People v. McRoberts CA3

CourtListener 10614439Calctapp20 de jun. de 2025

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Filed 6/20/25 P. v. McRoberts CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Tehama)
----

THE PEOPLE, C100951

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. C159446)

v.

DANIEL McROBERTS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant Daniel McRoberts, a sexually violent predator (SVP), challenges certain
terms of his conditional release from civil commitment. In the span of three pages, and
with almost no citation to relevant authority, he contends several of the terms are invalid.
Because McRoberts fails to meet his burden of demonstrating error, we affirm the order
overruling his objections. Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
McRoberts committed various sex offenses within a six-year period. (People v.
McRoberts (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1252.) In 1998, he “walked up to a nine-year-
old girl on a playground, made a sexual remark, and penetrated her vagina with his
finger.” (Ibid.) In 1999, he “walked up to a 14-year-old girl . . . he found attractive and
brushed against her buttocks and vaginal area.” (Ibid.) Later that year, he was “riding
his bicycle . . . when he saw a 13-year-old girl standing near a soda machine on school
grounds.” (Ibid.) “He approached her and told her she was pretty[] and then reached
inside her shirt to fondle her breast.” (Ibid.) In 2004, two months after his release on
parole for his last offense, he “was driving down the street and pulled up to a woman and
her young child. As he purported to ask for directions, the woman noticed that he was
masturbating. Making a vague threat about kidnapping the child, he drove off, still
masturbating.” (Ibid.) Ten days after his release from jail for indecent exposure, he
“drove up to an 11-year-old girl who had just gotten off the school bus near her driveway.
He got out of the car and offered her money for her underwear. When she retreated into
her yard, he grabbed her hand.” (Ibid.)
In November 2008, McRoberts was adjudicated an SVP under the Sexually
Violent Predator Act (§ 6600 et seq.; the SVPA) and committed to the custody of the
State Department of State Hospitals (the department). (People v. McRoberts (Feb. 25,
2015) [nonpub. opn.].) In 2017, he was conditionally released to a forensic conditional
release program managed by Liberty Healthcare.1 About two years later, he was
recommitted to the department’s custody after violating the terms of his release, including
having sexual contact in a community college library.

1 Liberty Healthcare is a for-profit company that contracts with the department to provide
supervision and treatment services for SVPs conditionally released into the community.

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In January 2022, McRoberts was again conditionally released. During this second
release, he failed to promptly report contact with a potential minor during a community
college class. He also had significant medical issues that required hospitalization.
During the hospitalization, he made an inappropriate sexual comment to an attending
female nurse. And he refused to sign a release of information that Liberty Healthcare
claimed interfered with its ability to assist in coordinating his aftercare services. After his
release from the hospital, he became increasingly uncooperative with Liberty Healthcare
supervisory staff. His medical issues delayed some community reintegration efforts like
employment and caused him to miss some individual and group treatments.
In February 2023, Liberty Healthcare requested revocation of McRoberts’s
outpatient status after he continued to demonstrate “an escalating pattern [of] significant
risk relevant behaviors, lack of compliance with his terms and conditions, and
problematic amenability to treatment and comportment of risk related behaviors.”
According to Liberty Healthcare, McRoberts’s risk relevant behaviors included
hypersexuality and sexualizing relationships, and his ongoing risk factors included
“impulsive acts, negative emotionality/hostility, sex drive/preoccupation, sex as coping,
deviant sexual interests, and cooperation with supervision.” During polygraph testing, it
was discovered that he (1) had engaged in multiple incidents of nonconsensual sexual
behavior while on the phone with an adult female; (2) was masturbating to videos of
topless women, (3) was using the women featured in ads from the mail and college flyers
for masturbation; (4) thought about attractive women he saw on television and in stores
and some nurses when he masturbated; and (5) watched high school beach volleyball on
television and “thought about how sexy they were.” In violation of his release terms, he
did not properly disclose these incidents. He also used an electric bike without approval,
traveled to inherently risky areas, and did not report this travel in his daily log. Liberty
Healthcare considered the bike incident a reflection of poor judgment.

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Overall, Liberty Healthcare concluded that his increase in sexual activity and lack
of adherence to reporting requirements reflected an increase in risk relevant and
dysregulated sexual behavior. Coupled with his impulsive acts, McRoberts was creating
a heightened situation of risk that was difficult to manage. After considering this report,
the court remanded McRoberts to the department’s custody. (Pen. Code, § 1610.)
Seven months into that recommitment, McRoberts made some effort in identifying
risky situations and potential risk factors, but his level of awareness remained
underdeveloped. Also, his identification of strategies to effectively manage those risks in
the community, while adhering to his release terms, was limited. A polygraph reflected
his significant reactions to questions about transparency in his journaling of sexual
thoughts and fantasies. Those reactions showed his ongoing difficulty with transparency
in treatment and meaningful engagement in developing risk management strategies.
A few months later, Liberty Healthcare determined McRoberts was again suitable
for conditional release after determining he had made progress in his journaling efforts
and in identifying strategies to manage his risks. But Liberty Healthcare also stated that
McRoberts would need to sign new terms individualized to him and that his success in
outpatient treatment would weigh heavily on his compliance with those terms.
In February 2024, the court ordered McRoberts conditionally released for
outpatient treatment. The order incorporated 49 terms that McRoberts initialed and
signed, including the following: (1) McRoberts must comply with and actively
participate in all treatment requirements and directives communicated by the program
director (term 1); (2) McRoberts authorizes the release of confidential health information
to the program director and other individuals or entities with information about his
medical care or community integration (term 4); (3) any visitors to McRoberts’s
residence must be approved by the program director (term 7); (4) McRoberts will not use
any legal medication, including any over-the counter medication without first discussing
such usage with his designated physician and the program director (term 16);

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(5) McRoberts will not smoke cigarettes, cigars, electronic cigarettes, vape, or use any
other tobacco product (term 17); (6) McRoberts will comply with his prescribed medical
treatment and medication when ordered by a licensed physician (term 20); (7) McRoberts
will not possess firearms, ammunition, hunting knives, swords, spears, bondage devices,
or other objects that could be reasonably used as a weapon (term 26); (8) McRoberts will
not operate, purchase, or possess a motor vehicle without written authorization by the
program director (term 32); (9) McRoberts will not possess a camera or any video or
camera equipment without prior approval of the program director (term 33); and
(10) McRoberts will consult with and obtain written authorization from the program
director before making any major life decision (term 40).
In March 2024, McRoberts objected to 12 of the 49 terms. He also objected to a
Liberty Healthcare document entitled “Initial Client Orientation and Agreement” (the
initial agreement). Among other provisions, the initial agreement prohibits McRoberts
from communicating with the media, contacting anyone without approval, and accessing
the Internet without approval. McRoberts claimed that the initial agreement improperly
imposed additional terms and conditions on his release without court approval. He also
challenged the substance of certain of those terms and conditions.
At a hearing on the objections, the program director for Liberty Healthcare
testified in support of the challenged terms. She testified that conditional release is the
final module of treatment in which the individual applies what he’s learned in the hospital
to the new stressors he encounters in the community. The goal of this final module is risk
management, integration in the community, and ultimately reaching readiness for
unconditional release. When people first come out of the commitment environment, she
explained, they are on an “intensive level of supervision or treatment” and are “gradually
reintegrate[d] into the community” with the ultimate goal of independence. That
integration is overseen by a “treatment team and representatives from the legal parties” to
determine where the individual is in terms of managing the risks that increase the

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likelihood of reoffending. Medical issues can increase those risks “because of stress,
because of pain, [and] because of a number of different things.” She reminded the court
this was McRoberts’s “third time out in the community” and explained that he had a
“difficult time transitioning into the community” partly due to the acquisition of
privileges too quickly and his inability to manage those privileges.
The trial court overruled McRoberts’s objections. In its view, the SVPA gave
Liberty Healthcare broad discretion to design rules and regulations to achieve the aims of
conditional release and to protect the public. And for each term to which McRoberts
objected, justification was provided. Also, term 1 allowed Liberty Healthcare to require
compliance with the initial agreement.
McRoberts appeals. His appeal is limited to terms 4, 7, 16, 17, 20, 26, 32, 33, and
40 and the entirety of the initial agreement.
DISCUSSION
The SVPA provides for the involuntary civil commitment of certain convicted sex
offenders. (Price v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1210, 1213 (Price).) To be
so committed, a judge or unanimous jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
person: (1) has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims;
and (2) has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and
safety of others in that it is likely he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal
behavior. (Id. at p. 1214; §§ 6604, 6600, subd. (a).) If that finding is made, the court
must order the person committed to the department “for an intermediate term . . . for
appropriate treatment and confinement in a secure facility.” (§ 6604.)
The SVPA was not designed to be punitive. (Price, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1214.) “Instead, it was ‘designed “ ‘to provide “treatment” to mentally disordered
individuals who cannot control sexually violent criminal behavior’ ” and to keep them
confined until they no longer pose a threat to the public.’ ” (Ibid.) To that end, a person
committed under the SVPA must have a current examination of his or her mental health

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condition at least once per year. (§ 6604.9, subd. (a).) That examination must consider
whether conditional release to a less restrictive alternative is in the best interest of the
person and “conditions can be imposed that would adequately protect the community.”
(§ 6604.9, subd. (b).)
If the court determines that the committed person would not be a danger to others
due to the committed person’s diagnosed mental disorder while under the supervision and
treatment in the community, the court must order the committed person placed with an
appropriate forensic conditional release program operated by the state for one year.
(§ 6608, subd. (g).) After that year, the committed person may petition the court for
unconditional discharge. (§ 6608, subd. (m).) The terms of conditional release must “be
drafted to include reasonable flexibility to achieve the aims of conditional release, and to
protect the public and the conditionally released person.” (§ 6608.8, subd. (b).) A trial
court may approve, modify, or reject the proposed terms if it finds they are not
appropriate. (§ 6609.1, subd. (c).) The department generally cannot alter the terms
without court approval. (§ 6608.8, subd. (d)(1).)
The parties agree that SVP conditional release terms are subject to an abuse of
discretion standard. But they disagree on how to apply that standard. McRoberts
contends we should import the test articulated in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 that
applies to probation and parole conditions, while the People contend we should affirm a
term or condition unless the trial court’s approval was “arbitrary or capricious or
otherwise outside the bounds of reason.” We do not resolve this debate because
McRoberts fails to meet his affirmative burden to show error. (People v. Mosqueda
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 399, 405.)
I
Term 4
Under term 4, McRoberts authorizes the program director and individuals and
entities with relevant information about his medical care or community reintegration to

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discuss and receive confidential health information as necessary to monitor his
performance in the community. McRoberts objects, claiming there was no evidence his
health condition played any role in his crimes. McRoberts is mistaken. In enacting the
SVPA, the Legislature expressed “ ‘concern over a select group of criminal offenders
who are extremely dangerous as the result of mental impairment.’ ” (Needham v.
Superior Court (2024) 16 Cal.5th 333, 350.) McRoberts was committed after a jury
found beyond a reasonable doubt that he has a diagnosed mental disorder and is likely to
engage in sexually violent criminal behavior. Thus, his mental health was integral to his
commitment and is equally integral to his conditional release from that commitment.
Citing a single case that considered whether a conservator could withhold
treatment from a conscious conservatee (Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th
519, 523), McRoberts also contends this term interferes with his right to make
fundamental medical decisions and his right to privacy regarding his medical
information. This contention is not adequately developed in at least three ways.
First, McRoberts does not explain how term 4, which relates to information-
sharing, impacts his decision-making rights.
Second, he does not cite or analyze any case law regarding the right to privacy of
medical information although abundant case law exists. (See Hill v. National Collegiate
Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 36-38 [establishing framework for privacy interest in
medical information].)
And third, he does not address the program director’s testimony as to the
connection between an SVP’s physical health and that person’s risk or the evidence in the
record demonstrating a connection between his hospitalization and his last conditional
release. Because of his deficient analysis, we consider his contentions forfeited and see
no reason to disturb this term. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779,
784-785.)

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II
Term 7
Term 7 requires McRoberts to obtain program director approval for visitors to his
residence. McRoberts contends this term is invalid because there is no evidence that any
of his crimes were committed in his home. McRoberts’s focus on his crimes is
misplaced. The relevant issue is whether this is a valid term of his release from civil
commitment as an SVP. The only other contention McRoberts makes regarding this term
is that (1) it is overbroad because it does not allow family members to visit him and (2) it
gives unbridled authority to the director to veto visitors without any standard. McRoberts
cites no authority in support of these contentions. He broadly asserts that “[c]ases
discussing terms and conditions of probation and parole . . . provide a close enough fit” to
be of assistance, but he does not cite a single case in the probation or parole context that
concerns regulation of home visitors or delegation to the probation or parole officer. For
this reason, McRoberts’s contentions are deficient and forfeited. (WFG National Title
Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894 [we may disregard
conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority]; Paglia &
Associates Construction, Inc. v. Hamilton (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 318, 327 [“[i]t would be
unfair for one side to loft an undeveloped legal idea, to rely on the court to work it out,
and to leave the opposing party with nothing concrete to tackle in the briefing”].)
III
Term 16
Term 16 prohibits McRoberts from using “any legal medication (with or without a
prescription), including any over-the-counter medication . . . , unless [he has] first
discussed this usage with [his] designated physician and informed [the program
director].” McRoberts contends this term, as applied to over-the-counter medication, is
“overbroad in violation of [his] right to control basic health issues.” But he does not cite
or analyze any relevant authorities in support of that contention. As a result, McRoberts

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does not meet his affirmative burden to show error. (See In re S.C. (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 [to demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal
analysis supported by citations to authority].)
IV
Term 17
Term 17 prohibits McRoberts from vaping, smoking cigarettes, cigars, or
electronic cigarettes, or using any other tobacco product while on conditional release. He
contends smoking has no relation to his crimes or the risk that he will commit a sex
offense in the future. But he does not address the relationship between smoking and the
supervision that is integral to his conditional release. This will be McRoberts’s third
attempt at conditional release in less than a decade. The most recent attempt involved
close supervision by Liberty Healthcare staff, including weekly visits and transportation
to and from errands. Indeed, as to relationship between smoking and the supervision
integral to his conditional release, the People contend the vaping and smoking ban is
necessary to protect those supervising him and to avoid McRoberts’s developing a habit
that he will need to break if he is returned to civil commitment. McRoberts does not
refute this relationship, and he does not substantively discuss this relationship in his reply
brief when brought to his attention by the People. By failing to respond substantively in
the reply brief to the People’s contention on this point, McRoberts impliedly concedes it.
(People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1063; Rudick v. State Bd. of Optometry
(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 90.)
V
Term 20
Term 20 requires McRoberts to comply with his prescribed medical treatment and
medication when ordered by a licensed physician. McRoberts contends this term is
invalid for three reasons. We reject all three.

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First, he contends his medical condition played no role in the commission of the
underlying crimes. McRoberts is mistaken. He ignores the direct connection between his
medical condition and his status as an SVP.
Second, McRoberts repeats his challenge to term 4, contending that term 20 is
“overbroad in violation of [his] due process right to privacy and control over his own
medical decisions,” citing Conservatorship of Wendland, supra, 26 Cal.4th 519. As in
term 4, his contention lacks sufficient development for our review. (WFG National Title
Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 894 [we may disregard
conclusory arguments that are not supported by pertinent legal authority].)
And third, he contends this term prevents him from refusing to take medication
when he has a terminal condition and wishes to end his life. This scenario is not before
us and is too speculative to warrant our review. (See In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th
1484, 1489 [“it is not within the function of the court to act upon or decide . . . a
speculative, theoretical or abstract question or proposition”]; In re G.B. (2018)
24 Cal.App.5th 464, 470 [refusing to consider speculative concern regarding probation
condition].)
VI
Term 26
Term 26 prohibits McRoberts from possessing firearms, ammunition, hunting
knives, swords, spears, bondage devices, or “other objects that could reasonably be used
as a weapon” unless authorized by the program director. McRoberts contends this
condition should be revised to permit him to possess routine household items without
approval. But he does not explain why such revision is necessary. He generally urges us
to follow probation condition cases, but he fails to discuss any of those cases and how
they dealt with similar limitations. (See, e.g., In re Kevin F. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 351,
357 [prohibition on possessing anything that probationer “could use as a weapon”],
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494; In re R.P. (2009)

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176 Cal.App.4th 562, 567-568 [prohibiting possession of any dangerous or deadly
weapon]; People v. Forrest (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1082 [prohibiting possession
of any instrument used as a weapon]; People v. Arevalo (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 652, 658
[we presume officer will not withhold approval for irrational or capricious reasons].)
Appellate rules compel us to disregard McRoberts’ deficient claim. (United Grand Corp.
v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146, 153.)
VII
Term 32
Term 32 prohibits McRoberts from operating, purchasing, or possessing a motor
vehicle without written authorization from the program director. He contends this term
should be amended to allow him to use the tractor that was on the property where he
spent his last conditional release. According to the People, McRoberts improperly
assumes he will be sent to the same property with the same tractor present. McRoberts
does not respond in his reply brief to the People’s contention. We treat his silence as a
concession that his desire to use and his access to the same tractor is too speculative at
this point. (Rudick v. State Bd. of Optometry (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 77, 89-90; In re I.A.,
supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1489.) Also, based on McRoberts’s history of driving or
biking to find his victims and his unauthorized use of an electric bike during his last
release, we find sufficient basis for this restriction.
VIII
Term 33
Term 33 prohibits McRoberts from possessing a camera without the program
director’s approval. McRoberts contends this term is invalid for two reasons: (1) it has
nothing to do with his crimes; and (2) possession of a camera is not criminal conduct or
reasonably related to future criminal conduct given the nature of his crimes. At the
hearing, the People argued this term was necessary to ensure that “if somebody is granted
the approval of taking pictures with their phone or other types of cameras that they’re at a

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place within their treatment to where [] they are able to safely manage this privilege.” It
was also necessary to ensure “we’re not allowing devices that could be used to film
potential victims or to participate in any other type of criminal or offense parallel-type
behavior.” Such “criminal or offense parallel-type behavior” is behavior that mimics the
progress of behavior when [McRoberts] was offending, but it’s not yet reached the point
of offending yet.
The record supports the People’s concern regarding giving McRoberts camera
access without approval. This will be McRoberts’s third attempt at conditional release.
His most recent attempt failed after he engaged in “an escalating pattern of significant
risk relevant behaviors,” involving hypersexuality and impulsivity. In particular, he used
the women featured in ads from the mail and college flyers for masturbation and thought
about attractive women he saw on television and in stores when he masturbated. This
activity raises sufficient concern that McRoberts’s access to a camera should require
approval.
IX
Term 40
Term 40 requires McRoberts to be “transparent with the [program director] . . .
with all fiscal information in disclosing all incomes, purchases, and expenditures.” It also
requires McRoberts to “consult with and obtain written authorization from the [program
director] . . . before making any major life decision including . . . entering into [a]
marriage, divorce, or sexual relationship, [and] purchasing a home.” McRoberts
concedes that it is reasonable to require him to provide notice of these major decisions,
but he insists that the decisions should remain his. McRoberts again fails to meet this
affirmative burden of showing error. Although he generally refers to his constitutional
liberty interest, he does not cite the federal or state constitution or any cases interpreting
similar supervised release restrictions. (WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 894.) He also does not establish or argue that this

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condition cannot have “any valid application,” which is required for his broader facial
challenge to this condition. (People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934, 946; People v.
Kendrick (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 769, 778 [as-applied challenge invites a fact-driven
inquiry].) Thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in overruling McRoberts’
objection to this condition.
X
Initial Agreement
McRoberts objects to the initial agreement claiming, “there is no evidence the trial
court approved” this document. We disagree. The trial court considered the initial
agreement, including McRoberts’s substantive concerns with certain of its provisions,
and approved it at the hearing on his objections.
DISPOSITION
The order overruling McRoberts’s objections is affirmed.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

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