CourtListener 10615511•People v. Schmitt CA1/5
Texto completo
Filed 6/23/25 P. v. Schmitt CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A170547
v.
BRIAN DOUGLAS SCHMITT, SR., (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No.
Defendant and Appellant. SCR7562591)
Brian Douglas Schmitt, Sr., was sentenced to 30 years to
life in prison for his convictions for oral copulation/sexual
penetration of a child under 10 (counts one and three; Pen. Code,
§ 288.7, subd. (b)),1 and committing a lewd act upon a child
(counts two and four; § 288, subd. (a)). In this appeal, he raises
several challenges to evidence admitted by the trial court. We
affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
A.
The victim, Jane Doe, is the granddaughter of Schmitt’s
former girlfriend, Janice.2 At the time of the crimes, Schmitt
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 To protect her identity, we refer to the victim by a
pseudonym and to her family members by their first names.
1
lived with Janice, and Doe periodically spent time with Schmitt
when she visited Janice’s house. Doe also regularly spent time at
the house of her maternal grandmother, Ruth. Doe’s parents
were going through a custody battle at the time.
One day in July 2022, while at Ruth’s house, Doe touched
her backside and indicated that Schmitt had molested her.
According to Ruth’s testimony at trial, Doe said that she had
something to tell Ruth and asked her to “please don’t be mad.”
Doe told Ruth that Schmitt “tried to put a finger in the back.” He
“trie[d] to force it” but Doe’s underwear was in the way. Ruth
testified that Doe was “shaking” and asked Ruth to “ ‘[p]romise
not to tell anybody.’ ” In response to Doe’s disclosure, Ruth was
“mad” and started crying.
B.
The following month, when she was nine years old, Doe was
interviewed by a forensic interviewer who specializes in
conducting interviews with child victims or witnesses of crime.
The interview, which lasted about 50 minutes, was recorded and
played for the jury at trial. During the interview, Doe related
that one day, when she was in the middle of watching a movie
with Schmitt at Janice’s house, Schmitt began touching her
private parts. Doe had been sitting in Schmitt’s lap, on a
reclining chair in the living room, and Janice was not there. Doe
was wearing pajamas with shorts and, after Doe paused the
movie, Schmitt started tickling her “all around.” While Doe was
upside down, Schmitt started touching her “private” and her
“bottom too.” Schmitt was “squishing” Doe’s legs. According to
Doe, Schmitt touched her under her clothes, put his fingers “[i]n
my butt hole and my pee hole,” moving his fingers around in a
circle. She recounted that “he kept on like digging in there” with
his fingers “and then taking it out and then smelling it and then
putting [it] back and then smelling.” Schmitt told Doe that it
smelled “nice.” When he was touching her “pee hole,” it felt like
2
rubbing. Doe felt like Schmitt was “torturing” her and she
thought it was “disgusting.”
Doe said that she was seven or eight when it happened, and
estimated that it happened three months before the forensic
interview (when she would have been eight years old). Doe had
been “too afraid and scared” to tell anyone because she was
worried her family members might start fighting, and she was
concerned about what would happen if she told anyone.
C.
The same day that Doe disclosed the abuse to Ruth, Ruth
told Janice, who had come to pick Doe up from Ruth’s house.
Schmitt was waiting in the car. When Janice spoke to her, Doe
said that Schmitt had “touched me on my butt and between my
legs.” Schmitt had touched Doe over her underwear. Janice did
not ask Doe many questions and “did not ask for specific details.”
After learning what had happened, Janice brought Doe back to
the house she shared with Schmitt. Doe stayed at Janice’s house
for about four days, during which time Janice “never let [Doe] out
of [her] sight.” As Janice later explained at trial, she wanted to
keep things as “normal as possible” for Doe.
At the end of the visit, after Doe had left, Janice confronted
Schmitt about the abuse. Janice testified that she “might have”
said to Schmitt that Doe shared that “you touched her in her
vaginal area and in her buttocks.” According to Janice, Schmitt
responded, “ ‘Yes, I did,’ ” and claimed that he had told her this
already. Janice asked Schmitt to leave her house. Schmitt
“wasn’t angry” and “didn’t argue” with Janice; instead he agreed
to leave. Janice later testified that Schmitt never denied the
allegations.
Ruth and Janice did not tell Doe’s mother, Mar, right away
about Doe’s disclosure, instead waiting about five days. When
Mar found out, she tried to ask Doe “many questions” but the two
3
were both emotional and Doe did not say much. Doe became
frustrated and did not want to talk about it. Doe did not tell Mar
that Schmitt penetrated her vaginally or anally with his fingers.
Doe was not willing to talk to everyone about what happened.
When Doe’s father learned of Doe’s allegations, he got mad
and did not believe she had been abused.
D.
Doe’s account at trial differed in some respects from
previous accounts of the abuse. She testified in January 2024
that while she was sitting in Schmitt’s lap watching a movie at
Janice’s house, Schmitt touched her front “private part,” which
helps her go “pee,” with his fingers. She was wearing pajama
shorts, and he lifted the bottoms of her shorts up and touched her
“private parts” under her clothing. Schmitt was “wiggling” his
fingers “around.” Doe could not remember Schmitt doing
anything else specific with his hands nor could she remember
him saying anything. When asked whether she was familiar
with a “butt hole,” Doe apparently indicated that she was not.
When asked whether Schmitt had touched her in “the place that
helps you go poop,” Doe answered that he did not touch that part.
Doe could not remember how long she waited to tell Ruth,
but she estimated that she told her “like two weeks after” the
abuse had happened. Doe testified that she told Ruth that
Schmitt had touched her under her underwear. Doe did not
recall telling Janice that he had touched her over her underwear.
E.
Once the family notified the police, the police worked with
Janice to set up a pretext telephone call with Schmitt, which the
police recorded. During the call, Janice told Schmitt that for her
to be able to move on, she needed “clarity” and needed to know
what had happened. Schmitt responded, “I can’t speak of
anything in the past. I’m sorry,” explaining that his son had
4
advised him not to talk to anyone. When Janice asked him, “Was
[Doe] even telling me the truth,” Schmitt replied, “I cannot
discuss anything from . . . my past. . . . no comment.” Schmitt
shared, however, that he believed that his marijuana addiction
“caused me to do things . . . that I wouldn’t normally do . . . if I
wasn’t out of my mind on marijuana.” He added, “I have mental
issues, from an early age.” During the call, Schmitt also asked
Janice to meet him outside of the library with three computers
they had shared, explaining, “I just wanna . . . remove everything
from . . . the computers.” Schmitt recognized that even after he
removed everything from the computers, “in some way it’ll still be
in there[,] [b]ut at least you won’t have to see it or deal with it.”
The police arrested Schmitt at the library, before Janice
could hand over the computers. The police then obtained the
computers from Janice, including a Toshiba laptop. The
computers were partitioned so that Janice and Schmitt each had
separate profiles. Among the documents recovered from
Schmitt’s partition on the Toshiba laptop were six sexually
explicit illustrations. At trial, Sergeant Ronald Flores explained
that when he was reviewing the data extracted from Schmitt’s
partition, the six images caught his attention because “[t]hey
depicted obvious computer-generated images of children engaged
in sexual conduct.”
F.
As part of its case, the prosecution introduced testimony
from a clinical and forensic psychologist, Dr. Tiffany Anderson,
whom the trial court designated as an expert on child sexual
abuse. Dr. Anderson testified about “Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome,” a set of behaviors observed in child
victims of sexual abuse. She was not familiar with the
allegations against Schmitt and did not offer any opinions as to
whether Doe had been sexually abused.
5
G.
Schmitt did not present an affirmative defense case.
DISCUSSION
Schmitt challenges the admissibility of the six sexually
explicit images from his computer; Sergeant Flores’s
characterization of the six images as depicting “children engaged
in sexual conduct”; and Dr. Anderson’s testimony on Child Sexual
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome. We review Schmitt’s
evidentiary challenges for abuse of discretion. (See People v.
Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367, 411 [challenge to admission of
lay opinion testimony]; People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
162, 170 (Lapenias) [challenge to Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome evidence]; People v. Memro (1995) 11
Cal.4th 786, 864 (Memro) [Evidence Code section 1101
challenge].)
A.
Schmitt contends that the trial court erred in admitting the
six sexually explicit images found on his computer pursuant to
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), because the images
were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. We disagree.
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), restricts the
admission of evidence of the defendant’s prior bad conduct to
prove his conduct on a specific occasion. Evidence Code section
1101, subdivision (b), however, permits evidence of the
defendant’s prior conduct “when relevant to prove some fact (such
as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake or accident . . . ) other than his or her
disposition to commit such an act.” Even where the evidence in
question is admissible, Evidence Code section 352 grants the trial
court discretion to “exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will,” as relevant here, create a substantial risk of undue
6
prejudice. “The ‘prejudice’ which section 352 seeks to avoid is
that which ‘ “ ‘uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against
the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on
the issues.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 275.)
Sexually explicit images, if found in the defendant’s
possession, may be relevant to prove intent or motive in
prosecutions involving sexual assault. (See People v. Parker
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 39 (Parker); Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp.
864-865.) For example, Memro held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting magazines and photographs
with sexually explicit stories, drawings, and photographs of
prepubescent boys and young adults in the defendant’s
prosecution for molesting a seven-year-old boy in violation of
section 288. (Memro, at pp. 864-865.) Memro reasoned that the
photographs gave rise to a permissible inference that the
defendant “had a sexual attraction to young boys and intended to
act on that attraction.” (Id. at p. 865.) As a result, Memro
concluded that the photographs were admissible because they
were probative of the defendant’s intent to commit a lewd or
lascivious act with the young victim. (Ibid.) Further, Memro
rejected the argument that the photographs—which depicted
young boys in sexually explicit poses—were unduly prejudicial.
(Ibid.) Although the images were “undoubtedly . . . disturbing,”
their probative value as to the defendant’s intent to violate
section 288 was “substantial.” (Ibid.) Similarly, in People v.
Avila (2014) 59 Cal.4th 496, 518-519, a murder case, our
Supreme Court held that evidence that the defendant possessed
child pornography and had, shortly before the crime, printed out
a story about an adult male having sex with children “was
probative of [the] defendant’s intent to commit lewd acts on the
young murder victim.”
In People v. Page (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 5, 40 (Page), our
Supreme Court considered the admission of pornographic
7
magazine images of postpubescent young adult women in a
prosecution for committing a lewd act on a child in violation of
section 288, subdivision (a). Page reaffirmed that evidence that a
defendant had possessed sexually explicit images may be
admissible to prove intent. (Id. at p. 40.) But the Court observed
in dicta that the probative value of the images in that case was
lessened because, among other things, none of the models in the
images appeared to be as young as the six-year-old victim, the
acts committed against the victim were dissimilar to the acts
portrayed in the images, and the defendant did not attempt to
conceal or destroy the images. (Id. at pp. 40-41.) Ultimately,
Page declined to decide whether the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting the evidence because the defendant had
not shown that its admission was prejudicial. (Id. at p. 41.)
In People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 686-688
(Westerfield), our Supreme Court considered the relevance of
child pornography in the context of determining whether a child
pornography charge was properly joined with charges for the
kidnapping and murder of a seven-year-old girl whose body was
found nude. In support of the child pornography charge, the trial
court had admitted six short video clips depicting forcible sexual
assaults of young girls, along with a photograph depicting a man
having sex with a young girl.3 (Id. at p. 684.) In holding that the
3 In Westerfield, the prosecution also introduced cartoon or
anime images depicting forcible sexual acts with pubescent girls
and mature females with girlish features, hairstyles, or clothing.
(Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 684.) However, because the
anime images were admitted to prove motive and intent in
connection with the murder and kidnapping charges but not the
child pornography charge, our Supreme Court’s analysis of the
relationship between the child pornography charge and the other
charges for purposes of joinder does not directly address the
anime images. (Ibid.; see also id. at pp. 686-688.)
8
child pornography offense was sufficiently connected to the
kidnapping and murder charges for joinder purposes, Westerfield
explained that the defendant’s possession of pornographic images
of children was indicative of his sexual interest in young girls,
and was therefore “highly relevant” to explain why he would have
kidnapped and murdered his young victim. (Id. at p. 687.)
Westerfield further explained that that there was an evidentiary
basis for believing that the defendant’s sexual interest in young
girls had motivated the kidnapping and killing, even though
there was no direct physical evidence that the victim had been
sexually abused: among other facts, the girl’s body was found
nude, her hair was found in the defendant’s home bedding, and
her handprint was found near the defendant’s bed. (Id. at pp.
685, 687.) Our Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument
that the child pornography charge was not sufficiently connected
to the other charges simply because none of the child
pornography depicted the victim herself and there was no
evidence that the scenes depicted in the pornography
corresponded to the kidnapping and murder. (Id. at p. 687.)
Instead, Westerfield reasoned that a common intent or motivation
was sufficient by itself to connect the child pornography to the
murder and killing for purposes of joinder, even without “physical
evidence or other objectively measurable factors” connecting the
pornography to the other charges. (Id. at pp. 687-688.)
Recently, in Parker, our Supreme Court upheld the
admission of images of women without pubic hair or in handcuffs
as probative of the defendant’s intent and motive to commit rape.
(Parker, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 39-40.) Although some of the
images depicted the victim’s face collaged onto a model’s nude
body, some images depicted other women. (Ibid.) Given that the
victim was found with her pubic hair removed and an injury that
could have been caused by a wrist restraint, the images were
probative of the defendant’s sexual interest and rape fantasy.
(Id. at p. 39.)
9
Here, the six sexually explicit illustrations challenged by
Schmitt were relevant to prove his sexual interest in young girls.
The images depicted prepubescent or pubescent girls with their
pubic areas and (in all but two images) their chests exposed; four
of the characters are completely flat-chested, while two appear to
have breast buds. Three of the images portray sexual assaults of
young girls and one image depicts a young girl surrounded by sex
toys. Further, the images, which were found on Schmitt’s
computer, were downloaded and viewed about two months before
Doe disclosed that Schmitt had assaulted her. As in Memro,
because a jury could find, based on the images, that Schmitt was
interested in sexual conduct with young girls, the images were
probative of his intent to violate section 288. (See Memro, supra,
11 Cal.4th at p. 865.) The jury could also reasonably infer from
the images that Schmitt was motivated by his sexual interest in
young girls, and that his assault of Doe was not an accident or
misunderstanding. (See Parker, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 39-40.)
Schmitt’s plea of not guilty put these questions at issue. (See
Memro, at p. 864.)
Schmitt argues that admission of the images was improper
without “some indicia of specific similarity between the cartoon
images and the facts of the charged offenses,” relying on Page and
Westerfield. Schmitt acknowledges that at least one of the
images “is related to the specific conduct described by Doe”
because it portrays an adult hand touching a young girl’s
partially exposed crotch over her underwear. Similar to the scene
depicted in that image, there was evidence that Schmitt held
Doe’s legs in place during the assault and touched her vaginal
area while she was upside down. Apart from the similarities to
that image, Schmitt argues that the only other similarity
between the offenses here and the images is that they generally
depict young females in sexualized situations.
10
But Schmitt’s argument fails to acknowledge the import of
the similarity in age between Doe and the characters depicted in
the images, which increases the probative value of the images as
evidence of his sexual interest in young girls. Unlike in Page,
where images of postpubescent women were admitted in a
prosecution involving a six-year-old victim, here the jury could
conclude that the images depicted prepubescent or pubescent
characters similar in age to Doe, who was at most about eight
years old at the time of the assault. Further, all images could
give rise to an inference that Schmitt was sexually excited by
young girl’s vaginas, which overlaps with the allegations that
Schmitt touched Doe’s vagina and digitally penetrated her.
Young girls’ hairless pubic areas and vaginas are fully visible in
five of the six images, and in the sixth image, the young girl’s
pubic area is partially exposed; one of the images is accompanied
by dialogue that reads: “Well, what kinda vaggy do you hide
here?” Although there were no allegations that Schmitt used a
sex toy during the assault or had intercourse with Doe, the
images depicting sex toys around a young girl’s vagina and
intercourse with a young girl could likewise suggest a fixation
with vaginal penetration of a young girl. Indeed, that the images
were highly probative of Schmitt’s sexual interest in girls is
reinforced by the fact that he sought to wipe them from his
computer shortly after he learned that Doe had reported the
abuse. (Cf. Page, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 41.)
The images are certainly disturbing. But so was Doe’s
account of Schmitt’s assault. (See People v. Ranlet (2016) 1
Cal.App.5th 363, 375-376 [holding that the defendant’s
statements indicating his sexual interest in his seven-year-old
daughter were no more inflammatory than her testimony
describing the defendant’s abuse].) The trial court’s conclusion
that the probative value of the images as evidence of Schmitt’s
sexual interest in young girls outweighed their prejudicial value
11
was not arbitrary or irrational. We therefore conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
B.
Schmitt next contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing a police witness, Sergeant Flores, to testify
that the six illustrations “depicted obvious computer-generated
images of children engaged in sexual conduct” because the
testimony constituted improper expert or lay opinion about the
age of the characters. We discern no error.
As the People argue, Schmitt forfeited this challenge by
failing to object on these grounds below. Before Flores testified,
Schmitt had argued against the admission of the images
themselves in part on the basis that, in his view, it would be
“pure speculation” to characterize the subjects depicted in them
as “ ‘prepubescent girls’ ” unless expert testimony was introduced
“to confirm that these images depict prepubescent children.”
When the prosecution elicited Flores’s testimony that the images
depicted “children,” defense counsel objected on the ground that
the testimony was speculative, but did not raise any objection
based on improper expert or lay opinion. Schmitt’s failure to
lodge a timely and specific objection that the testimony
constituted improper expert or lay opinion forfeited the objection.
(See People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 709; People v.
Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 475-476.)
In any event, his challenge lacks merit because Flores’s
testimony was not improper lay opinion. Schmitt incorrectly
represents that Flores characterized the illustrations as depicting
“young children”; he did not. Flores merely described the subjects
of the images as “children,” and he offered no opinion as to the
specific age or level of development of any of the subjects.
To be admissible, expert opinion must be “[r]elated to a
subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the
12
opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.” (Evid. Code §
801, subd. (a).) But no expertise is necessary to establish a
person’s age when the question is merely “whether the individual
in question has passed from minority to majority.” (See People v.
Caldwell (1921) 55 Cal. App. 280, 296 (Caldwell).) The
“ ‘outward physical appearance of an alleged minor may be
considered in judging of his age.’ ” (People v. Montalvo (1971) 4
Cal.3d 328, 335 (Montalvo).) Here, Flores’s lay opinion that the
subjects were “children” was proper because it was rationally
based on his own perception of the images and “[h]elpful to a
clear understanding of his testimony.” (Evid. Code, § 800, subds.
(a)-(b).) Flores’s explanation that the images “caught [his]
attention” because they were images of “children engaged in
sexual conduct” helped explain why they were relevant to his
investigation of Doe’s allegations. And they provided context to
help the jury understand Flores’s testimony about the pretextual
telephone call during which defendant spoke about his desire to
“remove everything from the . . . computers.”4
We are unpersuaded by Schmitt’s contention that an expert
on the artistic conventions in “anime” was necessary to determine
whether the images portray “children,” as Flores testified.
Whether or not the artist intended the images to depict
characters who are “almost 1000 years old,” in Schmitt’s words, is
irrelevant here. Flores did not offer specific ages. The images
contain anatomically detailed illustrations of female characters,
4 Schmitt suggests that Flores’s characterization of the
images was unnecessary to provide context about the pretext call
because the court could have permitted a more “general
description” of what Flores perceived. However, Schmitt does not
provide any example of a description more general than what
Flores offered – “images of children engaged in sexual conduct” –
and it is hard to imagine a more general description that would
have sufficiently provided context for Schmitt’s eagerness to
“wipe” the computers.
13
and there is no reason why a lay person is incompetent to form
an opinion about whether the females depicted are “children”
based on their “ ‘outward physical appearance.’ ” (Montalvo,
supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 335, italics omitted.)
Schmitt asserts that “the age of an image of a person is
subject to expert opinion,” citing People v. Kurey (2001) 88
Cal.App.4th 840, 847 (Kurey). But Kurey held that expert
testimony on the age of actors in a film was properly admitted in
that case because the experts testified “regarding developmental
factors beyond the normal experience and knowledge of the
average fact finder.” (Id. at p. 847.) Here, Flores did not testify
to any age-related factors beyond a lay person’s expertise.
Further, Kurey did not hold that expert testimony was always
necessary where the question is the age of persons depicted in an
image. Although expert testimony as to whether a subject is an
adult or a child may be appropriate in borderline cases, this is not
a close case. (See Caldwell, supra, 55 Cal.App. at p. 296; see also
Montalvo, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 335.)
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the challenged testimony.
C.
Schmitt challenges the trial court’s decision to admit expert
evidence concerning the behavior of children who have been
sexually abused. We affirm.
1.
At trial, Dr. Anderson, the prosecution’s expert on child
sexual abuse, explained that “Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome” (CSAAS) is a term that was coined in
1983 to describe a set of patterns and behaviors observed in
treating children who had been sexually abused. CSAAS is not a
tool that can be used to diagnose whether a particular child has
been sexually abused. Instead, it is an educational tool “to . . .
14
help people better understand how children might react when
they’ve been sexually abused,” because “a lot of the behaviors
that [sexually abused] children demonstrate . . . are usually
counterintuitive to what . . . adults would expect.” Dr. Anderson
had not reviewed the facts of Doe’s case and did not offer any
opinion about whether Doe had been sexually abused or not.
CSAAS involves five sets of behaviors: secrecy;
helplessness; entrapment and accommodation; delayed,
conflicted, and unconvincing disclosure; and retraction. With
respect to secrecy, Dr. Anderson testified that a child may feel
compelled to keep sexual abuse a secret for many reasons,
including the unequal power dynamic between the child and the
abuser, the child’s close relationship with the abuser, threats by
the abuser, or fear of upsetting other family members. As for
helplessness, Dr. Anderson explained that children “are quite
likely to feel helpless to . . . stop what is happening to them,” not
only because children are smaller and more vulnerable, but
because the abuser may be responsible for the child’s food,
shelter, family stability, or love. Rather than fight back against
the abuse, children may freeze during the abuse and feel like
they are physically unable to move. With respect to entrapment
and accommodation, Dr. Anderson testified that although the
child may feel trapped, they may nonetheless take steps to cope
with the abuse, whether it’s trying to lock their bedroom door,
wearing extra layers of clothing, or dissociating or blanking out
while the abuse is happening. Further, a child who copes by
disassociating during the abuse may have trouble “accurately
remember[ing] precise details.” With respect to disclosure, Dr.
Anderson explained that it is “quite common” for children to
delay—whether by weeks, months, or years—disclosing that they
have been sexually abused. In addition, when children do
disclose abuse, adults may find their account unconvincing
because children “oftentimes” display “neutral emotion” when
disclosing abuse. In addition, children may also engage in
15
piecemeal or incremental disclosure, in which they share some
details but then “take a step back from” disclosing because of
adults’ reactions to their disclosure. Finally, with respect to
retraction, Dr. Anderson explained that “some children” may
retract their allegations or a particular detail after they have
disclosed abuse, particularly “when the child does not like the
reaction” to the disclosure, as when a parent has a strong
emotional reaction.
According to Dr. Anderson, “[w]e know that these behaviors
can exist among children” who have been sexually abused, but
not all children will exhibit all five categories of behavior; some
may only display one or two. She testified that “for the most part
it is quite common that I see at least a few of these behaviors
among the children who I work with.” A child who has been
abused “may or may not respond with any of these five
behaviors.” Further, children who have not been abused, such as
those with emotional issues or behavioral dysregulation, may also
display these behaviors.
At the conclusion of Dr. Anderson’s testimony, the trial
court instructed the jury that her “testimony about child sexual
abuse syndrome is not evidence the defendant committed any of
the crimes charged against him. You may consider this evidence
only in deciding whether or not Jane Doe’s conduct was not
inconsistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested
in evaluating the believability of her testimony.”
2.
Schmitt contends that the child abuse accommodation
syndrome evidence is not sufficiently reliable under People v.
Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 (Kelly), but we disagree that the Kelly
test is applicable here.
Kelly held that a “new and emerging technique” used to
identify a person’s voice—“ ‘voiceprint’ ” technology—was
16
inadmissible absent a threshold finding that the technology had
“achieved that degree of general scientific acceptance as a reliable
identification device which will permit the introduction of
voiceprint evidence” in California courts. (Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d
at pp. 27-28, 30-31.) In Kelly, the defendant was convicted of
extortion based on making anonymous phone calls recorded by
the police, and voiceprint evidence was used at trial to establish
that the defendant was the caller. (Id. at p. 28.) Our Supreme
Court held that because the prosecution had failed to establish
that voiceprint technology had gained general acceptance in the
scientific community, the evidence was not admissible for
purposes of identifying the defendant’s voice. (Id. at pp. 32, 40-
41.)
The Kelly test applies to situations in which the
prosecution seeks to rely on “a novel method of proof.” (See Kelly,
supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30; see also People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d
1136, 1156 (Stoll) [explaining that the Kelly test applies where a
new “technique or procedure appears in both name and
description to provide some definitive truth which the expert
need only accurately recognize and relay to the jury”].) Here, not
only is CSAAS not novel, but the evidence was not admitted or
used in this case as a method of proving any “definitive truth”
(Stoll, at p. 1156); instead the evidence was admitted to educate
the jury on misconceptions about the expected behavior of child
abuse victims.5 Accordingly, the Kelly test is not applicable
where, as here, the CSAAS evidence is introduced to assist the
5 For this reason, we reject Schmitt’s contention that
CSAAS evidence is “self-fulfilling” in that regardless of how the
child behaves, it “is somehow indicative that the child has been
sexually abused, or, alternatively, that the child has not been
sexually abused.” As reflected in the trial court’s instruction to
the jury and the prosecution’s closing argument, the CSAAS
argument was not admitted for the purpose of diagnosing
whether or not Doe had in fact been abused.
17
jury in evaluating the victim’s credibility, and the expert’s
opinion was based on her clinical experiences and review of the
professional literature. (See Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at
p. 173; People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 473 (Munch).)
Such testimony need only “meet[] ‘traditional standards for
competent expert opinion, without . . . additional screening
procedures’ [under Kelly.]’ ” (Munch, at p. 473; see also, e.g.,
People v. Harlan (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 439, 448-449.)
Consistent with this approach, our Supreme Court held in
People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236 (Bledsoe) that even though
analogous rape trauma syndrome evidence failed the Kelly test
for reliability as a scientific method of diagnosing whether a
particular individual was raped, evidence about the syndrome
was nonetheless admissible to dispel misconceptions about rape
victims’ behavior.6 (See Bledsoe, at p. 251; see also People v.
Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 905 (Brown).) Relying on Bledsoe,
People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289 (McAlpin) recognized
that expert testimony on common reactions of sexually abused
children is admissible “ ‘to disabuse jurors of commonly held
misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the
emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-
impeaching behavior,’ ” although such evidence is not admissible
to prove that an alleged victim has been sexually abused.
(McAlpin, at pp. 1300-1301.) It is now well established in
California courts that evidence about the behaviors observed in
child abuse victims is relevant and admissible to help the jury
evaluate the alleged victim’s credibility, even if such evidence
does not qualify as reliable under Kelly as a method for
6 Stoll later explained that Bledsoe assumed without
deciding that the Kelly test applied to rape trauma syndrome
evidence, because the parties did not dispute the application of
Kelly. (See Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1161.) Bledsoe never held
that the Kelly test applied to the rape trauma syndrome evidence
at issue there. (Stoll, at p. 1161.)
18
determining whether a child has suffered sexual abuse. (See
People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 391; see also Brown,
at p. 906; McAlpin, at pp. 1300-1301; Lapenias, supra, 67
Cal.App.5th at p. 171; Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 468-
470, 472-473.) Further, notwithstanding Schmitt’s citation to
out-of-state cases questioning the validity of CSAAS evidence, as
Schmitt acknowledges, such evidence is admissible in at least
“forty states and the District of Columbia.” (See, e.g., Munch, at
pp. 471-472; see also McAlpin, at p. 1301; compare, e.g., State v.
J.L.G. (2018) 234 N.J. 265, 271-272 (J.L.G.) [rejecting the
admission of CSAAS evidence in New Jersey courts], with
Munch, at pp. 470-471 [criticizing the reasoning of J.L.G.].)
3.
Schmitt next contends the CSAAS evidence was not
relevant, either to dispel misconceptions about the behavior of
child victims of sexual abuse or to explain how Doe behaved. We
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence.
First, to the extent Schmitt asserts that CSAAS evidence is
no longer necessary because “attitudes and beliefs about child
sexual abuse have changed,” that contention fails because
Schmitt points to no evidence in the trial record supporting such
a conclusion. (See Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 172-
173.)
Second, the CSAAS evidence was relevant because the jury
could have reasonably concluded that Doe had displayed several
of the component behaviors: secrecy, helplessness, delayed and
piecemeal disclosure, and retraction.
The record contains evidence that Doe initially felt
compelled to keep the abuse a secret. For example, Doe told the
forensic interviewer: “I didn't wanna tell because I was too afraid
and scared.” She explained that she was “scared” about the
19
consequences of disclosing the abuse and she was concerned her
family members would fight over it. Consistent with Doe’s
account, Ruth testified that when Doe first told her about the
abuse, Doe said “please don't be mad” and asked her to
“ ‘[p]romise not to tell anybody.’ ”
Dr. Anderson’s testimony on helplessness was also relevant
in light of the evidence that Doe did not resist during the assault.
Even though Doe felt like Schmitt was “torturing” her and “it felt
disgusting,” she explained in the forensic interview: “I didn't tell
him to stop because . . . I thought he was having a great time.”
Schmitt concedes that Doe’s disclosure was delayed because
she did not immediately disclose the abuse. Doe’s disclosures
were also arguably piecemeal: when she spoke with Ruth, Janice,
and Mar, when she participated in the forensic interview, and
when she testified at trial, she shared accounts with varying
levels of detail about the abuse, some of which Schmitt argues
were inconsistent.
Schmitt argues that there is no evidence that Doe ever
recanted her allegations that Schmitt abused her. But as Dr.
Anderson’s testimony reflected, a retraction need not be
complete. Some victims of child abuse may partially recant based
on the responses of those around them: “a child may share a
detail and then later say oh no, that didn't happen.” Here, Doe
shared with the forensic interviewer that Schmitt had anally
penetrated her with his fingers, but later denied that in her trial
testimony. The record also contains evidence, for example, that
Doe had previously seen her mother crying when she was
recounting the abuse.
We disagree with Schmitt’s contention that there was no
need to rehabilitate Doe’s credibility because there was no
evidence that she acted inconsistently with having been abused.
Doe sought to keep the abuse a secret, did not immediately report
the abuse, did not resist during the assault, did not share
20
identical accounts each time she made a disclosure, and retracted
a key allegation. For example, in closing arguments, the
prosecution addressed Doe’s testimony that Schmitt did not touch
her anus by suggesting that “maybe she’s changing her testimony
based on a reaction from a family member,” specifically
referencing Mar’s emotional reaction to hearing Doe recount the
abuse. Schmitt, in turn, relied on the inconsistencies in Doe’s
accounts to argue that she had told “lies.” He argued to the jury
that “[t]he result of that [forensic] interview was a hideous tale
that is so completely inconsistent with what was said before that
it simply cannot be true.” Schmitt emphasized that “Jane’s
initial reporting to at least three other people was various
versions of Brian playing with her and trying to touch her over
the underwear . . . but now all of the sudden she's saying this
other stuff.” And Schmitt told the jury: “You heard from Jane.
You heard significantly changed testimony and lack of memory in
which you can only conclude that there is reasonable doubt as to
what actually happened. You heard a bunch of allegations
completely inconsistent and contradictory, a general complaint of
molestation unsupported by other evidence and in contradiction
with each recounting.” In sum, because Doe’s “credibility [wa]s
placed in issue due to [her] paradoxical behavior,” the CSAAS
evidence was relevant here. (See People v. Patino (1994) 26
Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744-1745.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
JACKSON, P. J.
CHOU, J.
P. v. Schmitt (A170547)
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