People v. Fields CA2/2

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Filed 6/23/25 P. v. Fields CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B334366

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA055358)
v.

RICHARD MARKEITH
FIELDS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Sean D. Coen, Judge. Vacated and remanded.

Tanya Dellaca, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Sophia A. Lecky, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Richard Markeith Fields
(defendant) appeals the trial court order declining to take action
after the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) identified defendant as a person serving
an invalid sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75.1
Defendant contends the trial court was required to recall his
sentence and conduct a full resentencing under current law. We
agree and vacate the trial court’s order and remand the matter
for recall and resentencing under current law in accordance with
section 1172.75.

BACKGROUND
In 2000, a jury convicted defendant of second degree
robbery. (§ 211.) Following a court trial, defendant was found to
have served one prior prison term within the meaning of section
667.5, subdivision (b), and sustained two prior convictions within
the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),
1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), as well as two prior serious felony
convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1)
(recidivist enhancement). The trial court granted the prosecution
motion to strike one of the two recidivist enhancements and
denied defendant’s motion to strike his prior convictions. The
court then sentenced defendant to a total term of 30 years to life
in prison, comprised of a third-strike term of 25 years to life, plus
one 5-year recidivist enhancement. The court stayed the one-
year prior prison term enhancement. The judgment was affirmed
in People v. Fields (July 25, 2001, B143887) (nonpub. opn.).

1 All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.

2
On December 22, 2022, the CDCR informed the trial court
defendant’s sentence qualified for resentencing under section
1172.75. On December 23, 2022, without the presence of
defendant or counsel, the trial court issued a minute order as
follows: “The defendant has been identified as an individual who
has received an invalid sentencing enhancement pursuant to
Penal Code section 1172.75(a). [¶] Pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.75(c) the court has reviewed the file and determined
that the defendant is not eligible for resentencing under this
section due to the fact that the invalid enhancement was stayed
and does not add additional custody time to defendant’s sentence.
[¶] No action is taken in this matter.”
We granted defendant’s motion to file a late notice of
appeal and to appoint counsel, directed the trial court to file
defendant’s notice of appeal, and directed the California
Appellate Project to assign counsel to represent defendant in any
further appellate proceedings. Defendant filed a notice of appeal
within the time allowed.

DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in summarily
declining to take action on the CDCR’s recommendation to recall
his sentence due to an invalid enhancement and in finding that
he was ineligible for resentencing because the enhancement was
stayed. The People disagree. The issue in this appeal is thus
whether section 1172.75 precludes recall and full resentencing on
the ground defendant’s prior prison term enhancement under
section 667.5, former subdivision (b) had been imposed and
stayed.

3
When defendant was sentenced in 2000, section 667.5,
former subdivision (b) required the imposition of a one-year
enhancement for each finding of a separate prior prison or county
jail term served by the defendant, unless the defendant had
remained free of custody for at least five years. (People v.
Renteria (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1276, 1282 (Renteria).) Effective
January 1, 2020, the Legislature amended the statute to impose
a one-year enhancement only for each prior term served for a
conviction of a sexually violent offense. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.)
Two years later, the Legislature added section 1171.1 making the
change retroactive, declaring that “[a]ny sentence enhancement
that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement
imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is
legally invalid.” (Former § 1171.1, subd. (a), added by Stats.
2021, ch. 728, § 3, now § 1172.75 subd. (a).)2
Section 1172.75, subdivision (b) requires the Secretary of
the CDCR to identify to the sentencing court any person in
custody “currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an
enhancement described in subdivision (a).” Under section
1172.75, subdivision (c), if the sentencing court finds the
judgment includes a now-invalid prior prison term enhancement,
“the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the
defendant.” Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1) further provides
that resentencing “shall result in a lesser sentence than the one
originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed
enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing

2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1171.1 was renumbered
1172.75. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.)

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evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public
safety.” In no event shall resentencing “result in a longer
sentence than the one originally imposed.” (Ibid.)
The court minutes of the sentencing hearing state: “As to
count 1, defendant is sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison
pursuant to 1170.12 (a) through (d) and 667(b) through (i) of the
Penal Code. Additionally, the defendant is sentenced to 5 years
pursuant to 667(a)(1) of the Penal Code. [¶] Total time in state
prison is 30 years to life. [¶] The 1-year 667.5(b) PC
enhancement is stayed.”3
There is a conflict in the Courts of Appeal regarding
whether section 1172.75 permits resentencing for defendants
whose judgments include stayed prior prison term enhancements
under section 667.5, former subdivision (b). The issue is pending
before the California Supreme Court in People v. Rhodius (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 38, 44, review granted February 12, 2024,
S283169 (Rhodius), the only published opinion that holds the
defendant would not be eligible for recall and resentencing due to
an invalid but stayed enhancement, and upon which the People
rely. On the other side, in the majority of published opinions,
appellate courts take the opposite view, holding that section
1172.75 applies to invalid enhancements that were stayed or
stricken by the sentencing court. (See People v. Espino (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 188, 194–198, review granted Oct. 23, 2024,
S286987; People v. Mayberry (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 665, 674–
676, review granted Aug. 14, 2024, S285853; People v. Saldana

3 We quote the minutes of the sentencing hearing because
much of the 2000 trial record, including the reporter’s transcript,
is unavailable and the clerk’s transcript does not include the
abstract of judgment.

5
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1276–1279, review granted Mar. 12,
2024, S283547 (Saldana); People v. Christianson (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 300, 311–316, review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189
(Christianson); Renteria, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1282–
1283.)
As the People acknowledge “it is important to understand
that the word ‘impose’ applies to enhancements that are ‘imposed
and then executed’ as well as those that are ‘imposed and then
stayed. However, as a practical matter, the word “impose” is
often employed as shorthand to refer to the first situation, while
the word “stay” often refers to the latter.’” (People v. Gonzalez
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1125.) The context in which the terms
are used must be examined. (Id. at p. 1126 [considering the
terms in relation to § 12022.53, subd. (f)].) Although the statute
the court was construing was section 12022.53, subdivision (f),
the People argue Gonzalez as holding the word “imposed” used by
itself necessarily means imposed and executed, not imposed and
stayed.
The People rely on Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at page
44, review granted, where that court concluded “[i]n order to
harmonize section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1)’s [lesser-sentence]
requirement with section 1172.75[,] subdivision (a), the meaning
of ‘impose’ must be interpreted to mean ‘imposed and executed.’”
The Rhodius court reasoned defendants with stayed prior prison
term enhancements are not entitled to recall and resentencing
under the statute as “[s]ection 1172.75[,] subdivision (d)(1)’s
requirement that the resentencing shall result in a lesser
sentence than the one originally imposed necessitates the
conclusion that the repealed enhancement increased the length of
the sentence. The only way for the repealed enhancement to

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have increased the length of a sentence is for the enhancement to
have been imposed and executed. If the repealed enhancement
was imposed and stayed, the sentence would not have been
increased, as was the case here. To interpret ‘imposed’ as used in
section 1172.75, subdivision (a), to include when a sentence was
‘imposed and stayed’ would require any sentencing court faced
with an ‘imposed and stayed’ enhancement to arbitrarily lower a
sentence simply because the judgment contained a stayed
enhancement.” (Rhodius, supra, at pp. 43–44.) The court also
concluded, “[a]n inmate whose sentence was imposed and stayed
is not actually serving any time based on a repealed statute . . . .”
(Id. at p. 47.)
We respectfully disagree and join the majority of appellate
courts that have reached conclusions contrary to Rhodius. When
prior prison term enhancements are included in the judgment
and stayed, the enhancements have been imposed and stayed.
(See Renteria, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 1282 [included in the
abstract of judgment].) As noted in Saldana, “The presence of a
stayed term or enhancement is not without significance; it is part
of the sentence and remains available if its execution becomes
necessary and proper for any legally sanctioned reason.”
(Saldana, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1278, review granted.)
“‘Thus, a stayed sentence enhancement remains as part of the
judgment and continues to carry the potential for an increased
sentence in certain circumstances, and removal of the stayed
enhancement does provide some relief to the defendant by
eliminating that potential.’” (Ibid., quoting Christianson, supra,
97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312, review granted.)
As the Christianson court explained: “Section 1172.75
requires the CDCR to identify all inmates ‘currently serving a

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term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in
subdivision (a).’ (§ 1172.75, subd. (b), italics added.) A judgment
may include a sentence that has been imposed but suspended or
stayed. [Citations.] Thus, by its plain language, all that is
required for the CDCR to identify an inmate under section
1172.75, subdivision (b) is for the enhancement to be included in
the abstract of judgment, regardless of whether it is imposed or
stayed.”4 (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 311–312,
review granted.)
In sum, “the Legislature chose to mandate a full
resentencing for those individuals impacted by a now invalid
section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement. [There is] no reason
to differentiate between defendants serving an additional term
based specifically on a now invalid enhancement[] and those for
whom the enhancement was imposed but stayed. In both
instances, the presence of the enhancement was one component
considered by the sentencing court in pronouncing the overall
sentence.” (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 315, review
granted.)

4 Although a copy of the abstract of judgment in this case is
not in the record on appeal, the minute order of the sentencing
hearing states: “The 1-year 667.5(b) PC enhancement is stayed.”
Further, section 1172.75, subdivision (b) requires the Secretary of
the CDCR to identify to the sentencing court any person in
custody “currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an
enhancement described in subdivision (a).” When the trial court
received the CDCR notification that defendant’s sentence
qualified for resentencing under section 1172.75, the trial court
found the judgment included an invalid enhancement. We
surmise the CDCR identified defendant from its copy of the
abstract of judgment.

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We agree and conclude, unless a sentencing court strikes
the enhancement altogether at the time of the original
sentencing, it remains “imposed” for purposes of relief under
section 1172.75.

DISPOSITION
The order of December 23, 2022, declining recall and
resentencing is vacated, and the case is remanded for recall of the
sentence and full resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section
1172.75. We express no view how the superior court should
exercise its sentencing discretion upon remand.

CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

LUI, P. J.

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

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