CourtListener 10621186•People v. Comminey CA4/3
Texto completo
Filed 7/1/25 P. v. Comminey CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064437
v. (Super. Ct. No. FVA023273-1)
WALTER CHARLES COMMINEY, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of San
Bernardino County, Gregory S. Tavill, Judge. Affirmed.
Lisa A. Kopelman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
In People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), the
California Supreme Court ruled youthful offenders are entitled to establish a
record of youth-related mitigating factors that may be relevant at their future
1
parole hearing. Defendant Walter Charles Comminey appeals from a
postjudgment order that was issued in conjunction with his Franklin
proceeding. His appointed attorney filed a brief under the procedures
described in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, declaring she was
unable to find any issues to raise on Comminey’s behalf. Having reviewed the
record ourselves, we also detect no arguable issues. We therefore affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2007, Comminey was sentenced to 75 years to life in prison
after a jury convicted him of first degree murder with multiple firearm
enhancements. If Comminey had been over the age of 25 when he committed
the murder, he would not be eligible for parole until he had served 75 years
in prison. But because he was only 18 years old at that time, he will be
eligible for a youth offender parole hearing during the 25th year of his
incarceration. (Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (b)(3).)
In 2023, Comminey filed a letter request for a Franklin
proceeding in the trial court. The court appointed him an attorney and set the
proceeding for April 11, 2024. In anticipation of the proceeding, defense
counsel had Comminey undergo an extensive psychological examination. The
results of that examination are contained in a detailed report that defense
counsel submitted to the court shortly before the Franklin proceeding.
1
The process by which this is done is commonly known as a
Franklin hearing, but the more accurate term is a Franklin proceeding, given
its limited scope and purpose. (See In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 449–450,
fn. 3.)
2
Along with that report, defense counsel also filed a lengthy
memorandum of points and authorities discussing the various youth-related
factors bearing on Comminey’s suitability for parole, including his family and
social history and his personal development while in prison. This information
was intended to show Comminey has transformed himself from an impetuous
teenage offender to a mature and responsible adult.
At the Franklin proceeding, the prosecutor did not offer any
evidence on behalf of the state; nor did he object to any of the information
that had been filed by the defense. That being the case, the court ordered all
of the information offered by the defense to be sent to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, so it can be considered in connection with
Comminey’s eventual youthful offender parole hearing. No other matters
were discussed at the proceeding.
Comminey filed an in propria persona notice of appeal, alleging
his attorney was ineffective at the proceeding. His appointed appellate
attorney filed a brief raising no issues but requesting that we independently
review the record pursuant to People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. We
informed Comminey of his right to file a supplemental brief, but he did not do
so. Under these circumstances, we are not required to independently review
the record for arguable issues. (Id. at p. 230.) But, in the interests of justice,
we have done so in this case.
DISCUSSION
The United States Supreme Court has recognized juvenile
offenders are generally less culpable than adult offenders and, except in the
rarest of cases, the federal Constitution requires states to afford juvenile
offenders a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.” (Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 75.) To
3
that end, the California Legislature enacted Penal Code section 3051, which
requires the Board of Parole Hearings to conduct a parole hearing no later
than the 25th year of a youthful offender’s incarceration, regardless of his or
her sentence. (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4; Pen. Code, § 3051, subd. (b)(3).) The
statute applies to offenders who were 25 years of age or younger at the time
of their crimes. (Id., subd. (a)(1).)
As noted at the outset, Franklin proceedings are intended to
facilitate youthful offender parole hearings. They permit a youthful offender
to “place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to
cross-examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender
parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the record any
evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender’s culpability or cognitive
maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors.”
(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.)
Importantly, however, this record-making process has no bearing
on the defendant’s underlying sentence. (In re Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p.
451.) Rather, the process is intended solely “to preserve information relevant
to the defendant’s eventual youth offender parole hearing.” (People v.
Sepulveda (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 291, 300.) The trial court has broad
discretion “to conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information
introduced is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the
governing rules, statutes, and regulations.” (People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4
Cal.5th 1123, 1132.)
As it turned out, the prosecution did not object to any of the
information defense counsel filed with the court or offer any evidence on
behalf of the state. This was a win for Comminey, in that he was permitted to
4
make an objection-free record of the mitigating factors bearing on his
suitability for future parole.
Comminey may have expected the Franklin proceeding to be
more involved, or to have an immediate impact on his sentence or parole
prospects. As we have explained, however, Franklin proceedings are merely
intended to preserve evidence for future consideration, and that objective was
fully achieved in this case. There is nothing in the record to suggest defense
counsel was ineffective in any respect. Nor are there any arguable issues
related to the trial court’s only order at the proceeding, which was to direct
defense counsel’s Franklin information be sent to prison officials.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s postjudgment order is affirmed.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
DELANEY, J.
5
Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude
Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.