CourtListener 10639775•In re M.G. CA2/5
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Filed 7/23/25 In re M.G. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re M.G., a Person Coming B339418
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
24CCJP01672)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
L.G., et al.,
Defendants and
Appellants.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of the County of
Los Angeles, Syna N. Dennis, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
Donna B. Kaiser, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant L.G.
Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant S.T.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
L.G. (father) and S.T. (mother)—the parents of M.G. (the
child)—appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and
disposition orders, arguing the court abused its discretion by
issuing those orders without hearing from an Indian tribal
representative who requested leave to participate in the
proceeding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 306.6.1
We affirm.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Prior Petition Involving M.G.’s Family
On April 3, 2020, the Department of Children and Family
Services (the Department) filed a petition under section 300 on
behalf of the child’s two older siblings, K.G. and P.G., alleging
that their parents’ substance abuse endangered them. On
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institution Code, unless otherwise indicated.
2
June 25, 2021, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights
of mother and father to K.G. and P.G. under section 366.26.
On appeal from the section 366.26 order, this court
conditionally reversed the order and remanded for compliance
with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 24 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq.) and related California statutes (§ 224, et seq.). (In
re K.G. (Feb. 18, 2022 (B315934) [non. pub. opn.].) On remand,
the juvenile court again terminated jurisdiction.
B. Current Petition on Behalf of the Child
On May 29, 2024, the Department filed a section 300
petition on behalf of the child alleging mother and father had a
recent history of methamphetamine and marijuana abuse, which
resulted in the removal of the child’s two older siblings, and that
mother had used drugs during her pregnancy with the child.
In the detention report, a social worker advised that,
following the delivery of the child on May 23, 2024, mother tested
positive for fentanyl2 and the newborn tested positive for opiates.
Mother also admitted using methamphetamine and marijuana as
recently as nine months prior to the child’s birth and that she
was not receiving any services to address her substance abuse
issues. On May 26, 2024, the juvenile court issued a removal
warrant for the child.
At the May 30, 2024, detention hearing, the juvenile court
found the Department had made a prima facie showing that the
child was a person described in section 300, placed her under the
supervision of the Department, and released her to the parents
2 Mother’s test for fentanyl was later determined to be a
“false-positive.”
3
under several conditions, including that the child would reside
with mother, the parents would submit to weekly drug and
alcohol testing, and the parents would make themselves available
for announced and unannounced visits by the Department.
C. Section 385 Application
On June 4, 2024, the Department filed an ex parte
application pursuant to section 385 seeking an order detaining
the child from the parents. According to the Department, prior to
the detention hearing, mother and father had been evicted from
the motel where they had been residing, but did not disclose that
fact to the juvenile court; the adoptive mother of K.G. and P.G.
reported that mother admitted using methamphetamine while
pregnant with the child; and the test of the child’s meconium
sample taken at the hospital came back positive for
methamphetamine.
During the June 5, 2024, hearing on the section 385
application, the child’s counsel conceded that the Department
had made a prima facie showing supporting its request to detain,
but argued there was an alternative means to protect the child as
mother had enrolled in an in-patient drug treatment facility that
allowed the child to reside there with her. The juvenile court
ordered that the child could remain placed with mother at the
facility, so long as mother resided there. But the court removed
the child from father with monitored visitation rights.
4
D. Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing
In a July 11, 2024, last minute information for the court,
the Department reported that mother was being discharged from
her in-patient drug treatment program for possessing drug
paraphernalia, offering marijuana to another mother at the
facility, and breaking the program’s rules.
At the July 16, 2024, jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the
juvenile court sustained the allegations relating to the parents’
substance abuse under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (2).
The court removed the child from the parents and ordered
reunification services for mother. The court, however, denied
father any further services.
E. ICWA Proceedings
The ICWA-010(A) form attached to the section 300 petition
stated that a social worker asked mother and father about the
child’s Indian ancestry, and they informed her the child was or
might be a member of or eligible for membership in the
“Chickamauga Cherokee Sac and White River Bands” (the tribe)
and that the child’s extended family members were or might be
members of the tribe. The detention report also stated that
mother claimed Indian ancestry on both sides of the child’s family
and that family members were “part of the [tribe].” Father
confirmed mother’s claim of Indian ancestry, as did the maternal
grandmother. And, the social worker further advised that “Chief
Stephanie Jeffords reported there [was] Native American
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Ancestry for the family” and that “they [were] part of the
[tribe].”3
On May 28, 2024, the Department e-mailed notice of the
detention hearing to Chief Jeffords who replied that the tribe had
“‘serious concerns about the events that transpired on 25 May
2024, whereby [the Department] failed to contact . . . mother’s
tribe, violating ICWA. Additionally, [the Department] acted
rashly by reacting to a false positive test, which has now led our
citizen to unnecessarily have her child taken and endure
considerable stress. . . . Mother has been under tribal care and
has been drug free for over 9 months. [¶] If anyone should have
been called it is the Indian Health Services.’”
Chief Jeffords’s e-mail attached a copy of a letter she sent
to the “Pasadena Superior Court.” In the letter, Chief Jeffords
3 The social worker reported that, on May 26, 2024, she
received a voicemail from Chief Jeffords accusing her of stealing
the child; claiming the child was a member of a federally
recognized tribe; asserting the social worker had violated state
and federal law, including ICWA; and threatening to “‘put [the
social worker] in jail.’” Chief Jeffords added, “‘I am getting an
attorney. We’re going to make sure that you suffer the
consequences of your actions. . . . How dare you.’”
Later that same evening, the social worker received a text
message from Chief Jeffords reiterating that the child was a
member of the tribe protected under ICWA who had been taken
from mother “‘illegally’” and claiming that the social worker had
“‘endangered the health of the baby and . . . mother.’” The chief
concluded by stating, “‘We have worked with [mother] over the
last year to improve herself. You have now undone months of
work. Your actions are illegal, immoral and unethical. [¶] Who
is your supervisor because I need to notify her that you are now
listed as part of our [lawsuit] for violating federal law.’”
6
advised the court that she intended “to intervene and testify on
behalf of [mother] whose baby was taken at two days old despite
the hospital . . . verifying the child’s health and welfare were not
in danger.”
At the May 30, 2024, detention hearing, mother and father
submitted ICWA-020 forms stating that the child and mother
were or might be eligible for membership in the tribe located in
either “Oklahoma” or “Missouri and Arkansas.” During the
hearing, the juvenile court asked mother about Indian ancestry,
and she responded, “I am Chickamauga Cherokee, and we’re a
federally recognized tribe. . . . [¶] I have been in contact with
my Chief. I’ve been in contact with her every day so far.” When
asked about his Indian ancestry, father replied, “Same as my
wife.”
In response, counsel for the Department noted that,
notwithstanding the claims of mother and Chief Jeffords to the
contrary, the tribe was not a federally recognized; the tribe, while
represented by Chief Jeffords, had moved to intervene in the
prior dependency proceeding involving two of the child’s older
siblings, claiming the tribe was federally recognized; and the
court in that proceeding found that the tribe was not federally
recognized, the child’s two older siblings were not Indian
children, and ICWA did not apply to that proceeding.
But the Department’s counsel also acknowledged that the
court in the siblings’ proceeding found their case to be a heritage
case pursuant to section 306.6 and that it had discretion to allow
the tribe to participate and provide recommendations in
accordance with that statute. Finally, noting Chief Jeffords’s
letter to the Pasadena court in this case, the Department’s
counsel agreed that it could be treated as a request to participate
7
in the proceedings under section 306.6 and therefore could be
determined either at the end of the detention hearing or at a
continued hearing.
In response to counsel’s arguments, the juvenile court took
judicial notice of the rulings in the prior dependency proceeding
and found that there was no reason to know that the child was an
Indian child within the meaning of ICWA and that ICWA did not
apply to the child’s case.
On June 4, 2024, the Department filed a written opposition
to Chief Jeffords’s request to intervene pursuant to section 306.6.
It argued that Chief Jeffords’s prior communications with the
Department and the juvenile court showed that the chief
misrepresented her tribe’s federally recognized status. The
Department asked the court to deny the request to participate or,
in the alternative, requested that any participation be limited to
attending hearings and submitting informational reports.
On June 27, 2024, the juvenile court continued the
scheduled hearing on the tribe’s request to participate under
section 306.6 to July 16, 2024, the date of the continued
adjudication hearing, and ordered the Department to give notice
to the tribe.
In its July 3, 2024, last minute information for the court,
the Department reported that it had contacted Chief Jeffords,
confirmed a mailing address for the tribe, and sent notices of the
jurisdiction/disposition hearing to the address provided.4
At the July 16, 2024, adjudication hearing, no
representative appeared on behalf of the tribe. At the beginning
4 The notice sent to the tribe provided the date, time, and
place of the adjudication hearing, but did not mention the
hearing on the tribe’s request to participate under section 306.6.
8
of the hearing, the juvenile court asked the Department’s counsel
whether there had been any updates concerning the child’s ICWA
status. Counsel responded that there had been no updates,
reminded the court that the matter was on calendar for a section
306.6 hearing, and represented that the tribe had been given
notice. Because no representative of the tribe had appeared for
the hearing, the Department’s counsel asked that the request to
participate be denied.
The child’s counsel acknowledged the tribe had “not
participated in the last couple of hearings,” but urged the juvenile
court to allow the tribe’s participation under section 306.6.
Counsel also noted that ICWA did not apply.
Mother’s counsel joined in the arguments of the child’s
counsel and emphasized that mother wanted the tribe “to be able
to have a seat at the table in this case”, adding that “the more
support a child has the better off they are.”
After hearing the arguments of counsel, the juvenile court
explained: “I have . . . no objection to the tribe’s participation,
per se. However, I am informed that they received notice, and
they chose not to show up. So it would seem to me the tribe has
already made its decision about whether or not it chooses to
participate in this matter. [¶] So on that basis, I would be
inclined to grant the Department’s motion and not allow
participation from the tribe.” After further consideration,
however, the court decided to allow the tribe to participate,
reasoning: “Since [the child’s] counsel and mother’s counsel want
the tribe to participate, I’ll allow the participation, but it will be
limited to attending hearings only, and they will get notice. And
if they show up, they show up. But they got notice of this
hearing, and they didn’t show up. [¶] . . . So let’s go on to the
9
adjudication. I’ll restate the prior ICWA findings there’s no
reason to know that the child is an Indian child within the
meaning of ICWA, and the court finds that ICWA does not
apply.”
On July 17, 2024, father and mother filed notices of appeal
from the juvenile court’s findings and orders made at the
jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
III. DISCUSSION
Mother and father5 contend that the juvenile court abused
its discretion when it denied the tribe the opportunity to
participate in the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. According to
the parents, “[t]he juvenile court’s stated reason for denying the
motion—the tribe’s absence from the hearing—was unsound
given that notice for the hearing was materially defective. This
necessarily means the action transgressed the confines of the
applicable legal principles—principles intended to assist the
court in determining the child’s best interest.”
A. Legal Principles
“In any given case, ICWA applies or not depending on
whether the child who is the subject of the custody proceeding is
an Indian child.” (In re Abbigail A. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83, 90.) Only
federally recognized Indian children and tribes are entitled to the
5 Father joins in mother’s arguments concerning the juvenile
court’s abuse of discretion without making any separate
arguments.
10
protections of ICWA; “non-federally recognized tribes . . . have no
rights under ICWA . . . .” (Id. at p. 94.)
In California, the Legislature enacted section 306.66 which
gives juvenile courts the discretion to allow non-federally
6 Section 306.6 provides, in pertinent part: “(a) In a
dependency proceeding involving a child who would otherwise be
an Indian child, based on the definition contained in subdivision
(b) of Section 224.1, but is not an Indian child based on the child’s
Indian tribe not having federal recognition, as described by
paragraph (4) of subdivision (a) of Section 224.1, the court may
permit the tribe from which the child is descended to participate
in the proceeding upon request of the tribe.
“(b) If the court permits a tribe to participate in a
proceeding, the tribe may do all of the following, upon consent of
the court: [¶] (1) Be present at the hearing or appear remotely
as authorized by subdivision (l) of Section 224.2. [¶] (2) Address
the court. [¶] (3) Request and receive notice of hearings. [¶]
(4) Request to examine court documents relating to the
proceeding. [¶] (5) Present information to the court that is
relevant to the proceeding. [¶] (6) Submit written reports and
recommendations to the court. [¶] (7) Perform other duties and
responsibilities as requested or approved by the court.
[¶] . . . [¶]
“(d) This section is intended to assist the court in making
decisions that are in the best interest of the child by permitting a
tribe in the circumstances set out in subdivision (a) to inform the
court and parties to the proceeding about placement options for
the child within the child’s extended family or the tribal
community, services and programs available to the child and the
child’s parents as Indians, and other unique interests the child or
the child’s parents may have as Indians. This section shall not be
construed to make [ICWA], or any state law implementing
[ICWA], applicable to the proceedings, or to limit the court’s
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recognized tribes to participate in cases involving children who
would be Indian children but for the unrecognized status of their
tribe. (§ 306.6, subd. (a); In re Abbigail A., supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 94.) The decision to allow such participation is made upon a
case-by-case basis. (§ 306.6, subd. (e).)
If the juvenile court decides to allow an unrecognized tribe
to participate in a dependency proceeding, section 306.6 limits
such participation to receiving notice of hearings upon request,
being present at hearings and addressing the court, examining
court documents, providing information to the court, including
the submission of reports and recommendations, and performing
such duties and responsibilities as requested by the court. (Id.,
subd. (b).)
We review a juvenile court’s ruling on an unrecognized
tribe’s request to participate in a dependency proceeding under
section 306.6 for abuse of discretion. (In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 984, 1005, cited with approval, but disapproved on
other grounds in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1141, 1152,
fn. 18.) “‘“The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether
the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more
discretion to permit other interested persons to participate in
these or any other proceedings.
“(e) The court shall, on a case-by-case basis, make a
determination if this section is applicable and may request
information from the tribe, or the entity claiming to be a tribe,
from which the child is descended for the purposes of making this
determination, if the child would otherwise be an Indian child
pursuant to subdivision (a).
12
inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for
13
that of the trial court.”’” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295,
318–319.)
B. Analysis
The parents contend the trial court abused its discretion in
limiting the tribe’s participation in these proceedings. In their
view, “[g]iven the family’s close connection to [the tribe] and the
tribe’s earlier effort to assist mother, granting the tribe the right
to present information to the court was the only decision
consistent with the purpose of section 306.6.”
We will assume for sake of argument that Chief Jeffords’s
letter to the Pasadena court asserting the tribe’s right to
intervene under ICWA, as a federally recognized tribe,
constituted a request, under section 306.6, to participate in the
child’s case as an unrecognized tribe. We nonetheless find no
abuse of discretion. Here, even after receiving notice that the
court would be conducting an adjudication hearing on July 16,
2024, the tribe did not appear at that hearing. Further, Chief
Jeffords threatened to jail the social worker for seeking to remove
the child from mother and expressed an interest in intervening
“on behalf of [mother].” On this record, the court could have
reasonably concluded that the best interests of the child—rather
than mother—supported an order limiting the tribe’s
participation to receiving notice of the hearings and appearing at
them.
The parents next contend that the notice provided to Chief
Jeffords was inadequate because it provided only that “there
would be an ‘Adjudication Hearing,’ with no mention of the
motion to intervene or section 306.6.” We disagree. “Section
14
306.6 permits the court in a dependency action to allow a tribe
which is not federally recognized to appear in the proceeding and
present information to the court. [Fn. omitted].” (In re A.C.
(2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 282, 287.) By its terms, the statute does
not require that any notice the court decides to provide to the
tribe include a reference to a section 306.6 hearing. (See ibid.)7
7 The parents, in their opening briefs, contended that the
Department provided defective notice to the tribe when it sent a
written notice of the July 16, 2024, because the tribe “was being
represented by California attorney, Mark Vezzola” yet the
Department failed to provide him with notice. In their reply
briefs, the parents conceded that they had made an error in their
opening brief in that the tribe was not represented by counsel in
these proceedings.
15
IV. DISPOSITION
The jurisdiction and disposition orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
MOOR, J.
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