CourtListener 10618936•Doe v. Transdev Services CA2/7
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Filed 6/27/25 Doe v. Transdev Services CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
JANE DOE, B327603
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. 19STCV43993)
v.
TRANSDEV SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Holly Fujie, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Gusdorff Law and Janet Gusdorff; The Finkel Firm, Jake
D. Finkel and Sheryl L. Marx, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Payne & Fears, Ray E. Boggess and Erika M. Rasch, for
Defendant and Respondent.
__________________________
Jane Doe appeals from a judgment following a grant of
summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Transdev
Services, Inc. Doe claims that in 2019 a fellow Transdev
employee sexually assaulted her while they were working. Doe
sued Transdev, alleging two causes of action under the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)—for sexual harassment
based on a hostile work environment and failure to prevent
harassment—as well as a host of non-FEHA claims.
Summary adjudication was proper for Doe’s common law
claims against Transdev for the intentional torts of sexual
assault and battery, false imprisonment, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, as well as related violations of
Civil Code sections 43 and 51.7, all of which hinged on either
respondeat superior or ratification theories of liability as to
Transdev. However, because a material factual dispute remains
over whether Doe’s attacker was a supervisor, the trial court
erred in granting summary adjudication on Doe’s hostile work
environment cause of action. Summary adjudication was also
improper for Doe’s causes of action for failure to prevent
harassment and negligent infliction of emotional distress,
because there are triable issues of fact about whether Transdev
had taken reasonable steps to prevent further harassment upon
receiving a complaint from another employee about
inappropriate behavior by Doe’s alleged attacker.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment and the order granting
Transdev’s motion for summary judgment. We direct the court to
enter a new order denying Transdev’s motion for summary
judgment, denying Transdev’s motion for summary adjudication
on Doe’s causes of action under FEHA and for negligent infliction
2
of emotional distress, and granting the motion on her other
causes of action.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Assault and Doe’s Claims Against Transdev
Transdev is a transportation company that contracted with
the Antelope Valley Transit Authority (the Transit Authority) to
operate its public bus system. In November 2018, Transdev hired
Doe as a bus driver working out of the Transit Authority’s
Lancaster facility. At that time, Robert Taylor worked for
Transdev as a road supervisor, but at some point in 2018 or 2019
his title (along with that of all the road supervisors in Lancaster)
changed to quality controller.
In July 2019, Doe reported to a supervisor (not Taylor) that
she had stopped abruptly at a red light, causing a disabled
passenger to fall out of his wheelchair and hit his head. Quality
controller Terrance Cloud investigated the incident and gave a
report to William Jackson, Jr., the safety and training manager.
Jackson decided Doe needed retraining on braking and asked
Cloud to have Doe retrained. Cloud asked Taylor, the only other
available quality controller, to handle the retraining.
According to Doe’s complaint, during her shift the following
day, Taylor interrupted her route to tell her another driver would
be taking over for her and that he would be conducting a coaching
of her based on the braking incident. Doe exited the bus she had
been driving, and Taylor drove her in a car back to the base
where Tayor instructed her to drive another empty bus. Taylor
directed Doe to drive to two different restaurants because he was
hungry. Taylor made inappropriate sexual comments, including
“I want to fuck you, I wish I could bend your ass right here,” and
3
he laid his glove over the video surveillance camera mounted on
the rear view mirror of the bus. When Doe expressed shock and
fear and said she wanted to get off the bus, Taylor mocked her.
Eventually Taylor commanded Doe in an angry tone to pull
over. Accessing the locked cabinet behind the driver’s seat, he
ejected the hard drive that stored the feed from the on-board
cameras. Ignoring Doe’s pleas, Taylor overpowered and sexually
assaulted her.
According to an incident report prepared by Jackson, at
3:50 p.m. that afternoon, Jackson asked Cloud whether Doe and
Taylor had returned. The retraining had begun around 1:30 p.m.
and typically lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Cloud told
Jackson he had been trying to reach Taylor by radio with no
response. He and Jackson used the GPS system to locate the bus
and drove to it.
When Jackson and Cloud opened the bus doors, Doe quickly
headed down the bus aisle to meet them. Cloud saw the hard
drive sitting on the front seat. When Doe got back to the base,
upon seeing Cloud, she thanked him “[f]or saving [her].”
After leaving work, Doe reported the incident to the police.
Doe’s operative second amended complaint alleges causes of
action against Transdev, Taylor, and the Transit Authority,
including claims against Transdev for sexual harassment in
violation of FEHA (Gov. Code1 § 12940, subd. (a)); failure to
prevent harassment in violation of FEHA (§ 12940, subd. (k));
“sexual assault, battery, and ratification”; violation of Civil Code
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government
Code.
4
sections 43 and 51.7;2 false imprisonment; and intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
B. Transdev’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting
Evidence
1. Summary judgment motion
In moving for summary judgment or in the alternative
summary adjudication, Transdev argued Doe’s FEHA
harassment claim (her first cause of action) failed because Taylor
was not a supervisor under FEHA and Transdev did not fail to
take “prompt remedial action” upon learning of Doe’s allegations.
Transdev asserted Doe’s failure to prevent harassment claim
(third cause of action) and her negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim (tenth cause of action) failed because Transdev
took reasonable steps to prevent harassment, including
investigating and finding prior incidents involving Taylor to be
unsubstantiated.
Transdev contended Doe’s second, fourth, fifth, eighth,
ninth, and tenth causes of action for sexual assault, battery, and
ratification; violation of Civil Code section 43; violation of Civil
Code section 51.7; false imprisonment; intentional infliction of
emotional distress; and negligent infliction of emotional distress,
2 Civil Code section 43 “codifies causes of action for false
imprisonment, assault, battery, invasion of privacy, and a
number of business torts.” (Gabrielle A. v. County of Orange
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1268, 1289.) Civil Code section 51.7
provides a cause of action for “gender violence” where “the
defendant threatened or committed violent acts against the
plaintiff,” and had “a prohibited discriminatory motive.”
(Gabrielle A., at p. 1291.)
5
respectively, all failed because they relied on untenable theories
of respondeat superior or ratification liability on the part of
Transdev. Regarding Doe’s respondeat superior theory, Transdev
posited it could not be held vicariously liable for Taylor’s alleged
sexual assault because as a matter of law it occurred outside of
the scope of Taylor’s employment. Transdev further asserted the
undisputed facts showed Transdev never ratified the alleged
misconduct, but instead took “immediate investigative and
remedial action” once Doe complained of the assault.
2. Transdev’s supporting evidence
a. Transdev’s response to Doe’s allegations
Jackson and Cloud recovered the hard drive that was
sitting on the front seat of the bus driven by Doe during the
retraining, and Jackson told Cloud to view its contents “to see if
the training was performed and what was going on.” That night,
Cloud emailed Jackson, explaining that the recording had a gap
because Taylor removed the hard drive.
The next morning, around 9:00 a.m., Doe and two union
representatives went to human resources generalist Luz
Perkins’s office and told her that Taylor had sexually assaulted
Doe. Jackson then informed Taylor of Doe’s allegations, placed
him on investigative leave, gave him a “your side of the story”
form to complete, collected his badge and keys, and made sure he
left the premises. Perkins opened an investigation and got
written statements from Cloud, Jackson, and Doe. Taylor never
returned the “your side of the story” form and resigned by email
two days later without returning to work. Perkins then reached
out to Doe to let her know that Taylor was no longer with
Transdev and that Doe, who had gone on leave, could return to
work whenever she was ready. Because Taylor never gave his
6
version of events, Perkins concluded she lacked sufficient
evidence to determine whether a sexual assault had occurred.
b. Transdev’s investigation of Estrada’s complaint
regarding Taylor’s inappropriate behavior
In May 2019, another Transdev employee, Gloria Estrada,
reported two incidents involving Taylor. In the first, she claimed
that in April Taylor said to a dispatcher, Patricia Lewis, “tell her
to stop, my dick is getting hard.” Estrada said operations
supervisor Ashley Robinson witnessed the comment. In the
second incident, Estrada said she did not pay for her cell phone
service, and Taylor allegedly responded, “If I had what you have,
I wouldn’t pay either,” while referencing her breasts with his eyes
and shoulders.
In response to Estrada’s complaint, Perkins collected
written statements from and interviewed Taylor, Lewis,
Robinson, and Estrada. Lewis denied the incident between her
and Taylor had occurred. Perkins concluded Estrada’s complaint
was unsubstantiated. She determined Estrada was upset
because Taylor, who lacked supervisory authority over her, had
directed her to perform some kind of task.
Perkins took notes on her investigation because Estrada
was having performance issues. Perkins did not compile her
notes into a written report summarizing the investigation and
instead verbally communicated her findings to Estrada.
c. Transdev’s trainings and policies
At onboarding, all Transdev employees, including Taylor,
received a copy of the employee handbook, a standalone unlawful
harassment policy, and a document titled “Sexual Harassment
Facts.” The handbook and policy explain what constitutes
unlawful harassment, how to report it, and the procedures
7
Transdev uses to investigate complaints. Transdev employees
also undergo a sexual harassment prevention training, which
Taylor and Doe both received.
d. Doe’s supervisors and Taylor’s status
Doe was hired by Perkins and reported to operation
supervisors Aitor Urionabarranechea and Robinson, who set
Doe’s schedule. Either Urionabarranechea or Robinson issued all
the attendance notices and written disciplinary warnings that
Doe received as an employee. Robinson, who also supervised
Taylor, testified Taylor did not “directly supervise,” assign duties
to, or have the authority to issue write-ups to Doe.
Doe reported she and Taylor had met briefly during a group
retraining where Taylor signed Doe’s training slip. Otherwise,
the only other time she recalled being with Taylor was on the
retraining at issue here.
e. Road supervisors and quality controllers
Transdev introduced evidence of Taylor’s transition from
road supervisor to quality controller and the duties associated
with each role. Taylor began working for Transdev in 2017 as a
bus driver and was later promoted to road supervisor. Road
supervisors could discipline bus drivers. Taylor testified that as
a road supervisor, his duties included ensuring driver safety,
reporting accidents, and conducting retrainings. He lacked
authority to hire, fire, or suspend employees.
In late 2018, the road supervisors at the Lancaster facility
were trying to join the Teamsters Local 848 union that already
included bus drivers. Because the union prohibited members
from supervising or disciplining other members, the road
supervisor role was eliminated following a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA), and the position of quality controller was
8
created. The CBA provided that quality controllers “shall not be
required to fill out employee discipline forms” or “have access to
any employee personnel files.”
The quality controllers reported to the same operations
supervisors as the bus drivers. Taylor, Jackson, Perkins, Cloud,
Robinson, and Transdev’s regional vice president Ibrahima Toure
testified that after the transition under the CBA, quality
controllers had no authority to supervise, discipline, or evaluate
other employees, nor to hire, fire, set pay, approve time off, or
assign routes. Jackson stated quality controllers could not
initiate progressive discipline, and Cloud testified that as a
quality controller he did not have the authority to discipline other
employees.
Taylor testified that after the title change, he was no longer
a supervisor and “some of the duties changed because we were
not – like I said, again, we weren’t in a position of any authority.
We weren’t in a position to fire anybody, none of that; so it was
just – they just changed the name.” He said he did not supervise
any employees “in particular by themselves” as a road supervisor,
no one reported to him, and he lacked the authority to discipline
others. He said he never issued write-ups and compared his role
to “serv[ing] papers,” explaining that if a write-up was required,
he merely delivered it.
Robinson stated Jackson’s department—the safety and
training team—would order retrainings. Cloud testified that
quality controllers could gather facts by reviewing footage and
speaking with employees but did not decide whether retraining
was necessary. That determination rested with safety or
operations supervisors. The safety and training team ordinarily
conducted retrainings, but would ask a quality controller to do
9
them if no one from that team was available. Jackson explained
that quality controllers observed bus drivers and pulled bus
footage at the request of operations supervisors, who would then
determine whether coaching was warranted or involve Jackson to
make that determination.
C. Doe’s Opposition and Supporting Evidence
1. Doe’s opposition to Transdev’s motion
Doe contended triable issues remained with respect to
whether Taylor was a supervisor. She pointed to evidence that
Taylor held a supervisory position when she was hired and that
his duties did not change when he became a quality controller.
Doe claimed Taylor twice disciplined her in that latter role—once
by verbally reprimanding her and once by retraining her—and
signed forms as a “supervisor.” Doe argued Taylor had the
authority to direct her daily activities, as shown by the fact that
he ordered Doe to participate in a retraining with him.
Doe also argued a jury could find Taylor was an
“ostensible” supervisor because Transdev ratified Taylor’s
exercise of supervisory authority. Doe pointed to the fact that
Perkins said Taylor had no authority to fill out “disciplinary
forms” relating to Doe, but Transdev “never reprimanded,
coached, or even suggested that Taylor stop this conduct.”
Doe further asserted that triable issues remained regarding
whether Transdev knew or should have known of Taylor’s
harassing conduct and failed to take measures to investigate or
remediate it. Doe contended Transdev did not investigate
Estrada’s claim that Taylor had commented about her breasts,
and Transdev made only a half-hearted investigation into
Estrada’s other contention about Taylor’s inappropriate
10
comments to Lewis, unreasonably concluded nothing
inappropriate had transpired, and improperly failed to discipline
Taylor.
Doe did not respond to Transdev’s arguments about her
respondeat superior or ratification theories. In a footnote, she
stated the FEHA supervisory liability issue and the non-FEHA
causes of action “involve the same legal analysis and underlying
facts.”
2. Doe’s supporting evidence3
a. Estrada’s complaint
In addition to the evidence introduced by Transdev, Doe
relied on Robinson’s emails to Perkins regarding Estrada’s
complaint. Robinson said she heard Taylor say “get [Lewis] away
because [his] nipples are getting hard” during an exchange where
Lewis had playfully poked Taylor’s chest. Robinson also noted
that Estrada previously said Taylor “was inappropriate with
other driver[s]” and Estrada, but Estrada had not provided
specific examples, and Robinson had never observed such
behavior by Taylor. Robinson also reported that Estrada had
3 Because the evidence cited in Doe’s separate statement
submitted in support of her opposition to the summary judgment
motion raise a triable issue of fact on her FEHA and negligence
claims, we need not consider additional facts Doe discusses on
appeal that were not referenced in her separate statement or
memorandum of points and authorities, which Transdev contends
we should not consider. (See Parsons v. Estenson Logistics, LLC
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1260, 1265, fn. 5 [noting the “ ‘ “Golden
Rule of Summary Adjudication” ’ ” that “ ‘[a]ll material facts must
be set forth in the separate statement’ ”].) Doe does not rely on
new facts for the remaining causes of action for which we
conclude summary adjudication was proper.
11
once said she retaliated against her ex-husband and others
involved in her divorce. Robinson believed that context was
relevant because Estrada had recently been irritated when
Taylor asked her to complete attendance paperwork and had
said, “that will be the last time he wipes his ass with me.”
Robinson flagged this for Perkins “in[ ]case this is a situation of
retaliation.”
Taylor’s written statement regarding the Estrada
complaint said in full, “I Robert Taylor do not remember anything
about this incident in question if i said anything that was
offensive to anyone or they over heard any comment that i’ve
made in a non professinal matter i apologize [sic].”
b. Transdev’s policy of investigating complaints
Transdev’s unlawful harassment policy provides,
“Investigation of a complaint will normally include conferring
with the parties involved and any named apparent witnesses. An
attempt should be made to get written statements from all
individuals that are interviewed or involved, particularly the
primary parties involved. A thorough investigation must still be
completed even if the person making the allegation refuses to
complete the ‘Incident Investigation’ form or any other written
statement.”
c. Taylor’s supervisory duties
Perkins stated that Taylor was a supervisor before he
became a quality controller. In Taylor’s October 2020 responses
to Doe’s form interrogatories, he listed “Quality Control
Supervisor” as a “description of his duties.” In his deposition,
Taylor stated he had no supervisory authority as a road
supervisor, but then also said that when he became a quality
controller, “they stripped the title of supervisor” and he was “no
12
longer [a] supervisor.” When describing the change from road
supervisor to quality controller, Taylor also said, “some of the
duties changed,” but then said he never had authority for hiring
or firing and his job duties were “exactly the same.”
Taylor confirmed he stopped Doe in the middle of her shift
and told her she would not be finishing her scheduled route, and
a relief driver would take over. Before the retraining, Taylor
gave Doe several pre-filled forms and asked her to sign them.
One of these forms, the “Employee Coaching Form,” indicated
Doe had been coached for “Poor Job Performance,” with Taylor
noting she had been retrained on controlling speed and judging
stopping distances. Taylor signed above the “Supervisor” line,
and Doe signed above the “Employee” line. Taylor had also filled
out an Employee Coaching Form for Doe in March 2019 after she
hit the curb with her tire. Taylor similarly signed that form as
“Supervisor.” When asked whether Taylor should have signed as
a supervisor, Perkins responded the form was outdated and
Taylor was not a supervisor.
Transdev’s emergency incident form also listed Taylor as
one of the options for “Responding Supervisor,” along with Cloud
and two others. Taylor completed such a form in June 2019 after
another vehicle clipped the mirror of the bus Doe was driving.
Taylor checked boxes for whether there were injuries, identified
which managers and operations supervisor personnel he notified,
and described the event.
D. The Summary Judgment Ruling
In March 2023, the trial court granted Transdev’s motion
for summary judgment and entered judgment in its favor.
13
The court first determined no triable issue of fact existed
regarding whether Taylor was Doe’s supervisor. In concluding
Taylor’s job did not fall within the ambit of FEHA’s definition of a
supervisor, the court relied on Taylor’s testimony that he lacked
disciplinary authority. The court discounted Doe’s evidence that
Taylor testified his job duties did not change when his title
changed from road supervisor to quality controller and continued
to refer to himself as a supervisor and signed forms labeled with
that title, reasoning the evidence showed the forms had not been
updated to reflect current titles. It also rejected Doe’s argument
that Taylor exercised supervisory control by interrupting Doe’s
shift for retraining, as the evidence showed Jackson—not
Taylor—ordered the retraining. The court similarly rejected
Doe’s argument that Taylor was an “ ‘ostensible’ supervisor,”
finding no evidence that Transdev “actually carried out
supervisory authority that was ratified by Transdev.”
The court also found no triable issue as to whether
Transdev knew or should have known of Taylor’s conduct. The
court noted Estrada’s complaint was unrelated to Doe and, in any
event, Transdev promptly investigated it. The court found that
upon learning of Doe’s allegations, Transdev immediately placed
Taylor on leave and opened an investigation. Further, Doe did
not dispute that Transdev provided sexual harassment training
and complaint procedures to employees.
The court did not explicitly address the arguments
regarding the non-FEHA causes of action and granted Transdev’s
motion “in its entirety.” Doe timely appealed.
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DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
1. Summary judgment
“Summary judgment is appropriate only ‘where no triable
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.’ ” (Regents of University of
California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618; see Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (c) & (f).) We review a summary
judgment ruling de novo. (Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th
29, 39.) In so doing, we “ ‘liberally construe the evidence in
support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve
doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.’ ” (Ibid.)
“A defendant may bring a motion [for summary judgment]
on the ground the plaintiff cannot prove one of the required
elements of the case.” (Luebke v. Automobile Club of Southern
Cal. (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 694, 702; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subds. (o)(1), (2) & (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 849.) “To carry its initial burden . . ., a defendant
must present evidence that either ‘conclusively negate[s] an
element of the plaintiff’s cause of action’ or ‘show[s] that the
plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain,’
evidence necessary to establish at least one element of the cause
of action.” (Luebke, at p. 702.) If the defendant satisfies this
initial burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present
evidence demonstrating there is a triable issue of material fact.
(Id. at pp. 702-703; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2);
Aguilar, at p. 850.) “The plaintiff must produce ‘ “substantial” ’
responsive evidence sufficient to establish a triable issue of fact.”
(Granadino v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th
411, 415.) “In determining if the papers show that there is no
15
triable issue as to any material fact, the court shall consider all of
the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which
objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all
inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
2. FEHA
“It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
‘harass’ an employee based on membership in a protected class”
(Bailey v. San Francisco District Attorney’s Office (2024)
16 Cal.5th 611, 626), including “because of . . . sex” (§ 12940,
subd. (j)(1); see Wawrzenski v. United Airlines, Inc. (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 663, 692 (Wawrzenski)). “Sexual harassment . . .
includes ‘ “any unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.” ’ ”
(Wawrzenski, at p. 692; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11019,
subd. (b)(2)(D); see also Doe v. Capital Cities (1996)
50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1045 [harassment includes sexual assault].)
In 2019, “the Legislature added section 12923, which ‘clarified
existing law’ ” to provide that “ ‘[h]arassment cases are rarely
appropriate for disposition on summary judgment’ ” and “involve
issues ‘not determinable on paper.’ ” (Wawrzenski, at p. 693; see
§ 12923, subd. (e).)
“FEHA imposes two standards of employer liability for
sexual harassment, depending on whether the person engaging in
the harassment is the victim’s supervisor or a nonsupervisory
coemployee.” (State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 1026, 1040-1041; see Wawrzenski, supra,
106 Cal.App.5th at p. 694.) “ ‘When the harasser is a supervisor,
the employer is strictly liable for the supervisor’s actions.’ ”
(Bailey v. San Francisco District Attorney’s Office, supra,
16
16 Cal.5th at p. 635.) “ ‘When the harasser is a nonsupervisory
employee, employer liability turns on a showing of negligence.’ ”
(Ibid.) Specifically, when the harasser is not the plaintiff’s
supervisor, an employer is liable “ ‘if the entity, or its agents or
supervisors, knows or should have known of this conduct and
fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.’ ”
(Ibid.; see § 12940, subd. (j)(1).)
In addition, “FEHA makes it a separate unlawful
employment practice for an employer to ‘fail to take all
reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and
harassment from occurring.’ ” (State Dept. of Health Services v.
Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1040; see § 12940,
subd. (k).) Such a claim “require[s] a finding of actual
discrimination or harassment under FEHA before a plaintiff may
prevail under section 12940, subdivision (k).’ ” (Paleny v.
Fireplace Products U.S., Inc. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 199, 213; see
Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11023(a)(2) [“There is no stand-alone,
private cause of action under . . . section 12940(k). . . . [T]he
private claimant must also plead and prevail on the underlying
claim of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation.”].)
B. Triable Issues of Fact Remain About Whether Taylor Was a
Supervisor
Under FEHA, a supervisor is “any individual having the
authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or
discipline other employees, or the responsibility to direct them, or
to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend that
action, if, in connection with the foregoing, the exercise of that
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but
17
requires the use of independent judgment.” (§ 12926, subd. (t).)
Doe does not dispute that Taylor did not have the authority to
hire, suspend, or fire her, or to set her pay or give her a raise or a
bonus. However, the definition of a supervisor under FEHA
includes persons who have “the responsibility to direct” another
employee or to recommend that another employee be discharged
or disciplined, if the exercise of that authority is not of a “routine
or clerical nature,” but rather requires “independent judgment.”
(§ 12926, subd. (t); see Chapman v. Enos (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th
920, 930 (Chapman) [“supervisors with responsibility to direct
others using their independent judgment, and whose supervision
of employees is not merely routine or clerical,” fall within FEHA
definition].) A triable issue remains about whether Taylor
exercised such a role during the relevant time period.
Chapman, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th 920 is instructive.
Chapman involved a sexual harassment claim by an investigator
in the district attorney’s office who claimed a deputy district
attorney sexually assaulted her. (Id. at p. 922.) The plaintiff had
conceded that the attorney did not have the authority to hire,
fire, promote, or transfer her; rather, her theory was that he was
her supervisor “because he had the responsibility to direct her
work.” (Id. at p. 929.) The appellate court reversed the judgment
in favor of the defendant following a jury trial. (Id. at pp. 925,
933.) The court determined that the trial court had improperly
instructed the jury that to qualify as a supervisor, a person must
be fully accountable and responsible for an employee’s work,
which are “not required elements of . . . the FEHA definition of
supervisor.” (Id. at p. 930.) Rather, the appellate court
determined a person could satisfy the FEHA definition if he or
she had the “responsibility to direct others using their
18
independent judgment,” and their “supervision of employees
[was] not merely routine or clerical.” (Ibid.)
The court determined there was evidence the attorney met
the FEHA definition of a supervisor because he “directed
[plaintiff’s] day-to-day duties to conduct investigations and trial
preparation on cases, and outlined her role in meetings and
trainings.” (Chapman, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 930.)
Although the senior and chief investigators “ultimately
supervised” the plaintiff, she received few assignments from
anyone other than the attorney, always cleared her time off with
him before having it approved by the chief investigator, and
believed the attorney was her “supervisor or ‘boss.’ ” (Ibid.) And
while the attorney did not have the authority to promote or
evaluate the plaintiff, the chief investigator regularly sought his
input in evaluating her work. (Id. at p. 923.) The court found
this was sufficient evidence the attorney was a supervisor vis-à-
vis the plaintiff. (Id. at pp. 930-931.)
Similarly, here, although Taylor did not have the authority
to hire, fire, or promote Doe, and although Doe’s formal
supervisors were Robinson and Urionabarranechea, there is
evidence that raises a triable issue about whether Taylor had the
“responsibility to direct” Doe’s day-to-day work. (§ 12926,
subd. (t); Chapman, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 929.) Taylor
interrupted Doe’s scheduled shift and redirected her, conducted
retrainings for Doe at least twice, and instructed her to sign
related paperwork. The Employee Coaching Form, identifying
him as “Supervisor,” indicated Doe engaged in poor job
performance and listed the corrective actions taken to improve
Doe’s performance, including retraining. When Taylor filled out
an Employee Coaching Form for Doe in March 2019, after Doe hit
19
the curb with her bus’s rear tire, Taylor likewise signed that form
as “Supervisor.”
Transdev relies on Perkins’s testimony that the forms
referencing quality controllers as “supervisors” had not been
updated, and emphasizes that the retraining of Doe was ordered
by Jackson and was only carried out by Taylor. However, there
was additional evidence from which a reasonable juror could
conclude that Taylor did exercise supervisory responsibility in his
role as quality controller. Perkins testified Taylor had
supervisory authority as a road supervisor, before his job title
was changed to quality controller, and Jackson confirmed that
road supervisors could discipline bus drivers. Taylor’s
contradictory statements reinforce the ambiguity: He reported
that he had no supervisory authority as a road supervisor, but
also said that when he became a quality controller, “they stripped
the title of supervisor” and he was “no longer [a] supervisor.” He
also testified “some of the duties changed,” but said his job duties
were “exactly the same.” Moreover, he continued to refer to
himself as a “Quality Control Supervisor” in verified discovery
responses. Viewed in the light most favorable to Doe, the
evidence raises a triable issue about whether Taylor’s actions in
directing Doe, assessing her job performance, and recommending
corrective action on forms identifying him as a supervisor were
merely “routine or clerical,” or rather were exercises of authority
that required “independent judgment.” (§ 12926, subd. (t); see
Chapman, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 931; cf. Webco Industries,
Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (10th Cir. 2003) 90 Fed.Appx. 276, 281-282
[substantial evidence supported conclusion of National Labor
Relations Board that employee trainer who performed only minor
20
supervisory duties did not satisfy the definition of a “supervisor”
under 29 U.S.C. § 152(11), which mirrors the FEHA definition].)
Summary adjudication on the first cause of action for
sexual harassment under FEHA was therefore improper.4
C. Triable Issues of Fact Remain About Whether Transdev
Took All Reasonable Steps To Prevent Harassment
Transdev moved for summary adjudication on Doe’s third
and tenth causes of action for failure to prevent harassment
under section 12940, subdivision (k), and for negligent infliction
of emotional distress, respectively, arguing both claims failed as a
matter of law for the same reason—Transdev took reasonable
steps to prevent harassment.
Under section 12940, subdivision (k), plaintiffs must
establish: (1) they were subjected to harassment; (2) the
employer failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent it; and
(3) that failure caused harm. (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel
Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 877, accord, Caldera v.
Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 31,
4 We need not reach Doe’s argument that Transdev is
judicially estopped from asserting that road supervisors are not
“supervisors” under FEHA because it took the opposite position
in Transdev Services, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (8th Cir. 2021) 991 F.3d
889, and thus we decline Doe’s request to take judicial notice of
documents relating to that case. We also need not reach Doe’s
argument that a triable issue remains as to whether Taylor was
an “ostensible” supervisor, or her alternative contention that
even if Taylor is not a supervisor, Transdev is liable for Taylor’s
sexual harassment because Transdev should have known of his
conduct and failed to take appropriate corrective action (§ 12940,
subd. (j)(1).)
21
43-44.) Liability under section 12940, subdivision (k), “depend[s]
upon numerous factors sometimes unique to the particular
employer including, but not limited to, its workforce size, budget,
and nature of its business, as well as upon the facts of a
particular case.” (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 11023(a)(1).)
Even assuming Transdev carried its initial summary
judgment burden on this issue, the evidence regarding
Transdev’s response to Estrada’s complaint about Taylor’s prior
inappropriate behavior presents a factual dispute as to the
reasonableness of Transdev’s steps toward preventing Doe’s
alleged harassment.5 A reasonable jury could conclude that
Transdev should have done more to investigate Estrada’s
complaint, discipline Taylor, and take steps toward preventing
further harassment or misconduct by Taylor. (See California
Fair Employment & Housing Com. v. Gemini Aluminum Corp.
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1025 [“An employer must take all
reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination.”].)
For example, Doe submitted evidence to demonstrate that
Transdev failed to investigate Estrada’s allegation that Taylor
referred to her breasts in speaking with her. In addition, a jury
could fault Perkins for not further investigating Estrada’s
allegation that Taylor said Lewis was making his “dick” hard
5 The trial court excluded Doe’s Exhibit J—Estrada’s
complaint—for failure to properly authenticate it. However, as
Transdev acknowledges, it included the same document as an
exhibit and cited it in its separate statement, and the trial court
discussed Estrada’s complaint in its order. We therefore need not
reach Doe’s argument that the court erred in sustaining
Transdev’s objection to Exhibit J because any alleged error was
harmless.
22
(which Robinson corroborated, except she thought Taylor said
Lewis was making his “nipples” hard), and instead crediting
Robinson’s suggestion that Estrada’s complaint was motivated by
her desire to retaliate against Taylor. Assessing whether
Transdev took all reasonable steps to prevent harassment
requires evaluating and comparing the accounts of the two
incidents, as well as the reasonableness and thoroughness of
Perkins’s investigation, factual conclusions, and determination
not to discipline Taylor. These analyses are fact-intensive,
involve assessing credibility, and are inappropriate for resolution
on summary judgment.
Nor is it determinative that Estrada, as opposed to Doe,
made the previous complaint. The issue is whether such a third-
party complaint should have prompted Transdev to take
additional steps to prevent further harassment of any Transdev
employee. (See M.F. v. Pacific Pearl Hotel Management LLC
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 693, 701 [that “initial harassment was not
directed at [the plaintiff] does not preclude [the defendant
employer] from having responsibilities under the FEHA toward
her”].) “If an employer knows a particular person’s abusive
conduct places employees at unreasonable risk of sexual
harassment, the employer cannot escape responsibility to protect
a likely future employee victim merely because the person has
not previously abused that particular employee.” (Ibid.)
The same reasoning applies to Doe’s negligent infliction of
emotional distress claim. “[T]here is no independent tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress. [Citation.] ‘The tort is
negligence.’ ” (Belen v. Ryan Seacrest Productions, LLC (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 1145, 1165.) “ ‘Negligence liability will be
imposed on an employer if it “knew or should have known that
23
hiring [or retaining an] employee created a particular risk or
hazard and that particular harm materializes.” ’ ” (D.Z. v. Los
Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 210, 235.)
Doe’s complaint asserts Transdev was negligent because it
breached its “duty to provide Plaintiff with a workplace free from
sexual harassment, assault and battery.” As with Doe’s failure to
prevent harassment claim, there are factual issues about the
adequacy of Transdev’s response to Estrada’s complaint that
preclude summary adjudication on Doe’s cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress.
D. Summary Adjudication of Doe’s Remaining Causes of
Action Was Proper
Transdev moved for summary adjudication on Doe’s second,
fourth, fifth, eighth, ninth and tenth causes of action for sexual
assault, battery, and ratification; violation of Civil Code
section 43; violation of Civil Code section 51.7; false
imprisonment; and intentional infliction of emotional distress,
respectively, arguing they were based on theories of respondeat
superior or ratification liability, which failed as a matter of law.
Doe did not substantively address these arguments in her
opposition in the trial court. The trial court granted Transdev’s
motion “in its entirety,” without addressing Doe’s non-FEHA
claims. We examine whether Transdev met its initial burden and
whether summary adjudication on these causes of action was
thus warranted.6 (See Gray v. La Salle Bank, N.A. (2023)
6 We do not address theories Doe raises for the first time on
appeal. (Ryan v. County of Los Angeles (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th
337, 371 [“ ‘ “A party is not permitted to change his position and
24
95 Cal.App.5th 932, 948 [“ ‘[W]e may affirm the summary
judgment on any correct legal theory, as long as the parties had
an adequate opportunity to address the theory in the trial
court.’ ”].)
Transdev met its burden of demonstrating Doe’s causes of
action for common law intentional torts and violations of the Civil
Code premised on respondeat superior liability failed as a matter
of law. Respondeat superior liability attaches only when the
conduct at issue is within the scope of the harasser’s employment.
(See Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th
1403, 1428.) Although the question of the “scope of employment”
is often a question of fact, summary adjudication is appropriate
where, as here, verbal harassment or a physical assault was
“motivated by [an employee’s] personal reasons unrelated to his
job duties and in violation of the employer’s sexual harassment
policy,” even if it took place at the workplace during work hours.
(Id. at p. 1432; accord, Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa
Clara (1995) 11 Cal.4th 992, 1006, 1012-1013 [“except where
sexual misconduct by on-duty police officers against members of
the public is involved [citations], the employer is not vicariously
liable to the third party for such misconduct,” even when the
adopt a new and different theory on appeal. To permit him to do
so would not only be unfair to the trial court, but manifestly
unjust to the opposing litigant.” ’ ”]; Kime v. Dignity Health, Inc.
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 708, 721 [arguments not raised in
opposition to motion for summary judgment are forfeited].) Even
though Doe did not address these causes of action in the trial
court, we still must examine whether Transdev met its initial
burden on summary judgment with respect to them. (Y.K.A.
Indus., Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency of City of San Jose (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 339, 367.)
25
misconduct is committed by a supervisor with a “high degree of
authority over the victim”].) Thus, Transdev established as a
matter of law that it does not have respondeat superior liability
with respect to Doe’s second, fourth, fifth, eighth, and ninth
causes of action against Transdev.7
Similarly, Transdev demonstrated there was no evidence to
support the theory that Transdev ratified Taylor’s misconduct.
“As an alternative to respondeat superior, an employee may be
liable for an employee’s act where the employer subsequently
ratifies the originally unauthorized tort.” (Samantha B. v.
Aurora Vista Del Mar, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 85, 109.) The
failure to investigate, respond to charges, or discharge an
employee after learning of wrongful conduct may be evidence of
ratification. (Ibid.; Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006)
145 Cal.App.4th 790, 810.) Although ratification is generally a
question of fact (Samantha B., at p. 109), the undisputed facts
demonstrate that as soon as Doe made her complaint, Jackson
suspended Taylor, gave him a form for an investigation, and
ensured he relinquished his badge and keys and left the
premises. Perkins immediately opened an investigation and got
written statements from Cloud, Jackson, and Doe. After Taylor
resigned, Perkins reached out to Doe to let her know that Taylor
was no longer with Transdev and that Doe could return to work
7 The same reasoning does not apply to Doe’s tenth cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. As discussed,
there are factual disputes about whether Transdev was negligent
in its response to Estrada’s complaint and in retaining and failing
to discipline Taylor. Therefore, summary adjudication is not
warranted for the cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
26
whenever she was ready. Based on these facts, Transdev’s
response “simply leaves no room for any inference that
[Transdev] ratified” Taylor’s assault or in any way “engaged in
‘positive misconduct’ that ratified the coemployee’s tort.”
(Franklin v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group
(C.D. Cal., Nov. 7, 2006, No. CV05-0330 GAF MANx) 2006 WL
5309515, at *37-40 [no ratification where employer “immediately
conducted an inquiry after the altercation, which resulted in [the
perpetrator] being placed on leave, and then terminated”].)
Therefore, Transdev also demonstrated Doe lacked evidence to
support a ratification theory for her second, fourth, fifth, eighth,
and ninth causes of action.
Because Transdev’s liability for these causes of action
hinged on either respondeat superior or ratification theories,
neither of which Doe addressed in opposing summary judgment,
Doe failed to meet her burden to establish there was a disputed
material fact prohibiting summary adjudication on these claims.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. We remand and direct the trial
court to enter a new order (1) granting Transdev’s motion for
summary adjudication on Doe’s second cause of action for sexual
assault, battery, and ratification; fourth cause of action for
violation of Civil Code section 43; fifth cause of action for
violation of Civil Code section 51.7; eighth cause of action for
false imprisonment; and ninth cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress; (2) denying Transdev’s motion for
summary adjudication as to Doe’s first cause of action for sexual
harassment based on a hostile work environment, third cause of
action for failure to prevent harassment, and tenth cause of
27
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress; and
(3) denying Transdev’s motion for summary judgment. Doe is
entitled to recover her costs on appeal.
STONE, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
FEUER, J.
28
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