CourtListener 10634523•People v. Whitecarter CA1/5
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Filed 7/16/25 P. v. Whitecarter CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
A170489
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Contra Costa County
ISAAC JAQUAN WHITECARTER, Super. Ct. No. 042201310)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Isaac Jaquan Whitecarter appeals a final judgment
following his trial for mayhem, assault by means of force likely to cause great
bodily injury, and criminal threats. The jury convicted him on all counts and
found true the special allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily
injury. On appeal, Whitecarter argues that the trial court erred in failing to
properly instruct the jury that it could consider the lesser included offenses
before reaching a verdict on the greater offense, in violation of People v.
Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322 (Kurtzman). We find no prejudicial error and
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
A felony information charged Whitecarter with: (1) mayhem (Pen.
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Code, § 203;1 count 1); (2) assault by means of force likely to cause great
bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 2); and (3) criminal threats (§ 422,
subd. (a); count 3). With respect to count 2, the information alleged that
Whitecarter personally inflicted great bodily injury in violation of
section 12022.7, subdivision (a).
After closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury that
“[s]imple battery is a lesser crime of mayhem, charged in [c]ount 1” and that
“[s]imple assault is a lesser crime of assault by means likely to produce great
bodily injury, charged in [c]ount 2.”2 It then told the jury, pursuant to former
CALCRIM No. 3517, that “[i]t is up to you to decide the order in which you
consider each crime and the relevant evidence. But I can accept a verdict of
guilty of a lesser crime only if you found the defendant not guilty of the
corresponding greater crime.” The prosecutor also argued during closing that
“you don’t reach a verdict on simple battery unless you find [Whitecarter] not
guilty of [c]ount 1, mayhem.” She similarly stated that “you don’t reach a
verdict on simple assault unless you find him not guilty on [c]ount 2.”
Defense counsel did not object to either the instruction or the prosecutor’s
argument.
During deliberations, the jury submitted a written request asking for
“more granularity surrounding the definition of [g]reat [b]odily [i]njury” and
clarification as to the “definition of moderate harm.” The trial court
responded that it was “the jury’s responsibility to determine where along the
continuum it believes the harm becomes a significant or substantial physical
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise specified.
2 With respect to count 2, the trial court instructed the jury that
“[g]reat bodily injury means significant or substantial physical injury. It is
an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.”
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injury rather than a moderate or minor one.” On the next day of
deliberations, the jury submitted a written request for readback of B.P.’s
testimony “related to threats.” Shortly thereafter, the jury wrote to the court:
“We are deadlocked and at an impasse on greater and lesser charges.” The
jury then took a lunch break and continued to deliberate for approximately
three hours that afternoon before informing the court that it had reached a
verdict. At that point, the court had provided the jury with a readback of
B.P.’s testimony but had not responded to the jury’s claim of an impasse. The
jury found Whitecarter guilty on all counts and found true the special
allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury.
The trial court sentenced Whitecarter to an aggregate term of five
years in prison. It designated count 2 as the principal term and imposed the
lower term of two years, plus a consecutive term of three years for the section
12022.7 enhancement. The court stayed the imposition of sentence on count
1 under section 654 and imposed a concurrent term of two years on count 3.
It awarded Whitecarter 509 days of custody credits. Whitecarter timely
appealed.
B. Facts
On November 12, 2022, B.P. was working at a fast-food restaurant
when she heard someone yelling at her co-worker’s brother, I.B. She walked
to the front counter and saw Whitecarter threatening to beat I.B. up for
staring in his direction. She intervened and told Whitecarter that I.B. had
special needs and did not know what he was doing. Whitecarter grew angry
and told B.P. to “shut the fuck up” and that she was “a stupid bitch,” and “a
beaner and dirty Mexican.”
B.P. called for help on her headset and her manager told her “to just
tell [Whitecarter] to get out.” B.P. did so, but Whitecarter got angrier and
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punched her, causing her headset and glasses to fly off her head. The
impact caused B.P. to fall onto a bench, but she immediately got up and
punched Whitecarter back. The two exchanged more punches as
Whitecarter hit B.P. twice in her right eye. B.P. recalled blood dripping from
her eye onto her clothes. As other employees pulled them apart, Whitecarter
told B.P. that he was “going to fucking kill [her].” B.P. believed him and
feared for her life. She was taken to the hospital and was told that her right
eye had ruptured. Her eye was then surgically removed.
II. DISCUSSION
Whitecarter contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error
because former CALCRIM No. 3517 provided to the jury did not comply with
Kurtzman, which held that a court may not instruct a jury “not to ‘deliberate
on’ or ‘consider’ ” a lesser offense before reaching a verdict on the greater
offense. (Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 225.) He further contends that
the error was compounded by the prosecutor’s misleading closing argument.
The People counter that Whitecarter forfeited this claim by failing to object
below to the court’s instruction or the prosecutor’s arguments. We reach the
merits of the claim and find no error.
A. Forfeiture
“Generally, a party may not complain on appeal about a given
instruction that was correct in law and responsive to the evidence unless the
party made an appropriate objection. [Citation.] But we may review any
instruction which affects the defendant’s ‘substantial rights,’ with or without
a trial objection. [Citation.] ‘Ascertaining whether claimed instructional
error affected the substantial rights of the defendant necessarily requires an
examination of the merits of the claim—at least to the extent of ascertaining
whether the asserted error would result in prejudice if error it was.’ ” (People
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v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1087.)
Here, Whitecarter did not object to either the jury instruction (former
CALCRIM No. 3517) or the prosecutor’s remarks.3 On the contrary, defense
counsel requested that the trial court instruct the jury with former
CALCRIM No. 3517. Nonetheless, we exercise our discretion to reach the
merits because the claimed error arguably affects Whitecarter’s substantial
rights. (See People v. Hishmeh (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 46, 52 (Hishmeh).)
B. Instructional Error
“Under the acquittal-first rule, a trial court may direct the order in
which jury verdicts are returned by requiring an express acquittal on the
charged crime before a verdict may be returned on a lesser included offense.”
(People v. Bacon (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1110.) But it is error for the court to
instruct a jury “not to ‘deliberate on’ or ‘consider’ ” a lesser offense before
reaching a verdict on the greater offense. (Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p.
335.) Instead, California law “simply restricts a jury from returning a verdict
on a lesser included offense before acquitting on a greater offense [but] does
not preclude a jury from considering lesser offenses during its deliberations.”
(Id. at pp. 324–325.)
We review de novo whether a jury instruction correctly states the law.
(People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) When instructions are claimed
to be ambiguous or unclear, “we inquire whether the jury was ‘reasonably
likely’ to have construed them in a manner that violates the defendant’s
rights.” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 873.) “We look to the
instructions as a whole and the entire record of trial, including the
3 To the extent Whitecarter argues there was any prosecutorial
misconduct, he forfeited the issue by failing to object below. (People v. Gray
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 217 [“defendant forfeited [his] claim of prosecutorial
misconduct by failing to object on this ground at trial”].)
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arguments of counsel.” (People v. Franco (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 713, 720.)
Here, the trial court did not err or mislead the jury by giving former
CALCRIM No. 3517. The court told the jury: “It is up to you to decide the
order in which you consider each crime and the relevant evidence. But I can
accept a verdict of guilty of a lesser crime only if you found the defendant not
guilty of the corresponding greater crime.” Whitecarter argues that this
instruction was misleading because it omitted the following language that
was added to CALCRIM No. 3517 in March 2024, the same month as the
trial: “You do not have to reach a verdict on the greater crime before
considering a lesser crime.” Although this addition further clarified the order
of deliberations, Whitecarter fails to explain how former CALCRIM No. 3517
conflicts with Kurtzman. Indeed, the court expressly told the jury that it
could decide “the order in which [to] consider each crime and the relevant
evidence”;4 it did not tell the jury that it could not deliberate on the lesser
included offenses before it reached a verdict on the greater offenses.
Whitecarter counters that the trial court’s instruction was erroneous
because it “misleadingly appears to apply to the multiple charged crimes” as
opposed to the charged crimes and their lesser included offenses. We are
unpersuaded. The court explained the concept of lesser included offenses
immediately before instructing the jury with former CALCRIM No. 3517. It
then made clear that “[s]imple battery is a lesser crime of mayhem” and that
“[s]imple assault is a lesser crime of assault by means likely to produce great
bodily injury.” (Italics added.) There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury
construed the court’s instructions as prohibiting it from considering the lesser
4 By contrast, in Hishmeh, the Court of Appeal found error because the
trial court “twice told the jury it could not ‘consider’ the lesser included
offenses unless it unanimously found defendant not guilty of [the greater
offense].” (Hishmeh, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 53.)
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offenses before reaching a verdict on the greater ones. (See People v. Wilson
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803 [we “presume ‘that jurors understand and follow
the court’s instructions’ ”].)
Nor did the prosecutor mislead the jury during her closing argument.
Consistent with Kurtzman, the prosecutor simply told the jury that it should
not reach a verdict on the lesser included offenses unless it found Whitecarter
not guilty of the respective greater offenses. She did not state, much less
suggest, that the jury could not consider the lesser offenses before reaching a
verdict on the greater offenses. Accordingly, Whitecarter has not
demonstrated error.
C. Prejudice
Even if the instruction was erroneous, we find no prejudice.
When a trial court improperly instructs a jury regarding its ability to
consider lesser included offenses before acquitting a defendant of the charged
crime, we reverse only if the defendant establishes a reasonable probability
that he or she would have received a more favorable result in the absence of
the error. (Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 335 [applying harmless error
standard established by People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818].)
Under this standard, there is no prejudice if the jury did, in fact,
deliberate on both the greater and the lesser offenses before reaching a
verdict despite any instructional error. (Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p.
335.) In Kurtzman, for example, our high court found no prejudice because
the record showed that the jurors continued deliberating over both the
greater and lesser charges despite the trial court’s erroneous instruction “not
to ‘deliberate on’ or ‘consider’ voluntary manslaughter unless and until it had
unanimously agreed on second degree murder.” (Ibid.) Indeed, the court
found that the jury’s “continued full and productive deliberations” naturally
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resolved its initial deadlock and that it was “not reasonably probable [that
the] jurors would have found defendant not guilty of second degree murder
absent the court’s erroneous comments.” (Id. at p. 336.)
Here, the record establishes that the jury did, in fact, consider both the
greater and the lesser offenses before reaching a verdict. In its third request
to the trial court, the jury wrote: “We are deadlocked and at an impasse on
greater and lesser charges.” The jury could only have reached “an impasse
on” the “lesser charges” if it had already deliberated on them. Thus, the
record makes clear that the jury not only understood it had discretion to
consider the offenses in any order, it actually exercised that discretion. (See
People v. Perez (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 395, 400 [any Kurtzman error was
harmless when the jury’s requests during deliberations evidenced that they
considered both the greater and the lesser offenses].)
Nonetheless, Whitecarter argues that the “misleading version of
[former CALCRIM No. 3517] may have given the jury the impression that
they could give no meaningful consideration of the lesser offenses before
rendering a verdict on the greater offenses.” This argument is not only
speculative but also makes no sense in light of the jury’s last written request
to the trial court. Indeed, the jury could only have been “deadlocked” on the
“lesser charges” if it had already given meaningful consideration of those
charges.
Whitecarter further argues the trial court’s failure to respond to the
third jury request exacerbated the prejudice created by the erroneous
instruction. We disagree. The court’s lack of response was not unusual
under the circumstances because of the intervening lunch break and because
the court had to provide the jury with a readback of B.P.’s testimony in
response to its second request (which was made 22 minutes before the third
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request). After the readback, the jury took a break, continued deliberations,
and reached a verdict less than 40 minutes later. Accordingly, it is unlikely
that the jury interpreted the court’s lack of response as an indication that it
should not consider the lesser included offenses before reaching a verdict on
the greater offenses. In any event, we do not see how the jury, in light of any
purported ambiguity in former CALCRIM No. 3517, could interpret any delay
by the court in responding to the jury’s third request as a rebuke of its
decision to deliberate on the lesser offenses before reaching a verdict on the
greater offenses.
Hishmeh is inapposite. In that case, the Court of Appeal found
prejudicial error because “the trial court twice told the jury it could not
‘consider’ the lesser included offenses unless it unanimously found defendant
not guilty of [the greater offense]” in response to the jury’s comment during
deliberations that “it was deadlocked 11 to one on the charged crimes.”
(Hishmeh, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 53.) By contrast, the trial court in this
case never prohibited the jury from considering the lesser included offenses.
In fact, the court did not even talk to the jury after learning about the jury’s
deadlock.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
CHOU, J.
We concur.
JACKSON, P. J.
SIMONS, J.
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