In re Aaron M. CA2/3

CourtListener 10639776Calctapp23 de jul. de 2025

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Filed 7/23/25 In re Aaron M. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re AARON M., a Person Coming B340859
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
_____________________________________
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP01498A)
FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

AARON M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Philip L. Soto, Judge. Affirmed.
Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

Aaron M. (father) appeals from an order terminating
parental rights to his two-year-old son. Father’s sole contention
is that the juvenile court and the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) conducted
an inadequate inquiry of the family’s possible Indian ancestry as
required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq.) and related state law (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 224.2).1 We find no prejudicial error, and thus we affirm the
order terminating parental rights.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Dependency proceedings; termination of parental
rights.
Father and Meredith K. (mother) are the parents of
Aaron M., who was born in April 2023. Aaron tested positive for
fentanyl and morphine at birth and was placed in the neonatal
intensive care unit to address his severe withdrawal symptoms,
including sweating, labored breathing, tremors, poor feeding,
loose stools, and sensitivity to touch. Hospital staff reported that
Aaron was difficult to console and cried for hours at a time while

1 All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to
the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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the staff tried to soothe him. He was administered phenobarbital
and morphine to address his withdrawal symptoms.
Mother left the hospital when Aaron was three days old.
DCFS removed Aaron from father and mother the following day.
DCFS filed a petition that, as subsequently amended,
alleged that Aaron was a juvenile court dependent pursuant to
section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), because mother used
amphetamines, methamphetamines, and fentanyl during her
pregnancy; Aaron tested positive for methamphetamines and
fentanyl at birth; father had a history of drug use and failed to
protect Aaron from mother’s drug use; and Aaron’s sister, B., was
a juvenile court dependent due to mother’s and father’s drug use.
The juvenile court detained Aaron from his parents, and in
July 2023, Aaron was placed with nonrelative caregivers D.K.
and V.S.
The court sustained the amended petition in July 2023. In
August 2023, the court bypassed reunification services for both
parents pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (11),
on the grounds that parental rights to Aaron’s sibling had been
terminated after the parents failed to reunify with her.
The court terminated parental rights to Aaron in
September 2024. He remains placed with his caregivers, D.K.
and V.S., who plan to adopt him.

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II. Facts relevant to the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA).
A. ICWA inquiry in Aaron’s sibling’s case.2
Aaron’s sibling, B., was born drug-exposed in 2020. The
parents failed to reunify with B., and parental rights were
terminated in October 2022.
Both parents appealed from the order terminating parental
rights. In September 2023, at the joint request of the parents
and DCFS, this court conditionally affirmed the order with
directions to the juvenile court to conduct a further ICWA
inquiry. Specifically, we ordered the court to direct DCFS to
“make reasonable efforts to interview [B.’s] known and available
extended family members,” including maternal grandmother
Linda K., paternal grandmother Renee S., paternal aunt
Cindee M.,3 and the maternal and paternal grandfathers,
regarding the family’s possible Indian ancestry.
The maternal grandmother died in 2023 and thus could not
be interviewed. In October 2023, a social worker contacted the
maternal grandfather to ask about the family’s Indian ancestry.
Maternal grandfather did not answer the call, and the social
worker could not leave a message because maternal grandfather
did not have voice mail. The social worker contacted mother to
ask whether maternal grandfather had a new phone number, but

2 At DCFS’s request, we granted judicial notice of four
documents describing the ICWA inquiry and findings in the
sibling’s case.
3 It is not clear from the record whether Cindee M. is father’s
sister or aunt.

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mother did not answer her phone. The social worker attempted
to call and text maternal grandfather several more times, but the
text was returned and the phone calls did not go through.
Also in October 2023, a social worker contacted the
paternal grandmother, Renee S., and asked whether the family
had any Indian ancestry. The paternal grandmother responded:
“There is NO Indian heritage in my families’ ancestry, nor does
[paternal grandfather] Steven M[.] I do not have his phone
number, but I will try to get it for you.”
In early November 2023, the paternal grandmother
reported that the paternal grandfather may not have a phone,
but she provided a phone number for paternal grandfather’s
sister, Mary G. The social worker contacted Mary G. and left a
detailed message with a call-back number.
In December 2023, the social worker contacted paternal
aunt Cindee M., who reported the family had no Indian ancestry.
On January 10, 2024, the juvenile court held a hearing and
found ICWA did not apply to B.’s case. No appeal was taken from
that finding.
B. ICWA inquiry in the present case.
During their first interview with a social worker in
April 2023, both parents denied having any Indian ancestry. The
parents again denied Indian ancestry during court appearances
in May 2023, August 2023, December 2023, April 2024, and
September 2024.
The social worker spoke to paternal grandmother Renee S.
and paternal aunt Cindee M. in March 2024; both women denied
that the family had Indian ancestry. The paternal grandmother
said she did not know where paternal grandfather lived and she
did not have a telephone number for him, but to her knowledge,

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he did not have Indian ancestry. There is no evidence in the
record that DCFS attempted to get a phone number for paternal
grandfather through any other source or contacted any member
of mother’s extended family.
III. Father’s appeal.
Father timely appealed from the order terminating
parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Father’s sole contention on appeal is that the order
terminating parental rights should be reversed with directions to
conduct a further ICWA inquiry. Specifically, father contends
that additional inquiry was required of the maternal and
paternal grandfathers, a paternal uncle, and “any other maternal
or paternal relatives who could be identified as having relevant
information concerning [Aaron’s] ancestry.” The contention lacks
merit, as we discuss.
I. Legal standards.
A. Duty of inquiry.
“In 1978, Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) to ‘formalize[ ] federal policy
relating to the placement of Indian children outside the family
home.’ ” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1124–1125 (Dezi
C.); see also In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1097–1098
(Kenneth D.).) The California Indian Child Welfare Act (§§ 224 et
seq.) is ICWA’s state analog.
Section 224.2, subdivision (b) specifies that once a child is
placed into a county welfare department’s temporary custody, the
agencies and juvenile courts have “an affirmative and continuing

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duty” to determine whether ICWA applies. This duty “includes,
but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian,
Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an
interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or
neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.”
“ ‘[E]xtended family member’ ” means “a person who has reached
the age of eighteen and who is the . . . child’s grandparent, aunt
or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece
or nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(2); see also § 224.1, subd. (c) [adopting ICWA definition of
“extended family member”].)
The statutory duty to inquire of extended family members
is grounded in a legislative recognition that “ ‘younger
generations [may] lack[ ] knowledge of their Native American
ancestry,’ ” and thus parents “may not be the best source of
information about a child’s Indian ancestry.” (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1139.) Our high court has cautioned, however,
that the statute “ ‘does not require the agency to “find” unknown
relatives and others who have an interest in the child, merely to
make reasonable inquiries. The operative concept is those people
who are reasonably available to help the agency with its
investigation into whether the child has any potential Indian
ancestry should be asked.’ ” (Id. at p. 1140; see also id. at p. 1143
[characterizing duty of inquiry under ICWA as “ ‘slight and
swift’ ”].) Accordingly, reversal is not required simply because
“every possible extended family member has not been asked
about the child’s Indian ancestry.” (Id. at p. 1140.)
B. Standard of review.
Our Supreme Court has said that a juvenile court’s “fact-
specific” determination that an ICWA inquiry “is adequate,

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proper, and duly diligent” is “ ‘a quintessentially discretionary
function’ (In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1005)
subject to a deferential standard of review. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2);
see also Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at [pp. 1101–1102].) ‘ “On
a well-developed record, the court has relatively broad discretion
to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper, adequate,
and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.” ’ ” (Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)
“If, upon review, a juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry
was adequate and proper and ICWA does not apply are found to
be supported by sufficient evidence and record documentation as
required by California law (rule 5.481(a)(5)), there is no error and
conditional reversal would not be warranted even if the agency
did not inquire of everyone who has an interest in the child.”
(Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) However, “ ‘the less
developed the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily
becomes. When . . . the court’s implied finding that the agency’s
inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent rests on a
cursory record and a patently insufficient inquiry that is
conceded, the only viable conclusion is that the finding is
unsupported by substantial evidence and the court’s conclusion to
the contrary constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.’ ” (Kenneth
D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1101–1102.)
II. Analysis.
Father contends an inadequate ICWA inquiry was made in
the present case, and we agree. As noted above, an ICWA
inquiry that “extend[s] no further than mother and father, both of
whom have longstanding issues with substance use disorder[s],”
will rarely be adequate, particularly if extended family members
are readily available. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.)

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Here, no inquiry was made of any of mother’s relatives, and there
was no showing in Aaron’s case that maternal relatives were
unavailable. The juvenile court thus erred by finding that DCFS
made an adequate ICWA inquiry.
We conclude, however, that the juvenile court’s error was
harmless.4 In Aaron’s sibling’s case, which was proceeding
concurrently with Aaron’s case, a social worker repeatedly called
and texted the maternal grandfather to inquire about the family’s
possible Indian ancestry, but maternal grandfather did not
answer the call and did not have voice mail. The social worker
left a message for mother asking if maternal grandfather had a
new phone number, but mother did not answer or return the call.
The only other maternal relative who mother identified was the
maternal grandmother, who was deceased. No other avenues for

4 In Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1094–1095, 1103,
our Supreme Court held that that absent exceptional
circumstances, a reviewing court may not consider postjudgment
evidence to conclude that ICWA error was harmless because
“California’s comprehensive scheme implementing ICWA
contemplates the juvenile court will make the threshold
determinations as to adequate inquiry and reason to know.”
Accordingly the high court said, “[a] reviewing court’s
determination that a postjudgment ICWA inquiry was sufficient
substitutes its judgment for that of the juvenile court, which is to
make those findings in the first instance.” (Id. at p. 1103.) That
holding does not preclude our consideration of the evidence and
findings in Aaron’s sibling’s case because that evidence was
reviewed by the juvenile court, which exercised its discretion to
find that DCFS had conducted an adequate ICWA inquiry and
that ICWA did not apply.

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contacting maternal grandfather or any other maternal relative
appear from our record.
With regard to father’s family, the social worker asked
paternal grandmother for paternal grandfather’s contact
information, but she did not have it. Paternal grandmother said,
however, that paternal grandfather did not have Indian ancestry.
Subsequently, paternal grandmother reported that paternal
grandfather did not have a phone, but she provided a phone
number for paternal grandfather’s sister, Mary G. The social
worker contacted Mary G. and left a detailed message with a call-
back number. A social worker also contacted paternal aunt
Cindee M., who reported the family had no Indian ancestry.
The juvenile court concluded in Aaron’s sibling’s case in
January 2024 that DCFS had conducted an adequate inquiry and
that ICWA did not apply to that case. That finding was
supported by substantial evidence—namely, by evidence that
(1) DCFS had spoken to, or made reasonable efforts to attempt to
speak to, all known extended family members on both sides of the
family, and (2) all of the extended family members with whom
DCFS had spoken denied Indian ancestry.
We conclude, moreover, that reversing for a further ICWA
inquiry in this case would contribute to an “endless feedback loop
of remand, appeal, and remand” that our Supreme Court has
cautioned against. (See Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.) As
described above, we previously conditionally affirmed the
termination of parental rights in the sibling’s case for DCFS to
make an ICWA inquiry of the maternal and paternal
grandmothers, the maternal and paternal grandfathers, and
paternal aunt Cindee M. DCFS made an inquiry of the paternal
grandmother and two paternal aunts; was unable to inquire of

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the maternal grandmother because she was deceased; and
attempted without success to contact the maternal and paternal
grandfathers. We decline to reverse and remand for yet another
attempt to contact the grandfathers.
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

ADAMS, J.

HANASONO, J.

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