CourtListener 10620150•People v. Ceja CA2/6
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Filed 6/30/25 P. v. Ceja CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B333328
(Super. Ct. No. YA106055-01)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
MARCO ANTONIO CEJA,
Defendant and Appellant.
Marco Antonio Ceja appeals from the judgment after a jury
convicted him of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code,1 § 192,
subd. (a)) as a lesser included offense of murder and found true
that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).2 Ceja
pleaded no contest to unrelated charges of recklessly fleeing a
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 Codefendant Brian Chase was jointly tried for murder
and was acquitted.
peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2) and felon in possession of a
firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced Ceja to
consecutive terms of six years for voluntary manslaughter, four
years for use of a firearm, and eight months each for fleeing and
felon in possession, for a total prison term of 11 years, 4 months.
Ceja contends the trial court erred when it instructed the
jury regarding imperfect self-defense voluntary manslaughter,
failed to instruct regarding imperfect self-defense involuntary
manslaughter, and failed to provide additional instructions. He
also contends the evidence was insufficient to convict and
cumulative error mandates reversal. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Prosecution case
Ceja and the victim, Guillermo Peinado, stole cars and
trailers together. About a month before the shooting, they
argued about a trailer they had stolen together. They ended up
fighting each other with their fists and Ceja broke the windshield
of Peinado’s motorhome with a metal pipe.
Peinado had a BB gun or pellet gun and a paintball gun. A
mutual acquaintance of Ceja and Peinado could tell the BB gun
was “fake” because it had duct tape on it and the tip was “not like
a real gun.”
Peinado had a close friend and neighbor, N.B. They were
“like brother and sister.” N.B. and Ceja were also friends.
Shortly before 10:00 p.m. in April 2022, Ceja visited N.B. at her
makeshift dwelling in a homeless encampment. Peinado was also
there, and he and Ceja said “hi” to each other. The exchange was
“normal” and with “no violence.”
Peinado left on a bicycle two or three minutes later. After
about a minute, Ceja followed him.
2
A surveillance video showed Peinado rode a bicycle away
from the encampment and passed Ceja’s truck. A few seconds
later, Peinado rode the bicycle in the opposite direction towards
Ceja. Ceja had his arm extended holding a handgun. N.B. heard
one shot. Peinado got off the bicycle and ran. Ceja ran after him.
A police officer found Peinado groaning and lying on the
ground in front of a house. A BB gun or pellet gun was within
arm’s reach of Peinado. Because the officer believed it was a
firearm, he waited for backup before rendering aid. Peinado died
of a single gunshot wound from a bullet that entered from the
front in his abdomen and exited his rear torso.
In a Perkins operation,3 Ceja spoke with two “cooperators”4
placed in a jail cell with him. Ceja said he shot a “homie” who
“was behaving really crazy.” Ceja said that on three occasions
when he tried to collect his drug sale profits, Peinado put a gun to
Ceja’s head. After the third time, Ceja looked for Peinado at his
house “to tell him to stop messing with me.” Ceja said he waited
two days before Brian Chase called him with Peinado’s location
and told Ceja to kill him.
Ceja said he chased Peinado on the night of the shooting.
Ceja hid in the bushes, then went after him and asked, “Hey,
what’s up?” Ceja said Peinado “tried to pull out the [gun].” Ceja
said he shot Peinado once in the stomach and did not shoot again
because his gun jammed.
3 Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292.
4 The “cooperators,” also referred to as “paid actors,” were
briefed by police about the case. Then, posing as inmates, they
had recorded conversations with Ceja to obtain information about
the case.
3
Defense case
The defense presented evidence that Peinado had
previously threatened Ceja. Months before the shooting, a
neighbor saw Peinado break Ceja’s truck’s windows with a pipe.
The neighbor told Ceja what Peinado had done. The neighbor
also saw an incident in which Peinado rode up on a bicycle and
argued with Ceja; Peinado threw down the bicycle, pulled a gun
from his waistband, and pointed it at Ceja. In another incident, a
man who worked with Ceja saw Peinado jump onto the trailer of
a truck Ceja was in, point a firearm at him, and say “watch out
for later.”
Ceja’s testimony
Ceja testified that when he discovered Peinado stole tools
from Ceja’s truck, they fought and hit each other. Ceja broke the
window of Peinado’s motorhome. Peinado ran into his
motorhome, retrieved a firearm, and said he would kill Ceja.
Peinado later confronted Ceja on the street, demanded $800 for
the window, threatened to kill Ceja if he did not pay it, and
pointed what appeared to be a “real” firearm at him. Peinado
then put the firearm away and threatened to kill Ceja later. Ceja
never paid Peinado.
Ceja said he purchased a loaded firearm because Peinado
had threatened to kill him, and other people said Peinado was
looking for him in order to kill him. Ceja kept the firearm with
him wherever he went because he was afraid of Peinado.
The night of the shooting, Ceja saw Peinado ride his bicycle
in the direction of Ceja’s parked truck. Ceja chased him because
he was concerned Peinado would steal from his truck. Peinado
rode the bicycle past the truck, then toward Ceja. Although it
was dark, when Peinado was four or five car lengths away, Ceja
4
saw Peinado’s left arm was raised with the firearm pointed at
him. Ceja pulled out his firearm, pointed it at Peinado, and
walked toward him. Ceja shot Peinado because Peinado was
pointing a firearm at him and he was afraid Peinado was going to
shoot him.
Closing arguments
The prosecutor argued that Ceja was guilty of premeditated
murder with express malice. He questioned the position of
Peinado’s firearm while he was riding his bike, whether Ceja
would have been able to see it four or five car lengths away on a
dark street, and whether Ceja would have been able to quickly
rack and aim the firearm. He also argued that a videotape
showed Ceja had already racked his firearm before arriving to
the location of the shooting, and had his firearm out before
Peinado pulled his firearm from his waistband.
Ceja’s attorney argued that he acted in self-defense because
he reasonably believed he was in imminent danger of being killed
and that his use of deadly force was reasonable. He said one of
the videos showed Peinado raised his firearm before Ceja.
Neither party’s argument discussed imperfect self-defense.
DISCUSSION
Jury instruction principles
“A trial court must instruct the jury, even without a
request, on all general principles of law that are ‘ “closely and
openly connected to the facts and that are necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case.” ’ ” (People v. Burney (2009) 47
Cal.4th 203, 246.) “[A] trial court errs if it fails to instruct, sua
sponte, on all theories of a lesser included offense which find
substantial support in the evidence.” (People v. Breverman (1998)
19 Cal.4th 142, 162, disapproved on other grounds in People v.
5
Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260, fn. 7.) “In this context,
substantial evidence is evidence from which reasonable jurors
could conclude ‘ “that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was
committed.” ’ ” (People v. Medina (2007) 41 Cal.4th 685, 700.)
We apply the independent standard of review to claims of
instructional error. (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838,
919.) “In determining the correctness of jury instructions, we
consider the entire charge of the court, in light of the trial
record.” (Id. at p. 926.)
Voluntary manslaughter instruction
Ceja contends the court erred in instructing the jury
regarding voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect
self-defense because there was insufficient evidence that his need
to defend himself was objectively unreasonable. We disagree.
The court instructed the jury regarding perfect (complete)
self-defense. (CALCRIM No. 505.) Without objection, the court
also instructed with CALCRIM No. 571, which stated in part: “A
killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary
manslaughter” if “[t]he defendant actually believed that he was
in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily
injury,” and “[t]he defendant actually believed that the
immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against
the danger,” but “[a]t least one of those beliefs was
unreasonable.” It stated: “If you find that Guillermo Peinado
threatened or harmed the defendant in the past, you may
consider that information in evaluating the defendant’s beliefs.”
It further stated: “The People have the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in
imperfect [s]elf-defense. If the People have not met this burden,
you must find the defendant not guilty of murder.”
6
The court was obligated to instruct regarding imperfect
self-defense voluntary manslaughter because it is a lesser
included offense of murder and “the evidence raises a question as
to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were
present.” (People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 154.) The
instruction given, CALCRIM No. 571, is a correct statement of
the law. (People v. Lopez (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306.)
Substantial evidence supported this instruction. Ceja
testified that notwithstanding the darkness of the street and the
distance between them, he saw Peinado pointing what appeared
to be a firearm at him. As the trier of fact, the jury evaluated
Ceja’s credibility, the videotapes, and still photographs from the
videotapes offered by both sides. The jury could have determined
that when Ceja shot Peinado, he unreasonably believed that
Peinado had already drawn his gun. Alternatively, the evidence
could support the conclusion that Ceja knew Peinado had not
drawn the gun, but had an actual but unreasonable belief that
Peinado, armed with what appeared to be a gun in his waistband
and approaching Ceja on a bicycle, posed an imminent danger of
killing him or inflicting great bodily injury. The jury could also
conclude from the videotapes that Ceja pointed his firearm while
Peinado was still riding his bicycle and that this showed Ceja’s
belief in the necessity to use deadly force was unreasonable. And
based on the prior incidents where Peinado pointed a firearm at
Ceja and made unexecuted threats to kill him, coupled with
Ceja’s statements in the Perkins operation, the jury could also
conclude Ceja did not have a reasonable belief he was in
“imminent danger of being killed.” (CALCRIM No. 571, italics
added.) Any of these scenarios are supported by sufficient
evidence to require an imperfect self-defense instruction.
7
Correctness of voluntary manslaughter instruction
Ceja also contends the voluntary manslaughter instruction
was erroneous because it stated that imperfect self-defense
applied if Ceja “actually believed that he was in imminent danger
of being killed or suffering great bodily injury,” and “actually
believed that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to
defend against the danger,” but “[a]t least one of those beliefs was
unreasonable.” (CALCRIM No. 571.) He contends an actual
belief in the need to use deadly force is not required to establish
imperfect self-defense. We again disagree.
The jury instruction correctly stated the law. Our Supreme
Court has explained: “Self-defense, when based on a reasonable
belief that killing is necessary to avert an imminent threat of
death or great bodily injury, is a complete justification, and such
a killing is not a crime. [Citations.] A killing committed when
that belief is unreasonable is not justifiable. Nevertheless, ‘one
who holds an honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to
defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury does
not harbor malice and commits no greater offense than
manslaughter.’ ” (People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 133–
134, some italics added.)
Ceja relies upon People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th
548, 648, which states in a shorthand manner that imperfect
self-defense applies when “ ‘ “ ‘a defendant killed another person
because the defendant actually, but unreasonably, believed he
was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury.’ ” ’ ” A
more complete explanation is given in People v. Her (2009) 181
Cal.App.4th 349, 353: “[T]he ‘belie[f] in the need to defend’ is
described as two beliefs—(1) the belief in imminent danger of
death or great bodily injury and (2) the belief in the need to use
8
deadly force to defend against that danger—the
unreasonableness of either belief would be sufficient to transform
perfect self-defense into imperfect self-defense.” “Where the
defendant kills while actually but unreasonably believing the use
of deadly force was necessary, [the] defendant is considered to
have acted in imperfect self-defense.” (People v. Sotelo-Urena
(2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 732, 744.)
Here, the accuracy of the imperfect self-defense instruction
is evident when viewed in conjunction with the perfect
self-defense instruction. Jurors were correctly instructed that
perfect self-defense required findings that “[t]he defendant
reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of being
killed or suffering great bodily injury” and “reasonably believed
that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend
against that danger.” (CALCRIM No. 505; People v. Her, supra,
181 Cal.App.4th at p. 353.) Thus, perfect self-defense would not
apply if Ceja reasonably believed he was in danger but did not
believe, or unreasonably believed, that deadly force was
necessary.
We conclude the jury was properly instructed regarding the
findings required for imperfect self-defense: actual belief as to the
danger and actual belief as to the need for deadly force, but at
least one of these beliefs was unreasonable. But even if the law
did not require an actual belief in the need to use deadly force,
Ceja was not prejudiced by the inclusion of this requirement in
the jury instruction because the jury found all the requirements
for imperfect self-defense were met. This benefited Ceja by
reducing the offense from murder to voluntary manslaughter.
Involuntary manslaughter instruction
Ceja also contends the trial court erred by not instructing
9
the jury sua sponte regarding imperfect self-defense involuntary
manslaughter. We are not persuaded.
The jury was instructed, “A killing that would otherwise be
murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant
killed a person because he acted in imperfect self-defense.”
(CALCRIM No. 571, italics added.) It was also instructed that
murder requires express malice (“he unlawfully intended to kill”)
or implied malice (he “deliberately acted with conscious disregard
for human life”). (CALCRIM No. 520.) The jury thus found that
Ceja killed Peinado with either an intent to kill or in conscious
disregard for human life, but that malice was negated by
imperfect self-defense. When a defendant has either the intent to
kill or “act[s] with a conscious disregard for life” and “kills in
unreasonable self-defense, the killing is voluntary rather than
involuntary manslaughter.” (People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th
82, 91 (Blakeley).)
A defendant who killed without malice, because they
actually but unreasonably believed in having to act in
self-defense, is guilty of “no less than voluntary manslaughter.”
(People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 460.) “[W]hen a defendant
kills in the actual but unreasonable belief that [they are] in
imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, the doctrine of
‘imperfect self-defense’ applies to reduce the killing from murder
to voluntary manslaughter.” (People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th
636, 664, italics added.)
Ceja argues that imperfect self-defense serves only to
negate malice, and an involuntary manslaughter conviction is
warranted when there is an unlawful killing without intent to
kill or conscious disregard for human life. Our Supreme Court in
Blakeley rejected the conclusion of People v. Welch (1982) 137
10
Cal.App.3d 834, 840 that an unintentional killing in
unreasonable self-defense can only be involuntary manslaughter.
(Blakeley, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 91.) In his dissent in Blakeley,
Justice Mosk opined that the court should have instructed on
imperfect self-defense involuntary manslaughter. (Id. at p. 99
[dis. opn. of Mosk, J.].) The majority had “no quarrel with
[Mosk’s] view” that “a defendant who kills in unreasonable
self-defense may sometimes be guilty of involuntary
manslaughter.” (Id. at p. 91.) But because Ceja killed with
intent to kill or with conscious disregard for life by intentionally
shooting at Peinado, an involuntary manslaughter instruction
was unwarranted. (Id. at p. 92.)
Involuntary manslaughter is killing without malice “in the
commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony; or in
the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an
unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection.”
(§ 192, subd. (b).) Ceja does not contend the “unlawful act”
(misdemeanor-manslaughter) theory applies. Nor does he
contend the “unlawful manner” (criminal negligence) theory
applies.
Involuntary manslaughter applies where there is a “lack of
‘due caution and circumspection,’ ” which is “the equivalent of
‘criminal negligence,’ ” i.e., “ ‘the natural and probable result of a
reckless or culpably negligent act.’ ” (People v. Penny (1955) 44
Cal.2d 861, 879–880.) “ ‘ “The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the
nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known
to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that
a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.” ’ ”
(People v. Velez (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 558, 565.) It applies, for
11
example, where the defendant “ ‘shot to frighten . . . but had no
intention of killing or injuring anyone and did not aim at them.’ ”
(In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593, 607.)
But here there was no evidence the shooting was merely
negligent. Ceja intentionally shot Peinado based on his perceived
need for self-defense. “[W]hen, as here, the defendant
indisputably has deliberately engaged in a type of aggravated
assault the natural consequences of which are dangerous to
human life, thus satisfying the objective component of implied
malice as a matter of law, and no material issue is presented as
to whether the defendant subjectively appreciated the danger to
human life his or her conduct posed, there is no sua sponte duty
to instruct on involuntary manslaughter.” (People v. Brothers
(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 35.) Accordingly, substantial evidence
did not support an involuntary manslaughter instruction.
Additional instructions
Ceja contends the trial court erred by not instructing
regarding “intentional killings,” “weapons,” and “assaultive
crimes.” We again disagree.
Ceja forfeited this claim by not requesting the instructions
in the trial court. And because we conclude “the trial court
adequately instruct[ed] the jury on the law, it ha[d] no duty to
give clarifying or amplifying instructions absent a request.”
(People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1331; People
v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 574.)
The contention also fails on the merits. There was no need
to define “intentional killing” or “assaultive crime(s)” because
these phrases do not appear in any instructions given to the jury.
Reference to a “weapon” occurs only in the instruction regarding
the enhancement for Ceja’s personal use of a firearm, which was
12
indisputably a handgun. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a); CALCRIM No.
3146.)
Whether Peinado’s BB gun or pellet gun was in fact a
weapon capable of killing or inflicting great bodily harm was
irrelevant; it was clear from both the perfect and imperfect
self-defense instructions that the issue is whether Ceja believed
he was in imminent danger. As to perfect self-defense, the jury
was told, “If the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, the danger
does not need to have actually existed.” (CALCRIM No. 505.)
For imperfect self-defense, the jury was told, “A danger is
imminent if, when the fatal wound occurred, the danger actually
existed or the defendant believed it existed.” (CALCRIM No.
571.) In our view, no further instructions were required.
Sufficiency of the evidence
Ceja reframes the issue of the reasonableness of the need
for self-defense as a claim that the evidence was insufficient to
establish criminal homicide. We conclude otherwise.
“When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence, ‘ “[t]he court must review the whole record in the light
most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it
discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 942–943.) “In
deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court
resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts”
because these are “the exclusive province of the trier of fact.”
(People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)
In our view, substantial evidence supports the conviction
for voluntary manslaughter. Ceja went to the encampment after
13
Chase alerted him Peinado was there. He said during the
Perkins operation he was looking for Peinado, chased him, and
hid so he could confront him. The videotape and timing of the
shooting support the conclusion that Ceja racked his firearm and
pointed it at Peinado before Ceja could have seen any firearm in
Peinado’s hand. Based on the evidence, the jury could reasonably
conclude that Ceja intentionally killed Peinado based on an
actual but unreasonable belief that Peinado had already drawn
his gun, or, if he knew Peinado had not drawn his gun, Ceja
unreasonably believed deadly force was necessary in defense of
imminent danger. Because substantial evidence supports the
jury’s verdict, “ ‘ “the opinion of the reviewing court that the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.” ’ ”
(People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 504.)
Cumulative errors
Ceja contends that cumulative errors resulted in an unfair
trial. “[W]e have found no error to cumulate.” (People v. Koontz
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1094.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J. CODY, J.
14
Hector M. Guzman, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Lynda A. Romero, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David O. Voet, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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