People v. Owens CA2/1

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Filed 7/16/25 P. v. Owens CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B337355

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA022383)
v.

RODNEY DARNELL OWENS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hayden A. Zacky, Judge. Affirmed.
Ralph H. Goldsen, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Stefanie Yee, Deputy
Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Rodney Darnell Owens appeals from an order
denying his supplemental petition in support of resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.75. For the reasons given below,
we affirm the order.

FACTUAL SUMMARY
In 1996, a jury convicted defendant Rodney Darnell Owens
of seven counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211),1 one
count of carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)), and one count of willfully
evading an officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2). As to each of the
robbery and carjacking counts, the jury found true enhancement
allegations that defendant had personally used a firearm in
committing the crimes. (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5,
subd. (a).) At the time he committed his crimes, he was on
parole. The court sentenced him to prison for 37 years, comprised
of: the upper term of 9 years for carjacking; the upper term of
10 years for the firearm enhancement on the carjacking count; a
consecutive one-year term (one-third of the middle term) for each
of the seven robberies; a consecutive one-year term (one-third of
the middle term) for the evading an officer count; and a one-year
prior prison enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b).
We affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion. (People v.
Owens (Jan. 30, 1998, B108853).)
In 2018, defendant was convicted of unlawful possession
of marijuana (§ 4573.6) and felony bribery of an officer (§ 67.5,
subd. (b))—crimes he committed in prison. As a result, 5 years
4 months were added to his sentence.

1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
In 2022, the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation (CDCR) informed the superior court that
defendant’s sentence includes a prison prior enhancement under
section 667.5, subdivision (b), which the Legislature declared
invalid in 2021, subject to an exception not applicable here.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 2.) This prompted the trial court to
review the sentence and strike the one-year enhancement, thus
reducing defendant’s sentence to 36 years. The court otherwise
left the sentence unchanged.
On March 4, 2024, defendant filed a “supplemental petition
in support of resentencing.” (Capitalization omitted.) He
requested the court conduct a full resentencing hearing and
reduce his sentence further by applying postconviction changes
in sentencing laws. In support of his petition, defendant
asserted: he was 24 years old when he committed his crimes
and is now 52 years old; he has served 28 years of his 37-year
sentence; he has not been convicted of a “super strike” offense
(see § 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)); he is not a sex offender; he
has completed his GED and numerous self-improvement and
rehabilitative programs during his incarceration; he has a “very
impressive” inmate assignment history; and his “last act of actual
violence in prison was in 2012.” Defendant provided supportive
letters from his wife, his daughter, a brother, and a prospective
employer. He also included a copy of what appear to be notes
from a 2023 Mule Creek State Prison classification committee
hearing concerning defendant’s potential for placement “in a
minimally supervised setting.” The notes state that, “based
on the length of time that has elapsed from the commission
of [defendant’s] crimes, it does not appear [defendant] would
pose an unreasonable or greater than average risk to the public.”

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In March 2024, the court held a hearing on defendant’s
petition. The district attorney opposed any reduction in
defendant’s sentence.
At the outset of the hearing, the court stated that it had
read and considered defendant’s supplemental petition “along
with all of the attachments,” as well as the original probation
report and our opinion in defendant’s direct appeal, and
“reviewed the court file.” The court further stated that it “is
aware of . . . all of the changes in California state law regarding
sentencing and the discretion that it does give courts.”
The court stated that among its “concerns” were the
facts that defendant committed his armed robberies “repeatedly”
against the same victim, that he committed an armed carjacking
and “a police chase,” that he was convicted of crimes committed
while in custody—including bribing an officer—and has
committed “acts of violence while in prison.”
During the hearing, the court stated that defendant
qualifies for the Elderly Parole Program (§ 3055), and
“assum[ed]” that he “will have an elderly parole hearing
relatively soon. So that kind of obviates the—or makes me
question why even re-sentence when that’s going to happen.”
During the hearing, the court accessed the CDCR’s website
because it was “just curious when his parole hearing is.” The
court noted that the website indicated that defendant was denied
parole in November 2019, and a tentative date for a parole
suitability hearing is scheduled for November 2026.
After hearing argument, the court stated: “I do wonder
why parole was denied for a period of seven years in 2019. It
could have been for that new charge. But it could have been
for reasons unknown to the court.” The court again referred to

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the availability of elderly parole, which “would benefit
[defendant], given his age and the length of time that he has
served in state prison.”
The court concluded: “The court will not exercise its
discretion at this time. [¶] The court does not find it’s in the
interest of justice given the underlying offenses that occurred.
The fact that there were numerous [sic] over a period of time
involving a handgun with a potential for a high degree of
violence. [¶] So the sentence remains.”
Defendant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
Under section 1172.75, when, as here, the CDCR informs
the superior court that an inmate is currently serving a sentence
that includes an invalid prison prior enhancement and the
court verifies that information, “the court shall recall the
sentence and resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)
The resentencing is a “full resentencing.” (People v. Monroe
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 401–402; accord, People v. Terwilligar
(2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 585, 601.)
In resentencing the defendant pursuant to section 1172.75,
the court is required to “apply the sentencing rules of the
Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2)), and the “court may consider
postconviction factors, including . . . the disciplinary record
and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated,
evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished
physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for
future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances

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have changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(3)). The new sentence shall be less “than the one
originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed
enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public
safety. Resentencing pursuant to . . . section [1172.75] shall
not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)
Section 1172.75 “vests the superior court with broad
discretion based on an inherently factual inquiry.” (People v.
Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 856–857.) We review the
court’s ruling for an abuse of such discretion. (Id. at p. 857.)
“Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court
knew the law and followed it.” (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10
Cal.5th 983, 1042; accord, People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th
1144, 1157.) The party challenging the sentence has the burden
of showing an abuse of discretion. (People v. Superior Court
(Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.) “ ‘In the absence of
such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to
achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review.’ [Citation.] Concomitantly, ‘[a] decision will not
be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree.
“An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in
substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.”
[Citations.]’ ” (Id. at pp. 977–978.)
Defendant contends that the court erred because it
“did not exercise discretion at all.” (See, e.g., People v. Sandoval
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847–848 [“[a] failure to exercise discretion

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also may constitute an abuse of discretion”].) He relies on the
court’s statement that it “will not exercise its discretion at this
time.” The defendant misinterprets the court’s statement. At the
outset of the hearing, the court stated that it “is aware of . . . all
of the changes in California state law regarding sentencing and
the discretion that it does give courts. (Italics added.) The
discretion that section 1172.75 gives the courts is the discretion
to reduce the defendant’s sentence, not increase it. (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(1) [resentencing “shall not result in a longer sentence
than the one originally imposed”].) Thus, in the context of
section 1172.75 resentencing, the court’s statement that it will
not exercise its discretion is a shorthand way of saying that the
court was not exercising the discretion the Legislature had given
courts—to reduce defendant’s sentence—not as expressing the
refusal to exercise discretion at all.
Moreover, the court’s statement must be viewed in light
of the entire transcript of the hearing. The court made the
statement defendant relies on immediately before stating that
its ruling was based on the facts concerning defendant’s crimes,
and after the court expressed its “concern[s]” about defendant’s
“acts of violence” and bribing an official while incarcerated.
There would have been no point in stating such facts and
concerns if the court had decided to refuse to consider or exercise
its discretion at all. We therefore reject defendant’s argument
that the court’s statement that it will not exercise its discretion
establishes error.
Defendant further contends that the court improperly
“based its denial of the petition . . . on the availability of elderly
parole.” Defendant points to the court’s comments during the
hearing regarding elderly parole. We do not read the court’s

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comments, however, as a basis or reason for the court’s ruling.
The court expressed its reasons for its ruling by stating it is not
“in the interest of justice given the underlying offenses that
occurred” and “[t]he fact that there were numerous [sic] over a
period of time involving a handgun with a potential for a high
degree of violence.” Elderly parole is not mentioned as a reason
for the ruling; rather, it appears that the court’s discussion of the
availability of elderly parole was a way of providing some solace
to defendant and, in the court’s words, its “hope for [defendant’s]
sake, and [his] family’s sake, that the parole board grants his
request [for parole].” We therefore reject defendant’s argument
that the court based its ruling on the availability of elderly
parole.
Defendant makes a series of arguments that amount to
reasons why the court, in his view, should have exercised its
discretion to reduce his sentence. The court, for example, “could
have found that aggravating circumstances did not outweigh
mitigating circumstances, and . . . then . . . imposed the low term
of [three] years” on the carjacking count. Defendant refers us
to an amendment to section 12022.5, subdivision (c), which gives
courts discretion to strike or dismiss a firearm enhancement
that is otherwise mandated. (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 1, p. 5104.)
The court, defendant argues, “could have stricken any or all of
the seven subordinate firearm use enhancements,” or imposed
concurrent sentences instead of consecutive sentences. He also
lists the mitigating factors cited in his petition, including: he was
24 years old when he committed his crimes; he is now an elderly
prisoner; he has spent more than 20 years in prison; he is not a
sex offender; he has never been convicted of a strike offense; an
internal prison report stated that he was not a danger to public

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safety; he has a commendable record of rehabilitation; and none
of his robbery and carjacking victims was harmed. These
arguments and mitigating facts, however, do not satisfy
defendant’s burden of showing that the court’s ruling is an abuse
of discretion. (See People v. Bernal (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1160,
1170 [“the presence of mitigating evidence is not enough to
render the trial court’s decision an abuse of discretion”].) To the
extent the court did not expressly address points raised by
defendant below, we do “not presume error from a silent record”
and, “ ‘[u]nless the record affirmatively demonstrates otherwise,
the trial court is deemed to have considered all the relevant
sentencing factors set forth in the rules.’ ” (People v. Knowles
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 765; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.409 [sentencing factors “will be deemed to have been considered
unless the record affirmatively reflects otherwise”].)2
Lastly, defendant argues that we should “consider
disqualification of [the sentencing judge] in the interests
of justice.” He relies on Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1,
subdivision (c), which provides: “At the request of a party or on
its own motion an appellate court shall consider whether in the
interests of justice it should direct that further proceedings be
heard before a trial judge other than the judge whose judgment
or order was reviewed by the appellate court.” Because we affirm

2 The Attorney General contends that certain arguments
defendant raises on appeal were not raised below and were
therefore forfeited on appeal. In reply, defendant contends
that any such forfeiture is a denial of his “statutory right to
the effective assistance of counsel.” Because we have considered
defendant’s arguments on the merits, we do not consider whether
his counsel was ineffective below.

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the court’s order, our disposition does not contemplate any
further proceedings. Even if the statute was applicable, the
request is without merit. As the Attorney General asserts,
“[t]he court’s informed and thoughtful decision does not
transform to one indicating bias simply because it was
unfavorable to appellant.”

DISPOSITION
The March 26, 2024 order from which the appeal is taken is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

BENDIX, J.

WEINGART, J.

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