People v. Wayfer CA1/3

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Filed 7/16/25 P. v. Wayfer CA1/3
[Redacted]
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A171939
v.
(Contra Costa County
BURL WAYFER III Super. Ct. No. 022401173)
Defendant and Appellant.
[REDACTED]

After declaring Burl Wayfer III incompetent to stand trial, the trial
court issued an order authorizing involuntary medication as needed. (Pen.
Code, §§ 1368, 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(I), undesignated statutory references
are to this code.) On appeal, Wayfer contends the court’s denial of an
evidentiary hearing before issuing the order deprived him of due process and
equal protection. He also argues that insufficient evidence supports the
order. We affirm.
BACKGROUND1
In August 2024, Wayfer was charged with felony assault with a deadly
weapon and misdemeanor resisting a peace officer. (§§ 148, subd. (a)(1), 245,
subd. (a)(1), 12022, subd. (b)(1).) After the trial court expressed doubt about

1 We granted Wayfer’s request to file briefs under seal.
(Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.47(c).) We concurrently filed a sealed, unredacted version of the
opinion — ordered to be sealed — as well as a public, redacted version.
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his competence, it suspended the proceedings and appointed a psychologist to
evaluate his mental status.
The clinical psychologist diagnosed Wayfer [REDACTED]. But at the
time of the evaluation, Wayfer was refusing medication. [REDACTED] The
psychologist opined he was not competent to stand trial because he did not
appear to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings. And based on
the high probability of harm to himself or others, she recommended
involuntary medication to stabilize his psychiatric symptoms long-term and
restore his competency.
The trial court found Wayfer incompetent to stand trial. It requested a
recommendation for his placement to restore competency and scheduled a
hearing regarding the administration of antipsychotic medication. A forensic
psychologist interviewed Wayfer and reviewed his prior psychiatric and
criminal history. [REDACTED]
At a November 2024 hearing, the trial court ordered Wayfer committed
to the State Department of State Hospitals. His counsel objected to any
involuntary medication, arguing the psychologists’ reports lacked sufficient
information regarding his capacity and dangerousness, and he had no issues
indicating dangerousness to himself or others while in custody. Wayfer also
asserted a right to an evidentiary hearing as a matter of due process. The
court disagreed, noting the psychologists opined he lacked the capacity to
make decisions regarding antipsychotic medication and is a danger to others.
It also concluded [REDACTED] a due process or equal protection violation.
Thus, it authorized the involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication as needed.

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DISCUSSION
Individuals have a protected liberty interest to be free from the
involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication. (Sell v. United
States (2003) 539 U.S.166, 178; In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 14.) “Pretrial
detainees” have the same right unless they are dangerous to themselves or
others “ ‘and the treatment is in [their] medical interest.’ ” (People v. Lewis
111 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1089–1090 (Lewis); Washington v. Harper (1990) 494
U.S. 210, 227 (Harper).) For defendants found incompetent to stand trial,
courts must make certain basic decisions, including hearing and determining
“whether the defendant lacks capacity to make decisions regarding the
administration of antipsychotic medication.”2 (§ 1370, subds. (a)(2)(B)–(2)(C);
Lameed, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 395.) When making this
determination, the court must consider the opinions of psychologists or
psychiatrists evaluating the defendant’s competency to stand trial. (§ 1370,
subd. (a)(2)(B).)
I.
Wayfer contends the trial court violated his due process rights by
denying him an evidentiary hearing before issuing its involuntary medication
order. After independently reviewing this constitutional issue of law, we
disagree. (California Assn. of Dispensing Opticians v. Pearle Vision Center,
Inc. (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 419, 426.) We instead agree with our colleagues

2 The trial court must also determine a treatment setting, such as state

hospital, private treatment facility, or outpatient treatment. (§ 1370, subds.
(a)(1)(B)(i)–(iii), (a)(2)(A).) And “if the court finds the defendant has the
capacity to make decisions regarding antipsychotic medication, it must then
determine whether the defendant consents to the use of such medication.”
(People v. Lameed (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 381, 396 (Lameed); § 1370, subds.
(a)(2)(B)(iv)–(v).)
3
in Lewis, which rejected the same arguments Wayfer makes here; we discern
no basis to depart from the reasoning in Lewis.
As a preliminary matter, Wayfer concedes the plain language of section
1370 does not require an evidentiary hearing, demanding nothing more than
a decision based on the trial court’s review of the competency report. But the
court “retains the discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing for the parties
to adduce live testimony or cross-examine witnesses where it finds such
hearing warranted.” (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1097–1098, italics
added.)
Nevertheless, Wayfer contends that after balancing the factors to
determine the process due before issuing an involuntary medication order —
the private interest affected by government action; the state’s interests; and
risk of erroneous deprivation through existing procedures and probable value
of additional or substitute safeguards — an evidentiary hearing is required.3
(Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 334–335; Conservatorship of
Christopher A., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 611.) Specifically, he argues the
same procedures approved in Harper, supra, 494 U.S. at page 235 — notice,
right to be present at an adversary hearing, and right to present and cross-
examine witnesses in involuntary medication proceedings for convicted
felons — and Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 488–489 — written
notice of violation, opportunity to be heard and present evidence, right to

3 Though Wayfer states we must assess “the dignitary interest in

informing individuals of the nature, grounds and consequences of the action
and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible
government official” — a factor in Conservatorship of Christopher A. (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 604, 611 — he fails to offer any analysis on this point, and
we consider the point waived. (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011)
194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [“ ‘We are not bound to develop appellants’
arguments for them’ ”].)
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confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, a neutral and detached
hearing body, and written statement of factual findings in a final parole
revocation proceeding — must be afforded here.
Not so. There is no dispute that Wayfer has a significant protected
liberty interest in avoiding the involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication. (Harper, supra, 494 U.S. at p. 221.) But critically, he has not
demonstrated the risk of an erroneous deprivation through the procedures
preceding the involuntary medication order. The court must consider the
written reports of “a careful diagnostic evaluation by a licensed psychologist
or psychiatrist.” (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1097; Mathews v.
Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at pp. 334–335 [acknowledging the “ ‘reliability and
probative worth of written medical reports’ ”]; § 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B).) He
had the right to be present, be represented by counsel, and present oral
argument at the hearing. (Harper, at p. 235 [“allowing respondent to contest
the staff’s position at the hearing satisfies the requirement that the
opportunity to be heard ‘must be granted at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner’ ”].) And although the evaluating psychologists did not
testify, “the conclusions and recommendations of the mental health experts
on the appropriateness of antipsychotic medication are likely more amenable
to written than oral presentation,” diminishing “the risk of error without oral
testimony.” (Lewis, at p. 1097; Mathews, at p. 345.) Thus, these procedures
create little risk of an erroneous or arbitrary deprivation of his interest
against involuntary medication. (Lewis, at p. 1097; Morrissey v. Brewer,
supra, 408 U.S. at p. 481 [“due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands”].)
Wayfer asserts — without support — that “vesting the trial court with
unbridled discretion” to allow cross-examination increases the risk of an

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erroneous deprivation. We are unpersuaded. (Benach v. County of Los
Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [“It is not our place to construct
theories or arguments to undermine the judgment and defeat the
presumption of correctness”].) Nor is the value of the additional procedural
protection of cross-examination in this context “beyond dispute,” as Wayfer
proclaims. Aside from repeating general axioms regarding the right to
confrontation in criminal cases, Wayfer fails to articulate how cross-
examination in involuntary medication hearings reduces the risk of an
erroneous deprivation. Even People v. Shepherd (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th
1193 — cited by Wayfer and noting the “ ‘ “absence of proper confrontation at
trial ‘calls into question’ the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process” ’ ”
in a probation revocation proceeding — states the right is not absolute where
witnesses (as here) can provide evidence through other means, such as letters
and other documentary evidence that would not be admissible in an
adversary criminal trial. (Id. at p. 1199.)
Finally, we agree with Lewis that requiring cross-examination in all
cases would significantly burden the state. Inevitably, there would be
attendant delays in hearings due to subpoenas and addressing legal and
evidentiary issues with “potentially significant adverse consequences” —
delays in restoring competency to stand trial, treatment within a reasonable
period of time, and timely prosecution of defendants whose competence can
be restored. (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1099.) To the extent that
Wayfer identifies cases in which incompetent defendants were provided with
evidentiary hearings before being involuntarily medicated, they do not
“support the notion that requiring evidentiary hearings in all cases ‘would
not present too great of a fiscal or administrative burden.’ ” (Ibid.; see e.g.,

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People v. McDuffie (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 880, 885; People v. Coleman (2012)
208 Cal.App.4th 627, 631–632.)
After balancing these factors, we conclude that due process does not
require an evidentiary proceeding in every section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(b)
hearing regarding involuntary medication. Given this conclusion, we do not
address Wayfer’s assertion that the erroneous denial of an evidentiary
hearing was prejudicial.
II.
Wayfer relatedly argues the trial court violated his equal protection
rights — treated him in an unequal manner compared to a similarly situated
group without some justification — by denying him an evidentiary hearing.
(People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99, 122; People v. Guzman (2005)
35 Cal.4th 577, 591–592; U.S. Const., 14th Amend.) We disagree.
At the outset, like Lewis, we assume without deciding that
“individuals subject to involuntary medication under section
1370(a)(2)(B) . . . are similarly situated to, and are treated in an unequal
manner from, . . . inmates subject to sections 2602 and 2603” — state prison
and county jail inmates — and “individuals subject to section 1370 (a)(2)(C)
and (D)” — those who consented to antipsychotic medication but
subsequently withdrew consent or for whom medication was not initially
ordered but later became necessary.4 (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th

4 Relying on State Department of State Hospitals v. J.W. (2018)

31 Cal.App.5th 334 — which noted in passing that involuntary medication is
permitted only following an evidentiary hearing — Wayfer argues he is
similarly situated to other civilly committed individuals under the
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Sexually Violent Predators Act, offenders with
mental health disorders, those committed as not guilty by reason of insanity
under section 1026, and state prisoners. (People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th
1081, 1107.) We disagree. J.W., based on cases addressing involuntary
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at p. 1106; People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1202 [equal protection
claim requires demonstrating “two classes that are different in some respects
are sufficiently similar with respect to the laws in question”].) The latter
two groups have the right to present evidence at a hearing. (§§ 2602,
subd. (c)(7)(B), 2603, subd. (c), 1370, subd. (a)(2)(D)(i)(III).)
But we reject Wayfer’s assertion that we must strictly scrutinize
whether there is a constitutionally sufficient reason for different treatment,
upholding it only if necessary to further a compelling state interest. (Warden
v. State Bar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 628, 641.) Though there is a significant liberty
interest in “ ‘avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs,’ ”
it does not necessarily warrant strict scrutiny. (Sell v. United States, supra,
539 U.S. at p. 178; People v. McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1210, fn. 13 [each
detail of a civil commitment program is not subject to strict scrutiny].)
Rather, we assess his claim under a rational basis review. (People v. Barrett
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081, 1109; Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1106;
People v. Magana (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 310, 324 [indefinite commitment
“affects the individual’s fundamental right to liberty,” but ensuring
“meaningful access to the statutory right to a jury trial, while essential to the
exercise of that right, does not affect a fundamental right”].)
Finally, Wayfer fails to demonstrate that there is “no rational
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate
governmental purpose” for providing state prison or county jail inmates

medication of these various groups, “addressed the authority of courts to
order involuntary medication to pretrial detainees who have not yet been
committed as a [sexually violent predator]; it did not purport to also decide
the procedures that govern the exercise of that authority.” (Lewis, supra,
111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1103.) Thus, there is no equal protection violation
concerning these groups because they “are not being treated differently.”
(People v. Castel (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1321, 1326.)
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under sections 2602 and 2603 an evidentiary hearing before the involuntary
administration of antipsychotic medication. (Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S.
312, 320; People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 75 [challenger bears burden
of “negat[ing] every possible, plausible grounds for the disputed disparity”];
Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1101.) Pretrial confinement is intended
to restore defendants to competency to allow criminal prosecution, thus
requiring “evaluation and treatment on an expedited basis.” (Lewis, at
p. 1109.) Mentally ill prison inmates, who may be serving longer sentences
and require long-term medication, do not have the same need. (Ibid.) For
other defendants found incompetent to stand trial and found to have the
capacity to refuse medication, or the court was unable to make a capacity
determination under section 1370, subdivisions (a)(2)(C) and (D), those
defendants “ ‘were already subject to a § 1370(a)(2)(B) determination’ ” —
without a requirement for an evidentiary hearing. (Lewis, at p. 1110.) It is
“rational for the Legislature to reserve those additional procedures” of an
evidentiary hearing “for situations where circumstances have changed and
there is a specific need to reevaluate an initial determination.’ ” (Ibid.)
Because there is a rational basis for the disparate treatment between
these groups, Wayfer’s equal protection claim fails.
III.
Wayfer contends insufficient evidence supports the involuntary
medication order. (Lameed, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 397 [reviewing
order authorizing involuntary administration of medication for substantial
evidence].) After reviewing the “entire record in the light most favorable to
the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a

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reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant” required medication, we
disagree. (People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 514–515.)
Relevant here, section 1370 authorizes involuntary antipsychotic
medication upon a finding the defendant lacks the capacity to make decisions
regarding antipsychotic medication. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(I)).)
Specifically, the court must determine whether in the absence of medication,
“it is probable that serious harm to the physical or mental health of the
patient will result.” (Ibid.) Probability of serious harm requires evidence
“the defendant is presently suffering adverse effects to their physical or
mental health, or the defendant has previously suffered these effects as a
result of a mental disorder and their condition is substantially deteriorating.”
(Ibid.) An involuntary medication order is also authorized upon a finding the
defendant is “a danger to others” — “the defendant has inflicted, attempted
to inflict, or made a serious threat of inflicting substantial physical harm on
another while in custody” or resulting in defendant being taken into
custody — and as a result of the defendant’s mental disorder or defect, the
defendant has a demonstrated danger of inflicting substantial physical harm
on others. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(II).) Upon finding any of these
conditions true, the court must issue an order authorizing involuntary
antipsychotic medication for no more than one year. (Lameed, supra,
247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 396–397.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s order. (§ 1370,
subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(I); Lameed, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 399.)
[REDACTED]
The psychologists’ reports further established Wayfer’s [REDACTED]
required medical treatment with antipsychotic medication. (§ 1370,
subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)(I); Lameed, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 400.)

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[REDACTED] (People v. Garcia (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1055 [relying,
in part, on competency reports noting antipsychotic medication is appropriate
to treat defendant’s mental disorder].)
Finally, the record reflects that if Wayfer’s mental disorder is not
treated with antipsychotic medication, it will result in serious physical or
mental harm to him. (Lameed, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 399.)
[REDACTED] (Id. at p. 401 [probability of serious harm demonstrated by
defendant presently suffering adverse effects to mental health].)
[REDACTED] (Id. at p. 400 [relying in part on psychologist’s opinion that
delusions and symptoms would persist in the absence of medication].)
On this record, substantial evidence supported the trial court’s
conclusion that Wayfer lacked capacity to make medication decisions
[REDACTED]. Given this conclusion, we need not address his argument
that there was insufficient evidence supporting the finding that he presented
a danger to others. (§ 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(ii)(II); People v. Garcia, supra,
99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1054 [“A trial court is required to permit involuntary
administration of antipsychotic medication if it finds one of [the] three sets of
conditions to be true”].)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

I CONCUR:

_________________________
PETROU, J.

A171939; People v. Wayfer

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TUCHER, P. J., Concurring in the judgment:
“Contrary to appellant’s characterization, he was never denied an
evidentiary hearing—he simply chose not to offer any evidence, seek to
examine any witnesses, or even move for a continuance based on a proffer
that he could offer evidence or challenge the evidentiary basis for the
[involuntary medication order (IMO)].” The Attorney General urges us to
affirm on that basis, and I would take that path here.
The factual record bears out the Attorney General’s characterization.
At a brief hearing on October 15, 2024, the trial court set another hearing
three weeks hence to address placement for competency restoration and
involuntary medication. Noting Dr. Stephanie Williams’s opinion that
Wayfer “meets criteria for involuntary medication on both capacity and
dangerousness grounds,” the court said it “will take argument on that” at the
November 5 commitment hearing. Wayfer offered no objection to this plan
and made no request to call witnesses at the forthcoming hearing.
At the November 5 hearing, the court began by committing Wayfer to
the Department of State Hospitals, then repeated its observation about Dr.
Williams’s opinion and its invitation for argument. Through counsel, Wayfer
articulated the view that information in the report was “insufficient on the
issue of capacity and dangerousness,” and that due process entitled him to an
evidentiary hearing. But Wayfer’s counsel acknowledged “the Court’s
position . . . that this is the date for a hearing,” and counsel neither requested
permission to call a witness nor asserted good cause for a continuance to
accommodate witness scheduling. Indeed, counsel mentioned no particular
witness or evidence she wanted to present.
The trial court then found “that this is the appropriate time and
manner of hearing” and concluded, without explanation, that “there [were] no
1
due process or equal protection violations” occurring. Neither the trial court
nor the prosecution asserted, at the October 15 or November 5 hearing, that
Wayfer did not have the right to call a witness to testify on issues relevant to
the proposed IMO. Nor would I so hold in this case.
My reluctance to rest our decision on the constitutional ground broken
in People v. Lewis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1078 (Lewis) stems in part from a
desire to avoid constitutional issues we need not reach. It is a “ ‘ “well-
established principle that [appellate courts] will not decide constitutional
questions where other grounds are available and dispositive of the issues of
the case.” ’ ” Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 230.
I also hesitate to suggest that, if Wayfer had timely requested to cross-
examine Dr. Williams, the trial court could properly have declined that
request. Cross-examination has been described “as ‘ “the greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,” ’ ” and the United States
Supreme Court “has declared: ‘Cross-examination of a witness is a matter of
right.’ ” (Fost v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 724, 733–734.) Indeed,
“[w]here a witness refuses to submit to cross-examination, or is unavailable
for that purpose, the conventional remedy is to exclude that witness’s
testimony on direct.” (Id. at p. 735; see also 3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (6th ed.
2025) Presentation at Trial, § 250; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 421,
superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Hinks (1997)
58 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1161; Washington v. Harper (1990) 494 U.S. 210, 228,
235 [approving procedures for IMO that include cross-examination].) I
acknowledge that the Lewis court anticipated a sort of cross-examination by
declaration (Lewis, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 1096 [“ ‘counsel is free to
contact the evaluating physicians . . . for additional information and reports,
2
and provide such reports to be considered’ ”]), and it may be that this
procedure satisfies the demands of due process, but I would avoid deciding
that weighty issue here.
As for the substantial evidence challenge, I reject that challenge for the
same reason the majority does—because substantial evidence in the form of
expert opinion supports a finding that Wayfer lacked capacity to make
medication decisions and risked serious harm to himself if he remained
unmedicated.
I accordingly join my colleagues in affirming the involuntary
medication order.

_________________________
Tucher, P. J.

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