CourtListener 10626073•People v. Barker CA5
Texto completo
Filed 7/9/25 P. v. Barker CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F087524
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF189972B)
v.
JOSEPH BARKER, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John D.
Oglesby, Judge.
Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez,
Amanda D. Cary, and Joseph Penney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Joseph Barker (appellant) of second degree murder (Pen. Code,
§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (b); count 1)1 with an enhancement for the intentional
discharge of a firearm proximately causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d); hereinafter section 12022.53(d)), willful, deliberate, and premeditated
attempted murder (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a); count 2) with an enhancement for the
intentional discharge of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), and assault with a
semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); count 3) with an enhancement for the personal
use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced appellant to 47 years to
life plus 20 years in state prison.
On appeal, appellant claims there was insufficient evidence to sustain the
section 12022.53(d) firearm enhancement on count 1, and the finding on count 2 that the
attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. We conclude substantial
evidence supported the jury’s findings. We affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Surveillance Videos.
On May 4, 2022, appellant drove to a gas station in his black Chrysler sedan.
Erica Gonzalez, his codefendant and girlfriend, was sitting in the front passenger’s seat.2
The events at the gas station were captured on high resolution surveillance video
cameras. Recordings from two different camera angles were admitted into evidence and
played for the jury.
The videos show appellant exit the gas station market with a soda cup and return
to his car, which is parallel parked between the market and a set of gas pumps. Gonzalez
is still in the front passenger’s seat. After appellant enters, the car does not move.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2 Gonzalez filed a separate appeal (case No. F087704).
2.
Approximately 30 seconds later, a grey sedan drives forward and stops facing the front of
appellant’s car, approximately one car length away. The grey sedan’s path forward
appears to be blocked by appellant’s car and an SUV that had parked at the gas pumps
next to appellant’s car. Angel Bowdey (Angel) is in the driver’s seat of the grey sedan.
Her sister, Ammie Bowdey (Ammie), is in the front passenger’s seat.3
After about 45 seconds, Angel drives the grey sedan forward and stops a few feet
from appellant’s car. Angel exits the grey sedan and approaches the front of appellant’s
car. She angrily bangs on the hood several times while appearing to yell. Appellant and
Gonzalez open their respective car doors. Gonzalez exits, stands between the car and the
open car door, and argues with Angel. Angel takes several steps toward Gonzalez,
moving around the hood toward the passenger’s side of the car. Ammie exits the grey
sedan and walks behind Angel.
Appellant, who was still seated in the driver’s seat, reaches through the car and
hands Gonzalez a silver semiautomatic handgun. Gonzalez points the handgun in the
direction of Angel and Ammie and pulls back the slide. Ammie grabs Angel by the arm
and attempts to move her back, but Angel pulls her arm away. Appellant steps out of the
driver’s side of the car and points a black semiautomatic handgun at Angel. Ammie takes
a step back, and appellant and Gonzalez open fire. It is unclear from the surveillance
videos who fires first. Angel collapses to the ground. Appellant then sweeps his
handgun to his left and briefly points it at Ammie as she retreats behind the grey sedan.
It is unclear from the surveillance videos whether appellant discharges the handgun when
he moves it in Ammie’s direction. However, an officer who recovered and reviewed the
surveillance videos testified it appears appellant “pointed his firearm at Ammie and
shot.”
3 For clarity, we refer to Angel Bowdey and Ammie Bowdey by their first names.
No disrespect is intended.
3.
Appellant and Gonzalez get back into appellant’s car and flee. As they exit the
gas station parking lot, Gonzalez rolls down her window and fires two additional shots.
The bullets strike the wall of the gas station market, several feet away from Angel and
Ammie.
II. Ammie’s Testimony.
Ammie testified she went with Angel to the gas station to pump gas. Angel
stopped her car in front of appellant’s car because she was trying to access the gas pump,
but appellant’s car was blocking her path. Angel started honking her horn, but
appellant’s car did not move. Angel then exited her car, banged on the hood of
appellant’s car, and asked them to move. Gonzalez stepped out of appellant’s car and
told Angel, “[B]ang on my hood one more time.” Angel responded, “[Y]ou’re not going
to do nothing.” Gonzalez pointed her handgun at Angel, and Angel stated, “[D]on’t point
it if you ain’t going to use it.”
Ammie tried to pull Angel away when she saw that Gonzalez had a handgun.
Appellant then exited his car with his own handgun, and appellant and Gonzalez both
started shooting. Ammie testified appellant and Gonzalez pointed their guns at both her
and Angel. She stated appellant and Gonzalez shot Angel and tried to shoot her, but she
ran behind the grey sedan.
Ammie went to check on Angel after appellant and Gonzalez began to drive away.
She saw that Angel had been shot. She briefly backed away from Angel when Gonzalez
fired shots from appellant’s car while exiting the parking lot.
Emergency responders arrived and transported Angel to the hospital via
ambulance, where she was pronounced deceased.
III. Appellants Are Arrested Outside of Their Residence.
An officer arrived at the gas station soon after the shooting. He reviewed the
surveillance footage from the gas station, which revealed the license plate number on
appellant’s black Chrysler sedan.
4.
Minutes later, a police aerial unit located appellant’s car parked outside of the
residence to which it was registered. Officers in the aerial unit observed appellant and
Gonzalez exit appellant’s car and walk toward a silver Ford, which was also parked
nearby. They entered and exited the silver Ford, then ran toward the residence.
Appellant jumped over a fence into a nearby yard, where he was contacted and arrested
by officers on the ground. Gonzalez hid in a crawl space under the residence. After
numerous callouts by officers, she exited from the crawl space and surrendered.
Officers conducted a search of the silver Ford. In the trunk, they discovered a
silver nine-millimeter caliber semiautomatic handgun, consistent with the firearm used by
Gonzalez, and a black .45-caliber semiautomatic handgun, consistent with the firearm
used by appellant. Both handguns were loaded.
IV. Subsequent Investigation.
The handguns recovered from the trunk of the silver Ford were swabbed and
tested for DNA. Appellant and Gonzalez could not be excluded as contributors to DNA
on both handguns.
A forensic pathologist conducted an autopsy on Angel’s body. He testified he
observed two gunshot wounds. One gunshot entered the front left side of the chest and
exited the lower right side of the back. Because the wound was through-and-through, no
associated projectile was recovered from inside of the body. The pathologist explained
he could not determine the caliber of the projectile that caused the gunshot wound to the
chest because the size of the wound does not correlate to the caliber of the bullet.
Another gunshot travelled through the left thigh, then entered the right thigh and
struck the femur. A projectile was recovered from the right thigh. The People’s firearms
expert examined the projectile and determined it was a nine-millimeter caliber bullet.
She compared the projectile to a round test fired from Gonzalez’s silver handgun and
opined both were fired by the same firearm.
5.
A crime scene technician responded to the scene of the shooting to search for
possible evidence. She observed four apparent bullet strikes on the outside wall of the
gas station market. She located two bullet fragments on the ground.
The People’s firearms expert explained that the two bullet fragments were a lead
core and a jacket fragment. The jacket fragment was damaged, consistent with it having
collided with something. The firearms expert compared the jacket fragment to a bullet
test fired from appellant’s black handgun and opined that both were fired from the same
firearm. The lead core was unsuitable for analysis.
V. Codefendant’s Evidence.4
Gonzalez testified appellant was her boyfriend and they lived together. They were
both fentanyl users. They began selling drugs together to support their habits and carried
guns for protection.
On the day of the shooting, Barker drove to a gas station so he could buy a soda.
When appellant went inside of the market, she remained in the car and smoked fentanyl.
Sometime after appellant got back into the car, she heard a thud and saw Angel yelling at
them. She had never seen Angel or Ammie before. She stepped out of the car and started
arguing with Angel but did not remember what was said. Appellant passed her a
handgun, and she heard his gun fire. She reacted by pulling the trigger of her handgun,
but she did not intend to do so. She claimed she was “oblivious” to everything around
her because she was under the influence of fentanyl.
Gonzalez testified that as she and appellant exited the gas station parking lot, she
fired two shots out of her window because she thought Angel and Ammie were going to
chase them. She claimed she was scared and panicking and did not know what was
happening.
4 Appellant did not present any evidence at trial.
6.
Gonzalez called a clinical psychologist who assessed her while she was in
custody. He diagnosed her with opiate use disorder and intermittent explosive disorder.
He explained how these conditions may have affected her thoughts and actions.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Kern County District Attorney’s Office filed an amended information
charging appellant and Gonzalez with the murder of Angel (§ 187, subd (a); count 1) with
a first degree murder allegation (§ 189, subd (a)) and a section 12022.53(d) firearm
enhancement, the attempted murder of Ammie (§§ 664, subd. (a), 187, subd. (a); count 2)
with an allegation the offense was willful, deliberate, and premeditated (§ 664, subd (a))
and a section 12022.53, subdivision (c) firearm enhancement, and assault with a
semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); count 3) with a section 12022.5, subdivision (a)
firearm enhancement. The People also charged Gonzalez with discharging a firearm
from a motor vehicle at Angel and Ammie (§ 26100, subd. (c); count 4) with a section
12022.5 subdivision (a) firearm enhancement.
Appellant and Gonzalez were tried jointly. After all parties rested, the trial court
granted Gonzalez’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on count 2 pursuant to
section 1118.1. The court denied appellant’s section 1118.1 motions as to counts 1 and 2.
The jury convicted appellant and Gonzalez of all remaining charges and
enhancements, except it found not true the first degree murder allegations on count 1 that
the murder was committed by means of premeditation and deliberation. Consequently,
appellant and Gonzalez were convicted of second degree murder on count 1.
DISCUSSION
I. The Jury’s Finding That the Attempted Murder of Ammie Was Willful,
Deliberate, and Premeditated Was Supported by Substantial Evidence.
On count 2, the jury convicted appellant of the attempted murder of Ammie and
found true the allegation that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated. Appellant does not challenge the attempted murder verdict, but contends
7.
the evidence was insufficient to sustain the additional finding of premeditation and
deliberation.
A. Standard of review.
“To determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review
the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it
contains [substantial] evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value, from which
a rational trier of fact could find that the elements of the crime were established beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Tripp (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 951, 955.) We “presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce
from the evidence.” (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.) “We need not be
convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; we merely ask whether
‘ “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Tripp, supra, at p. 955, italics omitted.)
B. Substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding.
“Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a
direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.” (People v. Superior
Court (Decker) (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1, 7.) Section 664, subdivision (a), prescribes an
increased sentence for attempted murder that is “ ‘ “willful, deliberate, and
premeditated.” ’ ” (See People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 877.)
“An attempted murder is premeditated and deliberate if it occurs ‘ “ ‘as the result
of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Cardenas (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 102, 121, quoting People v. Burney (2006)
47 Cal.4th 203, 235.) In this context, “ ‘[d]eliberation’ refers to careful weighing of
considerations in forming a course of action; ‘premeditation’ means thought over in
advance.” (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1080.) “ ‘The process of
premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended period of time. “The true
test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may
8.
follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at
quickly.…” ’ ” (Ibid.)
As noted above, appellant’s substantial evidence challenge is limited to the jury’s
finding the attempted murder was deliberate and premeditated. He does not contest the
jury’s verdict on the underlying attempted murder conviction, conceding that “the jury
could [have found] that appellant fired a shot in Ammie’s direction.” Instead, he
contends the evidence at most “reflects a sudden and rash impulse to fire one parting shot
at Ammie just before fleeing from the scene.”
Appellant’s claim is belied by his actions, which were captured on high resolution
surveillance videos. We have reviewed the videos in detail, and they strongly support the
jury’s finding appellant acted with premeditation and deliberation.
The videos show that after Angel approached appellant’s car and banged on the
hood, appellant did not immediately exit. Instead, he reached across the inside of the car
and passed a loaded handgun to Gonzalez. By ensuring his codefendant was similarly
armed, appellant consciously doubled the lethality they were prepared to inflict. This
evinced not only a clear intent to kill, but preparation and planning. Moreover, when
appellant passed the handgun, Ammie had already exited the grey Sedan and moved
toward Angel, suggesting appellant was aware of Ammie’s presence as he prepared the
ensuing attack. Once appellant passed the handgun, he immediately exited the car and
opened fire with his own handgun, further reflecting his preexisting intent to kill. When
appellant began shooting at Angel, Ammie was still standing near her. After Angel fell
to the ground, appellant redirected his fire toward Ammie as she fled behind the grey
sedan, indicating he intended to kill Ammie as well as Angel.
Appellant argues the relatively brief duration of the altercation undermined the
jury’s finding that appellant acted with premeditation and deliberation. However, it is
well established that premeditation and deliberation can occur in a brief period of time.
(People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 563; People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at
9.
p. 1080; People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 863.) “The act of planning—involving
deliberation and premeditation—requires nothing more than a ‘successive thought[] of
the mind.’ ” (People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 658.) True, the surveillance
videos show appellant started shooting only 14 seconds after Angel banged on the hood
of his car. But under California law, this was sufficient time for appellant to formulate
the intent to kill and reflect on the nature and consequences of his actions. (See People v.
Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 213 [defendant “had ample time to premeditate and
deliberate” when he took up a firearm, climbed out of a moving car, sat on the window
frame, reached across the roof, braced himself, and aimed at the victim]; People v. San
Nicholas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 658 [brief period between seeing the victim’s reflection
in a mirror and stabbing her was “adequate for defendant to have reached the deliberate
and premeditated decision to kill”].)
Appellant notes the preliminary hearing magistrate did not hold appellant to
answer for the attempted murder of Ammie,5 and the trial court granted Gonzalez’s
motion for a judgment of acquittal on the attempted murder charge pursuant to
section 1118.1. According to appellant, this procedural history reveals “the weakness of
the evidence.” We fail to see how these prior judicial determinations are relevant to our
independent assessment of whether the evidence at trial supported the jury’s finding that
appellant acted with premeditation and deliberation.
Next, appellant posits the jury’s finding the attempted murder was deliberate and
premeditated was inconsistent with its finding that the murder of Angel was not
deliberate and premeditated. Whether the verdicts were consistent is not relevant to our
substantial evidence review. As appellant concedes, “inconsistent verdicts are allowed to
stand if the verdicts are otherwise supported by substantial evidence.” (See People v.
5 After the preliminary hearing, People charged appellant with attempted murder in
the information, and the trial court subsequently denied appellant’s motion to set the
attempted murder count aside pursuant to section 995.
10.
Miranda (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 398, 405.) We find it instructive, however, to highlight
the differences in the evidence of premeditation and deliberation as to both charges.
Most significantly, appellant turned his handgun toward Ammie after he shot at Angel,
and she collapsed to the ground. Thus, before shooting at Ammie, appellant had an
additional moment to reflect and to personally observe the fatal consequences of
discharging a firearm at another human being.
Finally, appellant cites People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, where the
Supreme Court “said that generally [findings of premeditation and deliberation] are
affirmed when (1) there is evidence of planning, motive, and a method of killing that
tends to establish a preconceived design; (2) extremely strong evidence of planning; or
(3) evidence of motive in conjunction with either planning or a method of killing that
indicates a preconceived design to kill.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 434.)
But since Anderson was decided, the Supreme Court has repeatedly “emphasized that its
guidelines are descriptive and neither normative nor exhaustive, and that reviewing courts
need not accord them any particular weight.” (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th
379, 420; see People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1183; People v. Perez (1992) 2
Cal.4th 1117, 1125.) “Anderson provides ‘a framework to aid in appellate review,’ but it
does not ‘define the elements of first degree murder or alter the substantive law of murder
in any way.’ ” (People v Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 89.) Thus, the Anderson
guidelines do not limit our analysis.
To conclude, the evidence showed appellant passed a loaded handgun to his co-
defendant, then exited his car and fired multiple shots, including at Ammie. Accordingly,
our review for substantial evidence reveals that on this record, a rational jury could have
found appellant attempted to kill Ammie with deliberation and premeditation, and this
claim lacks merit.
11.
II. Substantial Evidence Supported the Section 12022.53(d) Firearm
Enhancement.
Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s true finding
as to the section 12022.53(d) firearm enhancement on the murder conviction (count 1).
Specifically, he alleges the evidence did not establish the bullets he fired actually struck
Angel.
The section 12022.53(d) enhancement applies where a defendant, “in the
commission of a [specified felony, including murder], personally and intentionally
discharges a firearm and proximately causes great bodily injury … or death.”
“ ‘[A] proximate cause of great bodily injury or death is an act or omission that
sets in motion a chain of events that produces as a direct, natural and probable
consequence of the act or omission the great bodily injury or death and without which the
great bodily injury or death would not have occurred.’ ” (People v. Bland (2002)
28 Cal.4th 313, 335 (Bland).) There may be more than one proximate cause. (Ibid.)
“ ‘When the conduct of two or more persons contributes concurrently as a cause of the
[great bodily injury or death], the conduct of each is a cause of the [great bodily injury or
death] if that conduct was also a substantial factor contributing to the result.’ ” (Ibid.;
People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 847.)
Applying the above principles, our high court explained in Bland that
“section 12022.53(d) does not require that the defendant fire a bullet that directly inflicts
the harm.” (Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 338.) “A person can proximately cause a
gunshot injury without personally firing the weapon that discharged the harm-inflicting
bullet.” (Id. at p. 337.) “The enhancement applies so long as defendant’s personal
discharge of a firearm was a proximate, i.e., a substantial, factor contributing to the
result.” (Id. at p. 338.) Thus, where multiple shooters fire at a victim, but it cannot be
determined which of the shooters’ bullets actually struck the victim, each shooter is
subject to the section 12022.53(d) enhancement so long as his or her conduct was a
12.
substantial factor contributing to injury. (Bland, at pp. 337–338; see People v. Sanchez,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 845–849.)
Appellant argues that in the instant case our substantial evidence review is limited
to whether appellant personally inflicted (i.e., directly caused) great bodily injury or
death because the trial court did not instruct on principles of proximate cause. In the
pattern instruction setting forth the elements of the section 12022.53(d) enhancement,
CALCRIM No. 3149, the court omitted the bracketed language defining proximate
cause.6 The court only instructed the jury it must find that appellant’s “act caused great
bodily injury or death to a person.” In appellant’s view, the substantial evidence
requirement cannot be satisfied by evidence that appellant’s shots proximately caused
injury or death, because the jury was not instructed on that theory. (See People v. Kunkin
(1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 251 [“We, of course, cannot look to legal theories not before the
jury in seeking to reconcile a jury verdict with the substantial evidence rule”].)
Regardless of whether our review encompasses proximate cause or is limited to
personal infliction of great bodily injury or death, the evidence was sufficient to sustain
the section 12022.53(d) enhancement because the jury could have reasonably found one
of appellant’s gunshots struck Angel. The autopsy revealed Angel sustained a gunshot
wound that entered the left chest and exited the right back. Because the wound was
through-and-through, and no associated projectile was recovered, there was no forensic
evidence tying the wound to either handgun. However, the surveillance videos clearly
show appellant pointed his handgun at Angel and fired multiple shots. Based on our
review of the videos, and considering the apparent trajectory of the shots, the position of
Angel’s body, and the location of the injury, we conclude a rational jury could have
6 The omitted bracketed language specifies that an act causes great bodily injury or
death if it is the “direct, natural and probable consequence of the act,” and is a
“substantial factor is causing the [injury or death].” (CALCRIM No. 3149.)
13.
found appellant fired the shot that struck Angel in the left chest.7 Therefore, substantial
evidence supported the jury’s section 12022.53(d) finding, and we reject this claim.
III. The Indeterminate Abstract of Judgment Has Clerical Errors Which Must be
Corrected.
The parties agree, as do we, that the indeterminate abstract of judgment contains
two clerical errors. The trial court is directed to make the following corrections. (People
v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [appellate courts have inherent power to correct
clerical errors in an abstract of judgment].)”
First, on count 1, appellant was convicted of second degree murder. The
indeterminate abstract of judgment, however, erroneously lists the conviction as
“MURDER: FIRST DEGREE.” We direct the trial court to amend the indeterminate
abstract to reflect appellant was convicted of second degree murder on count 1.
Second, on count 2, the indeterminate abstract of judgment lists appellant’s
punishment as both “life with the possibility of parole,” and as “7 years to life.” We
agree with the parties that listing the punishment twice in two different ways is
potentially confusing. The punishment for willful, deliberate, and premeditated
7 During rebuttal argument, the prosecutor’s asserted that the jury can conclude that
appellant’s bullet struck Angel “based off of the position of her body, her reaction, and
where he’s shooting.” Defense counsel objected that the argument “[m]istates the
evidence.” The trial court sustained the objection, stating, “The Court finds there’s no
evidence that the bullet that hit [Angel] was fired by [appellant].”
After closing argument, the trial court reversed its ruling based on its further
review of the surveillance videos. The court explained: “I want to make it clear I’m not
saying there is sufficient evidence to support that [appellant] was the shooter, but I think
there is sufficient evidence for you as a jury to review the evidence in this case and make
your own determination. I don’t want to influence you.” The court also reminded the
jury that it should not consider its comments on the evidence.
We reject appellant’s suggestion that the trial court’s remarks are relevant to his
sufficiency of the evidence challenge. Our role is to determine whether the jury’s
findings were supported by substantial evidence, and the court’s comments are not
evidence. (See People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 600, fn. 9; CALCRIM
No. 3530.)
14.
attempted murder is most accurately stated as “life with the possibility of parole.”8
Therefore, we direct the trial court to amend the indeterminate abstract to omit the
duplicative reference to a sentence of “7 years to Life” on count 2.
DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to prepare an amended indeterminate abstract of
judgment reflecting the following corrections. On count 1, the indeterminate abstract of
judgment shall reflect appellant was convicted of second degree murder. On count 2, the
indeterminate abstract of judgment shall omit the duplicative reference to a sentence of
“7 years to Life.” The trial court shall then forward the amended abstract of judgment to
the appropriate entities. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
LEVY, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DETJEN, J.
FRANSON, J.
8 Willful, deliberate, premeditated attempted murder is punishable by life in prison
with the possibility of parole. (§ 664, subd. (a).) A sentence of life in prison without a
specified minimum period of confinement carries a minimum term of seven years before
parole eligibility. (§ 3046, subd. (a)(1); see People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 97.)
15.
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.