ ”
(Gonzalez, at p. 330, quoting Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 760.)
Thus, Gonzalez reasoned, “the statutory interpretation for
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), which simply restricts the
scope of defendants eligible to receive the upper term, allows
[courts] to read the statute in a manner that is internally
consistent and avoids running afoul of the Sixth Amendment.”
(Gonzalez, at p. 330.)
We decline to follow Gonzalez and agree with Brannon-
Thompson’s interpretation of section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4).
That statutory provision is clear and unambiguous. The first
clause—“Unless the court originally imposed the upper term”—
expressly excepts a class of defendants—those originally
sentenced to an upper term—from the second clause’s burden of
proof requirement. Thus, if a defendant was originally sentenced
to an upper term, section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) allows the
court to reimpose the upper term at resentencing, without
needing to engage in any factfinding or to otherwise comply with
section 1170, subdivision (b)’s burden of proof requirements for
imposing an upper term sentence. (See Brannon-Thompson,
supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 466–467.)
Our reading of section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4), does not
conflict with the Sixth Amendment. As the Supreme Court
explained in Lynch, the Sixth Amendment prohibits imposition of
an upper term sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum
sentence that a court may apply without relying on facts, other
than prior convictions, that were not found true beyond a
reasonable doubt by a jury or admitted by the defendant. (Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 747.) Thus, “ ‘ “[t]he relevant ‘statutory
10
maximum’ ” . . . “is not the maximum sentence a judge may
impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum [the
judge] may impose without any additional findings.” ’ ” (Ibid.,
quoting Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 274–275.)
In other words, if a statute authorizes imposition of an upper
term sentence without requiring the court to rely on facts that
were not found true by a jury or stipulated to by the defendant,
imposition of such term does not violate the Sixth Amendment.
(Lynch, at p. 747.)
That is how section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) operates.
In a case like this one, where the defendant was originally
sentenced to an upper term, section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4),
allows the court to reimpose that same term without engaging in
additional factfinding by exempting the case from section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2)’s burden of proof requirement. Put another
way, section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) makes the upper term the
maximum sentence that the court may impose without additional
factfinding for defendants who originally were sentenced to an
upper term. (See People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359,
373, 374 [“Where, as here, the trial court elects to retain an upper
term sentence that complied with the Sixth Amendment when
originally imposed, the court need not engage in any additional
factfinding under section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4)”].)
In short, the court was not required to comply with
section 1170, subdivision (b)(2)’s burden of proof requirement
before it reimposed Sims’s upper term sentence for count 2.
The court, therefore, did not violate Sims’s Sixth Amendment
rights when it calculated his sentence by relying on aggravating
sentencing factors to which he did not stipulate and that were not
found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury.
11
2. The court did not abuse its discretion when it declined
to impose the lower term for count 2
Sims next contends the court erred when it did not impose
the lower term of two years for his assault with a deadly weapon
conviction in count 2. He argues the court was required to
impose the lower term under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6),
because he presented evidence that his physical trauma as a
child contributed to the offense. This argument lacks merit.
The court refused to impose a term lower than the upper
term for count 2, finding by clear and convincing evidence that
doing so would “endanger public safety.” The court found that
Sims’s claim that he suffered physical trauma as a child lacked
credibility because he did not provide any supporting statements
from “family members, friends, [or] interviews” or documentation
such as “police reports, [dependency] reports.” The court also
found that Sims presented “nothing” to show that his childhood
trauma contributed to his underlying offenses. Moreover, the
court explained, several aggravating sentencing factors justified
re-imposing the upper term for count 2. Based on the violent and
“egregious” nature of several of Sims’s underlying offenses, as
well as his long and violent criminal record, the court reasoned it
would not be appropriate to lower his sentence beyond striking
the three 1-year prior prison term enhancements. Finally, the
court found that Sims’s recent progress toward rehabilitation in
prison did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances such that
it would be appropriate to impose a lower sentence.
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) amended section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), to make the
lower term the presumptive sentence if, among other things, the
defendant has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood
12
trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation,
or sexual violence, and that such trauma was a contributing
factor in the commission of the underlying offense. (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(6).) The court may impose a sentence higher than the
lower term if it “finds that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances [such] that imposition of
the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.”
(Ibid.) “[T]he mere fact a defendant is young or has suffered past
trauma is insufficient—either or both must be ‘a contributing
factor in the commission of the offense’ for the low term
presumption to apply.” (People v. Knowles (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 757, 765 (Knowles).)
We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of
discretion. (Knowles, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 764.) The
court generally has wide discretion to select an appropriate
sentence while weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.
(People v. Avalos (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1582.) A court
abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily and capriciously,
relies on improper matters, or is unaware of the scope of its
discretion such that it does not exercise its discretion at all.
(Knowles, at p. 765.)
Sims has not shown the court abused its discretion when it
refused to impose a lower term sentence for count 2 under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). The court acknowledged that
Sims presented at least some evidence that he suffered physical
trauma as a child, but it noted that Sims provided no evidence
linking his childhood trauma to his assault with a deadly weapon
conviction. Further, it found that the evidence of any trauma
was greatly outweighed by the aggravating circumstances, such
that imposing a lower term sentence would endanger public
13
safety. In doing so, the court discussed what it found to be the
egregious nature of the underlying offenses in this case, Sims’s
criminal history that includes several convictions involving
violence, Sims’s failure to remain crime free for significant
periods of time after being released from custody on his prior
convictions, and Sims’s failure to take significant steps toward
rehabilitation until only shortly before the underlying
resentencing proceedings. On this record, we cannot conclude the
court abused its discretion in finding the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances such that it
would be contrary to the interests of justice to impose a lower
term sentence for count 2. (See § 1170, subdivision (b)(6).)
Sims argues the court erred in relying on numerous
aggravating circumstances that were not found true beyond a
reasonable doubt by the jury, including the way he committed the
underlying offenses and several of the circumstances related to
his criminal history, when it refused to impose a lower term
sentence for count 2. Sims points to no authority, and we are
aware of none, that prohibits a court from relying on aggravating
circumstances that were not found true by the jury when
considering whether to impose a lower term sentence under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). While courts are expressly
prohibited from considering certain aggravating circumstances
that were not found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury
when deciding whether to impose an upper term sentence in the
first instance under section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), such a
restriction does not appear in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6).
We therefore decline to impose such a restriction on a trial court
when determining whether to impose a lower term sentence.
(See People v. Bautista-Castanon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 922, 929
14
[declining to impose section 1170, subdivision (b)(2)’s burden of
proof requirement into section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) as a
prerequisite to declining to impose lower term sentence].)
Sims also argues the court erroneously found that his
assault with a deadly weapon conviction was a “violent felony”
when it explained why it refused to reduce his sentence for
count 2. To be sure, assault with a deadly weapon is not listed as
a “violent felony” under section 667.5, subdivision (c). But the
court did not reference that statute when it stated that assault
with a deadly weapon was a violent felony. Instead, the court
spoke at length about Sims’s violent and egregious conduct in
committing the offense, indicating it was referring to the manner
in which Sims committed assault with a deadly weapon when it
referred to it as a “violent felony.” In any event, to the extent the
court did err in finding the offense qualified as a “violent felony,”
Sims fails to explain how he was prejudiced by that finding.
As we just explained, the court found numerous aggravating
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstance of the
physical trauma Sims suffered as a child. Nothing in the record
suggests the court would have imposed a reduced sentence had it
not found the assault with a deadly weapon conviction was a
“violent felony.”
Finally, Sims argues the court should have imposed a lower
term sentence for count 2 under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6),
because he made significant progress toward rehabilitation while
in prison. That mitigating factor, however, is not listed in
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), as one the court must consider
when deciding whether to impose a lower term sentence. In any
event, as we just explained, the court expressly considered
evidence of Sims’s rehabilitation while in prison, and it found
15
that such evidence was outweighed by the aggravating
circumstances discussed above.
In short, Sims has not shown the court abused its
discretion when it declined to impose a lower term sentence for
his assault with a deadly weapon conviction in count 2.
3. The court did not abuse its discretion when it refused
to strike Sims’s prior serious felony conviction
enhancements
Sims next contends the court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion to strike the prior strike allegation and the
five-year prior serious felony enhancement under People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) and
section 1385. We disagree.
Under section 1385, a trial court may strike or dismiss a
prior conviction allegation in the interests of justice. (Romero,
supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 530–531; People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 373 (Carmony).) The statute was recently
amended to guide trial courts in exercising their discretion to
dismiss sentencing enhancements. (People v. Walker (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032 (Walker).)
Section 1385, subdivision (c), now provides that trial courts
“shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice
to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by
any initiative statute.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) The statute also
states that courts “shall consider and afford great weight to
evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the
mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.
Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances
weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless
the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would
16
endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a
likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in
physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (Id.,
subd. (c)(2).)
Among the mitigating factors listed in section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), are the five that Sims relies on here:
(1) application of the enhancements would result in a
discriminatory racial impact; (2) multiple enhancements were
alleged in the same case; (3) the underlying offenses were
connected to prior victimization or childhood trauma; (4) none of
the underlying offenses were violent felonies as defined in
subdivision (c) of section 667.5; and (5) the enhancements are
based on a prior conviction that is over five years old. (See
§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(A), (B), (E), (F), & (H).)
As our Supreme Court recently explained, section 1385,
subdivision (c) does not require trial courts to dismiss an
enhancement, absent a finding that doing so would endanger
public safety, whenever a listed mitigating circumstance is
proven. (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1029.) Rather, even
without a finding concerning public safety, trial courts “retain[]
the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that
it assigns significant value” to the presence of any listed
mitigating factors. (Ibid.)
We review a court’s decision not to strike or dismiss a prior
conviction allegation for abuse of discretion. (Nazir v. Superior
Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 490.) The party challenging the
sentence must show “ ‘ “that the sentencing decision was
irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a
showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve
legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
17
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review.” ’ ” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376–377.)
As a threshold matter, the court was not required to
explain on the record that it considered the mitigating factors
listed in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), or to expressly find that
striking the challenged enhancements would endanger public
safety. (See People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637
[a trial court is “ ‘not required to state reasons for declining to
exercise its discretion under section 1385’ ”].) In any event, as we
just discussed, the court provided a detailed explanation for why
it found that lowering Sims’s sentence beyond striking the three
1-year prior prison term enhancements, including striking his
prior serious felony conviction enhancements, would endanger
public safety. The record supports the court’s reliance on the
violent and egregious manner in which Sims committed the
underlying offenses, his long criminal history (including several
assaultive offenses and other crimes involving violence), his
failure to remain crime free for considerable lengths of time, and
his failure to make a serious effort to rehabilitate until only
shortly before the underlying resentencing proceedings. On this
record, the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Sims’s motion to strike his prior serious felony conviction
enhancements.
4. The trial court must determine the number of days
that Sims has spent in actual custody
Sims next contends his abstract of judgment must be
corrected to reflect the actual number of days that he spent in
custody leading up to the resentencing hearing. We agree.
At Sims’s original sentencing hearing in 2014, the trial
court awarded him 292 days of presentence custody credits,
18
consisting of 146 days for actual time served in custody plus
146 days of conduct credits. At the resentencing hearing held on
November 15, 2023, the court ordered the CDCR to recalculate
Sims’s custody credits. The amended abstract of judgment issued
after the resentencing hearing shows that Sims was awarded
only 293 days of custody credits, consisting of 147 days for actual
time served in custody plus 146 days of conduct credits.
Every defendant “sentenced to prison for criminal conduct
is entitled to credit against [him or her] for all actual days of
confinement solely attributable to the same conduct.” (People v.
Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 30 (Buckhalter).) “ ‘[T]he court
imposing a sentence’ has a responsibility to calculate the exact
number of days the defendant has been in custody ‘prior to
sentencing,’ add applicable good behavior credits earned
pursuant to section 4019, and reflect the total in the abstract of
judgment.” (Ibid.) When the defendant’s sentence “is modified
while in progress,” the trial court must credit the defendant “with
all actual days” he or she spent in custody up to that time and
award “such credits in the new abstract of judgment.” (Id. at
pp. 37, 40–41.)
Here, the trial court did not calculate the actual number of
days Sims spent in custody up to the date of the resentencing
hearing on November 23, 2023. Instead, the court ordered CDCR
to make that calculation. It does not appear that the CDCR
made that calculation, as the abstract of judgment issued after
the November 2023 resentencing hearing incorrectly reflects that
Sims was awarded only one additional day of actual custody
credit from the time he was originally sentenced in 2014, nearly a
decade short of the actual custody credits to which Sims was
entitled. Because the trial court, and not CDCR, was required to
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calculate Sims’ custody credits following resentencing (see
Buckhalter, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 37), the matter must be
remanded so that the court may calculate the correct custody
credits and prepare a new abstract of judgment (see People v.
Rojas (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 48, 55).
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded with directions to the trial court to
determine the number of days that Sims has spent in actual
custody and to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and
forward it to the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
WILEY, Acting P. J.
MATTHEWS, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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