CourtListener 10606276•People v. Gosal CA3
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Filed 6/17/25 P. v. Gosal CA3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C098723
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 08F07142)
v.
GURPREET GOSAL,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Gurpreet Gosal1 appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for
resentencing following an evidentiary hearing. (Pen Code,2 § 1172.6, subd. (d).)3
1 Defendant’s name is listed as both “Gurpreet Gosal” and “Gurpreet Singh Gosal”
in the record. We use defendant’s name as it appears on the resentencing order being
appealed.
2 Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
3 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered former section 1170.95 to
section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) There were no substantive changes to the
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Defendant asks this court to employ an independent standard of review given the case
was decided on a cold record. He argues that, under either an independent or substantial
evidence standard, the record is lacking in sufficient proof he aided and abetted implied
malice murder. He also argues the trial court’s failure to directly address his self-defense
claim in its written ruling requires reversal. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2013, a jury found defendant guilty of the second degree murder of P.S., also
known by his nickname Poma, but not guilty of the attempted murder or attempted
voluntary manslaughter of S.S. The jury also found true the allegations that defendant
personally and intentionally used a firearm in the commission of the murder, but found
not true the allegation that his discharge of the firearm proximately caused Poma’s death.
The trial court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life plus 20 years. Another panel of
this court affirmed this judgment in 2015. (People v. Gosal (June 9, 2015, C074473)
[nonpub. opn.].)
The trial court initially denied defendant’s 2019 petition for resentencing, finding
defendant failed to state a prima facie case for relief. (People v. Gosal (Dec. 2, 2021,
C093052 [nonpub. opn.].) Following defendant’s appeal, another panel of this court
reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for a section 1172.6,
subdivision (d) evidentiary hearing. (Gosal, supra, C093052.)
At the evidentiary hearing, the parties introduced into evidence the trial
transcripts, as well as the court’s file. The prosecution argued those transcripts showed
defendant was presently guilty of aiding and abetting murder under either express or
implied malice theories. Defendant disagreed, urging the court to focus on the testimony
of A.M., A.S., and defendant, which he asserted established he acted in self-defense.
statute. Although defendant filed his petition under former section 1170.95, we cite to the
current section number throughout this opinion.
2
I
The Trial Testimony
Defendant was friends with Amandeep Dhami, who was involved in a dispute with
Poma. Dhami and Poma agreed to meet to resolve their differences. Defendant flew to
Sacramento to attend this meeting.
Dhami picked defendant up from the airport. Soon thereafter, they went to a gun
store where Dhami gave defendant money to purchase ammunition. Defendant
purchased boxes of ammunition of various calibers, and Dhami took the bag containing
the ammunition.
At some point, Poma canceled the meeting leading to several heated phone
conversations over the course of the evening between Poma and Dhami.
Defendant originally planned to fly home the day after the scheduled meeting.
However, defendant changed his flight plans, purportedly because his ride to the airport
fell through. Instead, defendant went with Dhami to a festival being held at a religious
temple. Defendant drove Dhami’s car, while Dhami talked on the phone. When they
arrived, defendant parked perpendicular between two rows of cars, attracting attention.
A witness who saw defendant park the car testified he saw the men open the rear
passenger doors as if retrieving something, close the doors, and then walk towards the
fields. No more than 10 minutes later, the witness heard gunshots. Shortly thereafter, he
saw people chasing defendant and yelling at him.
M.M. was at the festival with Poma, A.K., and S.S. M.M. noticed Dhami and
defendant when they were about 10 to 12 feet away from the group; defendant was at
Dhami’s side. Dhami loudly and angrily cursed at Poma, insulting Poma’s sister. Dhami
then asked, “[N]ow where do you want to go?” (Italics omitted.) Poma did not respond,
and Dhami drew a revolver from his pants and fired at A.K. and Poma. To keep people
from helping, defendant also pulled a gun and shot at the group and the crowd. M.M.
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saw Poma bleeding on the ground near a gun. Poma was shot in the lower abdomen,
causing his death. M.M. did not see Poma with a gun before or during the shooting.
S.S. testified he saw a gun in Dhami’s hand and then he fell to the ground because
his legs stopped working. S.S. was shot above his left hip and his injuries required
surgery to stabilize his spine.
A.K. also saw Dhami and defendant approach the group. Dhami cursed at the
group and Poma in particular, calling him a “sister fucker” in Punjabi. A.K. warned
Dhami to watch his mouth, and Dhami drew a gun and started shooting. A.K. tried to
grab Dhami, but Dhami kept shooting. Within seconds of the first shot, defendant also
began shooting and at one point aimed directly at A.K. Defendant then ran away towards
the parking area. A.K. did not see Poma with a gun.
A.M., who was at the festival, heard a shot and saw defendant shooting a gun.
A.M. testified defendant was waving the gun in a back-and-forth motion in the direction
of a group of men, but aiming it at a downward angle. A.M. did not see defendant aim
the gun at anyone. Defendant then ran away through the parking lot and over a barbed
wire fence.
A.S., who was also at the festival, heard “fighting words” being exchanged in
Punjabi about 30 to 40 feet away from him. To A.S., it looked like an exchange between
two groups of two people that escalated into punches before two of them started firing
guns at the others. A.S. heard four to six shots and saw one of the unarmed men get shot
and fall to the ground. A.S. did not see any other guns.
Defendant was detained first by the crowd and then by county sheriffs. A receipt
from a gun shop was found in defendant’s clothes showing purchases of four of the five
ammunition boxes recovered from a black backpack left in the parking lot of the festival.
Several of the boxes were missing rounds of ammunition. Three handguns and keys to
Dhami’s car were recovered from various places in the festival grounds. Ammunition
recovered from the guns matched ammunition found in the black backpack.
4
Defendant testified at his initial trial denying he murdered Poma, attempted to
murder S.S., or that he went to the festival armed with the intent to shoot anyone. Rather,
defendant explained it was A.K. who was the aggressor, punching Dhami in the face after
Dhami had greeted the group. According to defendant, this caused Dhami to draw his
gun and fire several shots. Defendant also testified he may have seen another person
draw a gun. In the ensuing fight, defendant testified, someone hit him and he stumbled
into Dhami, who handed him a gun. Defendant testified he only fired that gun into the
ground to protect himself while he fled as others hit him. While running, defendant
threw the gun and keys away. Defendant denied seeing guns or ammunition in Dhami’s
car or that he armed himself after parking. Nonetheless, he admitted seeing a black
backpack behind the passenger seat. On cross-examination, defendant admitted to lying
to detectives investigating the case during three different interviews.
II
The Trial Court’s Written Ruling
The trial court issued a written ruling finding the prosecution had established
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of implied malice murder on a direct
aiding and abetting theory. Specifically, the court found defendant aided and abetted the
life endangering act of an “armed encounter with, and the shooting of, Poma and [S.S.]”
In so doing, the court credited the testimony of M.M. and A.K. as being “the most
compelling.” According to that testimony, both Dhami and defendant opened fire at
Poma’s group, with A.K. testifying that defendant shot directly at him. The court found
that although this alone satisfied the actus reus requirement, defendant also purchased
ammunition the day before with money from Dhami, knew that Dhami had the
ammunition, and was aware that Dhami had fought with Poma for hours on the phone the
day before the shooting. The court discredited defendant’s explanation about why he
missed his original plane flight in light of defendant’s admitted dishonesty to law
enforcement officials. Further, the trial court credited M.M.’s and A.K.’s testimony with
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establishing that defendant “was armed with at least one firearm when he and Dhami
encountered the Poma group.” The court concluded, “Against that backdrop,
[defendant’s] actions of driving Dhami to the festival and walking with Dhami through
the festival while armed directly aided Dhami in the shooting.”
As to defendant’s mens rea, the trial court determined defendant knew Dhami
intended to bring a gun to the encounter, again highlighting defendant’s actions as
previously described. Further, the court credited the witness who saw defendant park in
the parking lot with establishing that defendant and Dhami either arrived at the festival
already armed or they armed themselves when they accessed the rear passenger
compartment of Dhami’s car. Either way, defendant was aware Dhami was armed with a
gun.
Further, the trial court affirmed that defendant “knew that encountering Poma with
a firearm was dangerous to human life.” Supporting its determination, the court noted,
“There are few situations more dangerous than a purposeful armed encounter between
two individuals that have open hostilities between them.” While defendant was only 23
years old, he had worked as a truck driver for five years and had “enough life experience”
to recognize the danger.
Finally, the trial court determined defendant “disregarded the danger to Poma’s
life by being an active participant in Dhami’s encounter with Poma. The natural and
probable consequences of [defendant] arming himself and aiding Dhami [in the]
encounter [with] Poma was dangerous to human life and proximately caused Poma’s
death.” Accordingly, the court denied defendant’s petition for resentencing.
Defendant appeals.
6
DISCUSSION
I
Substantial Evidence Supports The Trial Court’s
Finding Defendant Aided And Abetted Implied Malice Murder
Starting in 2019, the Legislature amended the felony-murder rule and eliminated
the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder. (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.) It did this by amending section 188, which defines malice,
and section 189, the felony-murder statute. (Lewis, at p. 959; People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433, 448-449.) The Legislature also created a procedure in what is now
section 1172.6 that allows those previously convicted of felony murder or murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine to obtain relief from their convictions if
they could not be convicted of murder under the amended law. (Curiel, at p. 449; accord,
Lewis, at p. 957.) Subsequently, the Legislature codified aspects of the Lewis decision
and clarified the burden of proof and procedure at the evidentiary hearing stage of the
proceedings. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551.)
Here, we are concerned with the evidentiary hearing that occurs after the trial
court has determined a defendant set forth a prima facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (a), (c), (d); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) At that hearing, the
prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is
guilty of murder under the amended law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Both parties may, but
are not required to, present “new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.”
(Ibid.; see People v. Njoku (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 27, 43-46.) Moreover, “the court may
consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible
under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially
noticed.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) If the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt the
defendant is guilty of murder under a theory that remains valid after the amendments to
sections 188 and 189, the petition is denied. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
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Defendant first contends we should independently review this cold record case.
Having already rejected this claim in People v. Njoku, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pages 41-
43, we see no reason to revisit the issue here. We therefore will employ a substantial
evidence standard of review. (Ibid.)
Defendant argues substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s
determination he aided and abetted implied malice murder. In so doing, he attacks both
the trial court’s actus reus and mens rea findings. We are unpersuaded.
Under the substantial evidence standard, “we review the record ‘ “ ‘in the light
most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence [that] is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).)
“Our job on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition.
While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve
contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt
standard, our job is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted
or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.) “ ‘ “If the circumstances
reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not
warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding.” ’ ” (People v. Sifuentes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 217, 233.) Reversal is
not warranted unless “ ‘ “upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support the [trial court’s ruling].” ’ ” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th
500, 508.)
“[S]econd degree murder . . . is ‘the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought but without the additional elements, such as willfulness, premeditation, and
deliberation, that would support a conviction for first degree murder.’ [Citation.] . . .
8
‘Malice is implied when the killing is proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural
consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a
person who knows that his [or her or their] conduct endangers the life of another and who
acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” [Citation.] In short, implied malice requires a
defendant’s awareness of engaging in conduct that endangers the life of another.’ ”
(People v. Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 507.)
“[U]nder direct aiding and abetting principles, an accomplice is guilty of an
offense perpetrated by another if the accomplice aids the commission of that offense with
‘knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with] an intent to assist in
achieving those unlawful ends.’ ” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 843, quoting
People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225.) “ ‘[T]o be liable for an implied malice
murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid in the commission of
the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens rea, which must be
personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator
intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act,
knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for
human life.’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991.)
We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination
defendant aided and abetted a life endangering act, specifically, Dhami’s armed
encounter with Poma, and that defendant knew such act was dangerous to human life.
(Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991.) Defendant knew of Dhami’s disagreement with
Poma and flew to California to be with Dhami at the meeting with Poma and his group.
Shortly after arriving, defendant purchased boxes of ammunition with Dhami’s money,
and Dhami took possession of that ammunition, which was used in the shooting the next
day. Defendant knew that the meeting was canceled and that Dhami and Poma continued
to argue into the night. Defendant then drove Dhami to the festival and parked Dhami’s
car in a manner suggesting the need for a quick getaway. Defendant and Dhami appeared
9
to take something from the backseat—presumably the black backpack containing the
guns and ammunition that were later recovered by police. The pair then headed to the
fields. No more than 10 minutes later, gunfire erupted.
According to the witnesses found most compelling by the trial court, defendant
and Dhami approached the group together, with defendant at Dhami’s side. Dhami
cursed Poma before pulling out a revolver and firing at Poma. Shortly thereafter,
defendant drew a gun and began firing at the group, at one point aiming directly at A.K.
Thus, defendant’s actions culminating in defendant’s own firing of a gun at Poma’s group
clearly aided Dhami’s confrontation of Poma. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991.)
Moreover, considering this evidence, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer
that defendant knew Dhami’s armed encounter was dangerous to human life, especially
considering Dhami’s ongoing disagreement with Poma and possession of multiple guns
and ammunition, as well as defendant’s parking of Dhami’s car such that he could
quickly and easily leave the parking lot. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991.) Opening
fire on a group of people at close range is an inherently dangerous activity that involved a
high probability of death. (Ibid.) Moreover, defendant consciously disregarded that
danger by bringing Dhami to the festival to find and confront Poma, and by himself
shooting at the group.4 (Ibid.) Accordingly, defendant’s challenge to the evidence
supporting the trial court’s determination that he was still guilty of aiding and abetting
implied malice murder fails.
4 Defendant’s reliance on testimony suggesting defendant may have aimed his gun
into the ground—including his own discredited account—is misplaced as it ignores that
we do not resolve evidentiary conflicts at the appellate stage. (People v. Clements, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) A.K. testified that defendant shot the gun directly at him. The
trial court credited this testimony, and we must accept the trial court’s credibility
determinations. (Ibid.)
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II
The Trial Court Did Not Err By Failing To
Address Defendant’s Self-defense Claim
Defendant argues the trial court’s failure to explicitly address his claim of self-
defense in its written ruling has “deprived” him of that defense requiring reversal.
However, defendant has provided no authority, and this court is aware of none, requiring
the trial court to explicitly analyze the elements of defendant’s claim of self-defense in its
written ruling. Rather, section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) requires the trial court to
determine whether the prosecution has established “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder . . . under California law as amended by the changes to
[s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” The trial court’s ruling met this
requirement, determining beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution had established
that defendant was still liable for aiding and abetting implied malice murder. Implicit in
this determination is the trial court’s rejection of defendant’s claim of self-defense. (See,
e.g., People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 243-244 [imperfect self-defense operates
to negate malice element necessary for murder under California law, requiring the
prosecution to establish “the absence of that circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt”].)
The trial court’s outright rejection of defendant’s testimony and the crediting of two
witnesses whose testimony established that Dhami and defendant shot at Poma and his
group without provocation or justification further support this determination.
Nor are we persuaded that the trial court’s failure to provide a written analysis of
defendant’s self-defense claim is akin to a trial court’s failure to instruct the jury. We
presume the trial court understood and applied the law. (People v. Stowell (2003)
31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.) There is nothing in the record to suggest the trial court
misunderstood defendant’s assertion of self-defense. Accordingly, this claim fails.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
RENNER, J.
/s/
WISEMAN, J.*
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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