Smith v. Conetta CA2/3

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Filed 6/27/25 Smith v. Conetta CA2/3
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

WILLIAM SMITH, B327183

Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 18STPB07495

JAMES J. CONETTA,
as Trustee, etc.,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Deborah L. Christian, Judge. Reversed
and remanded.

Winget Spadafora & Schwartzberg, Timothy W. Fredricks
and Richard P. Tricker for Petitioner and Appellant.

Santiago Law Group and Artemio M. Santiago for Objector
and Respondent.
_________________________
William Smith challenges the probate court’s entry of
summary judgment against him on his petition to determine
the validity of amendments to an irrevocable trust to which he
was a beneficiary. The court found Smith’s petition was barred
by the 120-day statute of limitations under Probate Code section
16061.8.1 We reverse.
BACKGROUND
The trust at issue here is an irrevocable life insurance trust
created inter vivos in January 1990 by trustor/settlor Robert L.
Townsend. He and the named trustee, George Hadlow, executed
the Robert L. Townsend Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust (Trust)
agreement, effective January 12, 1990. Townsend expressly
established an irrevocable trust, “relinquish[ing] all right to alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate this Trust Agreement.” Townsend
transferred cash to the Trust to enable the trustee to pay
premiums on any policy held in the Trust insuring Townsend’s
life.2 On Townsend’s death, the trustee would receive the
proceeds from any life insurance policy.
The Trust specified how and to whom the trustee was to
distribute the Trust estate—including any life insurance proceeds
—on Townsend’s death. The primary beneficiary was Richard
Genovese: he was to receive the entirety of the estate if its
value was $1 million or less. If the estate was worth more than
$1 million then Genovese was to receive $1 million and “[a]ny
excess” was to be distributed, in different proportions, to several

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code.
2 The Trust held one life insurance policy in the amount of
$2,000,000, issued January 26, 1990.

2
named beneficiaries, including, among others, Smith and
James J. Conetta—the named successor trustee.3 If Genovese
predeceased Townsend (which he did), the bequest to Genovese
would instead be distributed equally between Smith and another
beneficiary named Frank Sinatra (or whomever survived
the other). If any named beneficiary (other than Genovese)
died before distributions under the Trust could be made, the
bequest to the deceased beneficiary would lapse to augment
proportionately the bequests to the named beneficiaries (other
than Genovese) still living at the time of distribution. The
beneficiaries also had the right to withdraw contributions
made to the Trust during the month of December in any year
when contributions were made.
On May 19, 2003, after receiving legal advice from attorney
Robert Hess, Townsend amended the Trust. The amendment
states, “Although the . . . [T]rust provides that it cannot be
amended, the Trustor, could cause the Trust to be terminated
by ceasing to make future gifts which would cause the existing
life insurance policy to lapse, which confirms that the existing
beneficiaries have no vested interests.” The Trust was amended
“in exchange for Trustor’s [Townsend’s] agreement to make
future gifts to keep the life insurance in force.” The amendment
changed the distribution of the Trust estate between the
beneficiaries on Townsend’s death so that Conetta now would
receive the lesser of $425,000 or 21.25 percent of the estate.

3 Smith and his then-wife jointly were to receive one-third
of the excess, up to $100,000, and Conetta was to receive one-
twelfth, up to $25,000.

3
The amounts the other beneficiaries were to receive also changed.
The 2003 amendment appointed Conetta as trustee—whom
the Trust already had named as successor trustee—and named
new successor trustees. Townsend and Conetta signed the
amendment as trustor and trustee, respectively.
On June 12, 2007, Townsend and Conetta signed a second
amendment to the Trust. The purpose of the amendment was
to divide the $2,000,000 life insurance policy held by the Trust
among the remaining beneficiaries as follows: $100,000 or five
percent to Smith, $100,000 or five percent to Smith’s former
wife (Patty Morejon), $120,000 or six percent to Frank Sinatra,
and $560,000 or 28 percent each to Conetta, James Townsend,
and John Townsend. If a beneficiary died, his or her interest still
would lapse and be distributed among the surviving beneficiaries.
Townsend died ten and a half years later, on January 31,
2018. On March 22, 2018, Conetta—as trustee—sent Smith
a letter notifying him of Townsend’s death, that Townsend had
formed a trust that was the beneficiary of a life insurance policy,
and that Smith was one of the Trust’s beneficiaries. Conetta
enclosed a check for $200,000 representing Smith’s share of
what Townsend had left to him under the terms of the Trust.
By letter dated April 11, 2018—70 days after Townsend
died—Conetta’s then-attorney Paul Nash sent a “Statutory
Notification Regarding the Robert L. Townsend Irrevocable
Life Insurance Trust (California Probate Code §§ 16060 et seq.)”
to the Trust’s surviving beneficiaries: Smith, Morejon, Sinatra,
and Conetta. The notification stated the Trust’s creation date,
January 12, 1990; that the original trustee Hadlow had resigned
on February 1, 2000 and successor trustee Conetta had taken
over duties as trustee; that on advice of attorney Robert Hess,

4
the Trust had been amended on May 19, 2003, and on June 12,
2007; and that Townsend had died on January 31, 2018. The
notification gave Conetta’s and Nash’s contact information and
informed the recipients they were “entitled upon reasonable
request to the trustee, to receive from the trustee a true and
complete copy of the terms of the trust.” The notification
included the following paragraph typed in all capital letters
and boldface type:
“You may not bring an action to contest
the trust more than 120 days from the date this
notification by the trustee is served upon you
or 60 days from the date on which a copy of the
terms of the trust is delivered to you during
that 120-day period, whichever is later.”
On August 10, 2018—121 days after Nash sent the
above notification—Smith filed against Conetta, individually
and as trustee of the Trust, and the two other Trust beneficiaries
Morejon and Sinatra, a “verified petition to determine validity
of amendments to irrevocable trust; for other relief for breach
of trust; for an accounting; and for instructions.” Smith alleged
Townsend and Conetta executed the 2003 and 2007 amendments
without first obtaining the consent of all the beneficiaries—
including his consent—or a court order. Smith alleged he first
“became formally aware” of the Trust amendments through the
April 11, 2018 letter. On information and belief, Smith alleged
the 2003 and 2007 amendments were invalid because they
(1) were modifications of an irrevocable trust made without
the consent of all the beneficiaries of the Trust; (2) were
modifications of an irrevocable trust made without a petition
to and order from the court allowing the modifications without

5
the consent of all the beneficiaries; (3) constituted a breach
of the trustee’s fiduciary duties and a breach of trust; and
(4) were the result of the trustee’s undue influence exerted
over Townsend. Among other things, Smith asked the court
to “rescind and nullify” the 2003 and 2007 amendments.
Conetta filed objections and a response to the petition
in November 2018. He alleged the petition was barred by the
120-day statute of limitations set forth under section 16061.8.
Conetta attached the April 2018 notification and a proof of
service Nash signed on April 11, 2018, stating he served on
that date a copy of the notification, as well as “a complete copy”
of the Trust and 2003 and 2007 amendments, “on the interested
parties in this action by placing a copy in a sealed envelope”
addressed to each beneficiary. Nash declared, “I am ‘readily
familiar’ with the firm’s practice of collection and processing
correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, it would be
deposited with the United States Postal Service with postage
thereon fully prepaid at Irvine California, on the same day
in the ordinary course of business.”
On August 6, 2021, almost three years after Smith filed
his petition, Conetta filed a motion for summary judgment, or
in the alternative, summary adjudication of issues, based on the
same statute of limitations argument. Smith opposed the motion.
He argued section 16061.8 did not apply because the petition
was not a direct contest of the Trust itself. Rather, Smith argued
the petition sought to enforce the Trust—because the attempted
amendments were not part of the Trust—and was “intended to
ascertain the validity of the purported amendments and to order
a complete accounting.” Smith also argued that, even if section
16061.8 applied, his petition was timely because he did not

6
receive the complete terms of the Trust until July 2019—more
than a year after Smith originally asked for a copy of the Trust
terms—when Conetta sent two missing exhibits to the Trust.
Smith argued the notice was insufficient in any event because
Conetta never sent a notice that he had assumed the role of
trustee, and the warning language was at the bottom of the
second page without any indication that there was a second
page to the notice. Smith also contended triable issues of fact
existed and accused Conetta of bad faith.
In support of his opposition, Smith submitted a copy
of the Trust, including Exhibits A (powers of the trustee) and
B (general provisions of the Trust); a letter from Conetta to
Sinatra, dated October 22, 2003, and letters from Conetta to
Smith, dated October 21, 2004, October 15, 2013, and October 15,
2014, notifying the beneficiaries of their right to withdraw funds
from the Trust between December 1 and 31 of the year of the
letter; Conetta’s March 22, 2018 letter informing Smith of
Townsend’s death; a May 8, 2018 email from Nash to Smith’s
attorney, stating he had mailed Smith a copy of the Trust “(sans
Exhibit B, which I do not have)”; a May 18, 2018 letter from Nash
to Smith’s counsel enclosing “a complete copy” of the Trust and
amendments; Smith’s demand for the production and inspection
of documents and Conetta’s responses; and a July 24, 2019 email
from Nash to Smith’s counsel attaching Exhibits A and B to
the Trust that he “discovered in files left by my client.” Smith
also filed objections to Conetta’s evidence.
In reply, Conetta argued Smith’s petition was a contest
of the Trust; the notification satisfied the requirements of section
16061.7; the late-discovered Exhibit B to the Trust had no effect

7
on Smith’s contest of the amendments;4 and there were no triable
issues of material fact.
On November 9, 2021, the court found it could not resolve
evidentiary issues raised by Smith’s objections to Conetta’s
evidence without supplementary declarations. The court
continued the hearing to March 1, 2022.
On December 1, 2021, Conetta filed a declaration in
response to Smith’s objections to the evidence Conetta submitted
in support of his motion. Conetta declared that in April 2003,
Townsend sought legal advice about his ability to amend
the Trust because the main beneficiary, Genovese, had died.
Townsend discussed the issue with Conetta, and Conetta also
received an April 28, 2003 letter from Hess to Townsend advising
him about amending the Trust. He and Townsend executed
amendments to the Trust on May 19, 2003, and June 12, 2007.
Conetta attached copies of Hess’s letter and the two amendments
to his declaration.
Nash also filed a declaration in response to Smith’s
objections. Nash declared he served the statutory notification
on Smith and all other beneficiaries on April 11, 2018. He
prepared a proof of service at the time he served the notification.
Nash declared that, at the same time he served the notification,
he served “a complete copy” of the Trust, including Exhibit A
and the two amendments, on Smith and all other beneficiaries.
On May 8, 2018, Nash emailed Smith’s counsel, telling him he

4 Nash declared he served a complete copy of the Trust,
including Exhibit A and the amendments, with the April 11, 2018
notification. He found Exhibit B later and emailed it to Smith’s
counsel.

8
already had mailed a copy of the Trust, except for Exhibit B—
“which [he] could not locate”—but he would be happy to mail him
another copy. On May 18, 2018, Nash mailed “another complete
copy” of the Trust and the two amendments to Smith’s counsel.
On February 14, 2022, Smith filed a memorandum in
opposition to Conetta’s evidence. Smith again argued his petition
was not time-barred because Conetta failed to give him “a full
and complete copy of the terms of the Trust” until July 2019
when Conetta, through his counsel, sent both Exhibits A and B
to the Trust to Smith’s attorney. Smith argued he did not receive
a complete copy of the Trust and both amendments in April 2018
—only the two-page letter. Smith rehashed other arguments
from his opposition. He also objected to Conetta’s and Nash’s
December 1, 2021 declarations, and his counsel filed a responsive
declaration.
At the March 1, 2022 hearing, the court stated its tentative
was to find the petition untimely. Smith’s counsel argued there
was a disputed issue of fact as to when Nash mailed the April
2018 statutory notification. Counsel argued Smith said he
received the letter 11 days after it purportedly was mailed, but
the letter would not have taken that long to arrive.5 Counsel
also argued an issue of fact existed as to whether Smith filed
the petition within 60 days of Conetta, through Nash, having
provided him with a complete copy of the Trust. Counsel
also brought up Nash’s prior disciplinary history.

5 Smith declared he received the two-page letter from Nash
on April 20, 2018.

9
Finally, Smith’s counsel argued the “ ‘attempted
amendments’ ” did not follow the legal requirements to amend
an irrevocable trust and thus had not had a legal effect on the
Trust. Counsel argued that, if the amendments were void and
invalid when created, they didn’t “amend anything.” Accordingly,
there was a question of whether the statute “even applie[d]”
because Smith was asking the court to “enforce the Trust.”
Citing Straley v. Gamble,6 the court found that, under
case law, a challenge to the validity of an amendment still must
be made within the 120-day statutory period. Smith’s counsel
argued the case law concerned a revocable trust, not an
irrevocable trust.
Conetta’s counsel argued there was no evidence to dispute
Nash’s sworn statements that he sent the statutory notification
on April 11, 2018. Counsel argued the court was correct—Smith
had to bring his petition to set aside the amendments within
120 days of service of the statutory notice.
The court found that, although Smith had a point about
the amendments, “the fact is that the case law considers the
amendments as part of the trust action. And so, therefore, it is

6 Straley v. Gamble (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 533. In Straley,
the appellant filed a petition for an order to determine the
validity of an amendment the settlor purportedly made to
her living trust shortly before her death. (Id. at pp. 535–536.)
The appellant filed, but did not serve, the petition within
120 days of the trustee’s service, after the settlor’s death, of a
section 16061.7 notification. (Id. at p. 536.) The issue before
the court was whether the petition had to be served within
the 120-day limitations period to be timely. The court found
it did not. (Id. at pp. 537–538.)

10
still controlled by the 120 days. That’s the court’s ruling.” That
same day the court issued a minute order granting the motion
and ordering Conetta to prepare the order after hearing. The
court continued the hearing on a petition for an order approving
the trustee’s first accounting Conetta had filed in December 2019
to June 30, 2022 and again to September 8, 2022.
On December 9, 2022, the court issued its order after
hearing and statement of decision granting Conetta’s motion for
summary judgment.7 The court found the petition to determine
the validity of the amendments to the irrevocable Trust, and
for an order distributing the Trust proceeds as laid out in the
original Trust instrument, was barred by sections 16061.7 and
16061.8; the breach of fiduciary duty issues that did not relate to
the accounting were subject to the 120-day statute of limitations,
not the three-year statute of limitations; the accounting claim
and any breach of fiduciary duty claim relating to it were not
part of the motion for summary judgment; and Smith failed
to present evidence demonstrating a triable issue of fact.
Smith moved for reconsideration on December 22, 2022.
He presented evidence that Nash had been suspended in 2016
for misconduct that was “ ‘dishonest, intentional, or surrounded
by, or followed by bad faith.’ ” Counsel argued Nash’s credibility
thus remained a triable issue as to when he mailed the
notification. Conetta opposed the motion.
On February 8, 2023, Smith filed a notice of appeal from
the summary judgment. On May 23, 2023, the court placed

7 Smith filed objections to the proposed order after hearing
and proposed statement of decision.

11
Smith’s motion for reconsideration off-calendar as moot due to
his pending appeal.
DISCUSSION
1. Applicable law and standard of review
Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no triable
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and
independently decide whether the facts not subject to triable
dispute warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter
of law. (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348.)
On appeal, Smith primarily contends summary judgment
was improper because section 16061.8 does not apply to a petition
challenging the validity of amendments made to an irrevocable
trust. The court thus erred in finding his petition—filed 121 days
from the date of the statutory notification—was time barred.
“The proper interpretation of a statute, and its application to
undisputed facts, presents a question of law that is also subject
to de novo review.” (Morgan v. United Retail Inc. (2010) 186
Cal.App.4th 1136, 1142.)8
“In construing a statute, our fundamental task is to
ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the purpose
of the statute. [Citation.] We begin with the language of the
statute, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning.

8 Smith also argues a triable issue of fact exists as to when
Nash sent the statutory notification, precluding summary
judgment. We need not resolve that issue to determine whether
the Legislature intended section 16061.8 to apply under the
circumstances here.

12
[Citation.] The language must be construed ‘in the context of the
statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme, and we give
“significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act
in pursuance of the legislative purpose.’’ ’ [Citation.] In other
words, ‘ “we do not construe statutes in isolation, but rather
read every statute ‘with reference to the entire scheme of law
of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and
retain effectiveness.’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] If the statutory
terms are ambiguous, we may examine extrinsic sources,
including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative
history.” (Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 83.)
2. Irrevocable vs. revocable trusts
It is undisputed the Trust here was irrevocable on
its creation in January 1990. “An irrevocable trust is one
that may not or may no longer be amended or revoked.”
(13 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2025) Trusts, § 2(4).)
“Irrevocable trusts are binding, even on their trustors.”
(Aguilar v. Aguilar (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 35, 37 (Aguilar).)
Indeed, the written consent of the settlor and all beneficiaries,
or a court order, is required to modify or terminate an irrevocable
trust. (§ 15403, subd. (a) [if all beneficiaries consent, they may
petition the court to modify or terminate an irrevocable trust];
§ 15404, subds. (a) [court approval not required if settlor and all
beneficiaries consent], (b) [if any beneficiary does not consent,
court may modify trust on petition by other beneficiaries, with
consent of settlor]; see also Aguilar, at p. 40.) On Townsend’s
creation of the Trust, therefore, Smith, as a named beneficiary,
“acquire[d] a vested and present beneficial interest in the trust
property,” and his interests were “not subject to divestment
as with a revocable trust.” (Empire Properties v. County of

13
Los Angeles (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 781, 787 (Empire Properties);
see ibid. [“nature of a beneficiary’s interest differs materially
depending on whether the trust is revocable or irrevocable”].)
By contrast, “ ‘[r]evocable trusts . . . can be amended
without approval from the beneficiaries.’ ” (Babbitt v. Superior
Court (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1146 (Babbitt); §§ 15401,
15402.) Accordingly, a beneficiary’s interest in the property
of a revocable trust is “ ‘ “merely potential” and can “evaporate
in a moment at the whim of the [settlor].” ’ ” (Estate of
Giraldin (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1058, 1065–1066.) In other words,
a beneficiary of a revocable trust has no pecuniary interest in the
revocable trust until it becomes irrevocable, e.g., on the settlor’s
death. (Babbitt, at pp. 1147–1148.)
Unlike the beneficiary of an irrevocable trust, therefore,
a beneficiary of a revocable trust has no right to petition the court
concerning the internal affairs of the trust under section 17200
until the trust becomes irrevocable, usually on the settlor’s death.
(Estate of Giraldin, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1076; see Bridgeman
v. Allen (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 288, 291 (Bridgeman) [probate
court dismissed without prejudice petition to determine validity
of amendment to revocable trust filed before settlor died finding
petitioner had no “standing to petition the court regarding
the internal affairs of the Trust while the Trust remained
revocable”]; see also § 15800, subd. (a)(1) [“during the time
that a trust is revocable and at least one person holding the
power to revoke the trust . . . is competent . . . : [t]he person
holding the power to revoke, and not the beneficiary, has the
rights afforded beneficiaries under this division”]; Cal. Law
Revision Com. com., West’s Ann. Prob. Code (2023) foll. § 15800
[explaining “section has the effect of postponing the enjoyment

14
of rights of beneficiaries of revocable trusts until the death or
incompetence of the settlor . . .”]; § 17200, subd. (a) [“Except as
provided in Section 15800, a trustee or beneficiary of a trust may
petition the court under this chapter concerning the internal
affairs of the trust or to determine the existence of the trust.”].)
Indeed, while a trust is revocable, a beneficiary has no
right to receive even the terms of the trust. (§ 16069, subd. (a)(1);
Babbitt, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1146 [because settlor
can amend a revocable trust without beneficiaries’ approval,
“ ‘the contents of revocable trusts should remain secret from
beneficiaries so as to ensure the settlor’s intent is fully realized,
without undue pressure from potential beneficiaries,’ ” quoting
from legislative history of § 16069].)
3. The relevant Probate Code sections
A trustee has a general duty to keep beneficiaries of a
trust reasonably informed of the trust and its administration.
(§ 16060.) On the reasonable request of a beneficiary, the trustee
must provide the terms of the trust and information relating
to the administration of the trust relevant to the beneficiary.
(§§ 16060.7, 16061, 16061.5.) However, a trustee is not required
to provide information, or the terms of a trust, to a beneficiary
of a revocable trust during the period when the trust may be
revoked. (§ 16069, subd. (a)(1).)
Section 16061.7 also requires a trustee to serve a
notification, with prescribed information, on trust beneficiaries
or heirs in the following circumstances: (1) when a revocable
trust, or any portion of it, becomes irrevocable due to a settlor’s

15
death;9 (2) whenever there is a change of trustee of an irrevocable
trust; and (3) whenever a power of appointment retained by
a settlor becomes effective or lapses on the death of the settlor
“with respect to an inter vivos trust which was, or was purported
to be, irrevocable upon its creation.” (§16061.7, subds. (a)(1)–(3),
(b).) The trustee must serve the notification within 60 days
of the triggering event. (Id., subd. (f).) Among other things,
the notification must identify the settlor and the date the trust
was executed, include the name and contact information for the
trustee, and notify the recipient he or she is entitled to a copy
of the terms of the trust on request. (Id., subd. (g)(1), (2), (5).)
If the trustee serves the notification because a revocable
trust, or portion of it, has become irrevocable due to the death
of a settlor, the notification “shall also include a warning, set out
in a separate paragraph in not less than 10-point boldface type,”
that states:
“ ‘You may not bring an action to contest the
trust more than 120 days from the date this
notification by the trustee is served upon you
or 60 days from the date on which a copy of the
terms of the trust is delivered to you during
that 120-day period, whichever is later.’ ”
(§ 16061.7, subd. (h), eff. Jan. 1, 2018.)

9 Specifically, the notification is required when the revocable
trust becomes irrevocable “because of the death of one or more
of the settlors of the trust, or because, by the express terms of the
trust, the trust becomes irrevocable within one year of the death
of a settlor because of a contingency related to the death of one
or more of the settlors of the trust.” (§ 16061.7, subd. (a)(1).)

16
Section 16061.8, in turn, is the statute implementing that
120-day limitations period.10
The version of section 16061.8 in effect in 2018 provided:
“No person upon whom the notification by the trustee is served
pursuant to this chapter [comprising §§ 16000 to 16110], whether
the notice is served on him or her within or after the time period
set forth in subdivision (f) of Section 16061.7, may bring an
action to contest the trust more than 120 days from the date
the notification by the trustee is served upon him or her, or
60 days from the date on which a copy of the terms of the trust
is delivered pursuant to Section 1215 to him or her during
that 120-day period, whichever is later.” (Former § 16061.8,
Stats. 2017, ch. 319, § 88, eff. Jan. 1, 2018.)
4. Sections 16061.7 and 16061.8 did not apply
In essence, the trial court found section 16061.8 applied
here because—70 days after Townsend’s death—Conetta
(through Nash) served a notification on Smith and the other
Trust beneficiaries containing the information required by
section 16061.7, subdivisions (g) and (h). Yet, because the Trust
was irrevocable on its creation—rather than made irrevocable
due to the settlor’s death—Townsend’s death did not trigger
Conetta’s duty to send a § 16061.7 notification. The only event
that could have triggered the trustee’s duty to serve the section

10 Sections 16061.7 and 16061.8 were added to the Probate
Code in 1997 through the same bill (Assem. Bill No. 1172 (1997–
1998 Reg. Sess.)). (§ 16061.7, added by Stats. 1997, ch. 724, § 23;
§ 16061.8, added by Stats. 1997, ch. 724, § 24.)

17
16061.7 notification was a change of trustee.11 No change
of trustee occurred on Townsend’s death, however. Rather,
the trustee had changed 18 years before Townsend died, when
Conetta as successor trustee took over the trustee’s duties
on Hadlow’s resignation. No reasonable person, therefore,
could construe the April 11, 2018 notification as having been
sent because there had been a change of trustee. Accordingly,
as section 16061.7 did not require Conetta to serve the
prescribed notification, section 16061.8 also did not apply.
Conetta argues former section 16061.8 “does not apply
only to those notices ‘required’ by [s]ection 16061.7, but to any
‘notification by the trustee . . . served pursuant to this chapter.’ ”
(Former § 16061.8.) The only “notification” referenced in the
chapter in which section 16061.8 is found is the notification
required by section 16061.7. Moreover, “pursuant to” means
“[i]n compliance with; in accordance with” (Black’s Law Dict.
(12th ed. 2024)) or “according to” (Merriam-Webster Unabridged
Dict. (2025) <https://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/
unabridged/pursuant%20to> [as of June 26, 2025], archived at
<https://perma.cc/ZY4K-QDGJ>). Although the “statutory
notification” here contained the information and warning
set forth in section 16061.7, subdivisions (g) and (h), because
Townsend’s death was neither an event triggering Conetta’s duty
to serve the notification—nor an event requiring the warning
language about the limitations period—we cannot conclude
Conetta served the notification “pursuant to this chapter.”

11 The third triggering event under section 16061.7,
subdivision (a)(3) is not relevant here.

18
To read former section 16061.8 otherwise would enable trustees
to trigger the 120-day limitations period on their mere whim
simply by sending a notice containing the information set forth
in section 16061.7.
It bears noting the parties’ and the court’s focus was
on whether Conetta’s petition challenging the validity of
the purported amendments to the Trust was a trust contest
triggering application of section 16061.8, not on whether Conetta
sent the notification “pursuant to” section 16061.7. Although
the trial court acknowledged different procedures exist for a
settlor to amend an irrevocable versus a revocable trust, the
court did not consider that a beneficiary’s interest is materially
different as between these two types of trusts. (Empire
Properties, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 787.) The court thus
did not consider the different import the death of a settlor
of a revocable trust has on the trust beneficiary’s interest in
and right to contest the trust. (See, e.g., Babbitt, supra,
246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1146–1148; Bridgeman, supra, 219
Cal.App.4th at p. 291.)12 In contrast to a beneficiary of a
revocable trust—whose ability to contest a trust is not triggered

12 Indeed, the Legislature added section 16061.7 to the
Probate Code to ensure beneficiaries and heirs would receive
prompt notification of the existence of trust assets and terms.
(See, e.g., Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No.
1172 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 15, 1997, p. 4 [“It
is . . . increasingly common for persons to use revocable trusts as
will substitutes. In these cases, the sponsor [of the bill] believes
that prompt notification of the heirs of a deceased settlor will
reduce the incidence of trustees concealing trust assets and
even the existence of trusts.”].)

19
until the death of the settlor—had Smith learned Townsend
amended the Trust in 2003 and 2007, he could have filed a
section 17200 petition to determine the amendments’ validity
while Townsend still was alive. In that case, section 16061.8
would not have applied because no notification under section
16061.7 would have been implicated. We see no reason why
Smith’s discovery of the amendments after Townsend’s death
should trigger the 120-day limitations period simply because the
trustee said it did in a notification not required by the statute.
Conetta notes section 16061.8 applies even if “the notice
is served . . . after the time period set forth in subdivision (f)
of Section 16061.7.” (§ 16061.8; former § 16061.8.) Even if
Conetta sent (through Nash) the April 11, 2018 notification
to comply—very belatedly—with his duty under section 16061.7,
subdivision (a)(2), we conclude the statute did not impose a
120-day limitations period in these circumstances.
5. The Legislature did not intend section 16061.8
to apply to irrevocable trusts
Although the plain language of former section 16061.8
states it applies to “person[s] upon whom the notification by
the trustee is served,” when read together with section 16061.7,
an ambiguity appears. As discussed, section 16061.7, subdivision
(h) requires, as it did in 2018, the trustee’s notification to warn
the recipient about the 120-day limitations period only when
the notification is sent because a revocable trust has become
irrevocable due to the death of a settlor. As section 16061.7
clearly did not require the trustee to include the warning if
the trustee sent the notification for other reasons—as was the
case here—reasonably, the Legislature did not intend for the

20
120-day limitations period implemented by section 16061.8 to
apply other than when a warning about the truncated limitations
period also was required. Otherwise, a trustee properly could
send a notification without warning the recipient about the
120-day limitations period when the trustee of an irrevocable
trust changed (which could occur during the settlor’s lifetime),
and the recipient nevertheless would be barred from contesting
the Trust for unrelated reasons—for example if the settlor
purported to strike the recipient as a beneficiary of the
irrevocable trust—more than 120 days after service of that
notification, despite having received no notice of the 120-day
period to raise the challenge.
Given this seeming contradiction between section 16061.7,
subdivision (h) and former section 16061.8, we may consider
extrinsic sources, including the legislative history of these
statutes, to determine the Legislature’s intent. That legislative
history supports our conclusion that the Legislature intended
section 16061.8 to apply to notifications served only in the
circumstance requiring the warning language under section
16061.7, subdivision (h)—that is, a notification sent because a
revocable trust has become irrevocable due to the settlor’s death.
When the Legislature first enacted section 16061.7 in 1997,
it included only two triggering events—when a revocable trust
became irrevocable due to the death of a settlor and when the
trustee of an irrevocable trust changed.13 That initial statute
also required a trustee’s notification sent because of either

13 The third triggering event, subdivision (a)(3), was added
in 2010. (See Stats. 2010, ch. 621, § 5.)

21
triggering event to warn the recipient of the 120-day limitations
period. (See former § 16061.7, subds. (a), (e)(6), added by Stats.
1997, ch. 724, § 23.)14 The Legislature immediately amended
section 16061.7 in 1998, however, to exempt a notification served
“only because of a change of the trustee” from having to include
the warning about the 120-day limitations period. (Former
§ 16061.7, subd. (g), as amended by Stats. 1998, ch. 682, § 10
[“Unless the notification by trustee is served only because
of a change of the trustee, the notification by trustee shall
also include a warning . . . .”].) The bill that introduced this
amendment did not propose any amendments to section 16061.8,
however. (See Assem. Bill No. 2069 (Reg. Sess. 1997–1998).)
In 2000, the Legislature again amended the subdivision
prescribing the warning about the 120-day period to read as
it does today—requiring the notification to include the warning
language only when the trustee is required to serve it because
a revocable trust has become irrevocable due to the death of
a settlor.15 (Stats. 2000, ch. 592 § 1; § 16061.7, subd. (h).)
Although the Legislature also made amendments to section

14 Assembly Bill No. 1172, as introduced on February 28,
1997, did not include section 16061.8. (See Assem. Bill No. 1172
(1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) § 33.) The bill was amended to add
that section imposing the 120-day limitations period and to
add the corresponding subdivision to section 16061.7 requiring
the warning about the time limit. (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill
No. 1172 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 6, 1997 at §§ 22, 23.)
15 Amendments made to section 16061.7 in 2010 and 2017
did not change the text of subdivision (h). (See Stats 2010,
ch. 621, § 5; Stats. 2017, ch. 319, § 87, eff. Jan. 1, 2018.)

22
16061.8 in 2000, 2010, and 2017, effective January 1, 2018, the
Legislature did not amend the language to reflect the changes
it had made to the warning requirement in section 16061.7.
(See Stats. 2000, ch. 592, § 2; Stats. 2010, ch. 621, § 6; Stats.
2017, ch. 319, § 88, eff. Jan. 1, 2018.)
As Smith notes, in 2022 the Legislature finally amended
section 16061.8, effective January 1, 2023, expressly to state
it applied only where a revocable trust had become irrevocable
due to the settlor’s death. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 30, § 1.)
Section 16061.8 now reads:
“A person upon whom the notification by the
trustee is served pursuant to paragraph (1)
of subdivision (a) of Section 16061.7, whether
the notice is served on the person within or
after the time period set forth in subdivision (f)
of Section 16061.7, shall not bring an action
to contest the trust more than 120 days from
the date the notification by the trustee is
served upon the person, or 60 days from the
date on which a copy of the terms of the trust
is delivered pursuant to Section 1215 to the
person during that 120-day period, whichever
is later.”
Accordingly, section 16061.8 now tracks section 16061.7,
subdivision (h)’s requirement that a warning about the 120-day
period be included only when the trustee sends a notification
because of the death of a settlor, as described in section 16061.7,
subdivision (a)(1).
Relying on Ailanto Properties, Inc. v. City of Half Moon
Bay (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 572 (Ailanto), Smith argues the

23
legislative history of the 2022 amendment demonstrates the
Legislature did not intend for former section 16061.8 to apply
in circumstances other than where a revocable trust becomes
irrevocable. (Id. at pp. 579, 589–590 [relying on legislative
history of later amendment to a statute that reflected the
Legislature’s understanding of the then-existing law that the
court was interpreting].) Conetta argues Smith impermissibly
is attempting to apply the 2022 amendment retroactively
to section 16061.8, which was not in effect in April 2018.
We agree with Smith. The legislative history demonstrates
the Legislature amended section 16061.8 in 2022 to clarify
it intended the 120-day period to apply only when the trustee
notification is sent because a revocable trust has become
irrevocable due to the death of a settlor, as already was
reflected in section 16061.7, subdivision (h). (Ailanto, supra,
142 Cal.App.4th at p. 589, fn. 13 [“We may properly rely on
the legislative history of subsequent enactments to clarify
the Legislature’s intent regarding an earlier enacted statute.
‘Although a legislative expression of the intent of an earlier act
is not binding upon the courts in their construction of the prior
act, that expression may properly be considered together with
other factors in arriving at the true legislative intent existing
when the prior act was passed.’ ”].)
First, as Smith notes, the author of the 2022 bill (Assem.
Bill No. 1745) that amended section 16061.8 stated: “This
legislative proposal would clarify Section 16061.8 to provide that
the 120-day limitation period applies only when the notification
is required by reason of the death of the settlor. A new limitation
period would not be created or revived if notification is required
upon the change of trustee of an existing irrevocable trust,

24
as the trust has already been deemed just that—‘irrevocable.’
The proposed change would clarify an ambiguity in current law
and further the existing statutory purpose of providing finality
in post-death trust administration.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary,
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1745 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
as amended Jan. 31, 2022, p. 3, italics added (Sen. Com.
Analysis).)16
The sponsor of the bill, the Trusts & Estates Section of
the California Lawyers Association, specifically noted Assembly
Bill No. 1745’s “clarification”—that the 120-day limitation period
applies only when the trustee’s notification “is required by reason
of the death of a settlor”—“is consistent with the language in
Probate Code Section 16061.7(h). Under Section 16061.7(h) the
trustee notification must include a statutory warning about the
120-day period to contest the trust, but only when the notification
is required by reason of the death of a settlor.” (Assem. Com.
on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1745 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) as introduced Jan. 31, 2022, p. 5, italics added (Assem.
Com. Analysis).)
The analysis by the Assembly Committee on the Judiciary
of Assembly Bill No. 1745, as introduced on January 31, 2022,
explained why that limitation in the existing law made sense:

16 Smith asked us to take judicial notice of the analysis by
the Senate Judiciary Committee. Although Conetta argues
the legislative history of the 2022 amendment is not relevant,
he did not oppose Smith’s request for judicial notice. We now
grant Smith’s request and take judicial notice of that legislative
history.

25
“The notice of limitation on bringing an action
is not sent in the event of one of the other
triggering events for notice: either a change
of trustees of an irrevocable trust or a power
of appointment becomes effective or lapses.
That is appropriate because those events
do not trigger the need to challenge the trust.
However[,] a trust becoming irrevocable does.
A time limitation for bringing suit in that
instance promotes the efficient administration
of a trust after the death of a settlor or other
event making the trust irrevocable, and all
interested parties are alerted to the short
limitation period available to contest the
validity of the trust instrument. . . . The
notification, statutory warning, and limitation
period help bring potential contests to a head
and settle them with finality.” (Assem. Com.
Analysis, supra, at p. 4, italics added.)
The analysis further notes the provision limiting when an
individual can bring an action to challenge a trust, stated in
former section 16016.8, “is broader than those instances where
the trustee is required to send the warning under Section
16016.7.” (Ibid.)
The legislative history thus indicates the Legislature
amended section 16061.8 so it would align with existing section
16016.7, subdivision (h). (See Cal. Lawyers Assn. Section on
Trusts and Estates, Legislation Alert: AB 1745 (Feb. 9, 2023)
<https://calawyers.org/trusts-and-estates/legislation-alert-ab-
1745/> [as of June 25, 2025], archived at <https://perma.cc/GDD4-

26
CM67> [explaining the amended statute ensured section 16061.8
was consistent with the already-existing section 16061.7,
subdivision (h)].) By doing so the Legislature also ensured,
as expressed in the legislative history, beneficiaries of a revocable
trust—who already had received notification that the trust
had become irrevocable and had the opportunity to contest the
trust during the 120-day period—would not have another chance
(or “multiple” chances) to contest the trust during a new 120-day
period, for example, if—perhaps years later—they received notice
the trustee of the now-irrevocable trust had changed. (Assem.
Com. Analysis, supra, at pp. 3–5.) As the author of Assembly Bill
No. 1745 noted, in such a situation, “the underlying provisions
of the trust do not change, as is the case when a revocable trust
becomes irrevocable.” (Sen. Com. Analysis, supra, at p. 4, italics
added.)
In essence, therefore, by amending section 16061.8,
the Legislature corrected the ambiguity it had created when
it amended section 16061.7 in 1998 and 2000 to require the
warning about the 120-day limitations period only in situations
where a revocable trust had become irrevocable due to the
settlor’s death (or the trust terms) but failed to specify that
same limitation in section 16061.8.
Moreover, the Legislature made clear it understood the
key difference between a beneficiary’s interest in the property
of an irrevocable trust as opposed to a revocable trust, bolstering
our conclusion it did not intend section 16061.8 to apply to a
notification sent in connection with an already irrevocable trust.
The executive summary of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s
analysis of Assembly Bill No. 1745 explained:

27
“A revocable trust may be revoked or changed
without the consent of the beneficiaries or a
court, whereas an irrevocable trust prohibits
the settlor from revoking or changing the trust
without the consent of the beneficiaries of the
trust or the court. Revocable trusts become
irrevocable when the settlor dies, or when
the trust instrument itself states when it is
to become irrevocable. Existing law requires
the trustee of a trust to notify the beneficiaries
and heirs of the deceased settlor of the
existence of the trust when specified events
occur. . . . This bill would limit the instances
when beneficiaries can bring an action to
contest a trust within the specified time period
to only when beneficiaries have received notice
that a revocable trust, or any portion thereof,
has become irrevocable because of the death of
one or more settlors or by the express terms of
the trust, as specified.” (Sen. Com. Analysis,
supra, at p. 1.)
The Legislature thus understood the death of a settlor of an
irrevocable trust would not trigger an opportunity or a necessity
for a beneficiary to contest the trust—and thus the need for the
120-day limitations period—as the settlor’s death would if the
trust were revocable. In other words, because the beneficiary of
an irrevocable trust has a vested interest in the trust’s property,
as we have discussed, the beneficiary need not wait for the death
of the settlor—as the beneficiary of a revocable trust would—
to be able to contest a settlor’s actions, for example, if the settlor

28
transferred assets out of the irrevocable trust. (See, e.g., Aguilar,
supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 37, 40 [beneficiary of trust made
irrevocable years earlier on co-settlor’s death successfully
challenged remaining settlor’s transfer of assets from that
irrevocable trust]; Bridgeman, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at pp. 290–
291, 294–295 [appellant—whom the probate court earlier found
could not challenge settlor’s amendment removing him as the
beneficiary from a revocable trust while the trust remained
revocable—filed a new petition after the settlor died more than
120 days after service of a section 16061.7 notification, which
was untimely because Code of Civil Procedure section 1013
did not extend the time under section 16061.8 to respond
for out-of-state service by mail].)
Based on the legislative history of sections 16061.7 and
16061.8, we only can conclude the Legislature’s earlier failure
to amend section 16061.8 to be consistent with section 16061.7,
subdivision (h), was an oversight.
In sum, we conclude section 16061.8 did not apply
here because Conetta had no duty to serve a section 16061.7
notification, and the Legislature intended section 16061.8
to apply only when a revocable trust has become irrevocable
due to a settlor’s death. Accordingly, we need not determine
whether the petition was a trust contest or address Smith’s
other contentions on appeal.

29
DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment and remand the matter for
further proceedings. William Smith is to recover his costs on
appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

ADAMS, J.

30

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