CourtListener 10639769•Prince v. Wagner CA2/7
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Filed 7/23/25 Prince v. Wagner CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
WALTER NEWELL PRINCE on B339898
behalf of COUNTY OF LOS
ANGELES and CITY OF LONG (Los Angeles County
BEACH, Super. Ct. No. 23STCV15903)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
DONALD P. WAGNER et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Christopher K. Lui, Judge. Affirmed.
Graham and Associates and Anthony G. Graham for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Nicole M. Walsh, Senior
Assistant County Counsel, and Stephanie N. Clark, Deputy
County Counsel, for Defendants and Respondents.
_______________________
Walter Prince appeals from a judgment entered after the
trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer filed
by the County of Orange (the County), the Orange County Flood
Control District (the District), and Donald Wagner (collectively
the County defendants). Prince’s amended qui tam complaint
filed on behalf of the County of Los Angeles (Los Angeles County)
and the City of Long Beach (Long Beach), alleged the County
Defendants violated the False Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 12650 et
seq.; CFCA)1 by conspiring to deprive Los Angeles County and
Long Beach of permit fees and property taxes related to property
located within the Rossmoor Retarding Basin, which is located
partially in Los Angeles County and partially in the County.
In sustaining the demurrer, the trial court held the County
defendants were public entities that could not be sued under the
CFCA. On appeal, Prince contends the court erred because the
County defendants fell within the CFCA’s definition of “persons”
against whom CFCA claims may be brought. Contrary to
Prince’s contention, the County defendants are not “persons”
subject to suit under the CFCA, because they are governmental
entities and (as to Wagner) a government employee acting in his
official capacity. We affirm.
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Government Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The First Amended Complaint
On July 7, 2023 Prince filed a qui tam complaint, followed
by an amended complaint against the County defendants,2
alleging a single cause of action for violations of sections 12650
and 12651 of the CFCA.3 Prince alleged that in around 1977 the
County defendants commenced a decades-long project to
construct the Rossmoor Retarding Basin, which was designed to
contain water during severe rainstorms, and a pumping station
to transfer water from the basin to an adjoining creek. Prince
alleged the County defendants failed to pay various permitting
fees and property taxes over 25 years, resulting in lost revenue
for Los Angeles County and Long Beach. The amended complaint
sought treble damages, a civil penalty, and costs and expenses
under the CFCA.
B. The Demurrer To the First Amended Complaint
On March 21, 2024 the County defendants filed a demurrer
to Prince’s first amended complaint. The County defendants
argued that governmental entities and government employees
sued for acts taken in their official capacity are not considered
“persons” who can be sued under the CFCA. (§ 12650,
2 Prince sued Donald Wagner in his capacity as chairperson
of the County Board of Supervisors.
3 As required under the CFCA, Prince filed his qui tam
action under seal to allow the Attorney General or appropriate
political subdivision to determine whether to intervene as
plaintiff and proceed with the action. (§ 12652, subd. (c).) Los
Angeles County and Long Beach filed a notice stating they would
not intervene in the action. (§ 12652, subd. (c)(7).)
3
subd. (b)(5).) The County defendants also argued the complaint
was barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, the CFCA
could not be used to pursue claims under the Revenue and
Taxation Code, and the complaint was uncertain and
unintelligible.4
C. The Trial Court’s Ruling and Notice of Appeal
On May 23, 2024 the trial court sustained the demurrer
without leave to amend. The court ruled the County defendants
could not be sued because, as public entities, they were not
“persons” under the CFCA. Alternatively, the court held Prince’s
claim was barred by the CFCA’s 10-year statute of limitations
because the last alleged act occurred between 1982 and 2002.
Prince filed a notice of appeal on July 17, 2024, before the
trial court entered a signed dismissal or other appealable order.
(See Vibert v. Berger (1966) 64 Cal.2d 65, 67 [“our courts have
held it to be ‘hornbook law that [an] order sustaining a demurrer
is interlocutory, is not appealable, and that the appeal must be
taken from the subsequently entered judgment’”]; see generally
Code Civ. Proc., § 581d [all dismissals ordered by the court “shall
be in the form of a written order signed by the court and filed in
the action”].) However, the trial court entered a judgment in
favor of the County defendants on July 11, 2025. We therefore
treat the premature notice of appeal as filed immediately after
entry of the judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(1).)
4 Because we conclude the County defendants could not be
sued under the CFCA, we do not reach the alternative grounds
for dismissal.
4
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“‘In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine
the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges
facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.’”
(Matthews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768; accord, T.H. v.
Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.)
When evaluating the complaint, “we assume the truth of the
allegations.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204,
209; accord, Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1230.)
However, we do not accept the truth of conclusions of fact or law
alleged in the complaint. (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical
Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994,
1010 [“‘“‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts
properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law.’”’”].)
In cases involving statutory interpretation, “our core
task . . . is to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s
underlying purpose in enacting the statues at issue.” (McHugh v.
Protective Life Ins. Co. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 213, 227; accord,
Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc. (2020) 10 Cal.5th 375, 381.)
“We first consider the words of the statutes, as statutory
language is generally the most reliable indicator of legislation’s
intended purpose. [Citation.] We consider the ordinary meaning
of the relevant terms, related provisions, terms used in other
parts of the statute, and the structure of the statutory scheme.”
(McHugh, at p. 227; accord, Jarman, at p. 381 [“‘We do not
examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the
statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope
5
and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the
enactment.’”].)
“‘“Ultimately we choose the construction that comports most
closely with the apparent intent of the lawmakers, with a view to
promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the
statute.”’” (1550 Laurel Owner’s Assn., Inc. v. Appellate Division
of Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th
1146, 1151; accord, Shorts v. Superior Court (2018)
24 Cal.App.5th 709, 720.) “‘“If the statutory language permits
more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider
other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and
public policy.”’” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017)
2 Cal.5th 608, 616-617.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Sustaining the Demurrer
1. The CFCA, Wells, and Harris
The CFCA provides in section 12651, subdivision (a), that a
“person” violates the act if the person, among other things,
“(1) [k]nowingly presents or causes to be presented a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval[;] [¶] . . . [¶]
(3) [c]onspires to commit a violation of this subdivision[;]
[¶] . . . [¶] [or] (7) knowingly and improperly avoids, or decreases
an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the state or
to any political subdivision.” The CFCA defines “‘[p]erson’” as
“any natural person, corporation, firm, association, organization,
partnership, limited liability company, business, or trust.”
(§ 12650, subd. (b)(9).) A person who violates the CFCA is liable
to the state or to the political subdivision “for three times the
amount of damages that the state or political subdivision
6
sustains because of the act of that person,” civil penalties, and
costs of suit. (§ 12651, subd. (a).)
The Attorney General or the prosecuting authority of a
political subdivision may bring an action for violation of the
CFCA. (§ 12652, subds. (a)(1) & (b)(1).) A “person” may also
bring a CFCA claim as a “qui tam” plaintiff in the name of the
state or a political subdivision whose funds are involved. (Id.,
subd. (c)(1).) When a qui tam plaintiff files an action under the
CFCA, the Attorney General or the prosecuting authority “may
elect to intervene” or “[decline] to proceed with the action.” (Id.,
subd. (c)(4), (6), & (7).) The qui tam plaintiff is entitled to a
substantial percentage of any proceeds from an action under the
CFCA, including up to 33 percent of the proceeds obtained by the
state or political subdivision if one or both entities proceed with
an action filed by the qui tam plaintiff (id., subd. (g)(2)), and up to
50 percent of the proceeds if the qui tam plaintiff proceeds with
the action (id., subd. (g)(3)).
The County and District argue they are not “persons”
subject to suit under the CFCA because they are governmental
entities, relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Wells v.
One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164 (Wells)
and State ex rel. Harris v. PrincewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2006)
39 Cal.4th 1220 (Harris). Wells and Harris are directly on point
and support the County and District’s position.
In Wells, a group of charter school students and their
parents sued charter schools, their corporate operators, and the
public school districts that provided oversight to the charter
schools (collectively, charter school defendants) for CFCA
violations. (Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 1178-1179.) They
alleged the charter school defendants submitted false claims to
7
receive state funding but failed to provide the equipment,
supplies, and services to the enrolled students necessary for the
internet home instruction the charter school operators had
promised. (Id. at pp. 1180-1182.) The charter defendants
demurred, arguing as to the CFCA cause of action that as public
entities they were not “persons” subject to suit under the CFCA.
(Id. at p. 1183.) The trial court sustained the demurrer with
respect to the CFCA claims without leave to amend, and the
plaintiffs appealed. (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court held that governmental entities,
including public school districts, are not “persons” subject to suit
under the CFCA. (Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1193.) The court
focused on the “usual and ordinary meanings” of the words used
to define the term “persons,” which, as discussed, included “any
natural person, corporation, firm, association, organization,
partnership, limited liability company, business, or trust.” (Id. at
p. 1190; see § 12650, subd. (b)(5).) The court added, “While, in
the broadest sense, a school district might be considered an
‘association’ or an ‘organization,’ the statutory list of ‘persons’
contains no words or phrases most commonly used to signify
public school districts, or, for that matter, any other public
entities or governmental agencies.” (Wells, at p. 1190.)
The Supreme Court observed that the CFCA specifically
referenced governmental entities in other parts of the statute.
(Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1191.) The statute provides that
any “person” who presents a false claim to the state or “political
subdivision” is subject to suit. (§ 12651, subd. (a).) Further, the
statute provides “[f]or purposes of this article” (the CFCA) that a
“‘[p]olitical subdivision’ includes any city, city and county, county,
tax or assessment district, or other legally authorized local
8
governmental entity with jurisdictional boundaries.” (§ 12650,
subd. (b) & (b)(6).) The court reasoned, “The specific enumeration
of state and local governmental entities in one context, but not in
the other, weighs heavily against a conclusion that the
Legislature intended to include public school districts as ‘persons’
exposed to CFCA liability.” (Wells, at p. 1190).
Wells also relied on the legislative history of the CFCA,
noting that “deletions from bills prior to their passage are
significant indicia of legislative intent.” (Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th
at pp. 1191-1192.) The court stated, “Assembly Bill No. 1441
(1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 1441), which in final
form became the CFCA, explicitly included, as covered ‘persons,’
‘any person, firm, association, organization, partnership, business
trust, corporation, company, district, county, city and county, city,
the state, and any of the agencies and political subdivisions of
these entities.’ (Italics added.)” (Id. at p. 1191.) However,
“subsequent amendment to the bill excised the references to
governmental entities.” (Ibid.) Thus, the court concluded, “[T]he
language, structure, and history of the particular statute before
us—the CFCA—strongly suggest that public entities, including
public school districts, are not ‘persons’ subject to suit under the
law’s provisions. On that basis alone, we are persuaded that
governmental agencies, including the district defendants in this
case, may not be sued under California’s false claims statute.”
(Id. at p. 1193.)
Finally, the Wells court explained “‘“[t]he ultimate purpose
of the [CFCA] is to protect the public fisc”’” and “help the
government recover public funds of which it was defrauded by
outside entities.” (Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 1196, 1201.)
But exposing governmental entities “to the draconian liabilities of
9
the CFCA would significantly impede their fiscal ability to carry
out their core public missions” and divert limited taxpayer funds
“into the pockets of outside parties.” (Id. at pp. 1193, 1195-1196.)
Accordingly, the “Legislature did not intend to subject financially
constrained school districts—or any agency of state or local
government—to the treble-damages-plus-penalties provisions of
the CFCA.” (Id. at pp. 1196-1197.)
Unlike public school districts, however, the Wells court
reasoned that charter schools can be operated by “corporations,”
“limited liability companies,” “organizations,” or “‘associations,’”
all of which are included within the definition of “persons.”
(Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1200.) The charter schools in Wells
were operated by non-profit corporations organized under the
Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law. (Id. at pp. 1200-
1201.) Further, the charter schools were “distinct outside
entities . . . given substantial freedom to achieve educational
results [without] interference by the public educational
bureaucracy.” (Id. at p. 1201.) In addition, “[t]he autonomy, and
independent responsibility, of charter school operators
extend[ed], in considerable degree, to financial matters.” (Ibid.)
Because charter schools were operated by a nonprofit public
benefit corporation, the public school district serving as the
chartering authority was not liable for the debts and obligations
of the charter schools. Accordingly, the charter schools and their
operators could be sued as persons under the CFCA. (Id. at
p. 1201.)
The same day it decided Wells, the Supreme Court held in
the companion case, Harris, supra, 39 Cal.4th 1220, that the City
and County of San Francisco (City) was not “a ‘person’ who may
sue, as a qui tam relator, upon a false claim involving, not its own
10
funds, but exclusively funds of the State of California.” (Id. at
p. 1223.) The court explained, “Absent contrary indications, we
assume the Legislature intended the same meaning of ‘person’ to
delineate both who may be sued under the statute, and who may
sue under its qui tam provision.” (Id. at p. 1229.) The Court
applied its reasoning in Wells, elaborating that “the language of
the CFCA contains one explicit indication that governmental
entities, state or local, are not among the intended class of
‘persons’ who may sue as qui tam relators. In providing that a
qui tam complaint shall be filed under seal . . . , the statute
describes such a complaint as one ‘filed by a private person.’
(§ 12652, subd. (c)(2), italics added.).” (Id. at p. 1230.) The court
rejected the City’s argument that use of the terms
“‘corporation[]’” and “‘organization’” in the definition of “‘person’”
supported a finding that a municipal corporation or government
organization was included in the definition. (Id. at p. 1232).
2. The County and District are not “persons” under the
CFCA
We agree with the County defendants that under Wells,
supra, 39 Cal.4th 1194 and Harris, supra, 39 Cal.4th 1220, the
County and the District are governmental entities that cannot be
sued as “person[s]” under the CFCA.
The County was established by the Legislature on
March 11, 1889. (Los Angeles County v. Orange County (1893)
97 Cal. 329, 330.) The County, like other counties, is a legal and
political subdivision of the state of California under the
California Constitution and the Government Code. (Cal. Const.,
art. XI, § 1, subd. (a) [“The State is divided into counties which
are legal subdivisions of the State.”]; § 23000 [“A county is the
11
largest political division of the State having corporate powers.”];
§ 23002 [“The several existing counties of the State and such
other counties as are hereafter organized are legal subdivisions of
the State.”].) Similar to the City and County of San Francisco,
which the Harris court held were governmental entities that
could not sue or be sued under the CFCA (Harris, supra, 39
Cal.4th at p. 1238), so too the County cannot be sued under the
CFCA.
The same holds true for the District, which the Legislature
created under the Orange County Flood Control Act of 1927 with
the stated purpose of controlling and conserving flood and storm
waters and preventing the waters from damaging property.
(Stats. 1927, ch. 723, §§ 1, 2 (a), pp. 1325-1326, Deering’s Ann.
Wat.—Uncod. Acts (1927) Act 730.) Accordingly, the District is a
legal and political subdivision of California. (Block v. Citizens
Trust & Savings Bank (1922) 57 Cal.App. 518, 519-520
[describing the District as a “political subdivision of this state” in
the context of its commencement of eminent domain action];
United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, etc. (S.D. Cal. 1946)
67 F.Supp. 780, 784 [the District is a “political subdivision of the
State of California, organized and existing by virtue of the
Orange County Flood Control Act”]; see White v. State of
California (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 298, 310 [“California
Constitution gives the state the power to allocate property tax
revenue among the counties and other local agencies and
entities,” including the District].)
Prince contends the holding in Wells is limited to public
school districts, and the discussion of whether other
governmental entities can be sued under the CFCA is dicta. But
Wells held more broadly that governmental agencies are not
12
liable under the CFCA, concluding based on the CFCA’s
language, history, and purpose “that neither [public school]
districts, nor any other agencies of state and local government,
are ‘persons’ subject to suit under the CFCA.” (Wells, supra,
39 Cal.4th at p. 1199.)
Prince’s contention that the County and District are
“corporation[s]” that fall within the definition of a “person” fares
no better. Prince bases his argument on the description in the
Government Code of each entity as a “body corporate and politic.”
(See § 23003 [“A county is a body corporate and politic, has the
powers specified in this title and such others necessarily implied
from those expressed.”]; Orange County Flood Control Act, Stats.
1927, ch. 723, §2 (b), p. 1325, Deering’s Ann. Wat.-Uncod. Acts.)
[“The Orange County Flood Control District is hereby declared to
be a body corporate and politic”].) Contrary to Prince’s assertion,
mere use of the word “corporate” in the description of an entity
does not render it legally equivalent to a private corporation. An
entity described as a “body corporate and politic” is more akin to
a municipal corporation than a private one. (See 1 McQuillin
Mun. Corp. § 1:18 (3d ed.) [“a municipal corporation with a
charter and privileges was regarded in English law as a body
corporate and politic—an association of individuals joined
together to accomplish some lawful purpose”].) And, as discussed,
the Supreme Court in Harris rejected the City’s argument that as
a “municipal corporation,” the City fell within the definition of a
“person” under the CFCA. (Harris, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 1232-
1233.)
Moreover, other governmental entities created as a “body
corporate and politic” are not liable under the CFCA. In Cordero-
Sacks v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles (2011)
13
200 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1273-1274, for example, the court held the
Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles was not a “person”
subject to suit for making a false claim because it was a
governmental agency despite the fact that the Housing Authority
is a “public body corporate and politic.” (See Health & Saf. Code,
§ 34240 [“In each county and city there is a public body corporate
and politic known as the housing authority of the county or
city.”].)
Finally, as the Wells court reasoned in finding that charter
schools were liable under the CFCA but public school districts
were not, the purpose of the CFCA is to help governmental
entities recover public funds, not to divert limited taxpayer funds
to the coffers of private parties. (Wells, supra, 39 Cal.4th at
pp. 1196-1197.) Subjecting the County and District to CFCA
liability would be contrary to the purpose of the CFCA because it
would divert taxpayer funds to outside parties and interfere with
the County’s and District’s fiscal ability to carry out their public
missions.
3. Wagner, as a public official sued in his official
capacity, is not a “person” who can be sued under the
CFCA
The County defendants argue Donald Wagner is not subject
to suit under the CFCA because he is a public official sued for
actions taken in his official capacity as the chairman of the
County’s Board of Supervisors. We agree. State of California ex
rel. Dockstader v. Hamby (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 480 is
instructive. There, the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of
a lawsuit under the CFCA against employees of a school district
for actions taken in their official capacities. (Id. at pp. 483-484.)
14
The court reasoned that “allowing plaintiffs to substitute the
individual [district] employees for the district itself amounts to
little more than a pleading device that seeks to circumvent the
Legislature’s intent to shield public entities from the draconian
effects of CFCA.” (Id. at p. 490.) Prince only sues Wagner in his
official capacity, and therefore, because the County cannot be
sued under the CFCA, neither can Wagner.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. The County
defendants are to recover their costs on appeal.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
STONE J.
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