CourtListener 10634404•People v. Sheard CA2/8
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Filed 7/16/25 P. v. Sheard CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B338675
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA058392-01
v.
SHAREEF SHEARD,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura Laesecke, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Michael H. Casey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo), we review an order denying Shareef Sheard’s motion
for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.1, subdivision
(a)(1). Because we find the order is not appealable, we dismiss
the appeal.
BACKGROUND
On September 29, 2006, a jury found appellant Shareef
Sheard guilty of attempted murder, assault with a firearm, and
possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury also found true
enhancements under sections 12022.7, subdivision (a), 12022.53,
subdivision (d), and 12022.5, subdivision (a). The trial court
imposed an aggregate sentence of 25 years to life plus nine years
eight months in prison.
On April 19, 2024, assisted by private counsel, Sheard filed
a motion for recall and resentencing pursuant to 1172.1,
subd. (a)(1). He asked the trial court to recall and reduce his
sentence based on his impressive rehabilitation efforts while
incarcerated. He also alleged he was the victim of serious
childhood trauma and of racial discrimination in the charging
process.
On April 26, 2024, the trial court declined Sheard’s
invitation to recall and resentence. It found: “Petitioner was
29 years-old when he attempted to kill the victim. Although not
premeditated, it was not the rash act of a juvenile and the victim
clearly posed no danger to him. Plus, he knew that he was not
allowed to possess a gun. Had the victim not received life-saving
medical care, Petitioner would have been facing a murder charge.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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[¶] The [c]ourt is not persuaded by the ‘mitigating’ documents
attached as Exhibit 3. Of the 25 certificates of vocational
training, 9 of them were issued on March 3, 2011, 4 of them were
issued on July 22, 2011, and 4 of them were issued on January
20, 2012, which leads the court to believe that they are
duplicative. Similarly, 4 of the attached Chronos are duplicative,
while the remainder simply document the receipt of the training
certificates. It appears that Petitioner has not taken any
vocational training since 2016 and he has not demonstrated
remorse. Therefore, the court declines the invitation to
resentence him pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1, Senate
Bill [No.] 620 and Assembly Bill [No.] 124. [¶] Although
Petitioner need only show a prima facie basis for a violation of
Penal Code section 745, he has not met his burden. Exhibit 4 is a
2020 report by the California Committee on the Revision of the
Penal Code, which asserts that gun enhancements are one of the
most common enhancements given to minorities in the State of
California. Petitioner argues that since he is Black and the court
imposed a gun enhancement, he is the victim of racial
discrimination. However, simply imposing the gun enhancement
does not trigger PC 745. Had the Legislature been persuaded by
the report that gun allegations were a product of racial bias, it
could have repealed the laws allowing courts to impose the
allegation and ordered courts to resentence anyone who is serving
a sentence for one. Since that is not the current state of the law,
Petitioner must demonstrate other evidence that he is entitled to
be resentenced pursuant to PC 745.” Sheard timely appealed.
We appointed counsel to represent Sheard on appeal. On
May 23, 2025, counsel filed a no issue brief pursuant to People v.
Delgadillo. Counsel advised us they told Sheard he could file his
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own supplemental brief within 30 days and sent Sheard
transcripts of the record on appeal as well as a copy of the brief.
On May 23, 2025, this court sent Sheard notice that a brief
raising no issues had been filed on his behalf. We advised him he
had 30 days within which to submit a supplemental brief or letter
stating any issues he believes we should consider. We also
advised him that if he did not file a supplemental brief, the
appeal may be dismissed as abandoned.
On June 10, 2025, Sheard filed a supplemental brief. He
contends: 1) the trial court improperly imposed the upper term
because it relied on facts not found true by a jury or judge and
not stipulated to by the parties; 2) the trial court incorrectly
thought Sheard was 29 years old when he committed the offenses
of conviction when he was 25 years old, so he met the criteria of a
youthful offender; 3) he was the victim of racial discrimination
because he, as a black man, was sentenced more harshly than
similar non-black offenders; and 4) the trial court mistakenly
thought he had submitted duplicate documents as exhibits to his
petition so it improperly discounted the mitigating significance of
his resentencing package.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1172.1, the Recall and Resentencing Statute
Section 1172.1 endows a trial court with authority to recall
the sentences of incarcerated defendants and resentence them
under certain circumstances. Like its predecessor provisions,
section 1172.1 is a statutory exception to the general rule that
“ ‘once a judgment is rendered and execution of the sentence has
begun, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or
modify the sentence.’ ” (People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629,
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637–638, quoting People v. Torres (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1081,
1084.)
Under section 1172.1, a trial court may recall and
resentence “at any time” upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
the Board of Parole Hearings, the district attorney of the county
in which the defendant was sentenced, or the Attorney General if
the Department of Justice originally prosecuted the case.
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) Until recently, the statute also provided
that a trial court may recall and resentence “on its own motion”
within 120 days of the date of commitment. Effective January 1,
2024, the 120-day provision was expanded. Now a trial court
may recall a sentence and resentence a defendant on its own
motion “at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time
of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory
authority or case law.” (Ibid.; Assem. Bill No. 600 (2023–2024
Reg. Sess.).) Once a trial court decides to recall and resentence, it
may either reduce the sentence by modification or vacate the
conviction and impose judgment on “any necessarily included
lesser offense or lesser related offense, whether or not that
offense was charged in the original pleadings.” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(3).)
Notably, section 1172.1, by its terms, denies a defendant
the right to petition the court for recall and resentencing.
(§ 1172.1, subd. (c) [“[a] defendant is not entitled to file a petition
seeking relief from the court under this section,” and “[i]f a
defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the
court is not required to respond.”].) As to a right to appeal, the
statute provides: “After ruling on a referral authorized by this
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section, the court shall advise the defendant of their right to
appeal.” (Id., subd. (d).)
II. The Right to Appeal Generally
The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not
appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is
expressly made appealable by statute. (Teal v. Superior Court
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, 598.) Criminal defendants are entitled to
appeal from “any order made after judgment, affecting the
substantial rights of the party.” (§ 1237, subd. (b).)
III. The Definition of “Substantial Rights”
Our Supreme Court has not provided “a comprehensive
interpretation of the term ‘substantial rights’ as used in section
1237, subdivision (b).” (People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155,
1161, fn. 3 (Loper).) But Loper did discuss how to approach
formulating a definition. There, the court addressed the question
whether a defendant has the right to appeal a trial court’s denial
of a request for compassionate release properly made by the
Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
under section 1170, former subdivision (e). That statute is
similar to section 1172.1 in that both statutes do not give
defendants the right to make a request for relief themselves. For
relief under section 1170, only the Secretary of the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation or the Board of Parole Hearings
may make such a request. (§ 1170, former subd. (e).)
In deciding that the denial of a request for compassionate
release affects substantial rights, our Supreme Court in Loper
noted: “Although the defendant has no independent right to
initiate compassionate release proceedings in the trial court, the
Secretary [of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation]
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evaluated defendant’s medical condition and made a
recommendation for compassionate release on his behalf. By
providing a mechanism for releasing eligible prisoners from
custody, section 1170[, former subdivision] (e) implicates a
prisoner’s substantial interest in personal liberty. Moreover,
although section 1170[, former subdivision] (e) authorizes the
trial court to exercise discretion whether to release a prisoner for
compassionate reasons, the statute also establishes clear
eligibility criteria (§ 1170[, former subd.] (e)(2)), suggesting that
discretion is not unfettered when evidence is presented satisfying
the statutory criteria. These factors lead us to conclude the trial
court’s ruling clearly affected defendant’s substantial rights for
purposes of section 1237, subdivision (b).” (Loper, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 1161, fn. 3.)
We glean from this footnote that the combination of three
factors dictates whether a defendant’s substantial rights in
personal liberty are implicated: 1) the Legislature sets up a
mechanism for releasing eligible prisoners from custody; 2) that
mechanism is used to get the issue of release from custody before
the trial court; and 3) that mechanism includes a list of eligibility
statutory criteria that must then be followed by the trial court in
making its ruling, suggesting that the trial court’s discretion is
not unfettered. We also glean from the extended discussion in
Loper on standing that whether or not the defendant has the
express right to initiate the request for sentencing relief is
immaterial to determining whether substantial rights are
affected. (See Loper, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 1161–1165
[defendant may appeal an adverse decision on a postjudgment
motion or petition if it affects substantial rights, even if someone
else brought the original motion].) Indeed, we find that it is use
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of the mechanism set up by the Legislature, coupled with
legislatively mandated factors to consider, that are determinative
of whether substantial rights are affected by the statute.
Keeping these three factors in mind, we hold that section
1172.1 does not implicate a defendant’s substantial rights where,
as here, a defendant has personally filed a petition not authorized
by statute. It is true that the Legislature created a mechanism
for release, satisfying the first of the three criteria set out above.
However, that mechanism, authorized for use by only designated
entities or persons, was not followed in this case. Section 1172.1,
subdivision (c) expressly provides: “A defendant is not entitled to
file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section. If
a defendant requests consideration for relief under this section,
the court is not required to respond.” The statute also expressly
provides that where an authorized request for relief is denied, a
defendant must be advised of their appellate rights, inferring a
right to appeal a properly authorized request. (§ 1172.1,
subd. (d).
Here, Sheard filed an unauthorized request for relief to
which the trial court was not obligated to respond. Thus, the
second criterion—that the authorized mechanism be used to
obtain the requested relief – has not been satisfied. This, we
emphasize, has nothing to do with a standing analysis per se.
Neither has the third factor been met. We see nothing in
section 1172.1 which describes the factors a trial court must
consider in deciding whether to recall a sentence. The only
factors set out are those that will support extending the time
within which the trial court may recall and impose sentence. We
conclude that section 1172.1, as created by the Legislature, does
not implicate the substantial rights of defendants. Therefore,
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orders denying requests for relief that do not properly invoke the
mechanisms set out by the statute are not appealable.
We also adopt the analysis of our colleagues in Division 2
who concluded that orders denying requests for relief from
defendants personally, as opposed to those from authorized third
parties, are not appealable. (People v. Hodge (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 985.) As Presiding Justice Lui wrote, “[T]he
second sentence of section 1172.1, subdivision (c) does undermine
any claim that defendants have a substantial right at stake when
they file an unauthorized request for resentencing. That
sentence excuses the trial court from any responsibility to rule on
such a request, or even to respond. It follows that a defendant
who chooses to file an unauthorized request for resentencing has
no right to a ruling. The defendant may have a liberty interest at
stake in any decision as to whether they should remain
incarcerated. But a defendant has no right to demand that the
trial court actually make such a decision. If the defendant has no
right to a decision, the trial court’s choice not to make one does
not deprive the defendant any right, much less a substantial
one.” (Id. at p. 996.) Under Hodge, where a statute expressly
relieves the court of any obligation to adjudicate a request for
relief filed by defendants personally, it follows that defendants do
not have a substantial right in this particular pathway toward
resentencing. (Ibid; see also People v. Faustinos (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 687, 697 [order declining to act on defendant’s
unauthorized section 1172.1 petition not an appealable order].)
We add that our analysis does not change where, as here,
the trial court issued an order explaining why it was declining to
act on the request (instead of ignoring the request, as it was
authorized to do). It is the Legislature’s mechanism and the use
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of that mechanism that is paramount in deciding whether
substantial rights are affected, not the format of the trial court’s
order.
Because we find that the order declining to take any action
on the section 1172.1 petition is not an appealable order, we do
not address Sheard’s the merits of his petition.
We decline Sheard’s request that we conduct an
independent review of the record. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 232.)
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
VIRAMONTES, J.
RUBIN, J.*
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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