CourtListener 10604500•People v. Diaz CA2/6
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Filed 6/13/25 P. v. Diaz CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B336635
(Super. Ct. No. PA059758)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
STEVEN DIAZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Steven Diaz appeals an order denying his petition for recall
and resentencing filed pursuant to Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)(A), and People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th
608, 634 (juvenile offender serving de facto sentence of life
without parole may petition for recall and resentencing).1 We
conclude that the trial court did not err by denying the recall and
resentencing petition because Diaz’s sentence of 40 years to life is
not the functional equivalent of life without parole. We affirm.
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 16, 2007, then 17-year-old Diaz approached
and shot Cesar Rivas, as Rivas sat in the driver’s seat of his
vehicle outside a local high school. Diaz was a member of the
“SanFer” criminal street gang; Rivas was a member of a tagging
crew. Diaz fired two gunshots through the driver’s side window,
striking Rivas near his lung and spine. Diaz testified at trial
that he shot Rivas because Rivas disrespected him. Diaz also
stated that he had been using methamphetamine for several days
prior to the shooting.
A jury convicted Diaz of attempted murder and assault
with a firearm. (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a), 245, subd. (a)(2).) The
jury also found true allegations that the attempted murder was
willful, deliberate, and premeditated; Diaz personally used and
discharged a firearm and inflicted great bodily injury; and Diaz
committed the crimes to benefit a criminal street gang.
(§§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d), 12022.5, 12022.7, subd. (a), 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)(C).)
The trial court sentenced Diaz to 40 years to life, consisting
of 15 years to life for the attempted murder conviction and 25
years to life for the firearm enhancement. The court stayed
sentence for the assault conviction pursuant to section 654. On
appeal, we ordered clerical corrections to the sentence but
otherwise affirmed. (People v. Diaz (May 24, 2010, B218837)
[nonpub. opn.].)
On September 13, 2023, Diaz filed a petition for recall and
resentencing pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), and
People v. Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 629 (juvenile
offender’s sentence of 103-years-to-life imprisonment a de facto
sentence of life without parole). Diaz asserted that his sentence
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of 40 years to life as a juvenile offender was the functional
equivalent of life without parole.
The trial court denied Diaz’s petition and noted that Diaz
would be eligible for parole at age 42.
Diaz appeals and argues that the trial court erred by
summarily denying his recall and resentencing petition. Whether
a defendant is eligible to petition for a recall and resentencing
pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) is a question of
statutory interpretation that we review de novo. (People v.
Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032.)
DISCUSSION
Diaz asserts that the record reflects that his sentence is the
functional equivalent of life without parole, relying upon People v.
Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608, and People v. Sorto (2024) 104
Cal.App.5th 435, 440. He asks that we remand the matter for
reevaluation of his petition.
Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) generally allows a
juvenile offender who has served at least 15 years of a sentence of
life without parole to petition for recall of the sentence and
resentencing to a term that includes an opportunity for parole.
Based upon constitutional principles of equal protection, People v.
Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 629, expanded the reach of
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A) to juvenile offenders serving de
facto sentences of life without parole. Courts have made clear,
however, that not all lengthy sentences are equivalent to life
without parole. (E.g., People v. Olmos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th
580, 583 [33 years to life not functional equivalent of life without
parole]; People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, 507 [50
years to life not functional equivalent to life without parole for
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) purposes].)
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Diaz’s sentence of 40 years to life is far less than the 103-
years-to-life sentence imposed in Heard for attempted murder
and voluntary manslaughter. It is also less than the 110-years-
to-life term imposed in People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262,
268; the 50-years-to-life term imposed in People v. Contreras
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 349, 369; and the 140-years-to-life sentence for
multiple homicides imposed in People v. Sorto, supra, 104
Cal.App.5th 435, 440.
In 2031, Diaz will be eligible for parole pursuant to the
youthful parole offender scheme. (§ 3051.) He will then be 42
years old. That scheme aside, Diaz will be eligible for parole in
any event after serving 40 years, at age 57. “[B]y no stretch of
the imagination can this case be called a ‘functional’ or ‘de facto’
[life without parole sentence].” (People v. Perez (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 49, 58.)
Diaz’s sentence affords him an opportunity to reintegrate
into society and realize his potential to participate as a
productive member of society. (People v. Contreras, supra, 4
Cal.5th 349, 360 [“Although they may be punished with long
sentences, [juveniles] must have ‘some meaningful opportunity to
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation’ ”].)
Diaz’s statistical evidence of prisoner life expectancy is not
persuasive. Our Supreme Court, in the Eighth Amendment
context, has commented upon the “legal and empirical
difficulties” associated with an “actuarial approach.” (People v.
Contreras, supra, 4 Cal.5th 349, 364.)
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DISPOSITION
The order denying the recall and resentencing petition is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
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David Walgren, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Shezad H. Thakor,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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