People v. Webber CA2/2

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Filed 7/17/25 P. v. Webber CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B342924

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA097132)
v.

GARRETT EVANS WEBBER,

Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT:
Early one morning, victim Jane Doe (aged 13) was walking to
school. Suddenly and without warning, defendant Garrett Evans
Webber approached her from behind, pulled out a semi-automatic
handgun, and pointed it at her head. He placed his arm around her
shoulder and pulled her toward a vehicle parked along the sidewalk.
Webber told her, “Get inside the car!” Jane Doe feared she would be
shot or killed if she did not get in and told Webber, “I’m sorry! I’m
sorry for whatever I did!” She attempted to pull away from Webber
and yelled for help. Some people passing by stopped and assisted her,
causing Webber to release her.
Following his arrest, Webber was charged with two counts:
count 1 was for attempted kidnapping of a victim under 14 with an
allegation that he personally used a firearm (Pen. Code,1 §§ 664/207,
subd. (a), § 12022.53, subd. (b)); and count 2 was for assault with a
semi-automatic firearm, with an allegation that he personally used
the firearm (§ 245, subd. (b), § 12022.5).
In November 2018, Webber pled no contest to the charges in
count 1 and admitted the firearm use allegation. He was sentenced to
the midterm of four years for the attempted kidnapping, plus 10 years
for the firearm enhancement. The court dismissed count 2 in
furtherance of justice. (§ 1385.)
In 2024, Webber filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.1, subdivision (a), as had recently been amended by
Assembly Bill No. 600 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) to expand resentencing
rights arising from ameliorative changes to applicable law.
(Stats. 2023, ch. 446, § 2.) The trial court ruled on the petition as
follows: “The Court has read and considered the request received from
Petitioner, filed by Petitioner’s attorney October 17, 2024. Under
[section] 1172.1, a judge may recall and resentence a defendant on the
court’s own motion, or upon request from the Secretary of the
[California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation], the Board
of Parole Hearings, the county correctional administrator, the district
attorney, or Attorney General. Pursuant to [section] 1172.1[,]
[subdivision] (c), ‘[a] defendant is not entitled to file a petition seeking
relief from the court under this section. If a defendant requests
consideration for relief under this section, the court is not required to
respond.’ Accordingly, the court will take no further action on the
petition. Clerk to give notice to defendant.”
Webber filed a timely notice of appeal. At his request, this court
appointed counsel to represent him. Appellate counsel filed a brief

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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under the authority of People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo), raising no appealable issues. Thereafter, Webber filed a
letter asking this court to “review my AB600 petition and see if I
qualify for relief.”
Section 1172.1 is an exception to the general rule that “ ‘once a
judgment is rendered and execution of the sentence has begun, the
trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or modify the
sentence.’ ” (People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 634.)
Resentencing under the statute “may be initiated by the original
sentencing judge, a judge designated by the presiding judge, or any
judge with jurisdiction in the case” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1)), either on
the court’s own motion or upon the recommendation of “the Secretary
of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the Board of
Parole Hearings, a county correctional administrator, a district
attorney, or the Attorney General.” (Id., subd. (b).) The statute both
denies defendants the right to request resentencing thereunder and
excuses the trial court from acting on such a request: “A defendant is
not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this
section. If a defendant requests consideration for relief under this
section, the court is not required to respond.” (Id., subd. (c).)
In criminal cases, the right to appeal is governed by
section 1237. This statute authorizes appeals from a final judgment of
conviction (id., subd. (a)), and from “any order made after judgment,
affecting the substantial rights of the party” (id., subd. (b)).
We recently addressed a similar set of circumstances in People
v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985. Hodge, while serving a sentence
for battery and assault with a deadly weapon, filed a request for
resentencing under section 1172.1. In response, the trial court entered
an order stating “ ‘[t]he court respectfully declines to exercise its
discretion to recall Mr. Hodge’s sentence.’ ” (Hodge, at p. 991.) On
appeal, although we concluded that the court’s response to Hodge’s
request for resentencing was an “order,” we held it was not appealable

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under section 1237, subdivision (b), because “a trial court’s order
declining to exercise its discretion under section 1172.1 to recall a
defendant’s sentence on its own motion after receiving the defendant’s
unauthorized request for such relief does not affect the defendant’s
substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b).” (Hodge, at
p. 999.)
Our review of the record discloses no basis on which to
distinguish Hodge from this case. Because the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to rule on Webber’s resentencing motion, the order
declining to initiate resentencing did not affect Webber’s substantial
rights and is not an appealable postjudgment order. Therefore,
Webber’s appeal must be dismissed.2
The appeal is dismissed.

_________________________________________________________________
LUI, P. J. CHAVEZ, J. RICHARDSON, J.

2 Even if the trial court’s order were appealable, the result would
be the same. Because the instant appeal is not from his conviction,
Webber is not entitled to our independent review of the record
pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 or its federal
constitutional counterpart, Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 226 [“the procedures set out in
Anders and Wende do not apply to an appeal from the denial of
postconviction relief”].) Since Webber has not provided any arguments
for us to consider, the appeal may be dismissed as abandoned.
(Delgadillo, at p. 232.)

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