CourtListener 10606797•People v. Arey CA5
Texto completo
Filed 6/17/25 P. v. Arey CA5
Opinion after recalling remittitur and vacating opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F086345/F087163
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Consolidated)
v. (Super. Ct. No. VCF389311A)
STEVEN BRIAN AREY,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEALS from a judgment and order of the Superior Court of Tulare County.
Nathan G. Leedy, Judge.
Janice M. Lagerlof, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and
Henry J. Valle, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant Steven Arey was convicted by a jury of 20 counts of lewd and
lascivious acts on a child under age 14. There were three victims. He appeals from the
judgment of conviction and from the victim restitution order. He challenges his
convictions, one of his fines, and two items of restitution. We agree with him that the
$1,000 fine imposed under Penal Code section 294, subdivision (b), must be stricken, but
we reject all his other claims. We accordingly order the abstract of judgment amended to
reflect the stricken fine and otherwise affirm the judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Arey was charged in an amended information with 20 counts of lewd and
lascivious acts on a child under 14 (Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. (a)). Counts 1 through 18
involved victim M.Y., count 19 involved victim J.S., and count 20 involved victim B.S.
In connection with all counts, the information alleged the crimes involved multiple
victims within the meaning of section 667.61, subdivisions (b) and (e). It also alleged as
to all counts except count 18 that the victims were under the age of 14 years and Arey
had substantial sexual contact with them (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)).
A jury convicted Arey on all counts and found true all special allegations. On
May 26, 2023, Arey was sentenced to consecutive terms of 15 years to life on each count
for a total sentence of 300 years to life. The court also imposed, among other fines and
fees, a $1,000 fine under section 294, subdivision (b). The court set a restitution hearing
date.
Arey filed a notice of appeal from the judgment.
On October 27, 2023, the trial court held the restitution hearing. The court
awarded $853,361.46 in restitution. This included $750,000 in noneconomic damages
under section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(F), split evenly among the three victims;
$12,161.46 in relocation expenses for J.S.; and $91,200 in lost income to M.Y.
Arey appealed from the victim restitution order, and we ordered the two appeals
consolidated.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2.
FACTS
I. Prosecution’s case
There were three victims in this case: M.Y., B.S., and J.S. M.Y., who is male,
was born in 1988 and was 34 at the time of trial. He has an older sister, B.S., who was
born in 1987 and was 36 at the time of trial. B.S. is married and thus now has a different
last name than M.Y. J.S., who is female, was born in 1986 and was 36 at the time of
trial; J.S. is not biologically related to M.Y. and B.S.2
A. M.Y.’s testimony
M.Y. has two older, biological siblings, B.S. and Tiffany. He also has a younger
adopted sister and four stepsiblings. His mother is Debi. He lived with his mother, his
stepfather, John H., and his three sisters in a house in Tulare. His mother ran a daycare
out of their home. John had four children from a prior marriage—Tyson, Andrew, Jared,
and Andrea—who lived mainly in Porterville with their mother. Jared visited the H.
house often, but the other three rarely visited.
M.Y.’s family, which was referred to during trial as the “H.” family because of his
stepfather’s last name, was very close with the S. family. In the S. family were Kevin
Sr., Lauretta, “Little Kevin,” J.S., and two other girls. Debi, John, Kevin Sr., and
Lauretta were best friends. The two families attended Valley Bible Church in Visalia.
B.S. eventually married Little Kevin.
Arey was friends with Kevin Sr. and Lauretta, and M.Y. met Arey at church
through the S. family. Arey was a member of the church and became increasingly
involved, eventually becoming a youth pastor. At first, Arey primarily spent time with
the S. family, so M.Y. mostly saw Arey only in passing. Eventually, Arey began
2 According to the probation department’s presentence report, Arey was born
November 29, 1970, making him 52 at the time of trial.
3.
spending more time with the H. family. He was at their house “all the time” and helped
with the kids, especially M.Y.
M.Y. was 6 or 7 when he started spending time with Arey. By the time he was 8
or 9, Arey had become a father figure to him.3 M.Y.’s parents were divorced and he did
not enjoy a good relationship with his stepfather; Arey “took [him] under his wing.”
Arey was unmarried, had no children, and worked as a correctional officer.
Arey took M.Y. to movies and bought him things like video games, baseball bats
and gloves, and really “anything [he] needed.” They did lots of activities together,
including playing video games, paintballing, dirt bike riding, and snowboarding. They
would play video games together at Arey’s home. Arey bought M.Y. a dirt bike and,
when M.Y. became interested in snowboarding, his own snowboard. M.Y. estimated that
he and Arey went on a hundred snowboarding trips. Some were day trips, others were
overnight.
Whenever the S. and H. families spent time together, Arey was also there as he
had become part of the “family.” He primarily hung out with the kids at these get-
togethers and often babysat them. M. loved Arey. Arey made him feel “great,” cared
for, and loved.
The first incident of sexual abuse occurred when M.Y. was 8 or 9 years old. M.Y.
and Arey were at Arey’s condominium in Tulare, about a mile away from M.Y.’s house.
M.Y. spent lots of time there. When he was not in school and Arey was not working,
they were usually at Arey’s condo. Arey walked M.Y. back to his bedroom and said he
had something to show him. Arey had M.Y. lie on the bed. Arey lay down next to him
and turned on a pornographic video that M.Y. recalled involved “bondage”—“there was
leather and whips.” M.Y. felt “very uncomfortable” and pulled a blanket over himself.
3 Arey is about 17 years, eleven months older than M.Y.
4.
He had never seen pornography before. Arey asked if the video excited him, and M.Y.
said it did not.
Arey turned off the video and brought out magazines depicting lesbian
pornography. They began looking at the magazines, and M. became erect. Arey went to
get condoms. Arey showed M.Y. how to unwrap and put on a condom. Arey did this by
placing one over his own erect penis, which M.Y. saw. Arey showed M.Y. how to
masturbate and told him it was part of growing up and of being a man. Arey then had
M.Y. go into the bathroom with the magazines and masturbate. It was M.Y.’s first time
masturbating. Arey coached him through the closed bathroom door, and M.Y.
masturbated until he ejaculated into the condom. Arey then came into the bathroom and
told M.Y. to flush the condom down the toilet. He also instructed M.Y. how to clean his
penis with toilet paper. Arey then put the magazines away into a hallway closet, where
they were kept in a black trash bag.
From this first incident until M.Y. was 13, M.Y. could not “even count the number
of times” Arey showed him pornographic magazines, but says it was certainly over
50 times. He was also shown pornographic movies more than 50 times. The two of them
also continued to masturbate together at Arey’s home. Sometimes they would masturbate
together with the magazines and ejaculate into towels. M.Y. watched Arey masturbate
over 50 times, and M.Y. also masturbated in front of Arey over 50 times. M.Y. said he
did not feel he had a choice to refuse to masturbate with Arey, but Arey never threatened
him.
M.Y. recounted one of their snowboarding trips to Kirkwood ski resort, near Lake
Tahoe. M.Y. was about 10 years old. They stayed at Arey’s mother’s house. They went
out to watch a movie, and while on their way back to the house, Arey stopped at a sex
store and said he was going to get something.4 They returned to the house, had dinner,
4 M.Y. gave conflicting accounts whether this store was in Sacramento or Tulare.
5.
and watched a movie with Arey’s mother. They went to bed, and Arey took out a box
containing a sex toy. It was pink and had a simulated vagina on one end and an anus on
the other. A man would insert his penis into either end and use it to masturbate. Arey
said having someone else put their hand on your penis or using something else to
ejaculate produced a different sensation. Arey made M.Y. hold the toy while Arey
thrusted his penis into it until he ejaculated. Arey then went to clean it out and returned
with it. M.Y. then used the toy on himself until he ejaculated, and then went to sleep in
the same bed as Arey. M.Y. did not want to use the toy on Arey. After this incident,
M.Y. became “more fearful” of what Arey would do to him next.
In Tulare County, M.Y. used the sex toy with Arey more than five times on
separate days, and Arey used it with M.Y. more than 30 times on separate days.
Eventually the toy became stretched out and stopped working well, so they began using
their hands to masturbate each other. In Tulare County, M.Y. manually masturbated
Arey more than 20 times on separate days, and Arey masturbated M.Y. more than
20 times on separate days. Sometimes they masturbated each other in the shower.
Many times while driving around in the car together, Arey would reach over and
touch M.Y.’s leg and his penis, and M.Y. would become erect. This happened at least
10 times in Tulare County.
M.Y. said there were at least 20 times where they were sleeping in the same bed
together and Arey pressed his erection into M.Y.’s leg and buttocks. Arey would lie next
to M.Y. with his arm over M.Y., in a “spooning” position. Every time M.Y. was being
spooned in bed, he was afraid of what Arey would do to him.
M.Y. also stated there were times with Arey in a swimming pool when they would
be playing games of “truth or dare.” On “multiple” occasions, Arey dared M.Y. to kiss
his erect penis or buttocks under the water, which M.Y. did. Sometimes others would be
present, primarily B.S. and J.S. These incidents happened when Arey was between 9 and
13.
6.
M.Y. related an incident involving him and J.S. They were either at the S.
family’s house or Arey’s house. They were playing games and having fun, and Arey
wanted to play truth or dare. Arey then wanted to play a game he called “sex.” M.Y.
knew what sex was because of the pornography he had watched with Arey. Arey told
M.Y. to get on top of J.S. and “dry hump her” while he watched. M.Y. and J.S. were
clothed and on top of an air mattress. The game made M.Y. “happy” because it “felt
good,” and he had an erection. The incident lasted 10 to 15 minutes, and the three of
them were the only ones in the room.
M.Y. also recalled a ski trip to Heavenly ski resort in Tahoe with Arey and B.S.
This was the only snowboarding trip B.S. went on with them. They stayed either at a
hotel or the resort lodge. There was only one bed in the room. When it was time to go to
sleep, M.Y. decided to sleep on the outside and have B.S. sleep in the middle because he
did not think Arey would do anything to her. The next morning, B.S. was “mad, upset,”
and “just pissed off,” but M.Y. did not know why. They got off the chairlift at the first
run, and B.S. took her snowboard off, sat down, and would not go down. Arey told M.Y.
to go down so he could talk to B.S. B.S. eventually came down.
M.Y. was also asked about his childhood friend, T.S. They met when M.Y. was
10 or 11. They were best friends and spent all their time together. T.S. went on more
than one snowboarding trip with M.Y. and Arey. M.Y. described a trip to Kirkwood
where the three of them stayed at a hotel with a pool. They played truth or dare in the
pool, and Arey had M.Y. kiss his penis and buttocks. M.Y. does not know if T.S. saw.
Back at the room, the three showered off in their swimsuits. After the shower, the three
snapped each other with towels as part of a game. They also ran around the room, and
Arey was “pantsing” M.Y. and T.S. M.Y. saw T.S.’s penis become exposed. M.Y. said
it was a “happy atmosphere” and they were “joking around.” M.Y. later asked Arey
about T.S.’s penis, and Arey explained that it was an uncircumcised penis. That night,
M.Y. made T.S. sleep in the middle of the bed. M.Y. testified he remembered waking up
7.
and seeing pornography on the television. He closed his eyes and tried going back to
sleep and “not be a part of whatever was happening.” He did not know if “anything else
happened” to T.S. that night.
M.Y. told a detective in 2019 that he was not sure if the pornography incident in
the hotel room happened; he did not know if it was reality or fantasy. He also did not
remember telling the detective in 2019 that the three of them masturbated together in the
hotel room.5
M.Y. had a girlfriend when he was 11 or 12 who he met at church. M.Y. would
“make out” with his girlfriend in the backseat of Arey’s car and touch her breasts while
Arey drove. Arey eventually told M.Y. he did not need to sit in the backseat to do that
with his girlfriend and said they could sit in the front seat. From then on, the two would
sit up front, with M.Y. on the outside and the girlfriend in the middle. M.Y. would make
out with her and touch her breasts.
Arey’s relationship with M.Y. and the H. family ended about M.Y.’s freshman
year of high school, when he was 13 or 14. This was also around the time that Arey had
moved into a house across the street from the H. family.6 Arey continued attending
Valley Bible Church, and so did M.Y. until he started attending a new church to be with
his friends. M.Y. occasionally would see Arey driving his car, but the two would not
even wave at each other. M.Y. lived at the house across the street from Arey until he was
17 or 18.
M.Y. was afraid to tell anyone about what happened between him and Arey
because Arey had promised to “come after” M.Y. or his family if he told anyone. M.Y.
5 The detective testified that M.Y. told him in 2019 that he vividly remembered
Arey putting his mouth on T.S.’s penis. But the detective spoke with T.S. and T.S. said
nothing inappropriate happened between him and Arey.
6 Arey lived in a condominium, then a house, and then the house across the street
from the H. family. Most of the abuse happened at the first house—the house he lived in
after the condominium.
8.
believed the threat because Arey “was the type that would fly off the handle.” Once
while driving to the beach, a man cut Arey off, and “[Arey] just lost it, and he took out
his gun and showed him the gun, and the guy slammed on the brakes and went back.”
Another time, someone threw a strawberry at M.Y. while he walked down the street, and
Arey got his car and chased the person “all round Tulare” with M.Y. in the car.
M.Y. recalled that Arey told him during their relationship that their activities were
“part of growing up and being a man, and this is what men do, and so if [M.Y.] wanted to
be a man, this is what we do.” Arey said it was the same type of relationship he had with
Little Kevin. After M.Y. disclosed his abuse to police, he asked Little Kevin if
something had happened between him and Arey, but Little Kevin was unwilling to talk to
M.Y. M.Y. asked Little Kevin to speak with police but he does not know if Little Kevin
did.
M.Y. never spoke with J.S. about the night Arey had them play the sex game and
never told her about things Arey did to him.
M.Y. got married and became a pastor. The first person M.Y. told about the abuse
was his wife. He told her in 2014 right before they got married. He testified he did not
tell police because he felt confident Arey was not abusing anyone else, and he also said
he was afraid of what might happen to him if Arey found out he reported the abuse to
police. In 2019, while serving as a pastor, a family reported to him their daughter had
been “severely sexually abused.” This impacted him and prompted him to speak with his
wife. He told her he did not want to have another one of his parents die before he was
“able to get this off [his] chest.” His wife suggested he speak with his mother, and he did
so the next day. His mother “almost fell to the ground” when M.Y. told her about the
9.
abuse, and she confronted Arey at his house that day. M.Y. reported the abuse to police
in October 2019.7
M.Y. never told B.S. or J.S. about what he told police, and B.S. and J.S. also have
not discussed with him any of the abuse they suffered. He also never told B.S. to lie
about what happened to get Arey in trouble. M.Y. said he did not want to testify but said
he did “to stand up for myself.”
B. B.S.’s testimony
B.S. met Arey when she was 6 or 7. Arey spent time at the S. and H. homes and
did a lot of fun stuff with the kids, including skateboarding, snowboarding, camping,
fishing, and tubing on his boat. She also saw Arey at church as he was an active member.
She described three instances of sexual abuse. The first incident happened when
she was in the third or fourth grade. Arey told her to kiss another girl who was over at
her house. They were in B.S.’s room, and the girl was B.S.’s age. B.S. kissed the girl as
she was told to do, and B.S. started crying and looked back at Arey. Arey “pointed to do
it again,” and she did. The kissing was on the mouth and both girls cried.
B.S. also discussed the snowboarding trip she went on with M.Y. and Arey when
she was 11 or 12 years old. She said she woke up in the middle of the night with Arey
next to her and noticed she did not have bottoms on. Arey was “spooning” her. She felt
his hands rubbing her butt and in between her legs. She “just sat frozen” and did not say
anything. She does not know how her bottoms came off.
The next day they went to rent boots and snowboards, and the plan was to go
down the bunny hill first and then a bigger run. She took the lift up the bunny hill but did
not want to go down because her anus was hurting.8 She eventually went down by sitting
7 M.Y. could not recall the exact month he made his report, but the lead detective
testified it was October 2019.
8 She gave no testimony about why her anus was hurting.
10.
on her snowboard and riding down like on a sled. She spent the rest of the day at the
resort café until M.Y. and Arey finished and then cried the whole way home. Arey made
her feel like she ruined the whole trip by not snowboarding, which made her feel worse.
She never spoke with M.Y. about what happened the night before. The only person she
spoke with about that incident was a detective.
The third incident she testified to involved a trip to Blockbuster with Arey. She
was 8 or 9 years old, placing this incident before the snowboarding trip.9 Her mom asked
Arey to return a movie to Blockbuster, and B.S. said she would go with him. While
driving, Arey had his erect penis out. He rubbed her hand on his penis until he ejaculated
and then cleaned himself. They returned the movie and went back home. Asked why she
did not tell anyone about this, she testified, “Because why would I tell on an adult?”
B.S. heard that M.Y. “had come forward with his trauma, and it made [her] feel
strong enough to do the same.” A detective was the first person she had ever told about
her abuse. She spoke with the detective for one or two hours before she ended the
interview and never talked with police again. She testified that she suffered additional
abuse but was unwilling to share it. She stated that she was telling the truth in court and
that no one had ever encouraged her to lie or make anything up.
On cross-examination, the defense introduced some of B.S.’s text messages. Two
were between B.S. and J.S., one was between B.S. and Little Kevin, and three were
between B.S., J.S., and Little Kevin. One of the text messages from J.S. to B.S. and
Little Kevin was:
“Hey, guys. So the detective just called me and he asked if either of
you would be willing to talk to him and share what Steve has done to either
of you. He basically said that if we could get one or two more people, we
could most likely take this guy down, but as of now, it’s just [M.Y.] and my
word against Steve’s. It’s, like, two is not enough but three or four
9 She told a detective she was in the sixth grade when this incident happened.
11.
definitely means that it happened. The detective said he would be willing
to drive out here and meet with us.”10
Little Kevin never spoke with police.
In a text message to J.S., B.S. said that Arey had done something to her too and
that J.S. is the only person she has ever told. B.S. messaged J.S. that she was sorry for
what happened to J.S. and that she was there for her if she ever wanted to talk. B.S. told
J.S. that J.S. was stronger than her. The other messages concerned the logistics of
making reports to the police officers and how to hold Arey accountable. None of the
texts disclosed details of abuse.
C. J.S.’s testimony
J.S. was close with B.S. Arey was her father’s best friend. Her father brought
Arey into their family because Arey did not have family with whom to spend time. Arey
was a “cool guy” who everyone wanted to hang out with. Arey spent lots of time with
the S. and H. families.
She described an incident one night after bible study. She and M.Y. asked to stay
the night at Arey’s home because he was the “fun guy.” J.S.’s and M.Y.’s mothers
agreed, and Arey, M.Y., and J.S. went to Arey’s condominium. She was about 10 or 11.
At the condominium, someone suggested playing a game of truth or dare where
truth was not an option. Arey made J.S. take her clothes off and pretend to have sex on
an air mattress in the living room. She did not know what sex was. She hid under a
blanket and removed her clothes, and Arey told her to start humping the air mattress. She
said she did not know what that meant, so Arey talked her through it. She stayed under
the blanket the whole time until she got dressed. Arey then made M.Y. hump the air
mattress. J.S. kept her eyes closed while M.Y. humped the mattress because she knew it
was wrong. Arey then told M.Y. and J.S. to pretend to have sex with each other by
moving “up and down on top of each other.” M.Y. and J.S. did as instructed.
10 J.S. went to police before B.S. did.
12.
Arey then said it was their turn to dare him to do something. She could not recall
what they dared him to do, but she remembers it “wasn’t anything bad.” Arey objected to
it and said it had to be “more than that,” so they dared him to remove his clothes and
hump the doorknob. Arey undressed and J.S. shut her eyes, but he said it was not fun if
she was not looking at him. She kept her eyes closed, and he said, “Okay. Then I’m just
gonna hump the doorknob.”
After the game it was time for bed, and Arey said to J.S., “You’re sleeping with
me on the air mattress.” She testified she “begged him to not make [her]” sleep with him.
She told him she wanted to sleep on the couch with M.Y., but Arey said that was not a
choice. While lying together on the mattress, Arey spooned her with his arms wrapped
underneath her breasts. His erect penis was protruding into her lower back. She tried
wiggling away, and he held her tighter. In the middle of the night while he slept, she got
herself out of his arms and got onto the couch and slept with M.Y. The next morning it
was as if nothing happened. She and M.Y. got dressed and left and never spoke about the
night before.
The first person she told about the abuse was her husband in 2011. During a
moment of sexual intimacy with her husband, her husband did something which brought
back memories of being touched by Arey on the air mattress. She “freaked out” and told
her husband she had something to tell him. She had always regretted not reporting her
abuse because of the thought that she maybe could have saved someone else. She said
she did not tell anyone when she was younger because Arey was her father’s best friend
and a law enforcement officer.
Debi called J.S. in 2019 and said that M.Y. had reported that something happened
to him. J.S. believed it because of her own experience. After the call, her husband
encouraged her to report what happened to her. She told Debi she believed M.Y. because
the same thing happened to her. J.S. had not seen M.Y. since 2013, and she had left
Tulare in 2016 when her parents divorced.
13.
J.S. drove to Tulare to file a police report. Later, on November 19, 2019, she
spoke with a detective in her home. She allowed the detective to take screen shots of
Facebook messages she exchanged with M.Y. and text messages she exchanged with B.S.
M.Y. sent her a Facebook message, after she made her police report, saying he was proud
of her for standing up. She did not tell M.Y. before making her report that she intended
to go to police. She and M.Y. exchanged multiple messages about coming forward to
police, but at no time did they ever encourage each other to report or tell each other what
to say.
J.S. also received a text message from B.S. after J.S. made her police report. The
message said, “I’m proud of you, and something happened to me, too, and I’ll never
repeat it and I will never say.” Before this message, J.S. and B.S. had never spoken about
what Arey had done to J.S. And as of the day of J.S.’s testimony, the two had never
spoken about “the specifics” of what Arey did to J.S. She first got an “idea” of what B.S.
said happened between her (B.S.) and Arey at the preliminary hearing in this case.
After her interview with the detective, she sent the text message to B.S. and Little
Kevin about how they needed to get more people to take Arey down, that two reports
were not enough.
No one ever asked J.S. to lie or make anything up about Arey, but she admitted
encouraging Little Kevin and B.S. to come forward if they had suffered any abuse. She
testified that she wants Arey to go to prison.
D. Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) evidence
Dr. Blake Carmichael, a clinical psychologist, testified about child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome (CSAAS). He knew nothing about the facts of this case when
he testified, and thus could not give an opinion on whether any of the alleged victims in
this case were in fact abused.
Dr. Carmichael described the origins of CSAAS. It was developed as an
educational tool by Dr. Roland Summit and his colleagues in the 1970s and 1980s to help
14.
people understand children who have been sexually abused. There are many myths and
misconceptions about sexually abused children which cause people to have misguided
expectations about how child sexual abuse victims should behave.
Dr. Carmichael explained that since CSAAS is an educational tool, it cannot be
used to determine whether a child has been abused. In fact, no such tool exists for
determining whether abuse has occurred. As an educational tool, it is useful for helping
people understand why abused children may act in unexpected ways. On the other hand,
a diagnostic tool is one used to analyze a person’s symptoms to determine whether they
have a mental disorder. Diagnostic tools involve “checklists” of symptoms clinicians use
to determine whether a person should be diagnosed with a mental disorder. “Child sexual
abuse” is not a mental disorder.
There are five components to CSAAS: secrecy; helplessness; entrapment and
accommodation; delayed, unconvincing, and conflicted disclosure; and recantation or
retraction.
Secrecy involves the perpetrator establishing and maintaining secrecy. This can
involve threatening or intimidating the child or making the child afraid that there would
be bad consequences for disclosing abuse, but it can also involve leveraging the child’s
love for the perpetrator. For example, the child might feel responsible for the perpetrator
getting into trouble as a consequence of disclosure.
Helplessness involves a bigger, stronger perpetrator abusing a vulnerable child.
This is why child victims do not often bite, kick, or scream to ward off the perpetrator.
Entrapment and accommodation factors into how children cope with the abuse.
Children will do ineffective things to stop the abuse or avoid the perpetrator. They will
also disassociate during acts of abuse, which makes it harder for them to recall some of
the details of the abuse. Children might not show outward displays of distress, sadness,
or anger when discussing the abuse, and may instead appear stoic.
15.
The delayed and unconvincing disclosure component refers to the fact that lots of
victims of child sexual abuse do not disclose for months or even years. Many will not
disclose before turning 18. It is common for children to not divulge everything at once,
and they may not remember peripheral details.
As to retraction, “a sizable minority” of children will experience negative
consequences after disclosing and will recant to make the consequences go away.
Not all five CSAAS components will always be present in a child sexual abuse
victim. Dr. Carmichael reiterated the components do not exist as a checklist, but as a
framework for understanding the behavior of abuse victims. He also stated that he was
not offering an opinion on whether any alleged victim in this case was showing any
CSAAS components.
II. Defense’s case
A. T.S.’s testimony
T.S. was born in 1987. He estimated he had joined M.Y. and Arey on more than
10 snowboarding trips. They sometimes stayed in a hotel, and they once stayed at a hotel
with a pool in Mammoth. He does not remember snapping towels at each other or
remember a time when swimming trunks were down, but he testified he was not
circumcised. When asked if he remembered the three of them laying on the bed together,
he said, “Absolutely not.” He said they did not watch pornography together, masturbate
together, or engage in oral sex with each other. He said he was 100 percent positive none
of that happened.
He was very close with M.Y. and Arey and spent lots of time with Arey. He never
saw Arey do anything inappropriate or sexual with anybody, nor did he ever hear Arey
talk about sexual things. He said Arey “positively affected” his life as a boy. Arey gave
him “the speak of a father” when he and M.Y. got in trouble. He never saw Arey “fly off
the handle.” Instead, Arey was always even tempered.
16.
T.S. never noticed a change in M.Y.’s demeanor; M.Y. never became sullen,
withdrawn, or depressed. M.Y. also never told him he was being abused by Arey.
Debi contacted him on Facebook, asking him to please contact detectives if he
remembers anything. He told her nothing happened to him, and he said he would have
come forward long ago if something did. He said he was sorry for what was going on.
B. Emigh family
Susan Emigh is Arey’s older sister, her husband is Thomas, and her son is Ben.
Susan has five children, and Arey was around her and her children all the time. Arey was
not the type of man to fly into a rage, and instead was level-headed and well-suited for a
career in corrections. She recalled a snowboarding trip in the early 2000s when Arey
brought M.Y. and M.Y.’s sister to her house. She recalled that Ben went snowboarding
with them.
Thomas recalled the visit with M.Y. and B.S. Arey had to convince B.S. to come
inside the house. She was not happy and was making faces. Thomas thought Arey was
reserved and easy going and not prone to losing his temper.
Ben grew up around Arey and did not believe he had a bad temper. Arey never
did anything inappropriate with him or anyone else. He looked up to Arey, and Arey was
a mentor and positive influence on him and his friends.
Ben recalled going on a snowboarding trip with Arey, M.Y., and B.S. to Kirkwood
when he was 15 or 16. They picked him up at his parents’ house. It was not his first time
going with M.Y., but it was his first time with B.S. He and B.S. were close in age. He
remembers the trip very well because of B.S.’s poor attitude; she made everything about
her, which was frustrating. He testified it was not a good day on the mountain, as most of
his day was spent with B.S. trying to get her to snowboard. He went with her on the
bunny hill to help her out. She tried sliding down on her butt, went a few feet, gave up,
and walked over to the chairlift and rode it back down. She was adamant about going
down on the chairlift.
17.
C. Other witnesses
Richard Kincaid, who was born in 1991, attended Valley Baptist Church with his
family. He was in the youth group and knew Arey. He and his brother Nicholas stayed
the night at Arey’s house three or four times, and he also spent time at Arey’s house with
other church kids. Nothing inappropriate ever happened. He was 15 to 16 years old
when he spent time with Arey, and he did not know M.Y., B.S., or J.S.
Robert Pentico knew Arey when Pentico was the lead pastor at Valley Baptist
Church and Arey helped with the teen youth group. Arey was like a part of his family,
and they spent lots of time together outside of church. Arey spent time with Pentico’s
daughter, Bethanie, when she was 8 to 14. Pentico never saw Arey do anything
inappropriate and never heard of him touching any child. He also never saw Arey lose
his temper.
Bethanie testified that she sometimes was alone with Arey and he never did or said
anything that made her uncomfortable. She knew M.Y. and B.S. and never saw Arey do
anything inappropriate to them. She also never saw Arey fly into a rage.
Andrew H. and Tyson H. were M.Y. and B.S.’s stepbrothers. They both testified.
They lived in Porterville but visited their father, John, in Tulare every other weekend and
spent time with their stepsiblings. They attended Valley Baptist Church with the H.
family and saw that Arey was very much part of their family. Arey lived across the street
from the H. family, and they never saw pornography at his house. Arey never acted
inappropriately with them, and they never saw him act inappropriately with M.Y., B.S.,
or J.S. Andrew knew Arey to be calm and nice, and he never saw Arey in a rage.
M.B. met M.Y. at Valley Baptist Church and they dated when they were 12 and
13. She was in the youth group and Arey was the youth group pastor. M.Y. never told
her that Arey had molested him, and she never got a weird feeling from Arey or felt he
was dangerous. She never saw him do anything inappropriate to anyone. She and M.Y.
18.
would kiss in Arey’s car, but Arey never did anything inappropriate to her or asked her to
do anything sexual.
D. Stoll expert
Dr. Richard Blak is a clinical and forensic psychologist who conducted a Stoll11
examination of Arey. Dr. Blak’s opinion, based on Arey’s self-reported psychological
history, was that Arey does not have the personality clusters that are consistent with a
convicted sex offender.
E. Memory expert
Dr. Bradley McAuliff, a professor of psychology, testified as an expert on child
witness memory, suggestibility, and forensic interviewing. He did not interview any
alleged victim in this case.
Dr. McAuliff explained that suggestibility is a broad term that refers to a
collection of factors that influence a witness’s memory. A concept directly related to
suggestibility is source monitoring, which refers to the cognitive process of identifying
the origin of a memory. Poor source monitoring can make a person more susceptible to
being influenced by external suggestions or misinformation. When a person struggles to
accurately identify the source of a memory, they are more likely to incorporate
information from external suggestions, even if those suggestions are inaccurate, which
causes false memories. Things that can affect suggestibility include being asked leading
questions and being exposed to conversations or other source material about a topic.
A person may struggle to disentangle suggested memories from what actually
happened. A delay between an event and the effort to recall it can make the
11 In People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136 (Stoll), the California Supreme Court
held that a defendant charged with child molestation has the right to introduce expert
testimony from a psychologist who evaluated him and determined that the defendant’s
character is not consistent with that of a typical child molester. (Id. at pp. 1152–1161.)
Such evidence constitutes character evidence that tends to show that the defendant did
not commit the charged crime. (Id. at pp. 1154–1155.)
19.
disentangling harder because the accuracy of encoded information deteriorates over time.
After a long time, an adult trying to recall an event from childhood may recognize gaps in
their memory and look to other information to fill the gaps, but they may unknowingly
gap-fill with false information. Also, several similar events may get blended in a
person’s mind, and separating out the events later may be difficult.
Dr. McAuliff also described the concept of stereotype induction, which is “a belief
about an individual that is based on generalized information.” He explained that in a
sexual abuse case, as word of the allegations spreads, a person may form the stereotype
of the accused as “a bad guy who does bad things,” and this can bias the person’s
evaluation of certain behaviors of the accused. For example, upon hearing that someone
is a sex offender, a person may retrospectively interpret past interactions—such as hugs
and smiles—as potentially sinister.
DISCUSSION
I. Admissibility of CSAAS evidence
Arey first contends that admission of Dr. Carmichael’s testimony about CSAAS
evidence deprived him of his right to due process and a fair trial. He argues that a trial
court should be required to hold a hearing to determine the scientific acceptance and
reliability of such evidence under People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 (Kelly) before
admitting the testimony. He maintains that if the trial court had held such a hearing, it
would have concluded that CSAAS is not a scientific theory that is generally accepted in
the relevant scientific community and would have excluded the testimony. We join the
other California appellate courts that have held that the admissibility of CSAAS evidence
is not subject to the Kelly rule.
A. Background
In defense counsel’s written motions in limine, counsel cited the California
Supreme Court’s holding in People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1301 (McAlpin)
that CSAAS testimony is inadmissible to prove that abuse occurred but is admissible to
20.
rehabilitate an alleged child victim’s credibility when the defendant suggests the victim’s
conduct after the incident is inconsistent with their testimony claiming abuse. (Id. at
pp. 1300–1301.) At the motions in limine hearing, counsel clarified that he was not
objecting to the admission of CSAAS evidence, and that his written motion served to
ensure that CSAAS evidence would not be used to prove the allegations. To that point,
the prosecutor said that her CSAAS expert had not been told anything about this case and
that she would not be eliciting an opinion from the expert on whether the victims had
been abused. Defense counsel then said that CSAAS evidence would not become
relevant unless the defense suggested that the victims’ conduct after the alleged incidents
was inconsistent with having been abused. The trial court agreed that CSAAS evidence
is typically presented in rebuttal to such a suggestion by the defense but assumed that the
defense would be making such suggestions here. The court said that when the CSAAS
expert testifies, if defense counsel believes CSAAS testimony is not appropriate, counsel
may object.
Counsel did not object when the CSAAS testimony was given. Still, Arey asserts
for the first time his challenge to the CSAAS evidence based on the Kelly rule. The
People assert that any objection to the CSAAS evidence is forfeited for failure to object.
Arey counters that his claim is not forfeited because an objection would have been futile
given the case law permitting the admission of CSAAS evidence. We reject Arey’s claim
on the merits and therefore need not address the forfeiture issue.
B. Analysis
The Kelly rule “conditions the admissibility of evidence based on a new scientific
method of proof on a showing that the technique has been generally accepted as reliable
in the scientific community in which it developed.” (People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d
18, 34.) The rule applies “only to expert testimony ‘based, in whole or part, on a
technique, process, or theory which is new to science and, even more so, the law.’ ”
(People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 173 (Lapenias).) But the rule applies
21.
only if “the unproven technique or procedure appears in both name and description to
provide some definitive truth which the expert need only accurately recognize and relay
to the jury. The most obvious examples are machines or procedures which analyze
physical data.” (Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1156.)
This argument has been rejected by other courts, including in Lapenias, supra,
67 Cal.App.5th 162 and People v. Munch (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464 (Munch). The
Lapenias court explained, “[T]he theory of CSAAS is not new. [Citation.] Further,
CSAAS testimony does not purport to provide a definitive truth; rather, the expert
testimony attempts to disabuse jurors of misconceptions they might hold about the
conduct of children who have been sexually abused. In short, expert CSAAS testimony
is not ‘ “ ‘scientific evidence’ ” ’ subject to the Kelly rule.” (Lapenias, at p. 173.) We
agree with this analysis. (See also Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 472–473
[rejecting challenge to CSAAS evidence under the Kelly rule].)
CSAAS evidence is subject to exclusion under Kelly when offered “ ‘to prove that
a molestation actually occurred,’ ” which is not why it was admitted here. (See People v.
Wells (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 179, 188 (Wells).) It was admitted here for the proper,
limited purpose of rehabilitating the victims’ credibility against Arey’s anticipated
suggestion that their delayed reporting of the alleged incidents is inconsistent with their
testimony claiming abuse. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1301 [CSAAS evidence
admissible to disabuse jury of misconceptions about how children react to molestation
and to explain abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior]; see also People v.
Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 82 [testimony about “rape trauma syndrome”
admissible to rehabilitate complaining witness’s credibility against suggestion that her
behavior after assault was inconsistent with her claim of having been raped].)
Arey urges us to part with the California jurisprudence that finds CSAAS
testimony admissible for the purposes it was used here. He cites cases from out-of-state
courts where courts have either severely restricted or entirely banned CSAAS evidence.
22.
But the California Supreme Court in McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1289, held that CSAAS
evidence is admissible in California for the purposes for which it was used here. (Id. at
p. 1301.) We are bound by precedent from our Supreme Court. (Auto Equity Sales,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) Arey suggests that this court, despite
McAlpin, can hold CSAAS evidence inadmissible because the McAlpin court did not
consider whether CSAAS evidence satisfies the Kelly test. We disagree and are bound by
the Supreme Court.
II. CALCRIM No. 1193
Arey argues the trial court erred in instructing the jury with the pattern CSAAS
jury instruction, CALCRIM No. 1193. He contends the instruction improperly permits
the use of CSAAS evidence to prove sexual abuse allegations true. We reject the claim.
A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo to ascertain whether the
instruction accurately states the applicable law. (People v. Ramirez (2023)
98 Cal.App.5th 175, 218 (Ramirez). We consider the challenged instruction “ ‘in the
context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a
reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ”
(People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326.) We assume that jurors understand and
follow the court’s instructions. (People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 816 (Ortiz).)
Over the defense’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM
No. 1193 as follows:
“You have heard testimony from Dr. Blake Carmichael regarding
child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.
“Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome relates to a pattern of
behavior that may be present in child sexual abuse cases. Testimony as to
the accommodation syndrome is offered only to explain certain behavior of
an alleged victim of child sexual abuse.
23.
“Dr. Blake Carmichael’s testimony about child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome is not evidence that the defendant committed
any of the crimes charged against him.
“You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not
MY., BS, and/or JS.’s conduct was consistent with the conduct of someone
who has been molested, and in evaluating the believability of their
testimony.”
Many California courts have upheld the language of CALCRIM No. 1193 as
accurately informing the jury of the limited use of CSAAS evidence. (People v.
Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 504 (Gonzales); Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 175–176; Ramirez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 219; Ortiz, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
p. 816; Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 474.) Still, Arey maintains the instruction
violates the limitation prohibiting the use of CSAAS evidence to prove that the sexual
abuse allegations are true. (See Lapenias, at p. 171 [CSAAS evidence not relevant to
prove abuse allegations true].) He focuses on the instruction’s last paragraph, asserting it
effectively instructs jurors that they can rely on counterintuitive victim behavior to
bolster the credibility of the victims and support an inference of guilt, violating the
parameters of the use of the evidence. He complains that the instruction does not “offer
jurors the option of rejecting CSAAS’s explanation for a witness’s conduct.” That is, the
instruction “does not acknowledge the possibility that” an alleged victim’s self-
impeaching behavior “could also accurately suggest that they were in fact lying.” “The
instruction thus points the jurors toward only one possible conclusion: appellant was
guilty.”
We disagree with Arey’s argument. The instruction told the jurors that CSAAS
evidence “is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against
him” and could be used only for the stated limited purposes. This, when combined with
Dr. Carmichael’s testimony that CSAAS is not a diagnostic tool and is useful only to
understand child reactions to sexual abuse, would not cause the jury to believe they could
consider the CSAAS testimony as proof that Arey sexually abused the victims.
24.
The appellate court in Gonzales, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th 494 rejected an argument
similar to Arey’s. There, the court noted that CALCRIM No. 1193 “must be understood
in the context” of the expert’s testimony, which in that case stated that “CSAAS is not a
tool to help diagnose whether a child has actually been abused.” (Gonzales, at p. 503.)
In this context, the court held, a reasonable juror would understand CALCRIM No. 1193
to mean that the jury could use the expert’s testimony to conclude that the alleged
victim’s behavior “does not mean she lied when she said she was abused,” not that the
alleged victim “was, in fact, molested.” (Gonzales, supra, at p. 504.) “The CSAAS
evidence simply neutralizes the victim’s apparently self-impeaching behavior. Thus,
under CALCRIM No. 1193, a juror who believes [the expert’s] testimony will find both
that [the alleged victim’s] apparently self-impeaching behavior does not affect her
believability one way or the other, and that the CSAAS evidence does not show she had
been molested. There is no conflict in the instruction.” (Ibid.)
We agree with Gonzales’s reasoning and conclude that CALCRIM No. 1193 was
properly given in this case.
III. CALCRIM Nos. 1191A and 1191B
Without objection, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 1191A
and 1191B, which together told the jury it could consider uncharged and charged sex
offenses to find Arey had the propensity to commit other charged sex crimes. Arey
contends these instructions improperly allowed the victims to corroborate their own
testimony. We conclude the trial court properly gave these instructions.
The CALCRIM No. 1191A instruction read:
“The People presented evidence that the defendant committed the
crimes of lewd and lascivious act upon a child that were not charged in this
case. This crime is defined for you in these instructions.
“You may consider this evidence only if the People have proved by
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact committed the
uncharged offense. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different
25.
burden of proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by
a preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than
not that the fact is true.
“If the People have not met this burden of proof, you must disregard
this evidence entirely.
“If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged offense,
you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence that the
defendant was disposed or inclined to commit sexual offenses, and based
on that decision, also conclude that the defendant was likely to commit
lewd and lascivious act upon a child, as charged here. If you conclude that
the defendant committed the uncharged offense, that conclusion is only one
factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by
itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of the charged crimes.
“The People must still prove the charge and allegation beyond a
reasonable doubt.
“Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose except for the
limited purpose as discussed above.”
The CALCRIM No. 1191B instruction read:
“The People presented evidence that the defendant committed the
crimes of lewd and lascivious act upon a child that were charged in
Count[s] 1–20.
“If the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed one or more of these crimes, you may, but are not
required to, conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or
inclined to commit sexual offenses, and based on that decision, also
conclude that the defendant was likely to commit and did commit the other
sex offenses charged in this case.
“If you find that the defendant committed one or more of these
crimes, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the
other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is
guilty of another crime. The People must still prove each charge and
allegation beyond a reasonable doubt.”
B. Analysis
Citing People v. Stanley (1967) 67 Cal.2d 812 (Stanley) and People v. Scott (1978)
21 Cal.3d 284 (Scott), Arey contends that CALCRIM Nos. 1191A and 1191B lowered
26.
the prosecution’s burden of proof because they effectively permitted M.Y, J.S, and B.S.
to corroborate their own accusations. (See Stanley, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 819 [victim’s
“testimony as to the other offenses, which was not corroborated by any other evidence, in
no way strengthened his testimony as to the offenses charged”]; Scott, supra 21 Cal.3d at
p. 297 [“Where the sole evidence of uncharged sexual conduct is the uncorroborated
testimony of the prosecutrix herself, it is inadmissible since it contributes nothing to a
determination of her credibility on the charged offenses and is highly prejudicial”].)
We disagree. Stanley and Scott are inapt because they predate Evidence Code
section 1108 (added by Stats. 1995, ch. 439, § 2, p. 3429), which permits evidence that
the defendant committed other sexual offenses, subject to Evidence Code section 352
analysis. “Prior to the enactment of [Evidence Code] section 1108, evidence of the
defendant’s disposition to commit a sex offense was generally excluded. [Citation.]
After the enactment of [Evidence Code] section 1108, courts can no longer exclude such
evidence as prejudicial per se, but must engage in a weighing process under [Evidence
Code] section 352.” (Gonzales, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at pp. 501–502.) Arey’s
corroboration argument was negated by the Legislature when it enacted Evidence Code
section 1108.
The instructive cases regarding Arey’s corroboration argument are People v.
Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152 (Villatoro) and Gonzales, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th 494.
In Villatoro, our Supreme Court concluded that Evidence Code section 1108 permits a
jury to consider both charged and uncharged offenses to infer propensity. (Villatoro,
supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 1163–1164.) In Gonzales, a divided panel concluded that former
CALCRIM No. 1191, which is substantially identical to current CALCRIM No. 1191A,
did not violate the defendant’s due process rights. (Gonzales, at pp. 500–502.) The
majority rejected the defendant’s argument that the jury instruction irrationally allowed
the jury to conclude the victim’s testimony about uncharged misconduct could
corroborate her testimony about the charged offenses. (Id. at p. 502.) The majority
27.
concluded “there is nothing irrational about a victim supporting her testimony with
testimony of uncharged sexual offenses. We agree, however, that such testimony is not
as probative as similar testimony from a third party. But it is still probative.” (Ibid; see
People v. Ennis (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 721, 733 [upholding trial court’s determination
such evidence was more probative than unduly prejudicial].) Thus, “CALCRIM
No. 1191 does not violate due process.” (Gonzales, at p. 502.)
We agree with Gonzales’s reasoning and conclude that CALCRIM No. 1191A and
1191B were not improperly given. In light of this conclusion on the merits of Arey’s
claim, we need not address forfeiture.12
IV. Opinion testimony of memory expert
As part of his challenge to M.Y.’s credibility, Arey called Dr. Bradley McAuliff to
provide expert testimony on suggestibility as it affects memory and the accuracy of
reports of abuse. Arey contends the court erroneously restricted the scope of his
testimony. We disagree.
A. Background
Dr. McAuliff described circumstances affecting the reliability of memory,
including the concept of stereotype induction—a psychological phenomenon where
generalized beliefs about a person affect how their behavior is interpreted. After he
described this concept, defense counsel asked:
“So stereotype induction if—in my layman’s understanding is where
you could have a group of people. They get together, and they have a
group interaction, and they talk about a particular case, and let’s say—
hypothetical, let’s say there’s three of them. They’re all—one comes
forward 20 years later—this is eight to 13 when the alleged abuse
happened. So 20, 25 years later, he comes forward, and he has people that
12 The People contend this claim of instructional error was forfeited for failure to
object but acknowledge that an appellate court may consider instructional errors that
affect a defendant’s substantial rights. (§ 1259.) Arey responds that his substantial rights
were affected and thus urges this court to address his claim under section 1259.
28.
he’s close to, and they come forward and they say something happened to
me, too. Would that be suspect under the stereotype induction situation?”
The prosecutor objected to the hypothetical question, arguing it suggested the
alleged victims in this case had false memories, which would infringe on the jury’s role
in determining credibility. Defense counsel asserted the question was proper because he
did not use the alleged victims’ names and the question tracked the facts of the case. The
trial court sided with the prosecution, finding the question impermissibly called for
Dr. McAuliff’s opinion on the alleged victims’ credibility. The court stated that
credibility determinations were for the jury to make.
B. Analysis
Arey argues on appeal the trial court abused its discretion by precluding
Dr. McAuliff from responding to the hypothetical question. We disagree.
“ ‘California law permits a person with “special knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education” in a particular field to qualify as an expert witness (Evid. Code,
§ 720) and to give testimony in the form of an opinion (id., § 801). Under Evidence
Code section 801, expert opinion testimony is admissible only if the subject matter of the
testimony is “sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would
assist the trier of fact.” ’ ” (People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1044.) “[T]he
pertinent question is whether, even if jurors have some knowledge of the subject matter,
expert opinion testimony would assist the jury.” (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th
1179, 1222.)
“ ‘[T]he rationale for admitting opinion testimony is that it will assist the jury in
reaching a conclusion called for by the case. “Where the jury is just as competent as the
expert to consider and weigh the evidence and draw the necessary conclusions, then the
need for expert testimony evaporates.” ’ ” (Summers v. A.L. Gilbert Co. (1999)
69 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1183.)
29.
“ ‘When expert opinion is offered, much must be left to the trial court’s
discretion.’ ” (People v. Sanchez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 14, 46 (Sanchez).) “ ‘The general rule
is that an expert may not give an opinion whether a witness is telling the truth, for the
determination of credibility is not a subject sufficiently beyond common experience that
the expert’s opinion would assist the trier of fact; in other words, the jury generally is as
well equipped as the expert to discern whether a witness is being truthful.’ ” (Ibid;
People v. Sergill (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 34, 39 [abuse of discretion to admit expert
opinion that a witness was credible].) “[A]ny ruling by a trial court on the admissibility
of evidence” is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th
690, 717.)
In Wells, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th 179, the defense sought to introduce the
testimony of an expert who would “testify that [the victim] did not exhibit the emotional
reaction one would expect from a petite girl who had been raped by a large man. Based
on her experience working with trauma victims, [the expert] believed [the victim’s]
demeanor was inconsistent with having suffered trauma.” (Id. at p. 187.) The appellate
court held the evidence was properly excluded. (Id. at p. 189.) The proposed testimony
applied the expert’s opinion about the usual reactions of a trauma victim to the actual
behavior of the alleged victim. (Ibid.) The jury would easily have understood the
testimony as a veiled opinion that since the victim did not exhibit the usual behavior she
had not actually been molested. (Id. at p. 190.)
Similarly, in “People v. Page [(1991)] 2 Cal.App.4th 161 …, an expert testified
about factors that could cause a false confession. The Court of Appeal held that the trial
court acted properly in not additionally permitting the expert ‘to discuss the particular
evidence in this case or to give his opinion regarding the overall reliability of the
confession.’ [Citation.] It was for the jury, not an expert, to determine the reliability of
the actual confession.” (Sanchez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 46 [concluding an expert may
30.
testify about factors the jury should consider, “and then leav[e] it to the jury to apply that
testimony to the actual facts”].)
Here, Dr. McAuliff was properly permitted to testify about stereotype induction
and other circumstances affecting memory reliability. But the hypothetical question
defense counsel asked was a step too far. The jury would have easily understood the
question as a veiled attempt to get Mr. McAuliff’s opinion on the reliability of the alleged
victims’ credibility. The jury, after hearing Dr. McAuliff’s testimony about relevant
circumstances affecting memory, was as well-equipped as Dr. McAuliff to assess the
reliability of the victims’ memories. Allowing Dr. McAuliff to answer defense counsel’s
hypothetical question would have trespassed on the jury’s factfinding function, and thus
the trial court properly excluded that testimony.
V. Cumulative error
Arey contends if none of the errors described in his first four claims were
prejudicial in isolation, their cumulative effects were. But we have found no error to
cumulate.
VI. Penal Code section 294 restitution fine
The trial court ordered Arey to pay a $1,000 restitution fine under section 294,
subdivision (b). This subdivision permits a court to impose a restitution fine on any
person convicted of violating section 261, 264.1, 285, 286, 287, or former section 288a,
where the minor is under 14 years of age. Arey correctly asserts, and the People agree,
that this fine is unauthorized and must be stricken because Arey was not convicted under
any of these statutes. Indeed, all 20 of his convictions are under section 288.
As an aside, we note that Arey’s challenge to this fine is cognizable on appeal,
even though he did not object to it below, because it was an unauthorized fine. (People v.
Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354.)
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VII. Victim relocation expenses
Arey contends the trial court’s order of restitution for $12,161.46 of relocation
expenses for J.S. violated section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(I), because there was no
verification by law enforcement that those expenses were necessary for the personal
safety of the victim, or from a mental health treatment provider that the expenses were
necessary for the emotional well-being of the victim. He asserts the order for relocation
expenses should be stricken and the matter remanded for a rehearing on the issue. The
People in their initial briefing conceded the error and agreed with Arey that remand is
required. But in response to our request for supplemental briefing on whether Arey’s
appellate claim was forfeited for failure to object below, the People rescinded their
concession and asserted the claim is forfeited. As we will explain, the claim is not
forfeited, and we agree with Arey that the order for relocation expenses must be stricken.
Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(I), provides that recoverable restitution costs
include “[e]xpenses incurred by an adult victim in relocating away from the defendant,
including, but not limited to, deposits for utilities and telephone service, deposits for
rental housing, temporary lodging and food expenses, clothing, and personal items.” The
subdivision, however, requires that such relocation costs “be verified by law enforcement
to be necessary for the personal safety of the victim or by a mental health treatment
provider to be necessary for the emotional well-being of the victim.” (Ibid.)
In her written statement submitted ahead of the restitution hearing, J.S. stated that
she and her husband and children had moved out of state in April 2022. She said that
moving out of state “was the best thing for my mental health and my overall well-being.”
She said she was seeking restitution for her relocation expenses because Arey “was a big
factor in why [they] moved out of state.” She said she “no longer wanted to live in fear
of this man.” She added, “We tried to wait for [the] case to go to trial before making the
move across the country, but my quality of life was getting worse so we made the move.”
Her written statement requested $12,161 in restitution for relocation expenses, and
32.
attached was a ledger of expenses totaling $12,161.46. The prosecution’s motion for
victim restitution included J.S.’s claim for $12,161.46 of relocation expenses and the
ledger. No verification from law enforcement or a mental health treatment provider was
provided for the expenses, either before or at the restitution hearing.
Defense counsel’s written opposition to the People’s restitution motion challenged
the relocation expenses claim for two independent reasons. First, the documentation of
the expenses was insufficient because the only documentary evidence submitted to
substantiate them—the ledger—was inadmissible. Second, “no evidence” showed that
Arey’s conduct was a “ ‘substantial factor’ in the move.” The written opposition did not
expressly challenge the expenses on the ground they were unverified.
No testimony was offered at the hearing. The court found the expenses were
“supported by extensive documentation and J.S.’s explanation of how and why her
decision to move came about in response to the proceedings in this case. So I think that
request is supported.”
On appeal, Arey challenges the relocation expenses award on the sole ground that
they were unverified by either law enforcement or a mental health treatment provider.
Since Arey did not expressly mention the verification requirement below, we requested
supplemental briefing from the parties as to whether Arey’s sole appellate claim is
forfeited. In their respective supplemental briefs, Arey argues the issue was preserved
and the People argue it was not.
We conclude the claim was preserved below by defense counsel’s written
opposition, which asserted that “no evidence” showed Arey’s conduct was a
“ ‘substantial factor’ ” in J.S.’s decision to move. The verification requirement is itself a
form of evidence necessary to support an award of relocation expenses. Because
verification is a statutory precondition and evidentiary component of such an award, the
defense’s argument that there was “no evidence” suffices to preserve the claim on appeal.
33.
On the merits of Arey’s claim, J.S.’s victim impact statement made clear that the
move was for her mental well-being, bringing her relocation expenses claim squarely
within section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(I). Because no mental health treatment provider
verified that the relocation expenses were necessary, the statute does not permit these
expenses to be awarded. Accordingly, the $12,161.46 of relocation expenses must be
stricken from the restitution order, and the matter must be remanded for a rehearing on
that item.
VIII. Noneconomic damages
When a defendant is convicted of a felony violation of section 288, 288.5, or
288.7, the court may award restitution for “[n]oneconomic losses, including, but not
limited to, psychological harm.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(F).) Under this provision, the
trial court granted the prosecution’s request for an award of $250,000 of noneconomic
damages to each of the three victims for their “pain and suffering.” On appeal, Arey
contends the trial court abused its discretion in awarding $250,000 of noneconomic
damages to each victim. But as we will explain, his appellate claims as to the
noneconomic damages award are forfeited.
A. Background
1. The victims’ impact statements
J.S. and M.Y. submitted victim impact statements before sentencing. J.S. also
spoke at the sentencing hearing, and a victim advocate read a statement prepared by M.Y.
B.S. made no statement.
J.S., in her written statement, said she was always nervous about coming forward.
She was scared of “standing up” to Arey, who she described as “badge heavy.” She said
the past three and a half years since coming forward had been “anything but easy.”
During that time, she would drive around her block several times making sure Arey was
not there. She also stayed vigilant while out in public, fearing Arey may be “lurking
around the corner.” She was anxious and suffered panic attacks. The constant fear led
34.
her to move out of state with her family. She was still in therapy, and it was helping her
heal. She said Arey had stolen her innocence.
In her oral statement at the hearing, J.S. added that in the years since reporting her
abuse, she was anxious at events with lots of people, fearing Arey would hurt her
husband and children. She said that if Arey were ever released from prison, it would
“send [her] back into a fearful state that I was in when he was roaming free” on bail.
Ahead of the restitution hearing, J.S. submitted another written statement which
tracked her previous statements as to her psychological harm. This statement contained
her request for relocation expenses, a reimbursement request for therapy bills, and $7,000
for her pain and suffering.
M.Y., in his written statement, said he spent many years feeling scared and
ashamed before disclosing his abuse. He tried running away from the memories and
numbing himself to the nightmares. But in late summer 2019, he could no longer “outrun
the darkness.” He found it harder to do his job as a pastor and be of service to people.
After reporting his abuse to police, M.Y. stopped going to the grocery store, the
gas station, and any other place where he had a memory of Arey taking him. M.Y. had
anxiety attacks and became a shell of his former self. He began taking anti-depressant
medication, but it did not help. He eventually had to be hospitalized for trauma-induced
psychosis. Then he began therapy and seeing a psychiatrist to manage his psychosis. He
was placed on anti-psychotic medication and given time off work until he could manage
his responsibilities again. But after continued therapy, he realized he was unable to
resume his position as pastor of his church, so he stepped down. With the loss of the job
came the loss of what was left of his identity. He had to apply for disability benefits.
The long court process stripped him of his mental stability, the financial stability of his
family, and his sense of safety. He was hospitalized again after suffering a second
psychotic episode. He is still nowhere near where he wants to be health-wise. Arey stole
not only his childhood, but also what could have been beautiful years with his wife,
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children, and ministry. He sometimes wishes he never came forward because of how
much he has lost by doing so.
M.Y.’s oral statement at sentencing tracked his written statement.
2. The People’s motion and the defense’s opposition
Ahead of the October 27, 2023, restitution hearing, the People filed a “motion to
impose victim restitution.” They requested a restitution order for M.Y.’s lost income,
J.S.’s relocation expenses, noneconomic damages for the psychological harm suffered by
the three victims, and reimbursement to the California Victim Compensation Board. The
People attached documents to prove the lost income and relocation expenses and also
attached J.S.’s letter she prepared for purposes of the restitution hearing.
The People, relying on section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(F), requested $250,000
in noneconomic damages for each victim, totaling $750,000. They derived the $750,000
figure from People v. Smith (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 415 (Smith). In that case, the
evidence showed the defendant molested his stepdaughter almost daily for years. (Id. at
pp. 420–421.) “The evidence presented at the restitution hearing established that
defendant not only molested Doe, as established by defendant’s convictions, but also
isolated her and took advantage of a position of trust from the time she was eight years
old until she left the home as an adult. She was still having nightmares and flashbacks
concerning the abuse. And she had been in therapy to deal with the problems caused by
the abuse. She was having difficulty keeping jobs, and, at age 30 at the time of the
hearing, had not finished her education, still attending Folsom Lake College. She twice
attempted suicide by overdosing on ibuprofen.” (Id. at p. 432.) The trial court awarded
$750,000 in noneconomic damages—$50,000 per year for 15 years of molestation. (Id.
at p. 433.)
In determining whether the award was an abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal
in Smith explained that a restitution order for noneconomic damages is to be affirmed if it
“does not, at first blush, shock the conscience or suggest passion, prejudice or corruption
36.
on the part of the trial court.” (Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 433, 436–437.) The
court held the award of $750,000—$50,000 per year for 15 years of molestation—did not
shock the conscience and thus was not an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
The People asserted that “[g]iven the extent of psychological harm described by
each child, $250,000 for each victim in no way shocks the conscience or suggests that
there is any prejudice or corruption by the court.” They anticipated that Arey would
likely argue that an equal award to all victims is unjustifiable given the disparity in the
length and severity of the abuse between the three of them. To that point, they stated that
the length of time of abuse is informative, but not dispositive, in determining the victims’
psychological harm. They said that the victims’ psychological harm did not end when
the abuse ended and that their lifetime of pain and suffering should be accounted for.
Defense counsel submitted a written opposition in which he challenged all of the
requested restitution items except for the reimbursement to the Victim Compensation
Board. The section on noneconomic damages read:
“As to the People’s request to impose a total of $250,000 in non-
economic damages (pain and suffering) for each of the three victims in this
case, for a total of $750,000, it is agreed that this Court enjoys very broad
discretion in imposing said damages under current state law. However, this
Court’s finding must nevertheless be rationally based and must not ‘shock
the conscience.’
“Defendant respectfully submits that the Court simply does not have
sufficient evidence before it upon which to base a rational finding of
$250,000 for each of the three victims. Defendant’s acts differed very
widely between the three victims, the ongoing emotional effects were not
substantiated fully, and consequently it is difficult to see upon what the
figure of $250,000 each is based.
“Defendant therefore respectfully requests the Court to deny the
award of pain and suffering, at least pending further testimony on this
matter.”
As to the restitution request for J.S.’s relocation expenses, which we have already
addressed in issue VII, the defense argued that (1) the expenses were not substantiated by
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admissible evidence and that (2) “no evidence” showed Arey was a “substantial factor” in
J.S.’s desire to move. Similarly, as to the request for M.Y.’s lost income, the defense
argued that (1) no admissible evidence substantiated the requested amount and that (2)
the connection between the abuse and M.Y.’s inability to work was too temporally
remote to support a finding of proximate causation.
3. The restitution hearing
The trial court began the restitution hearing by stating that it had read and
considered the People’s motion and the defense’s opposition and asking if the parties
intended to offer any other evidence. The People said they were submitting on what they
had filed. Defense counsel also submitted on the filings and asked the court if it had
questions for him. The court asked counsel, “As I take it, your objections here essentially
go to the foundation for these requests. You also argue that these documents amount to
hearsay … and shouldn’t be considered by the court?” Counsel said yes. The court
overruled the hearsay objection, explaining that “restitution hearings are considered part
of sentencing proceedings at which the typical rules of evidence do not necessarily
apply.” The court added, “As to the foundation, I think it’s adequate. I think all of these
requests are of the variety that the law recognizes, and they are supported by adequate
documentation.” The court thus overruled the foundation objection.
The court went on to award M.Y. his lost income and J.S. her relocation expenses.
The court then said:
“A new issue for me that was raised for the first time in this case, my
experience, was the pain and suffering request. The People have put forth a
figure of $750,000 which is $250,000 for each victim.
“They’ve cited a case where a court ordered $750,000 under
relatively similar circumstances to a single victim.
“The analysis that I’m to engage in is whether or not the type of
award shocks the conscience. I can’t say that a quarter-million-dollar
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award for enduring the type of abuse that Mr. Arey was convicted of
perpetrating in this case shocks my conscience.
“I acknowledge the inherit difficulty in putting a dollar amount on a
harm of that kind, but it’s something that happens all the time in our court
system.
“If I think about it in terms of how much a reasonable person would
be willing to pay to avoid having to go through something like this,
$250,000 does not sound unreasonable to me. So I will make that order
pursuant to the People’s request, as well.”
The court asked the prosecutor to prepare an abstract of restitution, and the
prosecutor said she would. The court then asked, “Anything else today, counsel?” to
which defense counsel responded no. The hearing ended.
B. Analysis
Arey contends the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay
$250,000 in noneconomic restitution to each of the victims. He asserts three claims.
First, the court erred by determining the noneconomic damages award based on a
“reasonable person” standard rather than the actual psychological harm suffered by the
victims. Second, the court erred by awarding equal noneconomic damages to all three
victims despite significant differences in the frequency and severity of the abuse they
experienced, without sufficient evidence to justify identical awards. And third, the court
erred by failing to make specific factual findings on the record of the victims’
psychological harm, rendering the basis for the noneconomic damages award unclear.
These claims were all forfeited by failure to object at the restitution hearing.
1. Noneconomic restitution principles and standard of review
“ ‘A restitution order is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not be reversed
unless it is arbitrary or capricious. [Citation.] No abuse of discretion will be found
where there is a rational and factual basis for the amount of restitution ordered.’ ”
(People v. Lehman (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 795, 801.) “The court ‘must demonstrate a
rational basis for its award, and ensure that the record is sufficient to permit meaningful
39.
review. The burden is on the party seeking restitution to provide an adequate factual
basis for the claim.’ ” (People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1182.)
In California, convicted criminals may be responsible for up to three types of
restitution, two of which are relevant here. (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644,
651 (Giordano).) First, absent “ ‘compelling and extraordinary reasons,’ ” all convicted
defendants must pay a restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b), based on the
statutorily authorized amounts, “ ‘set at the discretion of the court and commensurate
with the seriousness of the offense.’ ” (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).)
“Second, when a defendant is convicted of a crime involving a victim who ‘has
suffered economic loss as a result of defendant's conduct[,]’ the court must require the
defendant to pay full restitution directly to the victim or victims of the crime[.]”
(Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 651–652, quoting § 1202.4, subd. (f).)
“With one exception, restitution orders are limited to the victim's economic damages.”
(Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 431.) “Economic damages are ‘objectively
verifiable monetary losses including medical expenses, loss of earnings, burial costs, loss
of use of property, costs of repair or replacement, costs of obtaining substitute domestic
services, loss of employment and loss of business or employment opportunities.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.)
As noted above, the one exception to this rule is stated in section 1202.4,
subdivision (f)(3)(F), which provides for the court to order the defendant to pay
restitution for “[n]oneconomic losses, including, but not limited to, psychological harm,
for felony violations of Section 288,” which prohibits the commission of lewd or
lascivious acts on minors. (Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 431, italics added.) Smith
further defined noneconomic damages as “ ‘subjective, non-monetary losses including,
but not limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional distress,
loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation and
humiliation.’ ” (Id. at pp. 931–932.)
40.
On an appeal from an order of restitution for economic loss, the reviewing court
ordinarily looks for a “ ‘factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by
the trial court[.]’ ” (People v. Mearns (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 493, 499.) In those
situations, the trial court must employ an objectively reasonable and discernable
methodology rather than simply basing the award on its subjective beliefs regarding the
appropriate amount of compensation. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114,
1125.)
In contrast, Smith explained this standard was not applicable to review orders for
noneconomic restitution because “[u]nlike restitution for economic loss … loss for
noneconomic [harm] is subjectively quantified.” (Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at
p. 436.) In light of the fundamental difference between the two types of loss, Smith held
that a different standard of review must be applied to orders of noneconomic restitution to
allow for the subjective considerations of the trial court judge. (Ibid.) “We are guided in
this matter by the civil jury instruction concerning noneconomic loss: ‘No fixed standard
exists for deciding the amount of these damages. You must use your judgment to decide
a reasonable amount based on the evidence and your common sense.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
“The obvious difference between the review of a civil award of
noneconomic damages and a criminal restitution order for noneconomic
damages is that the trial court, not a jury, makes the determination in the
first instance. Even with that difference in mind, we see no reason to adopt
any other standard of review. We therefore affirm a restitution order for
noneconomic damages that does not, at first blush, shock the conscience or
suggest passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court.
“Admittedly, this standard is not as delimited as the review of a
restitution order for economic damages. By their nature, economic
damages are quantifiable and thus awards of economic damages are readily
reviewed for whether they are ‘rationally designed to determine the …
victim’s economic loss.’ [Citation.] Noneconomic damages, however,
require more subjective considerations. Thus, the different standard is
justified.” (Smith, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 436–437.)
41.
2. Forfeiture
We requested supplemental briefing from the parties as to whether Arey’s claims
concerning the noneconomic damages award are forfeited. Arey asserts the claims were
preserved by the arguments in the written opposition his counsel submitted below. The
People, on the other hand, argue the claims are forfeited.
A defendant’s failure to object on the specific legal ground later asserted forfeits
that ground for appeal. (Nadey, supra, 16 Cal.5th 102, 1000; Flinner, supra, 10 Cal.5th
at p. 726 [defendant forfeits argument on appeal when he objects on substantively
different grounds]; Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 433–434.) Applying this principle of
appellate procedure, Arey’s three-part challenge to the noneconomic damages award is
entirely forfeited because defense counsel failed to object to the trial court’s reasoning at
the restitution hearing. While the defense submitted a written opposition to the People’s
motion, that opposition responded only to the People’s rationale—not the court’s. The
trial court ultimately adopted its own reasoning, grounding the award in a “reasonable
person” standard rather than an individualized assessment of harm. When the court
announced this methodology, it explicitly asked if either party had anything further to
add. Defense counsel remained silent, thereby forfeiting any challenge to the court’s
analytical framework. The defense could not simply stand on its written opposition; it
had an obligation to object to the court’s pronouncement of the award if it intended to
challenge the court’s reasoning on appeal. We now address each of Arey’s three
appellate claims individually.
Arey’s first claim—that the trial court erred by using a “reasonable person”
standard rather than basing the award on the victims’ actual suffering—is forfeited. The
defense never objected to the court’s methodology at the restitution hearing, despite
being given the opportunity to do so. He thus cannot raise this issue for the first time on
appeal.
42.
Because the first claim is forfeited, the second and third claims necessarily fall
with it. The second claim asserts that the trial court failed to justify equal damages for
each victim despite the varying degrees of abuse, but this argument presumes that the
court was required to differentiate among the victims in the first place. That
presumption, however, has no place in the methodology the trial court applied. While the
defense made the argument about differentiating between the victims in its written
opposition, it was based on an individualized harm approach the trial court ultimately did
not use. Once the court applied a general, reasonable-person valuation, the defense
needed to object to that framework. Because it did not, there is no basis to argue that the
damages were improperly equal under an individualized harm framework.
The third claim, which asserts that the trial court failed to make specific factual
findings about the victims’ psychological harm, is likewise forfeited. Again, the trial
court did not base the award on individualized harm but rather on a general, reasonable-
person valuation of the abuse suffered. This methodology, by its nature, does not require
detailed factual findings about each victim’s psychological harm. The court explained its
reasoning in terms of what a reasonable person would pay to avoid the abuse, not on
individualized assessments of harm. If the defense believed specific findings were
necessary under a different framework, it had to raise the issue at the hearing. By
remaining silent, Arey’s claim that the court failed to make findings was forfeited.
Ultimately, this entire line of attack is predicated on an argument the defense
never raised at the restitution hearing, specifically regarding the trial court’s reasoning
and methodology for the noneconomic damages award. While the defense did challenge
the uniformity of the damages in its written opposition, it did not object to the court’s
application of a “reasonable person” standard or its adoption of that framework. Arey
had a clear opportunity to raise this objection at the hearing when the court articulated its
reasoning, yet he failed to do so. Because Arey failed to preserve the first claim, the
43.
second and third claims, which rely on the same underlying objection, are also forfeited.
Under well-established forfeiture principles, Arey cannot raise these issues on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The $1,000 restitution fine under section 294, subdivision (b), and the $12,161.46
of relocation expenses for J.S. under section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(I), are stricken
from the judgment. The matter is remanded for a rehearing as to the relocation expenses.
The judgment is otherwise affirmed. After the proceedings on remand are concluded, the
superior court clerk is to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward copies to
the appropriate entities.
SNAUFFER, J.
WE CONCUR:
PEÑA, Acting P. J.
SMITH, J.
44.
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