CourtListener 10637851•People v. Shears CA4/1
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Filed 7/21/25 P. v. Shears CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083490
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD242689)
CHARLIE P. SHEARS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael Smyth, Judge. Affirmed.
Sandra Gillies, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Daniel Rogers and Amanda Lloyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2013, a jury found Charlie P. Shears guilty of one count of murder
and two counts of premediated and deliberate attempted murder. The jury
determined Shears murdered in the commission of a robbery and personally
used a firearm in all three counts. In 2020, Shears filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The trial court denied
the petition at the prima facie stage in 2021, finding Shears ineligible for
relief based on the jury’s robbery-murder special circumstance finding. The
California Supreme Court subsequently issued its opinion in People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong), holding that a felony-murder special
circumstance finding by a jury at the time of Shears’s trial does not negate a
prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6. With a concession from the
People and relying on Strong, we reversed the trial court’s denial of Shears’s
petition and remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing.
After holding the evidentiary hearing in 2023, the trial court denied
Shears’s petition, finding that he was the actual shooter. Shears appeals
from that ruling, arguing the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and
the ruling was not supported by substantial evidence. We agree the trial
court applied the wrong standard but find that error harmless because
Shears is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
Pursuant to its personal firearm use finding and the available theories for
conviction, the jury necessarily determined that Shears was the shooter and
made all the necessary findings for currently valid theories of murder and
attempted murder. We therefore affirm the denial of Shears’s section 1172.6
petition despite our prior remand and the trial court’s reasoning.
1 Section 1172.6 was renumbered from section 1170.95, without
substantive change, effective June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For
clarity, we will refer to the section by its current numbering. All
undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
2
II. BACKGROUND
In 1996, a man wearing a ski mask entered the Moonlite Market,
pulled out a gun, and demanded money from the market’s owner,
Sleiman Hallak. The gunman fired two shots, prompting Jimmy Shaw, a
salesman who had been standing near Hallak, to run down an aisle to the
back of the market. The gunman fired several more shots, including one that
went by employee Cleo Shiver’s head, and continued to demand money. After
grabbing items from behind the cashier’s counter, the gunman left. Hallak
suffered three gunshot wounds and died at the scene.
In 2012, the San Diego District Attorney’s Office charged Shears with
Hallak’s murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) and attempted murder of Shaw
and Shivers (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); counts 2–3). Prosecutors alleged that
Shears personally used a firearm in all three counts (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)),
and the special circumstance that Shears murdered Hallak during the
commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)).
Shaw and Shivers testified at Shears’s 2013 trial, describing a single
perpetrator that they were unable to identify. The surveillance footage that
captured the crimes also depicted one perpetrator and was played for the
jury. After hearing gunshots, a witness observed one man exit the Moonlite
Market with a bag. Two of Shears’s family members and an acquaintance
stated that Shears said he was involved in the robbery as a lookout. Virginia
Shears, Shears’s wife, gave contradictory statements about Shears’s role in
the robbery, including that Shears was not involved at all, and Shears was
the shooter. Shears denied involvement in the robbery when questioned by
police.
The trial court instructed the jury that Shears could be guilty of a
crime either as the perpetrator or an aider and abettor. For count 1, the
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court presented two theories of first degree murder: felony murder and
willful, premeditated, and deliberate murder. The court explained that
felony murder could apply if either Shears or a coparticipant was the killer.
For counts 2 and 3, the trial court instructed that attempted murder
required the intent to kill, and that if the jury found Shears guilty of that
offense, it must also determine whether Shears acted “willfully, and with
deliberation and premeditation.” Regarding the personal firearm use
allegation, the trial court explained that “[s]omeone personally uses a firearm
if he or she intentionally does any of the following: 1. Displays the weapon in
a menacing manner; 2. Hits someone with the weapon; OR 3. Fires the
weapon.”
In closing argument, both sides argued a single perpetrator committed
the crimes. According to the prosecutor, Shears was “acting alone,” and
“there [wasn’t] more than one person involved in this.” The prosecutor
asserted, “if you find that Mr. Shears committed this crime, as you should, by
himself, and he was the shooter, then he’s also guilty of what they call
personal use of a firearm because he’s the one that used it. If he’s an aider
and abettor, he’s not. If you find that the evidence showed he was just a
lookout then, he’s not guilty of the personal use of a firearm.” Defense
counsel presented a similar theory, stating, “[f]act, the person was a lone
gunman, acted alone, had no participants along with him. Fiction, there
were other accomplices.”
The jury convicted Shears of first degree murder in count 1, finding
true the special circumstance that the murder was committed during a
robbery. The jury also found Shears guilty of willful, deliberate, and
premediated attempted murder in counts 2 and 3. The jury further
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determined that Shears personally used a firearm in the commission of all
three counts.
The trial court sentenced Shears to life in prison without the possibility
of parole for the first degree murder count, and consecutive terms of life in
prison with the possibility of parole for each attempted murder count. We
affirmed the convictions on direct appeal. (People v. Shears (Oct. 23, 2015,
D065200) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2020, Shears filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6.
The trial court found Shears made a prima facie showing for relief and issued
an order to show cause. The People then filed a supplemental response,
arguing the jury’s robbery-murder special circumstance finding rendered
Shears ineligible for relief as a matter of law. In his reply, Shears argued
that the California Supreme Court’s decisions in People v. Banks (2015)
61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 narrowed the
requirements for the felony-murder special circumstance, and the jury’s
special circumstance finding rendered prior to those decisions should not
preclude relief under section 1172.6.2
In 2021, the trial court reversed its prior order and denied Shears’s
petition. The trial court found Shears ineligible for relief based on the jury’s
robbery felony-murder special circumstance finding despite the decisions in
Banks and Clark.
Shears appealed and after briefing had been submitted, the California
Supreme Court issued its decision in Strong. In that decision, the high court
2 In Banks and Clark, our Supreme Court “substantially clarified the law
governing” the major participant and reckless indifference elements for an
aider and abettor under the felony-murder special circumstance. (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 706–707.)
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resolved a split of authority and held that “[f]indings issued by a jury before
Banks and Clark do not preclude a defendant from making out a prima facie
case for relief under” section 1172.6. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710.) In
supplemental briefing, the People conceded the trial court erred under Strong
and that the matter should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. We
agreed and reversed the trial court’s ruling with instructions to conduct an
evidentiary hearing. (People v. Shears (Dec. 13, 2022, D078792) [nonpub.
opn.].)3
At the evidentiary hearing in 2023, the trial court noted its review of
the record of conviction, which was the only evidence presented. This
included “all the evidence previously admitted at trial, including witness
testimony, stipulated evidence, matters judicially noticed, as well as trial
transcripts, jury instructions, and all verdict forms; the information, the
pleadings filed in the instant proceeding.”4 The trial court also stated, “I also
happen to have been the trial judge, and, given the nature of this case, I do
have a fairly good recollection of the trial, even though it was some ten years
ago.” The trial court also repeatedly referenced the jury’s findings. It stated,
“the jury . . . necessarily found it was one person, and that it was Mr.
Shears,” and “there was evidence that one could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was the shooter.” The trial court continued, “[t]he stronger
3 The People’s request for judicial notice of the record from Case No.
D078792 is denied. That record is not relevant to our current inquiry, and
the People did not serve Shears with the materials to be noticed. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.252(a)(3).)
4 The court sustained Shears’s objection to the court considering the
preliminary hearing transcript and records reflecting conviction in a 1996
robbery matter.
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evidence that was believed was a combination of Mr. Shears’s statements,
some of them; the video, there only being one gunman, one person in that
store; and their finding that Mr. Shears used the gun with the intent to kill
those two other men. I mean, that was the finding of the jury, and I think,
based on the evidence, it was not an unreasonable finding, even though they
could have found otherwise.” The court also stated the jury “couldn’t find
[Shears], as the getaway driver, guilty of the attempted murders with
personal use of a firearm,” and “the only way to read these verdicts is that a
jury concluded he was the actual killer.”
Ultimately, the court denied the petition, concluding that “based upon
the jury’s finding and the evidence that supports those findings with respect
to the attempted murders, I find the People have shown that they’ve
established beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Shears was the actual
shooter, just as the jury necessarily found, based on the verdicts and the
evidence presented at trial.” The court then made the same finding for the
murder. Shears appealed from that ruling.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Section 1172.6
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 1437) amended the law of homicide, eliminating several theories
of murder liability. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) This included
modifying section 189 to limit felony murder to the actual killer, or an aider
and abettor who intended to kill or majorly participated in the underlying
felony with reckless indifference to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e), added by
Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.) The new law also added subdivision (a)(3) to
section 188, which states, “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based
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solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3), added by
Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.)
Senate Bill 1437 also created section 1172.6, which authorizes those
convicted of murder under prior law to file a petition for resentencing. (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) A petition under section 1172.6 must satisfy three
conditions, including that “[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
At the initial hearing on the petition, the court determines if the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3) &
(c).) In this stage, “ ‘ “ ‘the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true
and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would
be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.’ ” ’ ” (People
v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 460.) If so, the court must issue an order to
show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine if the petitioner
should be resentenced. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).)
However, “ ‘[i]f the petition and record in the case establish conclusively
that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the
petition.’ ” (People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460.) For example, “[a]
petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law if the record of
conviction conclusively establishes, with no factfinding, weighing of evidence,
or credibility determinations, that . . . the petitioner was the actual killer,
or . . . the petitioner acted with malice aforethought that was not imputed
based solely on participation in a crime.” (People v. Lopez (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14.)
In this prima facie inquiry, the court may rely on the record of
conviction, which includes “the trial evidence, the jury instructions, and
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closing arguments of counsel.” (People v. Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 13.) Additionally, “ ‘[w]e may look to the jury’s verdicts, and the factual
findings they necessarily reflect.’ ” (People v. Morales (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
1120, 1131.)
At the evidentiary hearing, “ ‘the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is
ineligible for resentencing.’ [Citation.] To sustain their burden, the People
may rely on the record of conviction ‘or offer new or additional evidence.’ ”
(People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 294.) “A finding that there is
substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder, attempted murder,
or manslaughter is insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The trial
court must “act as an independent fact finder and determine, in the first
instance, whether the petitioner committed murder under the law as
amended by Senate Bill 1437.” (People v. Didyavong (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
85, 95.)
B. The Trial Court Applied the Wrong Standard at the Evidentiary
Hearing
Although the trial court stated that it found beyond a reasonable doubt
that Shears was the shooter, that determination was at least partially “based
upon the jury’s findings.” That statement, as well as the trial court’s
repeated references to the jury’s findings and its memory of the trial, show
the trial court did not act as an independent fact finder in the first instance.
The trial court therefore applied the wrong standard at the evidentiary
hearing. Nonetheless, that error was harmless as explained below.
C. The Trial Court’s Error Was Harmless Because Shears Is Ineligible for
Relief Under Section 1172.6 as a Matter of Law
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The failure to apply the proper legal standard at a section 1172.6
evidentiary hearing is harmless, and therefore not subject to reversal, if the
petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. (People v.
Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 745–747 [“in light of the evidence before
the trial court at the section [1172.6], subdivision (d)(3) hearing . . . Garrison
is ineligible for relief as a matter of law regardless of the standard of proof
applied by the resentencing trial court”].)5 Similarly, “ ‘a judgment or order
will be affirmed if it is correct on any theory, regardless of the trial court’s
reasons.’ ” (San Bernardino County Bd. of Supervisors v. Monell (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 1248, 1281.)
Although there was some evidence that accomplices may have been
involved in the Moonlite Market robbery, both the prosecution and defense
counsel rejected that evidence, urging the jury that there was a single
perpetrator. Further, the only use of a gun in this case was by the individual
who shot and killed Hallak and fired at Shivers and Shaw. There was no
evidence that an accomplice displayed a firearm in a menacing manner or hit
someone with it. As such, by finding the personal firearm use allegations
true, the jury necessarily determined that Shears was the perpetrator in all
three counts, and the actual killer in count 1. In other words, the jury did not
rely on aiding and abetting principles.
Under these circumstances, the jury’s first degree murder verdict in
count 1 could not have been based on the felony murder theory involving a
coparticipant killer. Instead, the jury must have relied on one of the other
5 This is true regardless of whether we apply the federal constitutional
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard (Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18, 24) or the state law “reasonably probable” standard (People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836).
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two theories presented, which were (1) an actual killer acting willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation; or (2) an actual killer who killed during
a robbery. These are both valid murder theories under current law. (§ 189,
subds. (a) & (e)(1); People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 53
[“defendants convicted of felony murder are not eligible for [section 1172.6]
relief if they were the actual killer”].) As for the attempted murder counts,
the jury necessarily determined that Shears, as the shooter, intended to kill
and acted willfully with deliberation and premeditation. This is also a valid
theory under current law. (§§ 189, subd. (a), 664.)
Accordingly, based on its personal firearm use finding and the available
theories for conviction, the jury necessarily determined that Shears was the
actual shooter and made all the required findings for currently valid theories
of murder and attempted murder. Shears is therefore ineligible for section
1172.6 relief as a matter of law, rendering the trial court’s error at the
evidentiary hearing harmless. For the same reason, the trial court was
correct to deny Shears’s petition, so we affirm that ruling despite the trial
court’s reasoning.
D. The Posture of This Case Does Not Preclude Us from Considering
Shears’s Resentencing Eligibility
Shears argues that we already determined that he made a prima facie
case for resentencing because in his prior appeal, we remanded the matter for
an evidentiary hearing. Shears therefore contends that under the law of the
case doctrine, the sufficiency of his prima facie showing has already been
determined and, given the court’s application of an erroneous standard to the
underlying order to show cause, the matter must be remanded for another
hearing. We disagree.
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“ ‘ “The doctrine of ‘law of the case’ deals with the effect of the first
appellate decision on the subsequent retrial or appeal: The decision of an
appellate court, stating a rule of law necessary to the decision of the case,
conclusively establishes that rule and makes it determinative of the rights of
the same parties in any subsequent retrial or appeal in the same case.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘Generally, the doctrine of law of the case does not
extend to points of law which might have been but were not presented and
determined in the prior appeal. [Citation.] As an exception to the general
rule, the doctrine is . . . held applicable to questions not expressly decided but
implicitly decided because they were essential to the decision on the prior
appeal.’ ” (Leider v. Lewis (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1121, 1127, italics omitted.)
Our prior opinion was based on a single ground; namely the trial
court’s improper reliance on the jury’s pre-Banks and Clark felony-murder
special circumstance finding. The parties did not address, and we did not
determine, whether the jury’s personal firearm use findings precluded Shears
from section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. Nor was resolution of that issue
essential to our previous decision because it was not a basis for the trial
court’s ruling. Further, the People conceded that the matter should be
remanded for an evidentiary hearing after the California Supreme Court
issued its opinion in Strong. Accordingly, “this case is governed by the
general rule that law of the case does not apply to arguments that might have
been but were not presented and resolved on an earlier appeal.” (Leider v.
Lewis, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1130.)
Shears further contends that the remittitur limited the trial court’s
ability to reconsider the prima facie showing and by not asking the trial court
to revisit the prima facie inquiry after remand, the People forfeited that
issue. However, because we affirm correct orders regardless of the trial
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court’s reasoning, “ ‘a respondent may assert a new theory to establish that
an order was correct on that theory “unless doing so would unfairly prejudice
appellant by depriving him or her of the opportunity to litigate an issue of
fact.” ’ ” (San Bernardino County Bd. of Supervisors v. Monell, supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 1281, italics omitted.) As Shears acknowledges, the
prima facie inquiry does not involve an issue of fact (People v. Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 14), and regardless of the trial court’s reasoning, the
denial of Shears’s section 1172.6 petition is correct because he is not entitled
to relief as a matter of law.
In sum, Shears is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law
for reasons not previously submitted to or considered by this court. Having
now reviewed those reasons, and the entire record of conviction presented to
the trial court, we conclude that Shears is not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing under section 1172.6, so there is no need to remand for such a
hearing. The trial court was correct to deny Shears’s petition, and we affirm
that order despite the trial court’s reasoning and our previous remand for an
evidentiary hearing.
IV. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
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RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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