Nelson v. Huhn CA2/8

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Filed 7/1/25 Nelson v. Huhn CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

KAREN NELSON, Individually B330596
and as Trustee, etc.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 22STCP04212)
v.

ERIC HUHN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Richard L. Fruin, Jr., Judge. Reversed
and remanded with directions.

Bidna & Keys, Richard D. Keys and Howard M. Bidna for
Defendant and Appellant.

Lagerlof and Robert A. Bailey for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
INTRODUCTION
Following their parents’ death, disputes arose between a
brother and sister about the administration of their parents’ trust
and the value of the trust’s assets, including two real properties
located in California. The trust required an equalizing payment
be made to the brother by the sister, but the siblings disagreed as
to the amount, leading to litigation in the state of Washington.
The siblings participated in mediation pursuant to the Annotated
Revised Code of Washington (ARCW) section 11.96A.300
conducted by a Washington mediator, resulting in settlement.
The settlement term sheet resolved the pending disputes between
the siblings, including the appraisal process for determining the
value of the two real properties. The settlement term sheet
expressly specified the “valuation shall be based . . . on the
highest and best use of the property using the Uniform
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice.”
The siblings’ mutually agreed-upon appraiser prepared and
emailed the reports but, within days, notified the siblings that
the report for one of the properties is erroneous and incomplete
as a result of a subordinate’s mistake. The sister argued the
appraiser’s reports are “final and binding” and filed a petition in
California requesting that they be confirmed as arbitration
awards pursuant to the California Arbitration Act (CAA). The
brother argued he never agreed to arbitration, let alone
arbitration under California law, and the appraiser’s report is not
valid or complete as the appraiser did not utilize the Uniform
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP) in
preparing the report.
The trial court tentatively denied the sister’s motion to
confirm the appraisals as arbitration awards but ultimately

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granted it. The trial court denied the brother’s request for
reconsideration.
Because we find the parties’ settlement term sheet did not
amount to an agreement to arbitrate, we reverse the judgment
and underlying order granting the motion to confirm. We
remand with instructions to the trial court to return the matter
to the appraiser to complete the appraisal pursuant to the terms
of the parties’ settlement term sheet.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The Trust
In 1998, Walter and Betty Huhn created The Betty B.
Huhn and Walter R. Huhn Trust of 1998 (the Trust). Walter died
in 2014. In 2017, Betty—a Los Angeles County resident at the
time—amended and restated the Trust. In 2021, Betty died.
The Trust provides that upon the surviving spouse’s
(Betty’s) death, the assets of the Trust are to be distributed to
children Eric Huhn and Karen Nelson.
Relevant to this appeal, article seven of the Trust provides
that the duplex property located at 3910 East Blvd. in Los
Angeles, California (L.A. duplex) shall be distributed to Karen,
and the single-family residence located at 665 Chaparro Road in
Covina, California (Covina property) shall be distributed to Eric.
Article seven section D(1)(c) of the Trust expressly states Betty
was “aware that those properties will have different fair market
value and want[ed] her total estate to be shared equally between
[Karen] and [Eric]. Therefore she require[d] the properties to be
appraised on her death and sufficient Trust assets to be given to
the beneficiary receiving the lesser valued property above to
equalize the gift as distributed. For example, if the [L.A. duplex]

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is valued at $1,000,000 and the Covina property is valued at
$500,000, then $500,000 of Trust assets would be transferred to
[Eric] to equalize this distribution.”
Article eleven of the Trust contains a “Choice-of-Law
Clause”: “The validity of this trust and the construction of its
beneficiary provisions shall be governed by the laws of the State
of California in force from time to time. This paragraph shall
apply regardless of any change of residence of a Trustee or any
beneficiary, or the appointment of a substitution of a Trustee
residing or doing business in another state.”
Upon Betty’s death, Karen became the successor trustee by
operation of the Trust. On April 7, 2021, Karen sent Eric a
“NOTIFICATION BY TRUSTEE PURSUANT TO CALIFORNIA
PROBATE CODE SECTION 16061.7.” In the notification, Karen
specified both her address and the “address of the principal place
of business of the administration of the trust” as “2011
Drummond Drive, Gig Harbor, WA 98322.”
II. Washington Litigation and Resulting Settlement
Disputes arose between Eric and Karen over Karen’s
administration of the Trust, the distribution of non-real property
assets, and the value of the Trust’s real property assets.
On November 24, 2021, Eric served Karen with a notice of
mediation “pursuant to RCW 11.96A.300”1 and requested
mediation.
On February 1, 2022, Eric initiated litigation against
Karen in Pierce County Superior Court in Washington and filed a

1 “RCW 11.96A.300” refers to section 11.96A.300 of the
Annotated Revised Code of Washington—“Mediation Procedure,”
which is in Chapter 11.96 entitled “Trust and Estates Dispute
Resolution.”

4
petition to compel mediation (In re Betty B. Huhn Trust, case No.
22-4-00215-1). Eric served Karen with another notice of
mediation per Washington law; the notice specified this “matter
must be resolved using the mediation procedures of RCW
11.96A.300 unless the court determines at the hearing that
mediation shall not apply pursuant to RCW 11.96A.300(3).”
On February 28, 2022, Eric and Karen agreed to
participate in mediation and continued the hearing on Eric’s
petition. On April 20, 2022, the parties participated in mediation
with Stew Cogan in King County, Washington. Mediation
continued on April 25, 2022, when the parties entered into and
executed the settlement term sheet totaling five pages, which set
forth the parties’ agreement resolving their disputes over Karen’s
administration of the Trust.
The settlement term sheet included detailed specifics
regarding the agreed upon “process for determination of the value
of the LA and Covina properties.” New appraisals of the two
properties were to be prepared by a mutually agreeable MAI2
appraiser. The appraiser’s “determination of value for the
properties shall be final and binding on the parties as to the
value of properties.” The appraiser “shall conduct the appraisals
pursuant to written instructions mutually agreed upon by
counsel for parties” including the instruction—“The valuation
shall be based on date of death and based on the highest and best
use of the property using the Uniform Standards of Professional
Appraisal Practice.” The instructions also specify that the

2 “MAI” signifies the appraiser is a Member of the Appraisal
Institute, considered the top designation in the appraisal
profession. (Forty-Niner Truck Plaza, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. (1997)
58 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1268, fn. 2.)

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parties shall provide the appraiser with information and
documents such as “a list of improvements/repairs made since the
date of death,” “identification of any easements, encroachments,
encumbrances, rent control,” and “rental income and expenses for
2018–February 5, 2021.”The equalization payment must be made
by Karen to Eric “[w]ithin 60 days of the finalization of the
appraisals.” The parties “shall use all reasonable and good faith
efforts to cooperate with the other party necessary to complete all
the tasks set forth above.” Eric “will dismiss the Petition to
Compel Mediation within 3 court days of execution of this
agreement.”
Finally, the settlement term sheet provided “[a]ll
controversies, claims, disputes, questions of interpretation and
counterclaims arising under or relating to the Settlement Term
Sheet . . . shall be first raised via written notice to opposing
counsel. If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute
informally in 10 days, then the dispute shall be submitted to
mediation with Stew Cogan. If the parties are unable to resolve
their dispute through mediation, the matter may be submitted to
a court of competent jurisdiction.”
III. Appraisal Reports
On June 13, 2022, both parties agreed upon and retained
Beth Finestone (Finestone), an MAI appraiser and the managing
director of Integra Realty Resources, to serve as the appointed
appraiser of the L.A. duplex and Covina property. Finestone’s
engagement letter provided she would appraise the properties as
of the date of Betty’s death—February 5, 2021. The engagement
letter also provided the appraisals would be conducted pursuant
to the instructions in the settlement term sheet and referred to
the instruction that the valuation be “based on the highest and

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best use of the property using the Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice.”
Finestone’s engagement letter specified that the resulting
reports will include “investigations into comparable SFR sale
properties that would be relevant in the valuation process.” It
included a list of “Information Requested for the Appraisal” from
the parties including a summary of competed renovations,
information concerning the development history of the properties
within the last 10 years, and copies of any and all leases in place
at the date of value. Finestone’s engagement letter stated: “Upon
completion of my analysis, I would prepare an appraisal report
for each property in full compliance with USPAP.”
On October 7, 2022, Finestone served lengthy appraisal
reports for the L.A. duplex and the Covina property. The
137-page appraisal report for the L.A. duplex used the sales
comparison approach and income approach; it included a
summary of comparable rentals as well as comparable improved
sales. The report included a reconciliation of the two approaches
and provided a “final opinion of value” of $1.35 million. The 100-
page appraisal report for the Covina property used the sales
comparison approach and included a summary of comparable
improved sales; it provided an opinion of value of $730,000. Both
appraisal reports state: “The appraisal is intended to conform
with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice
(USPAP) and the Code of Professional Ethics and Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice of the Appraisal Institute.”
On October 12, 2022, Eric’s counsel emailed Finestone (and
copied Karen’s counsel), requesting Finestone to “give the reports
a second review with particular attention to the highest and best
use of the properties, including associated comparables for those

7
uses, as that is a term of our Settlement Agreement.” (Italics
added.) Eric’s independently retained MAI appraiser Kevin
Donahue (Donahue) asked Finestone about certain comparable
sales that were relevant but not included in the appraisal report.
Finestone indicated she would reexamine her appraisal based on
this information. Finestone requested information about the L.A.
duplex, including “copies of the actual leases that were in place
as of the date of value,” “a summary of when each tenant that
was in place on the date of value, first occupied/leased the space,”
and whether “the property owner, prior to [the] date of value,
filed any paperwork with the Los Angeles Housing Department
to enable them to begin the redevelopment process.”
On October 18, 2022, Karen’s counsel emailed Finestone
(and copied Huhn’s counsel) and “object[ed] to additional work
being done on this.”
On October 20, 2022, Finestone emailed both parties’
attorneys and stated “information has recently come to light that
may have an impact on our opinion of value for the [L.A. duplex].
As a result, we are in the process of reviewing the report and do
not consider our assignment complete. To complete the
assignment, we need [Karen’s] responses to the following” and
requested copies of “the actual leases that were in place as of the
date of value” and other information/paperwork. (Italics added.)
During a telephone call on October 27, 2022, Finestone
informed both parties’ counsel that her October 7, 2022 appraisal
report did not include comparable sales data that is relevant to
determining the market value of the L.A. duplex and that its
“inclusion . . . would make a material difference in [her] opinion
of the market value for the [L.A. duplex].” Finestone confirmed
that the second appraiser in her office, Thomas Richardson (also

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an MAI), assisted her in the research necessary for the appraisals
but neglected to include a recent sale of a comparable property in
the area.
Karen “refused” to provide the additional information
requested by Finestone.
The parties participated in another mediation with Stew
Cogan of King County, Washington on November 28, 2022. No
resolution was reached.
Two weeks later, on December 14, 2022, Eric filed a civil
complaint against Karen in Mason County Superior Court in
Washington (Eric Huhn v. Karen Nelson, case No. 22-2-98675-
23), and sought declaratory relief that Finestone’s October 7,
2022 appraisal of the L.A. duplex was not final or binding
because Finestone said it was not complete and because the
process utilized by Finestone did not comport with the parties’
settlement term sheet. Eric requested the trial court order Karen
“to provide the information requested by the appraiser and to
cooperate in concluding the agreed upon appraisal process and
calculation of the equalizing payment owed to Eric.”
IV. Karen’s Petition to Confirm Appraisal
Concurrently, on November 29, 2022, Karen filed a petition
in Los Angeles Superior Court to confirm the October 7, 2022
appraisals as final and binding arbitration awards pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure3 section 1280 et seq. On December 7,
2022, Karen filed a motion to confirm the appraisals as binding
and final awards “pursuant to a settlement agreement between

3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

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the parties.” In support of the motion, Karen submitted her own
declaration and that of her counsel Robert Bailey.
V. Eric’s Request to Stay or Dismiss Karen’s Petition
On January 11, 2023, Eric filed a request to dismiss
Karen’s petition to confirm the appraisals or, alternatively, to
stay proceedings pending resolution of the Washington litigation.
He argued, “Instead of allowing the appraiser to complete her
appraisal or refund her fees, [Karen] filed the petition in
[California] seeking to confirm the incomplete/unfinished
appraisals as a final and binding arbitration award under Code of
Civil Procedure § 1285.” Eric argued Washington law should
apply and not California law because “[u]nlike California, the
[A]rbitration [A]ct enacted by the State of Washington does not
include ‘agreements providing for valuations, appraisals, and
similar proceedings’ within the definition of ‘agreements’ covered
by its arbitration statutes [(Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 7.04A.010 et
seq.)]. ” In support, he submitted the declarations of Finestone,
Donahue, and his counsel Teresa R. Byers.
Finestone’s declaration provides:
It was “common practice” for Finestone to “work[] closely
with a second appraiser in [her] office to assist [her] in the
research necessary for the completion of this appraisal” and MAI
appraiser Thomas Richardson’s work “was completed under [her]
direction.” She stated: “Soon after I sent the . . . October 7, 2022
appraisals, I received a phone call from Kevin Donahue, MAI,
who inquired as to whether or not I was aware of a recent sale of
a property at 3920 East Boulevard. The sale of this property was
not within the set of potential comparables that Mr. Richardson
or I had identified during the course of our research.” Finestone
determined that the sale of this property “would have been used

10
as a comparable had I known about it when I prepared my
appraisal report; and that the inclusion and analysis of this
property sale as a comparable in my appraisal would make a
material difference in my opinion of the market value for the
[L.A. duplex].” In researching the sale, Finestone “also identified
other sales that were not initially identified” and “indicate[d] that
the actual market value of the [L.A. duplex] is higher than the
opinion that I presented in my report dated October 7, 2022.”
As soon as Finestone “realized [the] report dated October 7,
2022 did not contain some of the comparable data that is relevant
to the market value of the [L.A. duplex],” she notified both
parties’ counsel that “the value opinion expressed in [the] report
. . . is not valid due to the additional comparable data that I had
identified after my original report had been submitted.” During
her October 27, 2022 telephone call with both parties’ counsel,
Finestone was very clear that her appraisal report did not include
the opinion of market value for the L.A. duplex that she would
have given had she “been aware of the relevant sales that [she]
now know[s] to exist.” Finestone’s report “needed to be
supplemented with additional data and analysis, and that the
opinion of market value needed to be revised.” Finestone offered
to refund the entirety of the report cost if counsel wanted to
obtain a new appraisal, but Karen’s counsel “did not want either
the corrected report or the refund, and that he considered the
current report final and binding.”
Donahue’s declaration provides:
Donahue reviewed Finestone’s October 7, 2022 appraisal
report and determined the appraisal “did not discuss numerous
other comparable sales, including the sale of 3920 East
Boulevard on October 26, 2020, which is two doors down from the

11
[L.A. duplex].” Donahue opined “the October 7th Appraisal is
incomplete and must be supplemented with consideration of the
other comparable sales before it can yield a proper ‘highest and
best use’ opinion of value.” Donahue further stated Finestone
“exceeded her charge, her powers, and authority by failing to
adequately consider the market. By not researching or analyzing
the other comparable sales in the area, her opinion of value does
not satisfy ‘the highest and best use’ standard of the Uniform
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, which Finestone
was expressly required to adhere to.” Donahue opined rules 1-1,
1-4, and 2-2 of the USPAP were not met, rendering the appraisal
report for the L.A. duplex “not a credible report and is not
adequate . . . to rely on.”
On January 13, 2023, Eric filed a notice of related case—
the Washington litigation.
On January 24, 2023, Eric filed an opposition to Karen’s
motion to confirm the appraisal, and Karen filed an opposition to
Eric’s request to dismiss or stay. Both parties filed evidentiary
objections.
VI. Trial Court Hearing and Ruling
The hearing on both parties’ pending motions took place on
February 6 and 10, 2023. Counsel for both parties confirmed
having received the court’s tentative ruling to deny Karen’s
motion to confirm the award and to “return[] to the appraiser [the
matter] to consider whether she wants to revise her opinion.”
After argument, the trial court found that Finestone
“discovered that her subordinate, who actually prepared the
appraisal, failed to identify comparables, so that she would get
comparables that were required for an MAI appraisal [per
USPAP].” “[I]t seems to me here the appraiser says, I made a

12
mistake. And I made the mistake because I relied upon the
subordinate. And I merely validated his work. And the
professional standards would require that I would look at, not
only at duplexes, but also would look . . . at single family homes.
So I would like to correct my mistake. That seems to me to be a
fair resolution. [¶] Then we look at the California Arbitration Act.
And it has a number of statutes which have these generalized
statements as to whether or not a mistake can be corrected. I
understand the mistake was not corrected within 30 days
because Ms. Finestone did not do a new appraisal. But she said
how she would do a new appraisal, and for someone experienced
in the business, it’s probably a matter of 15 more minutes. [¶] So
I would think the fair result would be to let her do an appraisal
that is consistent with professional standards. If I’m going to
have to deal with the wording of the California Arbitration Act to
find a basis to permit her to do that, I will spend the time to do
it.” The court took the matter under submission.
On March 3, 2023, the trial court issued a written ruling
granting Karen’s motion to confirm the award and denying Eric’s
motion to dismiss or stay Karen’s petition. The trial court stated:
“The settlement agreement does not provide that the arbitrator
will have an opportunity to consider overlooked information to
correct the final award. Nor does the settlement agreement
provide an opportunity to the parties to ask the arbitrator to
reconsider her final award.” Referencing section 1286.6,
subdivision (a), the court did “not find that the appraised value
discloses ‘an evidence miscalculation of figures’ nor that the
appraiser has made ‘an evidence mistake in the description of
any person, thing or property referred to in the award.’
Referencing section 1286.6, subdivision (c), the award is not

13
‘imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the
controversy.’ The correction sought by [Eric] would increase the
arbitration value[4] and thus would affect the ‘merits of the
controversy.’ ” Finally, the court overruled the evidentiary
objections of both parties.
On March 7, 2023, notice of entry of judgment granting the
petition to confirm the appraisal was filed.
VII. Eric’s Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial
On March 8, 2023, Eric filed a motion for reconsideration of
the trial court’s March 3, 2023 ruling, or, alternatively, a motion
for new trial. Eric argued the court’s “tentative ruling was not
adopted, despite indications from the [c]ourt of its intent to do so.
The [c]ourt in the [o]rder applied California law despite Eric’s
contention that Washington law should control. The [o]rder
should have been submitted to the parties as a revised tentative
ruling, and the parties should have been permitted to further
present their cases.” Eric argued he was “given no opportunity to
present his case when the tentative ruling was not adopted, and
the [c]ourt in essence reversed itself by applying California law
and confirming the appraisal as an arbitration award.”
Karen filed her opposition to Eric’s motion.
On March 24, 2023, judgment was entered granting
Karen’s petition to confirm the appraisal per section 1287.4.
VIII. Trial Court Hearing on Reconsideration Motion
The hearing took place on May 3, 2023. Eric argued, “The
tentative was in our favor. There was nothing said by your honor
during the two hearings on February 6th and February 10th that

4 Karen’s counsel indicated it is “an $800,000 difference.”

14
led me to any other conclusion that the tentative was going to be
adopted, which it wasn’t.” Eric argued, “We were blindsided by
this, your honor, and there is a lot of money at stake and it’s
unfair and it’s not in accordance with the intentions of the
parents [to have an equal distribution]. This is basically a
million-dollar issue. And the trustee [Karen] knows it, because
the first appraisal that she got in this matter was for $2.3 million
and what she is trying to cram down here is an appraisal that is
admittedly an error by the appraiser at $1.35 million.” The court
took the matter under submission. The record does not include
any ruling on the motion.
On May 23, 2023, Eric filed a notice of appeal from the
judgment entered March 24, 2023.
DISCUSSION5
Eric contends the judgment and underlying order granting
Karen’s petition to confirm the appraisal award must be reversed
because 1) no agreement to arbitrate existed between the parties;
2) Washington law applies and Washington does not recognize an
agreement to a binding appraisal as constituting an agreement to
arbitrate; 3) Eric had no hearing or opportunity to be heard—one
of the required attributes of any arbitration; 4) Finestone’s

5 We deny Eric’s request for judicial notice filed August 2,
2024 as the documents attached to Eric’s request are not relevant
and unnecessary to our determination of the issues on appeal.
(Mercado v. Superior Court (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1143, 1153,
fn. 6; Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th
1057, 1063 [disapproved on other grounds by In re Tobacco Cases
II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276]; see also American Cemwood
Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th
431, 441, fn. 7.)

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October 7, 2022 appraisal report was not final and not completed
in accordance with the express terms of the settlement term
sheet and Finestone’s engagement letter.
We find Eric’s appeal meritorious, warranting reversal of
the underlying judgment and order.
I. Standard of Review
We review de novo the trial court’s order granting a
petition to confirm an arbitration award. (Glaser, Weil, Fink,
Jacobs & Shapiro, LLP v. Goff (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 423, 433;
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th
362, 376, fn. 9.)
Statutory interpretation is an issue of law which we review
de novo. (Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of
San Diego (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1171, 1183.)
Where the issue involves the application of law to
undisputed facts, we review the matter de novo. (Martinez v.
Brownco Construction Co. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1014, 1018.) To the
extent the court’s ruling rests on issues of disputed fact, however,
we apply the substantial evidence test. (Kacha v. Allstate Ins.
Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1031.) If the word “substantial”
means anything at all, it clearly implies that such evidence must
be of ponderable legal significance; obviously the word cannot be
deemed synonymous with “any” evidence—it must be reasonable
in nature, credible, and of solid value; it must actually be
“substantial” proof of the essentials which the law requires in a
particular case. (Ibid.)
II. Applicable Law
Some similarity exists between an appraisal and
arbitration because, in both, the parties select private, unofficial

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persons to mediate their disputes. However, the two are not the
same. (4 Am.Jur 2d (2025) Alternative Dispute Resolution, § 3;
see generally 6 Cal.Jur.3d (2025) Arbitration and Award, § 24.)
An arbitration adjudicates a controversy while the purpose of an
appraisal is to avoid one and to ascertain only such matters as
quantity, valuation, and amount. (6 Cal.Jur.3d, supra,
Arbitration and Award, § 24; Bewick v. Mecham (1945) 26 Cal.2d
92, 97–98; see Gonzalez v. Gonzalez (1917) 174 Cal. 588, 594,
604.) Thus, for example, an agreement for an appraisement of an
insurance loss should be distinguished from an agreement to
submit a controversy as to the loss to arbitration. (6 Cal.Jur.3d,
supra, Arbitration and Award, § 24.)
Contractual arbitration refers to the process whereby
parties voluntarily submit their disputes for resolution by
impartial third persons instead of by a judicial tribunal provided
by law. (§ 1280, subd. (a) [“agreements providing for valuations,
appraisals, and similar proceedings”]; Herman Feil, Inc. v. Design
Center of Los Angeles (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1406, 1414, italics
added [“[Contractual arbitration] is a procedure for resolving
disputes which arises from contract; it only comes into play when
the parties to the dispute have agreed to submit to it.”]; see
Coopers & Lybrand v. Superior Court (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 524,
537–539 (Coopers); Moore & Thomas, 4 Cal. Civil Practice
Procedure (2025) Alternative Dispute Resolution, § 26:63.) Some
cases say that whether a contract provision that calls for a
binding valuation, appraisal, or similar proceeding is an
arbitration agreement depends upon whether the parties
intended the proceeding to be arbitration. (See Coopers, at
pp. 537–539; Dore v. Southern Pac. Co. (1912) 163 Cal. 182, 189;

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Thompson v. Newman (1918) 36 Cal.App. 248, 251–252; 12 Miller
& Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2025) § 45:7.)
Notwithstanding the distinctions (Lewis Food Co. v.
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 515, 520),
appraisals and valuation proceedings fall within the definition of
agreements governed by the rules of arbitration in California.
Section 1280, subdivision (a) defines an “agreement” to include
“agreements providing for valuations, appraisals . . . .” (§ 1280,
subd. (a).) California has a well-established policy favoring
arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive means of settling
disputes. (See generally § 1280 et seq. [the CAA].) To support
this policy and encourage parties to settle their disputes through
arbitration, it is essential that arbitration judgments be both
binding and final. (A.M. Classic Construction Inc. v. Tri-Build
Development Co. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1474.) Thus, as a
general rule, California courts will indulge every reasonable
intendment to give effect to arbitration proceedings. (Ibid.)
There is no required form or terminology for an arbitration
agreement, except where statutorily prescribed for particular
transactions. (See, e.g., § 1295 [agreements concerning medical
malpractice]; § 1298 [disputes arising from real estate contracts].)
An agreement need not expressly provide for arbitration and may
incorporate by reference an arbitration clause contained in
another document. (Wolschlager v. Fidelity National Title Ins.
Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 784, 791; Kleveland v. Chicago Title
Ins. Co. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 761, 765 [plaintiff was not bound
by arbitration provision that was neither included in preliminary
title report nor incorporated by reference into that report].)

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State law principles govern the formation of contracts.
(Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 233, 244.)
An arbitration provision that is ambiguous is construed against
the drafter. (Civ. Code, § 1654; see Sandquist, at pp. 247–248.)
When a party denies the existence of an arbitration agreement,
the party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. (Moore & Thomas, 4 Cal. Civil
Practice Procedure (2025) Alternative Dispute Resolution,
§ 26:66.) Therefore, the mere presentation of a written
arbitration agreement without supporting testimony can fail to
establish a valid agreement. (Ibid.; Gamboa v. Northeast
Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164–165 (Gamboa);
see Remedial Construction Services, LP v. AECOM, Inc. (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 658, 663.)
Even though California law favors agreements for
arbitration of disputes, “ ‘ “there is no policy compelling persons
to accept arbitration of controversies which they have not agreed
to arbitrate.” ’ ” (Victoria v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 734,
744 (Victoria).) “ ‘[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party
cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he
has not agreed so to submit.’ ” (AT&T Technologies. v.
Communications Workers of America (1986) 475 U.S. 643, 648;
see Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100
Oak Street (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312, 323 [“The scope of arbitration is
. . . is a matter of agreement between the parties”]; Knight et al.,
Cal. Practice Guide: Alternative Dispute Resolution (The Rutter
Group) (2024) ¶5:2111.) The key factor is whether the terms
agreed upon are intended as a substitute for litigation. (See, e.g.,
Southard v. Newcomb Oil Co., LLC (2021) 7 F.4th 451, 454–455
[an agreement to participate in “alternative dispute resolution”

19
did not qualify as arbitration agreement because the agreement
did not include “common features of classic arbitration”].)
III. Analysis
Eric contends the trial court erred in confirming the
appraisal reports as arbitration awards for multiple reasons.
First, Eric contends the settlement term sheet that he and
Karen executed does not amount to an arbitration agreement.
He believes the trial court erred in determining that Finestone’s
appraisal could be confirmed as an arbitration award “because
there was no agreement to ‘arbitrate.’ . . . Whether the parties to
a contract have agreed to arbitration is a threshold question of
contract formation and state law.” Eric contends he “never
agreed that the appraisal . . . contemplated by the Settlement
Term Sheet would be subject to confirmation as an arbitration
award under the . . . provisions of the California Arbitration Act.”
He argues if there is any question as to whether the appraisal
reports qualify as arbitration awards, that the issue should be
determined via Washington law, not California law. He argues:
“The Settlement Term Sheet was the result of a mediation
conducted in Washington under Washington law that settled
litigation initiated in Washington concerning a Washington
trustee’s administration of a trust in Washington. Washington
law therefore controls the issue.”
Second, Eric argues the trial court further erred in
affirming the appraisal of the L.A. duplex as an arbitration
award because the parties never had an opportunity to be heard
or to comment on, object, or rebut any of the information relied
upon by the appraiser in forming her opinion of value—rendering
it not an arbitration.

20
Third, Eric contends Finestone’s report failed to include a
number of relevant comparable properties “including a property
virtually identical to the [L.A. duplex] located next door . . . that
had sold four months before the valuation date in the appraisal
for $2.2 million.” Eric argues this rendered Finestone’s
appraisal/opinion of value incomplete and not final, as it did not
satisfy the highest and best use standard of USPAP that
Finestone was expressly required to adhere to pursuant to the
parties’ settlement term sheet. We address these contentions.
A. There Was No Agreement to Arbitrate
The threshold question here is whether the parties’
settlement term sheet amounted to an agreement to arbitrate.
The settlement term sheet states that Finestone’s
appraisals or “determination of value for the properties shall be
final and binding on the parties.” Regardless of the phrase “final
and binding,” nothing in the settlement term sheet suggests that
Finestone’s appraisals may be confirmed as arbitration awards.
(See Coopers & Lybrand, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 537
[“[A] mere agreement for a binding valuation is not per se an
agreement to submit to arbitration. Something more is
required.”].) Eric argues he never agreed to arbitration. He
emphasizes that “[n]o derivation of the word ‘arbitrate’ appears
in the Settlement Term Sheet.” Karen argues the settlement
term sheet need not use the word “arbitration.” Karen is correct.
“The fact that a procedure is labeled as ‘arbitration’ does not
mean that it is . . . and a procedure may constitute arbitration
even though it does not bear that characterization.” (Elliott &
Ten Eyck Partnership v. City of Long Beach (1997)
57 Cal.App.4th 495, 503 (Elliott & Ten); see Cheng-Canindin v.

21
Renaissance Hotel Associates (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 676, 691
(Cheng-Canindin).)
A party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any
issue that he or she has not agreed to submit. (Granite Rock Co.
v. Teamsters (2010) 561 U.S. 287, 299; Lawrence v. Walzer &
Gabrielson (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1501, 1505.) As with any other
type of contract, an arbitration contract requires mutual consent
of the parties, and their consent to arbitrate must be
communicated by each party to the other. (Harris v. TAP
Worldwide, LLC (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 373, 381; Serafin v.
Balco Properties Ltd., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 165, 173.)
One party cannot unilaterally impose a duty to arbitrate upon
another party without that party’s knowing consent. Although
there is a strong public policy in favor of arbitration, there is no
public policy requiring persons to arbitrate disputes that they
have not agreed to arbitrate. (Franco v. Greystone Ridge
Condominium (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 221, 227; Avery v.
Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 50,
59; Crowley Maritime Corp. v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. (2008)
158 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1069.) A party normally is not obligated to
arbitrate unless he or she has expressly agreed to do so by
entering into a valid and enforceable written contract with the
party who seeks arbitration. (§ 1281.2; see Victoria, supra, (1985)
40 Cal.3d at pp. 738–739; Freeman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 473, 479; see Coopers, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d
at p. 537; Van Luven v. Rooney Pace, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d
1201, 1205–1207.)
Eric next argues there is “no evidence whatsoever that at
the time they entered into the Settlement Term Sheet either
[Eric or Karen] contemplated that the appraisals to be prepared

22
would be subject to confirmation as ‘arbitration awards’ under
the [CAA].” It is true. Oddly, neither Karen nor Eric submitted
any declaration or evidence in support of their motions and
responses in the underlying matter to suggest, let alone
establish, whether they consented to or intended the settlement
term sheet to also operate as an agreement to arbitrate. This
operates against Karen. When a party denies the existence of an
arbitration agreement, the party seeking arbitration bears the
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (Moore &
Thomas, 4 Cal. Civil Practice Procedure (2025) Alternative
Dispute Resolution, § 26:66.) Therefore, the mere presentation of
a written arbitration agreement without supporting testimony
can fail to establish a valid agreement. (Ibid.; Gamboa, supra,
72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 164–165; see Remedial Construction, supra,
65 Cal.App.5th at p. 663.)
B. Eric Forfeited his Conflict of Law Argument
Eric argues the trial court erred in applying California law,
as he contends this action should be governed by Washington
law. He cites to ARCW provisions and Washington case law
demonstrating that Washington does not qualify an appraisal
report as agreements covered by Washington’s arbitration
statutes. (See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 704A.010 et seq.; Peterson
v. Granger Irr. Dist. (1926) 137 Wash. 668, 670 [“[T]he contract is
not one calling for arbitration, but one calling for appraisement.
That there is a distinction between these two methods of
determining controversies . . . has been recognized by this
court . . . . The rule . . . that there exists in this [Washington]
state, in addition to the statutory arbitration, the common law
appraisal.”].)

23
Karen argues Eric “relied entirely on California law in
advancing his argument to vacate the appraisal award” and thus
waived his conflict of laws argument.
We agree with Karen.
Nowhere in Eric’s January 11, 2023 filings below did he
request the trial court to apply Washington law. He filed a
request to dismiss Karen’s petition to confirm or alternatively to
stay proceedings pending resolution of the Washington litigation.
Eric had argued that Washington law, not California law, should
be applied but only in the context of the underlying court staying
the action to allow for the Washington litigation to first conclude.
Eric did not request the trial court to apply Washington law. He
did not provide any conflict of law analysis. He did not reference
article eleven of the Trust containing a “Choice-of-Law Clause.”
He did not discuss full faith and credit in any detail, or analyze
why Washington, as opposed to California law, would or should
apply. As such, we find Eric waived any choice of law or conflict
of law argument on appeal. (See AICCO, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of
North America (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 579, 595.)
C. There Was No Valid Arbitration as There Was No
Hearing or Opportunity to be Heard
As already mentioned, under California law, agreements
providing for “valuations, appraisals and similar proceedings” are
treated as agreements to arbitrate. (§ 1280, subd. (a), italics
added; Mahnke v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 565,
575.) Karen argues the parties’ agreement to a “final and
binding” appraisal qualified the settlement term sheet as an
arbitration agreement and “made [it] subject to the [CAA].”

24
Karen’s argument misses the point. Regardless of whether
the CAA applies, we agree with Eric—the trial court erred in
affirming the appraisal reports as arbitration awards because the
parties never had an opportunity to be heard or to comment on,
object, or rebut any of the information relied upon by the
appraiser in forming her opinion of value—rendering it not an
arbitration.
Although arbitration may take many procedural forms, a
dispute resolution mechanism is not an arbitration unless it has
all of the following attributes: 1) a third party decisionmaker
chosen by the parties; 2) a mechanism for ensuring neutrality in
the rendering of the decision; 3) an opportunity for both parties to
be heard; and 4) a binding decision. (Cheng-Canindin, supra,
50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 684–685; Saeta v. Superior Court (2004)
117 Cal.App.4th 261, 268; Elliott & Ten, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th at
p. 503.) Thus, absent an agreement to the contrary, the parties
subject to the arbitration procedure are entitled to be heard, to
present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses. (§ 1282.2,
subd. (d).)
Here, there was no hearing nor “an opportunity for both
parties to be heard.” (Cheng-Canindin, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at
p. 684.) Similarly, despite the parties’ settlement term sheet
having detailed instructions providing for the appraisal process,
it fails to include any terms for a hearing or opportunity for the
parties to submit evidence or information to the appraiser or to
comment on, object or rebut the appraiser’s findings before the
appraiser’s opinion of value is deemed final and binding on the
parties. “Arbitration should give both parties an opportunity to
be heard.” (Id. at p. 689.) Thus, while an agreement to an
appraisal may be enforceable as an agreement to arbitrate under

25
the CAA, failure to provide a hearing or opportunity to be heard
rendered this an invalid or faulty arbitration procedure,
warranting reversal.
The significance of affording the parties an opportunity to
be heard or to rebut the appraiser’s findings makes sense in the
parties’ case here. That surely would have allowed for a number
of issues to be addressed and resolved.
For instance, Karen’s failure to provide information and
documentation that she was required to supply to Finestone
pursuant to the instructions in the settlement term sheet would
have been discovered. Finestone had notified the parties that
“[t]o complete the assignment, we need [Karen’s] responses to the
following requests” and then requested copies of the leases in
place as of the date of value and other information/paperwork.
The record provides that Karen “refused to provide the additional
information requested by Finestone and attempted to tender a
check to Eric for an equalizing payment” based on the October 7,
2022 appraisal report.
Another issue that would have been addressed was the
issue raised via email to Finestone by Eric’s counsel on October
12, 2022, requesting Finestone to “give the reports a second
review with particular attention to the highest and best use of
the properties, including associated comparables for those uses,
as that is a term of our Settlement Agreement.” (Italics added.)
The sale of the comparable property located at 3920 East
Boulevard on October 26, 2020, which is two doors down from the
L.A. duplex, was noticeably missing from Finestone’s report.
This error would have been promptly brought to Finestone’s
attention, as it was by Eric’s counsel within five days of receiving
Finestone’s appraisal reports, and addressed.

26
Eric also provided evidence showing Finestone’s appraisal
reports did not comply with the settlement term sheet’s
instruction that the reports be prepared per USPAP. Donahue
provided a declaration that opined, “By not researching or
analyzing the other comparable sales in the area, [Finestone’s]
opinion of value does not satisfy ‘the highest and best use’
standard of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal
Practice, which Finestone was expressly required to adhere to.”
Donahue opined that rules 1-1, 1-4, and 2-2 of the USPAP were
not met, rendering the appraisal report for the L.A. duplex “not a
credible report and not adequate . . . to rely on.”
On the other hand, no evidence was provided by Karen
demonstrating that USPAP standards were met, and the terms of
the settlement term sheet satisfied.
We also take a moment to note that Finestone has stated in
writing that the appraisal report was based upon error and she
submitted a declaration stating that her October 7, 2022
appraisal was not valid. (Roehl v. Ritchie (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th
338, 347–348 [we pay substantial deference to an arbitrator’s
determination of her own authority; “Any doubts about the
arbitrator’s power to decide these issues must be resolved in his
[or her] favor.”].)
For these reasons, we find the parties’ settlement term
sheet does not amount to an agreement to arbitrate, and the
failure to include a hearing or opportunity to be heard rendered
the procedure not an arbitration.
We therefore reverse the judgment and underlying order
granting Karen’s petition to confirm. We instruct the trial court
to deny Karen’s petition and to return the matter to Finestone, or
another mutually agreed upon appraiser, if appropriate, to

27
complete the appraisal reports upon receipt of the requested
documentation and information from Karen and pursuant to the
terms of the parties’ settlement term sheet.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded to
the trial court with instructions to deny Kaen’s petition and
return the matter to the appraiser to complete the appraisal
reports pursuant to the instructions provided in the parties’
settlement term sheet. Eric Huhn is awarded costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

WILEY, J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

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