CourtListener 10637814•People v. Garcia CA2/6
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Filed 7/21/25 P. v. Garcia CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B337066
(Super. Ct. No. BA493002)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
PABLO GARCIA,
Defendant and Appellant.
Pablo Garcia appeals from the judgment after a jury found
him guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a),
189, subd. (a); count 1), possession of a firearm by a felon
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2), and possession of a firearm with
an enumerated prior misdemeanor conviction (§ 29805, subd. (a);
count 3), and found true an enhancement that he personally used
a firearm in the commission of the murder (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
For offenses committed 10 days later, the jury convicted Garcia of
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
fleeing a peace officer in disregard for the safety of others (Veh.
Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 7), and hit and run with injury
(Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(1); count 8). Garcia admitted a
prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–
(d)). The trial court sentenced Garcia to 60 years to life in state
prison plus a determinate term of six years, eight months.
Garcia contends substantial evidence does not support the
conviction for hit and run with injury; the trial court erred in
imposing multiple punishment without a jury determination that
the crimes of murder and felon in possession of a firearm
constituted more than one course of conduct, and felony evading
and hit and run constituted more than one course of conduct; and
trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Offenses on October 26, 2020
Garcia approached Divante Williams outside a liquor store
where Williams worked as a security guard. Garcia extended his
arm and, as Williams tried to run away, shot him.
Williams died of a gunshot wound to his upper chest. A
second bullet entered his abdomen and lodged near his hip.
Three .380 caliber shell casings from a semiautomatic firearm
were found in front of the liquor store door.
Offenses on November 5, 2020
Jairo Moreno was shot three times outside his home.
Officer Patricia Montejano followed a pickup truck that matched
the description of the vehicle involved in the shooting. The truck
drove at an unsafe speed, failed to stop at stop signs and red
lights, drove on the wrong side of the road against oncoming
traffic, drove on the center divider, and made unsafe left and
right turns.
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The truck flipped onto its side. Home security video
admitted into evidence showed that five seconds after the truck
came to rest, the driver, later identified as Garcia, climbed out
the driver’s door, which was now on top, and ran away. Police
officers issued commands to Garcia but he did not comply.
The passenger, Julissa Ramirez, then climbed out of the
truck. She stood for a moment, then fell to the ground. She
crawled to a nearby parked car and used it to pull herself up,
took a step, then lowered herself to the ground. She was
transported from the scene.
A .380 caliber semiautomatic handgun was found in the
center console of the pickup truck.
After midnight the night of the accident, and again the
following day, Detectives Ricardo Rivera and Alejandro Galvan
saw Ramirez in the hospital. She had been admitted and was in
a patient room. In Rivera’s opinion, Ramirez on both days
“appeared . . . to be in a lot of pain” because she kept moving
around to try to get comfortable and acted “annoyed.” Galvan
also believed she was in pain.
On both days, Ramirez was connected to an intravenous
line. Rivera testified, “If I recall correctly, I do recall the injury
that she had, I believe, around her eye—eyebrows.” He
continued, “It seemed like an abrasion, maybe a stitch. I don’t
recall exactly what it was at the time, but I do remember
something over her right eye.” A photograph of Ramirez in the
hospital did not show an injury but showed a tattoo above her
right eyebrow. Rivera did not see additional injuries. Galvan did
not recall if he saw any injuries.
Trial
Garcia was originally charged in count 7 with evading a
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peace officer causing serious bodily injury. (Veh. Code, § 2800.3,
subd. (a).) At the conclusion of the prosecution’s case, the court
acquitted Garcia of this charge pursuant to section 1118.1
because there was insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury.
Count 7 was amended to evading a pursuing peace officer with
“willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.”
(Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a).) The court denied the section
1118.1 motion to acquit on count 8, hit and run with injury (Veh.
Code, § 20001, subd. (a)).
The parties stipulated that Garcia was prohibited from
possessing a firearm based on a felony conviction and a
qualifying misdemeanor conviction. Garcia requested a jury
instruction for hit and run with property damage (Veh. Code,
§ 20002, subd. (a)) as a lesser offense for count 8. The court
denied the request because Ramirez had been admitted to the
hospital for at least two days after the accident. The detectives
also testified they saw Ramirez “hooked up to an I.V.” and said
she was in pain. The jury acquitted Garcia of the attempted
murder of Moreno but convicted him of counts 7 and 8.
Sentencing
For the offenses committed on October 26, the court
imposed an indeterminate sentence of 60 years to life for first
degree murder with a prior strike and personal use of a deadly
weapon (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a), 667, subd. (e)(1),
1170.12, subd. (c)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a); count 1), and a
consecutive determinate sentence of four years for felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2). Pursuant
to section 654, the court stayed the sentence for possession of the
same firearm with an enumerated misdemeanor prior (§ 29805,
subd. (a); count 3). For the offenses committed on November 5,
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the court imposed consecutive sentences of 16 months for evading
a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 7) and 16
months for hit and run with injury (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd.
(b)(1); count 8). The 16-month sentences were calculated as
one-third the midterm of two years, doubled for the strike.
(§§ 667, subd. (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).)
DISCUSSION
Evidence of injury
Garcia contends there was insufficient evidence that
Ramirez was injured in the accident. We are not persuaded.
“The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in
injury to a person, other than himself or herself, . . . shall
immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and
shall fulfill the requirements of [Vehicle Code section] 20003
. . . .” (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a).) The driver must give their
name and other information to any police officer at the scene, and
“shall render to any person injured in the accident reasonable
assistance, including transporting, or making arrangements for
transporting, any injured person to a physician, surgeon, or
hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that
treatment is necessary or if that transportation is requested by
any injured person.” (Veh. Code, § 20003, subd. (a).)
“[W]e review the whole record to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]
The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the
verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value . . . . In applying this test, we review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of
the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably
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have deduced from the evidence.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43
Cal.4th 327, 357.) “We ‘must accept logical inferences that the
jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.’ ”
(Ibid.)
We conclude there was sufficient circumstantial evidence
for the jury to draw the inference that Ramirez was injured in the
accident. She was the passenger in a vehicle that rolled onto its
side. She climbed out of the truck, fell to the ground, and was
unable to remain standing. She was transported to the hospital,
was admitted, and remained hospitalized for at least two days.
She was connected to an intravenous line. The jury also could
have credited percipient witness testimony that she appeared to
be in pain and had an injury over her eye.
Garcia contends that Ramirez might have been
coincidentally hospitalized for some other reason like “drug
withdrawal symptoms, malnutrition, pregnancy complications,
cancer, an internal infection, or some other pre-existing medical
condition.” But there was no evidence at trial that Ramirez was
pregnant or had any of the suggested conditions. “Where the
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, a
reviewing court’s conclusion the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant
the judgment’s reversal.” (People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th
at p. 358.)
Knowledge of injury
Garcia also contends there was insufficient evidence that
he knew of Ramirez’s injuries. We disagree.
For purposes of Vehicle Code section 20001, “criminal
liability attaches to a driver who knowingly leaves the scene of an
accident if [they] actually knew of the injury or if [they] knew
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that the accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably
anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person.” (People v.
Holford (1965) 63 Cal.2d 74, 80, fn. omitted; People v. Harbert
(2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 42, 52.) “Such knowledge . . . may be
imputed to the driver of a vehicle . . . where the seriousness of the
collision would lead a reasonable person to assume that there
must have been resulting injury.” (People v. Ryan (1981) 116
Cal.App.3d 168, 180.) “[T]he knowledge of the driver is a factual
question for the determination of the trier of fact” and “is usually
proved by the facts and circumstances surrounding the individual
case.” (Ibid.; People v. Rocovich (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 489, 493
[knowledge established where defendant rearended car,
propelling it into another vehicle and onto an embankment];
People v. Roche (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 459, 461–462 [knowledge
established where defendant hit child on bicycle who remained
lying in street].)
Here, Garcia lost control of his truck and flipped it onto its
side. Ramirez was on the passenger side, closest to the
pavement. The accident was sufficiently serious that the jury
could conclude that Garcia would reasonably anticipate that
Ramirez was injured. We conclude substantial circumstantial
evidence supports the jury’s verdict for count 8.
Multiple punishment
Garcia contends he improperly received multiple
punishment pursuant to section 654 because the jury did not
determine whether murder and felon in possession of a firearm
on October 26 constituted more than a single ongoing course of
conduct, and whether the felony evading and hit and run on
November 5 constituted more than a single ongoing course of
conduct. We again disagree.
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“An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by
different provisions of law may be punished under either of such
provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished
under more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).) “ ‘Although
section 654 speaks in terms of an “act or omission,” it has been
judicially interpreted to include situations in which several
offenses are committed during a course of conduct deemed
indivisible in time.’ ” (People v. Clair (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 949,
958–959.) “If, however, the defendant had multiple or
simultaneous objectives, independent of and not merely
incidental to each other, the defendant may be punished for each
violation committed in pursuit of each objective even though the
violations share common acts or were parts of an otherwise
indivisible course of conduct.” (People v. Cleveland (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 263, 267–268 (Cleveland), citing People v. Beamon
(1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639.)
“The question of whether section 654 is factually applicable
to a given series of offenses is for the trial court, and the law
gives the trial court broad latitude in making this
determination.” (People v. DeVaughn (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th
1092, 1113.) “A trial court’s express or implied determination
that two crimes were separate, involving separate objectives,
must be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.”
(People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618.)
Garcia contends two cases decided after the judgment here,
Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821 (Erlinger) and
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch), entitle him to a
jury determination whether the crimes on each offense date
constituted more than one course of conduct on that date.
Erlinger involved a federal offense of possession of a
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firearm by a felon, which was punishable by a maximum prison
term of 10 years. But the defendant was charged pursuant to the
Armed Career Criminal Act, which increased the punishment to
a mandatory minimum of 15 years and a maximum of life in
prison if the defendant had three or more qualifying prior
convictions for offenses “ ‘committed on occasions different from
one another.’ ” (Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 825.) The high
court held the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States
Constitution require a jury determination whether the prior
offenses were committed on different occasions because it
increased both the minimum and maximum sentence to which
the defendant was exposed. (Erlinger, at pp. 835, 849.) The court
relied upon Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490
(Apprendi) and its progeny, which hold that “only a jury may find
‘facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a
criminal defendant is exposed’ ” or that “increase a defendant’s
minimum punishment.” (Erlinger, at p. 822.) In contrast here,
the jury found Garcia guilty of the offenses of murder and felon in
possession of a firearm committed on October 26, and felony
evading and hit and run committed on November 5, and the court
imposed sentences that did not exceed the statutory maximum
for any of these offenses.
In Lynch, our Supreme Court considered section 1170,
subdivision (b), as amended effective January 1, 2022, which
generally prohibits imposition of the upper term unless the jury
found true or the defendant admitted aggravating factors.
(Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 742.) The court held that “a Sixth
Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on
unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence,
even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly
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established.” (Id. at p. 768.) The court relied upon Apprendi,
supra, 530 U.S. 466, to require “the right to a jury trial on ‘any
fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence.’ ”
(Lynch, at p. 766.)
We conclude Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466 does not apply
here. “[I]t is well settled that the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial does not apply to trial court findings under section 654.”
(People v. Carter (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 831, 845–846; see also
People v. Morelos (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 758, 770.) “The
question of whether section 654 operates to ‘stay’ a particular
sentence does not involve the determination of any fact that could
increase the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum for the underlying crime.” (Cleveland, supra, 87
Cal.App.4th at p. 266.) A defendant therefore is not entitled to a
jury determination whether they had “a separate ‘intent and
objective’ for multiple offenses occurring during a course of
criminal conduct.” (Id. at pp. 265, 270.)
As our colleagues in Division Seven of this district
explained in Cleveland, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at page 270:
“Unlike in the ‘hate crime’ provision in Apprendi, section 654 is
not a sentencing ‘enhancement.’ On the contrary, it is a
sentencing ‘reduction’ statute. Section 654 is not a mandate of
constitutional law. Instead, it is a discretionary benefit provided
by the Legislature to apply in those limited situations where
one’s culpability is less than the statutory penalty for one’s
crimes. Thus, when section 654 is found to apply, it effectively
‘reduces’ the total sentence otherwise authorized by the jury’s
verdict. The rule of Apprendi, however, only applies where the
nonjury factual determination increases the maximum penalty
beyond the statutory range authorized by the jury’s verdict. . . .
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Here, however, every factual element of the [charged offenses]
was submitted to the jury, and the jury found Cleveland guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of both crimes. . . . Indeed, in finding
section 654 did not apply, Cleveland received the same sentence
as he was exposed to by the jury’s verdict.”
Cleveland was followed by Division Four of this district in
People v. Solis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1021–1022. Our
Supreme Court has cited Cleveland and Solis with approval for
the proposition that “Apprendi does not apply to the factual
determinations made by the trial judge in connection with the
decision whether to stay sentences on particular counts under the
provisions of section 654 prohibiting multiple punishment.”
(People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1238, 1263–1264, overruled on
another ground by Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S.
270, 288–293, judg. vacated and cause remanded sub nom. Black
v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 1190.) Because both Erlinger and
Lynch are based on the rationale of Apprendi, they do not
undermine Cleveland. Garcia was not entitled to a jury
determination before the court imposed separate punishment for
both murder and felon in possession of a firearm, and for both
felony evading and hit and run.
Ineffective assistance of counsel
Garcia contends counsel was ineffective by failing to
request a jury determination regarding application of section 654,
and by failing to ask the trial court to stay counts pursuant to
section 654. Again we disagree.
A defendant alleging ineffective assistance must prove (1)
deficient performance, and (2) resulting prejudice. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687; People v. Riel (2000) 22
Cal.4th 1153, 1175.) “The defendant must show that there is a
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reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
(Strickland, at p. 694.) If a defendant fails to establish either
prong, the claim should be denied. (Id. at p. 687.)
Because a request for a jury determination regarding
section 654 would have been meritless, we conclude counsel was
not ineffective by failing to request it. (People v. Washington
(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 19, 26.) Regarding the failure to ask the
trial court to stay counts, “we presume that the trial court knew
the law and followed it.” (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th
983, 1042.) We also conclude Garcia’s claim of a reasonable
probability the trial court would have reached a different
outcome is undeveloped and does not show error. (Allen v. City of
Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.) No ground for
reversal exists.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J. CODY, J.
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Deborah S. Brazil, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and David A. Wildman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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