CourtListener 10639772•People v. Edmond CA2/7
Texto completo
Filed 7/23/25 P. v. Edmond CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B333724
Plaintiff and (Los Angeles County
Respondent, Super. Ct. No. TA150158)
v.
MICHAEL EDMOND,
Defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kelvin D. Filer, Judge. Affirmed.
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Lauren N. Guber, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________
Michael Edmond appeals from a judgment of conviction
after a jury found him guilty of three counts of committing a lewd
act on a child under the age of 14 years. On appeal, Edmond
contends the court abused its discretion in admitting photographs
of two of the victims’ genitals and erred by failing to instruct the
jury on expert testimony regarding Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS). Edmond also argues there
was not substantial evidence to support the convictions. Finally,
Edmond asserts the court incorrectly calculated his custody
credits. We modify the sentence to reflect the appropriate
number of custody credits and affirm the judgment as modified.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Evidence at Trial
In 2019 Michael Edmond was the coach for several youth
sports teams and was the deejay at events in the local park.
Many children in the neighborhood spent time at Edmond’s home
that summer playing and swimming. Edmond would help them
with math and reading and take them to cheerleading practice
and football games. It was common for 10 to 13 children to be at
Edmond’s house each day. Many of the children spent the night
at Edmond’s house, some for a few nights a week, others for
weeks at a time. Typically the boys slept in the living room, and
the girls slept in the den. Edmond slept in a chair in the den
with the girls. Edmond’s brother and sister also lived in the
home in 2019.
Three of the children who spent significant time in
Edmond’s home during the summer of 2019 were Asyah H.,
2
Arianna G., and Sanai L.1 In August or September 2019, Sanai
and Asyah told Sanai’s mother that Edmond had acted
inappropriately with some of the girls. Sanai’s mother informed
the other parents and filed a police report. Edmond was arrested
on September 21, 2019.
Asyah was nine years old in the summer of 2019 and
12 years old at the time of trial. She testified she spent a lot of
time at Edmond’s house during the summer of 2019 and slept
there three or four nights per week. Asyah described several
incidents in which Edmond touched her inappropriately or made
her feel uncomfortable. On one occasion she was asleep in the
den and awoke to someone “touching [her] butt.” She did not see
who it was. At one point Edmond showed Asyah pictures of
women’s “butt[s]” and “boobs,” which made her feel “weird.”
Another time Asyah asked Edmond to put lotion on her
back. She stated, “[H]e was putting his fingers lower than where
my back was. . . . He had the lotion on his hand, and then he was
putting his finger in my private area.” She clarified that by
“private area” she meant “like my butt part. . . . Like where the
hole is.” Asyah said the area started burning and she started to
cry. She went into the bathroom and took a shower.
Asyah also recounted a time she was lying on the couch in
the den watching television while Arianna and Sanai were in a
blanket fort they had built in the den. The side of the fort facing
the couch was open so the girls could get in and out. While Asyah
was watching television, she felt Edmond lie down on top of her,
1 There were two additional alleged victims in this case,
Octavia H. and Kaila C. Because the jury acquitted Edmond on
all charges relating to Octavia and Kaila, we do not recount their
testimony.
3
and he “started rotating his body like up and down.” Asyah
recalled, “He was on top of me, and then I felt his private area.
And then he just kept on going up and down.” She felt
uncomfortable and scared.
Arianna was 11 years old in the summer of 2019 and
14 years old at the time of trial. She frequently spent the night
at Edmond’s home during the summer of 2019. She recalled one
incident in the summer of 2019 when she and Octavia were lying
naked on the couch, and Edmond “would go on top of one of us,
and then he [would] switch to the other one.” Initially, Arianna
was clothed, but then Edmond took her clothes off. He was not
wearing a shirt. Edmond touched the two girls with his hands
and was “groping” and “rubbing” their “chests” and “private
area.” In addition, Edmond’s penis “was rubbing against”
Arianna’s butt. Arianna was in shock and felt surprised. While
this was happening, Asyah and Sanai were asleep in the fort.
Arianna recalled another time that summer when she,
Asyah, and Sanai were dancing on the couch while Edmond
watched them from his chair. He told the girls to take their
clothes off and then watched them dance naked. Ariana
remembered Edmond had something in his hand, which she
thought was a camera. Arianna was nervous and scared. She
did not want to be naked on the couch while being recorded.
Sanai was 10 years old in the summer of 2019 and 13 years
old at the time of trial. She stayed at Edmond’s home most of the
summer of 2019, sometimes going home on weekends. Sanai
described an incident similar to one described by Arianna when
Edmond told Sanai, Asyah, and Arianna to take their clothes off
and “have a dance party” while Edmond appeared to film them
from his chair. Sanai recalled another time when she was asleep
4
on the couch and woke up to Edmond “touching” her on her
“private area” where she “pee[s] from.” She felt uncomfortable
and upset. On another occasion Sanai remembered falling asleep
with her pants and underwear on, but when she woke up her
clothes were gone. Another time Sanai was taking a shower
when Edmond came into the bathroom and tried to record her.
She was “really uncomfortable” and tried to hide herself with the
shower curtain.
In the fall of 2019, after Sanai’s mother filed a police report,
a forensic nurse examined each of the girls, and a forensic or
sexual assault examiner interviewed them. The video recordings
of the interviews were played for the jury, and the transcripts
were provided to the jury. Forensic nurse Malinda Wheeler
interviewed Sanai in September 2019. Wheeler testified
regarding the procedures for forensic interviews generally, and
she stated it is common for children to divulge more information
about their abuse as time passes. This is because children may
be afraid or ashamed and “they just want to gauge the reaction of
a trusted, loving adult in their life, to see, well, what’s really
going to happen if I tell this little bit. And then they will tell
maybe a little bit more the next time. And then maybe a little bit
more the next time.” Wheeler also explained it was common for
children to report that the sexual abuse had occurred while other
children were nearby or in the same room.
Forensic nurse examiner and forensic interview specialist
Patricia Goclowski interviewed Arianna and conducted a sexual
assault examination on Sanai. Goclowski testified regarding her
interview methodology. She stated it was common for child
sexual assault victims to omit details during their forensic
interviews for several reasons. They may have forgotten certain
5
details by the time of the interview, or they may feel like they
have already disclosed details and do not need to repeat
themselves. Sometimes children are subject to external
pressures that make them reluctant to make disclosures.
Forensic interviewer Suzy Flores conducted a forensic
interview with Asyah. Flores testified regarding the general
methodology of forensic interviews of child sexual abuse victims.
She explained children often disclose more details about their
abuse as time passes because when they first report abuse, they
are often “testing the waters,” and “a lot of time it’s not the full
narrative of whatever their experience was.” She further
explained it was not common for children to immediately report
their abuse because they may have a close relationship with the
abuser and/or feel affection toward the abuser. For these
reasons, it is common for children to return to the location of
their abuse even if they anticipate the abuse will continue.
Sexual assault nurse examiner Jennifer Rivera conducted
physical examinations of Asyah and Arianna in November 2019.
She testified both girls complained of abdominal pain and
constipation. Asyah also complained of genital pain and pain
during urination. Arianna complained of rectal pain and
bleeding. Rivera stated both girls’ examinations were normal
and did not confirm or negate sexual abuse.
Los Angeles Police Detective Rose Gaeta led the
investigation into the alleged abuse. Detective Gaeta testified
that a search warrant was executed at Edmond’s residence, and
several electronic devices were seized, including a video recorder,
cameras, and a cell phone. The officers found nothing relevant to
the sexual abuse allegations on the devices. Gaeta interviewed
6
Edmond on the day of his arrest, and a recording of the interview
was played for the jury and admitted into evidence.
In the interview, Edmond denied any sexual abuse. He told
Detective Gaeta he had known Arianna, Asyah, and Sanai their
entire lives and was close to their families. He said he was like a
“God-dad” or “Papa” to them. He stated, “The girls love hanging
on me. They love kissing on me. . . . They wanna lay on me and
rubbing backs and rubbing on legs, that’s about as far as I go.
I’m not sexually doing—I don’t know where that came from. I’m
just surprised.” He continued, “We wrestle a lot. She may be
lying on top of me, but no open sex.” Edmond admitted he had
watched pornography and masturbated in the den when he
thought the girls were asleep. He also admitted to applying
ointment on the upper inner thigh of one of the girls.
Edmond called his sister, Charlotte Island, as a witness.2
Island testified she never witnessed any inappropriate sexual
behavior between Edmond and the girls. But Island did recall an
incident in which Sanai was crying late at night in the bathroom.
Sanai was wearing only a towel and complained about having
bug bites. Island offered Sanai ointment and allergy medication,
and Island let Sanai sleep in Island’s room.
The defense also called Bradley McAuliff as an expert
regarding child and witness suggestibility in forensic
interviewing. McAuliff reviewed the five recorded interviews of
the children (and other materials) in preparation for his
testimony. He opined that suggestibility could be an issue in this
case because the alleged abuse occurred three years prior to the
trial. During that time, the victims’ memories may have faded,
2 Edmond did not testify at trial.
7
and the girls may have been susceptible to influence from adults
or their friends. McAuliff was asked about a hypothetical
scenario in which two girls report sexual abuse to a parent and
the parent discusses the allegations with other parents, who then
question their own children about the allegations. McAuliff
opined this situation created a risk of cross-contamination in
which one individual’s account can merge into another
individual’s memory of the incident. He stated as to the recorded
interviews, “For the most part those interviews were done
well. . . . Although I may have done something differently . . . I
certainly wouldn’t argue that those forensic interviewers are
bad—you can’t believe anything those children say.”
B. The Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found Edmond guilty on three counts of
committing a lewd act on a child under age 14, one each as to
Asyah, Arianna, and Sanai. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).)3 The
jury found Edmond not guilty on the remaining counts, including
counts relating to Octavia and Kaila and additional counts
alleged as to Asyah and Arianna.
Edmond waived his right to a jury trial on two alleged
aggravating factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421,
and the trial court found true that the victims were particularly
vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)) and Edmond took advantage of a
position of trust or confidence (rule 4.421(a)(11)). In the
bifurcated proceeding the court also found true the allegation
that the offenses were committed against multiple victims
(§ 667.61, subds. (b) & (e)(4)).
3 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
8
The trial court sentenced Edmond to a state prison term of
15 years to life on one count of committing a lewd act on a child
and imposed a concurrent term of 15 years to life on each of the
remaining two counts.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Prejudicial Error in
Admitting Photographs of Asyah’s and Arianna’s Genitalia
1. Proceedings below
Prior to trial the prosecution notified the trial court that it
intended to introduce into evidence two photographs of Asyah’s
and Arianna’s genitals that were taken during their forensic
examinations in 2019. The photographs depict the girls’ vaginas
and anuses. The prosecutor stated the photographs were
relevant to “capture the appropriate age [and] physical stature at
the time when the crime was reported.” The prosecutor
continued, “I have to prove to the jury that penetration
occurred. . . . [T]he jury needs to know the anatomical—how
would I say? The vagina of an adult is much more developed as
opposed to the vagina of a child who is under 10 years old.”
Defense counsel objected that the photographs were more
prejudicial than probative. The court deferred ruling on the
admissibility of the photographs until trial.
The prosecution sought to introduce the photographs
during trial, arguing the photographs corroborated Asyah’s
testimony that Edmond forced the girls to remove their clothes
and dance naked for him and that Edmond rubbed lotion on her
anus. Defense counsel argued the photographs had no probative
value, were inflammatory, and were being admitted only to elicit
sympathy from the jury.
9
After reviewing the photographs, the trial court ruled the
prosecution could admit one photograph each of Asyah and
Arianna. The court rejected the prosecutor’s argument that the
photographs corroborated testimony about the girls dancing
naked. However, the court stated, “I’m not suggesting
evidentiary value for either side, because the evidentiary value
cuts both ways as I see it. . . . [T]here is some evidentiary value
given the photos that show whether there was or was not pubic
hair, the amount of pubic hair, and also the anatomy of the girls’
bodies. . . . And I don’t think it’s too prejudicial. . . . [O]ur jurors
are adults, and I don’t think they will be swayed by having one
photo of that particular area of the young girls.”
During her testimony, Rivera identified the photographs as
ones she had taken during her physical examinations of Asyah
and Arianna. Rivera identified the opening of the vagina, the
hymen, and the anus in Asyah’s photograph. Neither side asked
Rivera questions about the photographs.
Defense counsel renewed her objection to the photographs
prior to the admission of exhibits at the close of the prosecution’s
case. The trial court again overruled the objection, stating, “I do
think there is some evidentiary value in supporting the physical
appearance of the children and whether that was something that
could conceivably encourage, instigate, be a motive actually as
well in terms of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a
child. . . .”
During her closing argument, the prosecutor showed the
photographs to the jury. In recounting Asyah’s testimony that
Edmond had applied lotion to her anal area, the prosecutor
stated, “And that is the reason why I showed you Asyah’s
photograph of her genital parts. . . . That is her vagina, and that
10
is her hole.” The prosecutor showed the photograph again later
in her argument, pointing out it depicted “very minimal pubic
hair. You can see how small her vagina is.” The prosecutor also
showed the photograph of Arianna’s genitals, observing it
depicted “some pubic hair. Again, a prepubescent child.”
2. The trial court erred in admitting the photographs,
but the error was harmless
Edmond contends, the Attorney General concedes, and we
agree the trial court erred in admitting the photographs of the
victim’s genitalia. As the Attorney General succinctly stated,
“the photographs do not appear to be relevant to any contested
issue in this case,” and “there were no physical findings depicted
in either of the photos that would tend to prove any element of
the charged offenses.” However, admission of the photographs
was not prejudicial.
“[T]he application of ordinary rules of evidence like
Evidence Code section 352 does not implicate the federal
Constitution, and thus we review allegations of error under the
‘reasonable probability’ standard of [People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818].” (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 226-227;
accord, People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 373-374
[applying Watson to alleged error under Evid. Code, § 352 in
admitting photographs of victim].) “‘Under the Watson standard,
the erroneous admission of a photograph warrants reversal of a
conviction only if the appellate court concludes that it is
reasonably probable the jury would have reached a different
result had the photograph been excluded.’” (Thomas, at p. 374.)
Edmond argues admission of the photographs requires
reversal because “at least one juror would have had reasonable
11
doubt as to appellant’s guilt . . . but for the emotions evoked by
the photographs.” While the photographs may have evoked an
emotional reaction in the jury, the record does not support a
finding it was reasonably probable the jury was overcome with
emotion that affected the verdicts. Notably, the jury did not find
Edmond guilty on all counts relating to Asyah and Arianna
despite admission of the photographs. And during deliberations,
the jury requested readback of part of Asyah’s testimony and
submitted a question asking for clarification on the unanimity
instruction. This shows the jury was carefully considering the
witnesses’ versions of events and assessing their credibility, and
there is no evidence the jury was overcome by emotion or
otherwise improperly influenced by the photographs. It was
therefore not reasonably probable Edmond would have obtained a
more favorable result had the trial court excluded the
photographs. (See People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
B. The Lack of an Instruction with CALCRIM No. 1193 Does
Not Require Reversal
1. CSAAS evidence and the limiting instruction
“Expert testimony on CSAAS has long been held admissible
in California for the limited purposes of dispelling commonly held
myths or misconceptions about child sexual abuse and aiding the
jury in ‘evaluating the credibility of an alleged child victim of
sexual abuse.’ [Citations.] CSAAS testimony is permitted ‘“to
explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly
self-impeaching behavior,”’ such as delayed disclosure of the
abuse. [Citations.] An expert’s explanation of CSAAS ‘is
admissible to rehabilitate [a complaining] witness’s credibility
when the defendant suggests that the child’s conduct after the
incident—e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his or
12
her testimony claiming molestation.’” (People v. Sedano (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 474, 479.)
“However, pursuit of that laudable rehabilitative purpose
must not lead the expert to cross over into affirmatively vouching
for the truthfulness of a complainant’s allegations against the
defendant.” (People v. Sedano, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 479-
480.) Thus, “[e]xpert testimony about CSAAS ‘is inadmissible to
prove that a child has been abused because the syndrome was
developed not to prove abuse but to assist in understanding and
treating abused children. However, . . . such evidence may be
admitted to dispel common misconceptions the jury may hold as
to how such children react to abuse.’” (People v. Mateo (2016)
243 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1069 (Mateo).)
Accordingly, the Judicial Council of California has
developed a pattern jury instruction stating, “Child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome relates to a pattern of behavior that
may be present in child sexual abuse cases. Testimony as to the
accommodation syndrome is offered only to explain certain
behavior of an alleged victim of child sexual abuse. [¶] [The]
testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome is
not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes
charged against (him/her) [or any conduct or crime[s] with which
(he/she) was not charged]. [¶] You may consider this evidence
only in deciding whether or not [alleged victim’s] conduct was
consistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested,
and in evaluating the believability of the alleged victim.”
(CALCRIM No. 1193.)
13
2. Proceedings below
During a pretrial hearing the prosecutor stated she
intended to have an expert testify regarding CSAAS. Defense
counsel objected, but requested that, if the trial court allowed the
testimony, the jury be given a limiting instruction that the
expert’s testimony is not evidence that abuse occurred. The court
agreed it would instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 1193 either
before or after the expert’s testimony.
The prosecution’s CSAAS expert was unavailable to testify
at trial, and the prosecution instead relied on the testimony of
Wheeler and Flores for an explanation of CSAAS. Although
neither Wheeler nor Flores mentioned the syndrome by name or
opined on the credibility of the alleged victims in this case, they
testified regarding common behaviors of child sexual assault
victims. During the testimony of both Wheeler and Flores, the
trial court instructed the jury with a modified version of
CALCRIM No. 332, stating, in part, that the jury must consider
the opinions of the expert but is not required to accept them as
true or correct and the jury may disregard any opinion it finds
unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence.
After the conclusion of evidence, the court held a conference
during which it reviewed the proposed instructions with the
parties. Defense counsel did not request CALCRIM No. 1193.
CALCRIM No. 332 was included in the jury instructions given at
the conclusion of the case.
3. The trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to
instruct with CALCRIM No. 1193
“In criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, a trial
court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to the
14
issues raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case.” (People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th
911, 953.) But as the Court of Appeal explained in Mateo, supra,
243 Cal.App.4th at page 1071 with respect to expert testimony on
CSAAS, “As a general matter, the Legislature has determined
that limiting instructions need not be given sua sponte. ‘When
evidence is admissible as to one party or for one purpose and is
inadmissible as to another party or for another purpose, the court
upon request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and
instruct the jury accordingly.’” (Quoting Evid. Code, § 355, italics
added.) The Mateo court observed that the Supreme Court has
consistently applied Evidence Code section 355 with respect to
limited purpose evidence, citing People v. Hernandez (2004)
33 Cal.4th 1040, 1051-1052, in which the Supreme Court stated
there was no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the limited
use of gang evidence, and People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th
1073, 1088, footnote 5, which observed as to evidence of battered
women’s syndrome, “an additional limiting instruction might also
be appropriate on request.” (Mateo, at p. 1071; see People v.
Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 63 [no sua sponte limiting instruction
required for evidence of prior criminal acts].) We review de novo
whether a trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on
applicable principles of law. (People v. Martin (2000)
78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1111.)
Notwithstanding the case law and plain language of
Evidence Code section 355, Edmond relies on People v. Housley
(1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947 (Housley) to support his position that
the limited purpose instruction for CSAAS must be given
regardless of whether the defendant makes a request. In Housley
the court acknowledged the general principle that a trial court
15
has no sua sponte duty to give a limiting instruction. (Housley,
at p. 957.) However, the court observed that “[t]he frequency
with which defendants recently have challenged the alleged
misuse of CSAAS evidence suggests this type of testimony may
be unusually susceptible of being misunderstood and misapplied
by a jury. . . . [W]here the case boils down to the victim’s word
against the word of the accused, such evidence could unfairly tip
the balance in favor of the prosecution.” (Id. at p. 958.) The court
concluded “that because of the potential for misuse of CSAAS
evidence, and the potential for great prejudice to the defendant in
the event such evidence is misused, it is appropriate to impose
upon the courts a duty to render a sua sponte instruction limiting
the use of such evidence.” (Id. at pp. 958-959.)
The only published case to address this issue since Housley
is Mateo, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at pages 1073 to 1074. In
rejecting the reasoning in Housley, the court in Mateo observed
the holding in Housley was “at odds” with the Supreme Court’s
more recent decision in Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1073.
(Mateo, at p. 1073.) As the Mateo court explained, “Throughout
its opinion in Humphrey, the court repeatedly referred to the trial
court’s duty to give a limiting instruction on the use of battered
women’s syndrome evidence on request. [Citation.] The majority
opinion in Humphrey does not require a sua sponte limiting
instruction on the use of evidence of battered women’s syndrome,
it suggests that an instruction would be discretionary on request:
‘If the prosecution offers the battered women’s syndrome
evidence, an additional limiting instruction might also be
appropriate on request, given the statutory prohibition against
use of this evidence “to prove the occurrence of the act or acts of
abuse which form the basis of the criminal charge.” [Citations.]’
16
[Citation.] Battered women’s syndrome is analogous to CSAAS.
Both syndromes explain that victims’ ‘seemingly self-impeaching’
behaviors–e.g., delayed disclosure, returning to the home–are
consistent with their claims of having been beaten, raped, or
sexually molested. [Citations.] We can think of no reason why a
duty to instruct should be imposed in one situation and not the
other.” (Ibid.) Thus, the Mateo court concluded, a limiting
instruction regarding CSAAS testimony “need only be given if
requested.” (Id. at p. 1074.)
We agree with the analysis in Mateo and conclude the trial
court did not have a sua sponte duty to give a limiting instruction
regarding the CSAAS testimony.
4. Edmond has not shown ineffective assistance of
counsel
Edmond argues that, if we find the trial court had no sua
sponte duty to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 1193, his
counsel was ineffective for failing to request the instruction. To
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “defendant
must show, among other things, that his ‘counsel’s performance
was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’ [Citation.]
In evaluating his claim, we ‘defer[] to counsel’s reasonable
tactical decisions’ and presume that ‘counsel acted within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’” (People v.
Arredondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th 694, 711; accord, People v. Salcido
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 172.) “[I]f the record ‘“sheds no light on why
counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged,”’ we must
reject the claim ‘“unless counsel was asked for an explanation
and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no
17
satisfactory explanation.”’” (People v. Caro (2019) 7 Cal.5th 463,
488.)
In this case, the record is silent as to why defense counsel
did not request the trial court instruct with CALCRIM No. 1193.
And counsel may well have had valid tactical reasons for not
making the request. As the Court of Appeal reasoned in Mateo,
in concluding defense counsel might have had a tactical reason
for not requesting CALCRIM No. 1193, “As a tactical matter,
competent counsel could rationally conclude that it would be
counterproductive to request an instruction highlighting expert
testimony supporting the victim’s credibility. ‘A reasonable
attorney may have tactically concluded that the risk of a limiting
instruction . . . outweighed the questionable benefits such
instruction would provide.’” (Mateo, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1076; accord, People v. Venegas (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 32, 37
[“Experienced trial lawyers may worry limiting instructions can
simply underline evidence they would rather not highlight.”].)
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Convictions
“When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence for a jury finding, we review the entire record in the
light most favorable to the judgment of the trial court. We
evaluate whether substantial evidence, defined as reasonable and
credible evidence of solid value, has been disclosed, permitting
the trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People
v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 820; accord, People v. Penunuri
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142 (Penunuri) [“‘To assess the evidence’s
sufficiency, we review the whole record to determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime or special circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.’”].)
“‘“Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable
18
suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the
exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon
which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither
credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial
evidence.”’” (Penunuri, at p. 142; accord, People v. Mendez (2019)
7 Cal.5th 680, 703.) “Moreover, unless the testimony is
physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a
single witness is sufficient to support a conviction.” (People v.
Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)
“‘We presume in support of the judgment the existence of
every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the
evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the
trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted
simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be
reconciled with a contrary finding.’” (People v. Westerfield (2019)
6 Cal.5th 632, 713; accord, Penunuri, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 142
[“‘A reversal for insufficient evidence “is unwarranted unless it
appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support’” the jury’s verdict.’”].)
Edmond argues the evidence was insufficient to support the
findings that he committed the requisite acts with sexual intent.
Under section 288, subdivision (a), “a person who willfully and
lewdly commits any lewd or lascivious act . . . upon or with the
body, or any part or member thereof, of a child who is under the
age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or
gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or
the child, is guilty of a felony.” “‘Any touching of a child under
the age of 14 violates this section, even if the touching is
outwardly innocuous and inoffensive, if it is accompanied by the
19
intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desires of either the
perpetrator or the victim.’ [Citation.] By focusing on the
defendant’s intent to sexually exploit a child rather than on the
nature of the defendant’s offending act, section 288 ‘assumes that
young victims suffer profound harm whenever they are perceived
and used as objects of sexual desire.’” (People v. Shockley (2013)
58 Cal.4th 400, 404.) “Conviction under the statute has never
depended upon contact with the bare skin or ‘private parts’ of the
defendant or the victim. [Citations.] Stated differently, a lewd or
lascivious act can occur through the victim’s clothing and can
involve ‘any part’ of the victim’s body.” (People v. Martinez (1995)
11 Cal.4th 434, 444.)
“As the vast majority of courts have long recognized, the
only way to determine whether a particular touching is permitted
or prohibited is by reference to the actor’s intent as inferred from
all the circumstances.” (People v. Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th at
p. 450.) The jury may properly infer sexual intent based on “the
absence of an innocent explanation.” (Id. at p. 452 [“if the trier of
fact is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt, from all the
circumstances, that the touching of a child was sexually
motivated, nothing in the language, history, or purpose of
section 288 indicates that the touching should escape punishment
simply because it might not be considered a means of sexual
gratification by members of the mainstream population,” italics
omitted].)
All three girls testified regarding at least one incident in
which Edmond touched their bodies inappropriately. Asyah
recounted one incident in which Edmond rubbed lotion on her
butt “where the hole is” and another when he repeatedly rotated
his body on top of her. Arianna recalled a time that Edmond
20
instructed her to take off her clothes, and he then lay on top of
her while groping her chest and “private area.” Sanai stated she
once woke up to Edmond touching her where she “pees from.”
Presuming, as we must, that the jury believed the girls’
testimony, each of these accounts supports a finding Edmond
touched the girls’ bodies. Further, it was reasonable for the jury
to infer Edmond’s sexual intent given the lack of an innocent
explanation for these acts. Further, Edmond showed the girls
pictures of nude women and had them dance naked for him.
Even if an innocent explanation were possible—for example, that
Edmond mistakenly rubbed lotion on Asyah’s anus—the jury was
under no obligation to credit that interpretation. (See People v.
Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 713; Penunuri, supra, 5 Cal.5th
at p. 142.)
Edmond also argues the three girls’ testimony should be
rejected as inherently improbable. He argues that not only were
the girls’ descriptions of the acts improbable, but also it was
improbable the sexual abuse occurred while other girls were
sleeping in the same room. Edmond relies on three cases decided
more than 70 years ago to support his contention. For example,
in People v. Headlee (1941) 18 Cal.2d 266 (Headlee) the defendant
was convicted of three counts of kidnapping for purposes of rape.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction based on the
“inherent improbability” of the alleged victim’s testimony,
observing that the victim conceded she “exerted no physical effort
to prevent the alleged assault” and did not attempt to escape
when she had an opportunity to do so. (Id. at pp. 268, 274.)
Further, the court explained the victim “although
unmarried . . . had previously engaged in acts of sexual
intercourse.” (Id. at p. 274.) Thus, the court found it “highly
21
improbable” that the victim had not consented “either actively or
passively” to sexual intercourse with the defendant. (Id. at
p. 273-274.) The other cases relied on by Edmond are similarly
based on antiquated views and are inapposite. (See People v.
Carvalho (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 482, 489-490 (Carvalho)
[husband’s conviction for kidnapping his wife reversed because
wife’s testimony that she was afraid of husband was “fantastic”
and “[did] violence to reason” given wife had multiple
opportunities to get help or escape]; People v. Casillas (1943)
60 Cal.App.2d 785, 792-794 (Casillas) [father’s conviction for rape
of his teenage daughter reversed where trial court in bench trial
found daughter was credible in testifying her father had raped
her, but Court of Appeal found daughter’s inconsistent testimony
created reasonable doubt, noting there was no “corroborative
evidence or incriminatory circumstances being shown”].)
As a threshold matter, it was up to the jury to decide
whether the testimony of the girls was credible. Further, as to
the presence of the other girls during the abuse, the jury heard
testimony that it is common for children to report sexual abuse
had occurred while other individuals were in the same room or
house. Whatever relevance Headlee, Carvalho, and Casillas
cases may have in today’s legal landscape given the modern
understanding of CSAAS and battered women’s syndrome, we do
not find their reasoning applicable here.4
4 Edmond argues he was denied a fair trial because of the
cumulative errors involving the admission of evidence and jury
instructions. “‘[A] series of trial errors, though independently
harmless, may in some circumstances rise by accretion to the
level of reversible and prejudicial error.’” (People v. Abilez (2007)
41 Cal.4th 472, 523; accord, People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800,
844.) As discussed, the only error the trial court made was
22
D. Edmond Is Entitled to Additional Presentence Custody
Credits
Edmond contends, the People concede, and we agree
Edmond is entitled to additional presentence actual custody
credits and conduct credits. A defendant may earn presentence
conduct credit for performing assigned labor and complying with
applicable rules and regulations. For those defendants convicted
of a violent felony, which includes convictions under section 288,
subdivision (a) (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(6)), the rate of accumulated
conduct credit is limited to 15 percent of the actual days in
custody. (§ 2933.1, subds. (a) & (c).)
Edmond was arrested and placed in custody on
September 21, 2019, and he was sentenced on August 31, 2023.
The trial court awarded Edmond 1,074 days of actual custody
credits, plus 161 days of conduct credits for a total of 1,235 days
of presentence custody credits. However, the number of days
between his arrest on September 21, 2019 and sentencing on
August 31, 2023, including both the start and end dates, is
1,441 days. Edmond was therefore entitled to 1,441 actual days
of custody credit plus 216 days of conduct credit calculated at
15 percent of the total actual days (§ 2933.1), for a total of
1,657 days of presentence custody credits.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is modified to award Edmond
1,657 days of presentence custody credits. As modified, the
admission of the victims’ photographs, which we found was
harmless. Under these circumstances, there was no cumulative
error that prejudiced Edmond.
23
judgment is affirmed. The superior court is directed to prepare a
corrected abstract of judgment providing a total of 1,657 days of
presentence credits (1,441 actual days plus 216 days of conduct
credits), and to forward a copy of the corrected abstract of
judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
24
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.