Wykowski v. Chimienti CA2/5

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Filed 7/18/25 Wykowski v. Chimienti CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

HENRY G. WYKOWSKI, B333654

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC709545)
v.

FRANK CHIMIENTI,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gail Killefer, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of J. David Nick and J. David Nick for
Defendant and Appellant.
Wykowski Law and Daniel V. Weston for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Frank Chimienti appeals from a judgment
following a court trial. Plaintiff Henry G. Wykowski sued
Chimienti for malicious prosecution, alleging he initiated a
malicious lawsuit against Wykowski for purported legal
malpractice. The trial court found Chimienti liable and awarded
Wykowski $10,000 for out-of-pocket expenses, $25,000 for
emotional distress, and $129,461.09 for money paid by
Wykowski’s insurance carrier for his legal representation.
Chimienti contends the trial court erred by excluding
expert witness testimony. He also argues there was insufficient
evidence to support the judgment. Finally, Chimienti asserts the
trial court erred in awarding damages. We affirm.1

II. BACKGROUND2

A. Wykowski’s Legal Representation of Sosa

Daniel Sosa was the president and owner of Mid City
Cannabis Club, Inc., doing business as La Brea Collective (Mid

1 We deny Wykowski’s motion to dismiss the appeal.

2 “In accordance with the substantial evidence standard of
review, we recite the facts established by the record viewed in the
light most favorable to the judgment, giving [the respondent] the
benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any conflicts
in the evidence in support of the judgment. [Citation.]” (Los
Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Casaola (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th
189, 194, fn. 1.)

2
City). Chimienti, Sosa’s friend and office mate, served as legal
counsel for Sosa from 2010 until at least April 2023.
In March 2011, the IRS audited Mid City and Sosa. On
January 27, 2012, the IRS issued an Income Tax Discrepancy
Adjustment to Sosa, stating that he owed approximately $35,000
for tax years 2007 to 2009 (January 2012 Demand Letter).3 The
IRS also notified Sosa that Mid City owed taxes.
In March 2012, Chimienti engaged Michael Zipperstein, a
certified public accountant, to act as Sosa’s accountant.
Zipperstein, in turn, referred Sosa to Wykowski, a tax lawyer
who specialized in advising cannabis companies.
On October 24, 2012, the IRS issued Sosa a Notice of
Deficiency stating that he owed approximately $135,000 in taxes,
and a Notice of Deficiency against Mid City stating that it owed
$982,846.96 in taxes.
On November 26, 2012, Chimienti sent Wykowski an e-
mail stating, “Please see the attached NOD for Daniel Sosa,
personally, and for Mid City Cannabis Club, Inc. . . . .” Chimienti
attached to the e-mail the two October 24, 2012, Notices of
Deficiency. Chimienti did not, however, send Wykowski the
January 2012 Demand Letter.
In the same November 26, 2012, e-mail, Chimienti asked
Wykowski to contact him about “a referral fee for this matter.”
Some time after sending this e-mail, Chimienti asked Wykowski
for payment of a referral fee. Wykowski refused. (See Rules Prof.
Conduct, rule 7.2(b) [lawyer may not “compensate, promise or
give anything of value” to another person, including a lawyer, for

3 On our own motion, we judicially notice the record in the
prior appeal. (Wykowski v. Chimienti (Oct. 28, 2019, B293271)
[nonpub. opn.].)

3
recommending or securing the referral of business to a lawyer or
law firm, except upon certain conditions].)
In January 2013, Sosa, individually and for Mid City,
entered into an Attorney-Client Fee Agreement (Agreement) with
Wykowski. The Agreement defined the “Client” as “Daniel Sosa,
individually, and Mid City Cannabis Club Inc., dba La Brea
Collective.” Chimienti acted as the point of contact between the
clients and Wykowski and told Wykowski that he would “relay
everything to . . . Sosa.”
Wykowski filed petitions on behalf of Sosa and Mid City in
United States Tax Court, challenging the two October 24, 2012,
Notices of Deficiency. On January 21, 2013, Wykowski sent
Chimienti an e-mail explaining that he had filed the petitions
and “I followed what we agreed to and for [Sosa’s] personal taxes
only challenged the erroneous capital gains.”
In December 2013, Wykowski contacted the IRS Appeals
Office to discuss a possible settlement for Mid City and Sosa.
After meeting with an appeals officer, Wykowski informed Sosa
and Chimienti of the proposed settlement terms.
At the end of 2013 or early 2014, the IRS informed
Wykowski that it intended to move to dismiss Mid City’s petition
because Mid City’s corporate status had been suspended by the
Secretary of State for failure to pay taxes. Wykowski had
previously been unaware of Mid City’s suspended status. The
IRS agreed, however, that it would abide by the terms of the
settlement offer until the United States Tax Court ruled on the
motion to dismiss.
On January 2, 2014, Wykowski informed Sosa and
Chimienti that the IRS had moved to dismiss Mid City’s petition
because of its suspended status. Chimienti worked to remove the

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suspension of Mid City’s corporate status and asked Wykowski to
oppose the IRS motion to dismiss. Wykowski complied.
On or about February 2014, Chimienti and Zipperstein
advised Wykowski that Sosa did “not wish to contest the
deficiency asserted against [him] individually” because the IRS’s
calculation of taxes due was more favorable than Zipperstein’s
calculation of what Sosa owed.
In March 2014, Sosa and Chimienti authorized Wykowski
to settle with the IRS. The United States Tax Court
subsequently denied the IRS’s motion to dismiss Mid City’s
petition.
After the case was settled, Wykowski billed Sosa for the
unpaid invoices for his work for “La Brea Collective,” which
included services for both Mid City and Sosa. Chimienti
responded with two e-mails stating that Sosa refused to pay. In
the first e-mail, dated November 6, 2014, Chimienti stated that
“[a]s far as I am concerned the only thing that you did for this
client was to ruin his chances to have a shot at appealing this
case by failing to advise the client to get the corporation off
suspension . . . . Now you are coming at the client with a $32,000
bill? I propose that you squash the entire bill and chalk it up to a
lesson learned concerning the appeals process.” In a second e-
mail, dated February 6, 2015, addressed to Wykowski’s assistant,
Chimienti wrote: “I have already advised [Wykowski] that the
client is not going to pay the remainder of this bill and advised
him as to why the client is not paying the bill. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
Further, should collection efforts continue concerning this matter
I am advising the client to retain counsel to file a malpractice
claim. [¶] If [Wykowski] would like to send over a mutual
release—my client forgoing his claims and the firm forgiving any

5
amounts it claims are due and owing for work done on this
matter, I will pass it on to the client for review.”
On April 16, 2015, Chimienti sent an e-mail to Wykowski
and Sosa, stating: “I recently learned the reason the IRS
assessed an additional over 300,000 in income to . . . Sosa’s
personal taxes from 2009 was that . . . Wykowski agreed to such
an assessment at the time the case for Mid City was settled. This
was very confounding to me because . . . Wykowski did not have
any authority to deal with . . . Sosa’s personal taxes and was
never retained by . . . Sosa to handle such matters.”

B. Legal Malpractice Suit

Chimienti then had discussions with Sosa about filing a
malpractice claim against Wykowski and Zipperstein, and
included the filing of a lawsuit as an action item on a whiteboard
that he maintained in Sosa’s office. Chimienti contacted various
malpractice attorneys to represent Sosa and eventually “found”
Matthew Mahoney to represent Sosa. Chimienti provided
Mahoney with his files and other information about the
malpractice lawsuit. Chimienti also provided the “initial
statement” to Mahoney.
On March 9, 2016, Sosa, represented by Mahoney, filed a
malpractice action against Zipperstein, Zipperstein’s related
entities, Wykowski, and Wykowski’s law firm. The first cause of
action (the Mid City cause of action) was filed by Mid City
against Zipperstein and Zipperstein’s related entities and alleged
that the defendants “negligently and carelessly performed their
duties for Mid City.” The Mid City cause of action further alleged
that Zipperstein and his related entities “had a duty to ensure

6
Mid City was not in a state of suspension before filing a petition
to challenge the assessment of a deficiency, and that all relevant
taxes and fees were paid by Mid City.”
The second cause of action (the Sosa cause of action) was
filed by Sosa against “all defendants,” including Zipperstein,
Wykowski, and Wykowski’s law firm and alleged defendants
“failed to exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence in
performing their services for . . . Sosa and were negligent in their
representation of . . . Sosa.” The Sosa cause of action alleged that
in February 2014, defendants “incorrectly informed . . . Sosa that
if he did not challenge the IRS’s position, his individual tax
liability would be approximately $35,000, as reflected in the
[January 2012 Demand Letter]. They further informed . . . Sosa
that it would be unlikely that he would achieve a better result if
he continued to challenge the deficiency assessment.” Based on
defendants’ allegedly negligent advice, “Sosa believed he would
owe approximately $35,000 to the IRS and therefore agreed not
to continue contesting the assessment of tax liability.
Accordingly, in February 2014, . . . Sosa instructed Wykowski to
discontinue any efforts to challenge the deficiency that had been
assessed by the IRS against [him].”4
On December 14, 2017, the trial court granted Wykowski’s
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Sosa’s claim
was time-barred and that Sosa had presented no evidence that
Wykowski breached a duty to Sosa. Among other things, the trial
court determined: “[Wykowski] has demonstrated that he had no
way of knowing that . . . Sosa had the subjective impression that

4 As we explain above, Chimienti never sent the January
2012 Demand Letter to Wykowski, who first learned of its
existence when Sosa filed the malpractice complaint.

7
Sosa’s tax liability was $35,000. When he was engaged,
Wykowski was provided by Sosa’s accountant Zipperstein and
Sosa’s business attorney Chimienti on November 2012, a scanned
copy of the October 2012 [Notice of Deficiency]. He was never
provided with the [January 2012 Demand Letter]. [¶] . . .
Chimienti admitted at his deposition that he received an email
from Wykowski indicating that Wykowski had filed a petition
challenging Sosa’s personal taxes and challenged only the
erroneous capital gains. Those capital gains were the reason for
the amended amount and should have alerted Chimienti that a
different amount was being sought. Chimienti admits that if he’d
read the email, which he admits he did not, it would have rung a
bell that something was amiss and Chimienti would have asked
to look at the petition. This appears to be Chimienti’s mistake
rather than Wykowski’s mistake.”
On January 2, 2018, judgment was entered in Wykowski’s
favor.

C. Malicious Prosecution Suit

On June 12, 2018, Wykowski filed a complaint for malicious
prosecution against Chimienti and Sosa.
On February 13, 2020, Wykowski reached a settlement
agreement with Sosa and dismissed his claim against him.

D. Motion in Limine

On March 21, 2023, Wykowski filed a motion in limine to
exclude the testimony of Michael Fahmy, Chimienti’s designated

8
expert witness, on the grounds, among others, that Fahmy’s
proffered testimony was not relevant to the instant proceedings.
On March 27, 2023, Chimienti filed his opposition to the
motion in limine. Chimienti proffered that Fahmy would render
an opinion on “the methods used by the Federal Government[ ] to
collect taxes from corporations that have not filed or paid their
taxes . . . .” (Boldface omitted.) Chimienti also proffered that
Fahmy would opine that it was negligent for a tax attorney to fail
to check on the suspension status of a corporate client and that
“Wykowski was negligent in his handling of . . . Sosa’s corporate
tax matters . . . .”
On April 4, 2023, the trial court heard argument on the
motion in limine. Following argument, the court granted
Wykowski’s motion, finding Fahmy’s testimony to be not
relevant. The court stated that Sosa’s malpractice action against
Wykowski concerned Wykowski’s handling of Sosa’s individual
tax issues rather than his handling of Mid City’s tax issues.

E. Statement of Decision and Judgment

The parties proceeded to a bench trial that began on
April 4, 2023. Chimienti, Sosa, and Wykowski testified as
witnesses.
On May 22, 2023, the trial court issued its proposed
statement of decision. Following additional briefing, the court
issued its final statement of decision on July 24, 2023. The court
described the allegation in the malpractice action, which “alleged
that Wykowski informed Sosa that if Sosa did not challenge the
IRS’s audit, his individual tax liability would be approximately
$35,000, as reflected in the [January 2012 Demand Letter].” The

9
statement of decision also recited the allegations in the complaint
that, based on Wykowski’s advice, Sosa “‘believed he would owe
approximately $35,000 to the IRS and therefore agreed not to
continue contesting the assessment of tax liability,’” and that
Wykowski allegedly did not discuss the amount the IRS actually
sought. The court continued: “It is not disputed that these
allegations in the Malpractice Action were false. The allegations
appear to have been drawn from Chimienti’s own errors and
misunderstanding. For example, Chimienti testified that he
neglected to read the October Notice of Deficiency before
forwarding it to Wykowski on November 26, 2012 [citation], and
that he was not aware of the $135,000 assessment against Sosa
individually until the litigation of the Malpractice Action. The
court notes that the IRS sent the October 2012 Notices of
Deficiency directly to Sosa. [Citation.]”
The trial court awarded Wykowski $25,000 for emotional
distress, $10,000 for money that he personally paid to his
insurance company for his defense in the malpractice action, and
$129,461.09 for the attorney fees paid by his insurance for his
legal representation.
On August 15, 2023, the trial court entered judgment in
favor of Wykowski against Chimienti. Chimienti timely
appealed.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Exclusion of Expert Witness Testimony

Chimienti contends that the trial court erred by excluding
Fahmy’s testimony. “‘A trial court’s exercise of discretion in

10
admitting or excluding evidence is reviewable for abuse [citation]
and will not be disturbed except on a showing the trial court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’
[Citation.]” (Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 446–
447.) “This is particularly so with respect to rulings that turn on
the relevance of the proffered evidence. [Citation.]” (Shaw v.
County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 281.)
Chimienti contends that Fahmy’s testimony was relevant
because Wykowski’s handling of Sosa and Mid City’s taxes was “a
singular subject.” According to Chimienti, Fahmy would have
testified that a reasonable tax attorney would have taken
affirmative steps to investigate Mid City’s suspended status,
which would have supported a finding that Chimienti had
probable cause to institute a malpractice action against
Wykowski. We find no error.
Evidence Code section 210 defines relevant evidence as
“evidence . . . having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove
any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action.” We will assume, without deciding, that expert
testimony about a lawyer’s duty of care was not prohibited, as a
matter of law, at trial. (But see Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert &
Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 884 (Sheldon Appel Co.) [trial court
erred when it permitted attorneys to be called as expert
witnesses to give their opinions as to whether a reasonable
attorney would conclude that the claims advanced in the prior
action were tenable because such a matter is “‘within the
province of the court to decide’”].) Even if Fahmy’s testimony was
relevant to whether the Mid City cause of action was objectively
reasonable, it was not relevant to the question of whether the

11
Sosa cause of action was objectively reasonable and that was the
only claim filed against Wykowski. Accordingly, the trial court
did not err by excluding Fahmy’s testimony.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Chimienti next contends that the judgment is not
supported by substantial evidence. “In reviewing a judgment
based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, we
review questions of law de novo. [Citation.] We apply a
substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court’s
findings of fact. [Citation.] Under this deferential standard of
review, findings of fact are liberally construed to support the
judgment and we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable
inferences in support of the findings. [Citation.]” (Thompson v.
Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981 (Thompson).)
“[I]n order to establish a cause of action for malicious
prosecution of either a criminal or civil proceeding, a plaintiff
must demonstrate ‘that the prior action (1) was commenced by or
at the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal
termination in his, plaintiff’s, favor [citations]; (2) was brought
without probable cause [citations]; and (3) was initiated with
malice [citations].’” (Sheldon Appel Co., supra, 47 Cal.3d at
p. 871.)5
“Liability for malicious prosecution is not limited to one
who initiates an action. A person who did not file a complaint
may be liable for malicious prosecution if he or she ‘instigated’

5 Chimienti does not dispute there was sufficient evidence for
finding malice.

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the suit or ‘participated in it at a later time.’ (5 Witkin,
Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 497, pp. 730–731;
see Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50
Cal.3d 1118, 1131, fn. 11 [‘A person who is injured by groundless
litigation may seek compensation from any person who procures
or is actively instrumental in putting the litigation in motion or
participates after the institution of the action’].)” (Nunez v.
Pennisi (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 861, 873 (Nunez).)

1. Instigation of Lawsuit

According to Chimienti, the trial court’s finding that the
allegations in the malpractice suit “came from Chimienti” (italics
omitted) was not supported by substantial evidence because the
court “had zero evidence explaining how the allegations reached
Mahoney” and thus the court’s finding that Chimienti instigated
the lawsuit was based on speculation. We disagree.
The record supports the trial court’s finding that Chimienti
instigated the malpractice lawsuit. Indeed, it was Chimienti who
warned Wykowski, by e-mail, that if Wykowski continued to
collect his fees, Chimienti would “advis[e] the client to retain
counsel to file a malpractice claim.” Chimienti also admitted that
he sought out counsel to represent Sosa in the malpractice claim,
“found” Mahoney to file the lawsuit, and provided Mahoney with
the records and “initial statement” for the lawsuit. Although
Sosa testified that Chimienti did not participate in the decision to
file the malpractice suit, Sosa also admitted that he prepared for
his testimony at trial by reviewing an e-mail that had been sent
to him by Chimienti’s lawyer. Based on this, the court gave
“[Sosa’s] testimony little, if any, weight.” Further, while

13
Chimienti denied advising Sosa to pursue a malpractice action
against Wykowski in connection with his services to Sosa, the
court did “not find Chimienti credible on this issue.” “[W]e defer
to the trier of fact on issues of credibility.” (Lenk v. Total-
Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.) On this record,
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Chimienti was “‘actively instrumental in putting the litigation in
motion.’” (Nunez, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 873.)

2. Knowingly False Statements

Chimienti next contends the trial court erred in finding
that he instigated a malicious prosecution based on his negligent
transmission of evidence, because, in his view, the theory of
instigation liability requires the transmission of knowingly false
information. According to Chimienti, the court erroneously found
that he was merely negligent in providing information to
Mahoney, and cites in support that portion of the court’s
statement of decision that the allegations in the malpractice
action “appear to have been drawn from Chimienti’s own errors
and misunderstanding,” that he had testified that he “neglected”
to read certain documents, and that he “was not aware” of the
October 2012 Notice of Deficiency assessment against Sosa until
the malpractice action litigation commenced.
We will assume, without deciding, that a plaintiff who
alleges a malicious prosecution claim, premised on the instigation
of a civil lawsuit, must prove that a defendant provided
knowingly false statements to the party that filed the complaint.
(See Rupp v. Summerfield (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 657, 664
[finding that the trial court erred in delivering jury instructions

14
in a malicious criminal prosecution action premised on the giving
of false information to the police because “[a]s an abstract
statement of the law, the word ‘knowingly’ should have been
included in the instruction . . .”].)
We disagree with Chimienti’s characterization of the
excerpts from the statement of decision as supporting a finding
that Chimienti acted negligently, but not knowingly, when he
provided false information to Mahoney for the malpractice action.
In the portions of the statement of decision cited by Chimienti,
the trial court recited Chimienti’s testimony that he “neglected to
read the October Notice of Deficiency” and that he “was not
aware” of Sosa’s $135,000 tax liability. Further, the court’s
statement that Chimienti’s “errors and misunderstanding”
caused the filing of the malpractice suit is not inconsistent with a
finding that Chimienti provided knowingly false information to
Mahoney and Sosa. Indeed, because Chimienti did not object to
the statement of decision regarding what facts were known to
him, the doctrine of implied findings applies. “‘A judgment or
order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all
intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its
correctness.’ [Citation.] Specifically, ‘[u]nder the doctrine of
implied findings, the reviewing court must infer, following a
bench trial, that the trial court impliedly made every factual
finding necessary to support its decision.’ [Citation.]”
(Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.) This includes
implied findings regarding credibility. (Baugh v. Garl (2007) 137
Cal.App.4th 737, 744; see also In re Jessica C. (2001) 93
Cal.App.4th 1027, 1043 [“A trier of fact is free to disbelieve a
witness, even one uncontradicted, if there is any rational ground
for doing so”].)

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As discussed, the malpractice complaint included false
allegations that Wykowski advised Sosa that his individual tax
liability was approximately $35,000 based on the January 2012
Demand Letter. Chimienti, however, never sent the January
2012 Demand Letter to Wykowski and Wykowski therefore did
not learn about the demand letter until he was served with the
malpractice complaint. Thus, the record supports a finding that
Chimienti knew the information that he provided to Mahoney,
and which appeared in the malpractice complaint, was false.

3. Probable Cause

Chimienti next contends that there is no substantial
evidence that the initial malpractice lawsuit was initiated
without probable cause. According to Chimienti, he had “‘a
reasonable belief in the possibility of [Sosa’s] suit being
successful.’” Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
contrary finding.
“The probable cause element is evaluated ‘objectively’ by
asking ‘whether any reasonable attorney would have thought the
claim [legally and factually] tenable.’ [Citations.] A prior action
was not initiated without probable cause merely because it was
ultimately found to lack merit; it was initiated without probable
cause only if ‘all reasonable lawyers’ would ‘agree’ that the suit,
at the time of filing, was ‘totally and completely without merit.’
[Citation.] This objective assessment is necessarily made using
‘the facts known to the defendant’ ‘at the time the suit was filed.’
[Citations.] Although the objective question of tenability is
always a ‘question of law’ for the court to decide [citations], the
question of what facts were known at the time of filing is a

16
‘question of fact’ which, if disputed, is for the [factfinder] to decide
and, critically, to decide before the court makes its objective
determination of tenability. [Citations.]” (Gruber v. Gruber
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 529, 537–538.)
The malpractice action alleged that Wykowski “incorrectly
informed . . . Sosa that if he did not challenge the IRS’s position,
his individual tax liability would be approximately $35,000 as
reflected in the [January 2012 Demand Letter].” The complaint
further alleged that Sosa, based on Wykowski’s negligent advice,
believed that his tax liability would be $35,000 and did not know
that he would instead owe approximately $135,000. Although
Chimienti testified that he was unaware that he never sent the
January 2012 Demand Letter to Wykowski and failed to read the
October 2012 Notices of Deficiency before sending them to
Wykowski, the trial court impliedly found Chimienti’s testimony
not credible on this issue. Indeed, Chimienti testified that he,
Sosa, and Zipperstein had a discussion regarding the Notices of
Deficiency, and he was aware that if Sosa did not timely respond,
the amount listed in the notice would be assessed.
We agree with the trial court’s legal conclusion that no
reasonable attorney, given the facts known to Chimienti, would
have found the malpractice action against Wykowski to be
tenable. To prevail on the legal malpractice claim, Sosa would
have to demonstrate, among other things, that Wykowski
breached his duty by failing to advise Sosa about the January
2012 Demand Letter or the October 2012 Notices of Deficiency
and settling with the IRS without consulting Sosa. (See O’Shea
v. Lindenberg (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 228, 235 [in legal
malpractice case, plaintiff must demonstrate breach of duty].)
The record demonstrates that Chimienti never sent Wykowski

17
the January 2012 Demand Letter and thus Wykowski could not
have informed Sosa that he could settle with the IRS for
approximately $35,000. And, the record supports a finding that
Chimienti told Wykowski that he was authorized to settle Sosa’s
personal tax liability with the IRS. Accordingly, we find no error
as to the finding of lack of probable cause.

4. Causation

Chimienti argues that attorney Mahoney had the “legal
duty” to investigate the merits of the malpractice lawsuit
independently, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7,
subdivision (b).6 Chimienti contends that Mahoney’s failure to
act therefore served to “break the chain of causation.” We reject
this argument.
“For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
the measure of damages . . . is the amount which will compensate
for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it
could have been anticipated or not.” (Civ. Code, § 3333.) “A
separate investigation that is independent protects a
complainant from liability for malicious prosecution.” (See Lugo
v. Pixior, LLC (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 511, 515 [finding that
because police investigation was independent, prosecutor’s

6 An attorney signing a pleading certifies “that to the best of
the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, all of the following
conditions are met: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) The allegations and other
factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (b)(3).)

18
decision to prosecute malicious prosecution plaintiff “was a
superseding cause that insulated [defendant] from liability, as a
matter of law”].)
An attorney generally has no obligation to investigate the
information provided by the client before filing suit. (See Daniels
v. Robbins (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 204, 223 [“In general, a lawyer
‘is entitled to rely on information provided by the client’”].) And,
as discussed, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that Chimienti was “‘actively instrumental in putting the
litigation in motion.’” (Nunez, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 873.)
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports a finding that
Chimienti caused Wykowski damages.

C. Applicability of Collateral Source Rule

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by
applying the collateral source rule to award Wykowski
$129,461.09 as damages for the attorney fees paid by his
insurance company for his legal representation.
“[T]he measure of compensatory damages for the malicious
prosecution of a civil action includes attorney fees and court costs
for defending the prior action . . . .” (Bertero v. National General
Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 59, fn. omitted.) “‘“Whether a plaintiff
‘is entitled to a particular measure of damages is a question of
law subject to de novo review. [Citations.] The amount of
damages, on the other hand, is a fact question . . . [and] an award
of damages will not be disturbed if it is supported by substantial
evidence.’”’ [Citation.]” (Markow v. Rosner (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th
1027, 1050.)

19
“Compensatory damages are moneys paid to compensate a
person who ‘suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission
of another’ (Civ. Code, § 3281), and the measure of damages
generally recoverable in tort is ‘the amount which will
compensate for all the detriment proximately caused’ by the tort
(id., § 3333). Civil Code section 3282, in turn, defines ‘detriment’
as ‘a loss or harm suffered in person or property.’ . . . [¶] When,
as here, the costs . . . are paid in whole or in part by a third party
unconnected to the defendant, the collateral source rule is
implicated. The collateral source rule states that ‘if an injured
party receives some compensation for his injuries from a source
wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be
deducted from the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise
collect from the tortfeasor.’ [Citation.] Put another way,
‘Payments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party
from other sources [(i.e., those unconnected to the defendant)] are
not credited against the tortfeasor’s liability, although they cover
all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.’
[Citation.] The rule thus dictates that an injured plaintiff may
recover from the tortfeasor money an insurer has paid . . . on his
or her behalf.” (Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc.
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 541, 551 [applying collateral source rule to
money paid by insurer to medical providers for plaintiff’s
necessary medical treatment for tortiously caused injuries]; see
also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley (1946) 28 Cal.2d 347, 349
[“Where a person suffers personal injury or property damage by
reason of the wrongful act of another, an action against the
wrongdoer for the damages suffered is not precluded nor is the
amount of the damages reduced by the receipt by him of payment
for his loss from a source wholly independent of the wrongdoer”].)

20
Chimienti contends that none of the policy reasons for
applying the collateral source rule apply for legal malpractice
insurance, citing Norton v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th
1750 for its discussion of Helfend v. Southern California Rapid
Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1 (Helfend). In Helfend, our
Supreme Court concluded: “We therefore reaffirm our adherence
to the collateral source rule in tort cases in which the plaintiff
has been compensated by an independent collateral source—such
as insurance, pension, continued wages, or disability payments—
for which he had actually or constructively . . . paid or in cases in
which the collateral source would be recompensed from the tort
recovery through subrogation, refund of benefits, or some other
arrangement.” (Id. at pp. 13–14.) The Helfend court expressly
declined to “consider or determine the appropriateness of the
rule’s application in the myriad of possible situations which we
have not discussed or which are not presented by the facts of this
case.” (Id. at p. 6, fn. 3.)
We reject Chimienti’s suggestion that, because it was
unclear whether subrogation applied, Wykowski would receive a
double recovery which is contrary to the collateral source rule.
As discussed by the Helfend court, “[e]ven in cases in which the
contract or the law precludes subrogation or refund of benefits, or
in situations in which the collateral source waives such
subrogation or refund, the rule performs entirely necessary
functions in the computation of damages. For example, the cost
of medical care often provides both attorneys and juries in tort
cases with an important measure for assessing the plaintiff’s
general damages. [Citation.] To permit the defendant to tell the
jury that the plaintiff has been recompensed by a collateral
source for his medical costs might irretrievably upset the

21
complex, delicate, and somewhat indefinable calculations which
result in the normal jury verdict. [Citations.]” (Helfend, supra, 2
Cal.3d at pp. 11–12, fn. omitted.)
We also reject Chimienti’s argument that the primary
purpose for obtaining malpractice insurance is to protect the
attorney from his own negligence, as compared to medical
insurance, which covers medical treatment regardless of the
source of the injury. The purpose of malpractice insurance is to
protect the insured from the risks of malpractice, including
attorney fees, regardless of whether the insured actually
committed malpractice. (See, e.g., Johnson v. First State Ins. Co.
(1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1081 [professional liability insurance
covered claims against insured “by reason of any act, error or
omission in professional services rendered”].) Like the plaintiffs
in Helfend, supra, 2 Cal.3d 1, the insurance benefits Wykowski
received were the result of “providence” and foresight to protect
himself against the risk of attorney malpractice. (See id. at
pp. 9–10 [“The collateral source rule as applied here embodies the
venerable concept that a person who has invested years of
insurance premiums to assure his medical care should receive the
benefits of his thrift. [Fn. omitted.] The tortfeasor should not
garner the benefits of his victim’s providence”].) Moreover,
“payment from the plaintiff’s insurance company presents the
strongest case for application of the rule. Application of the rule
is ‘supported by two public policy rationales: favoring the injured
party over the culpable tortfeasor and encouraging the public to
purchase insurance benefits.’ [Citation.]” (Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 174, 179, fn. omitted
[discussing law journal’s analysis of collateral source rule].) The

22
trial court therefore did not err when it applied the collateral
source rule here.

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff is awarded costs on
appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM (D.), J.
We concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

MOOR, J.

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