People v. Groner CA4/1

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Filed 6/12/25 P. v. Groner CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084415

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD292855)

MARCUS EBON GRONER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert O. Amador, Judge. Affirmed.
Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Tami
Falkenstein Hennick and Melissa Mandel, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
In December 2021, Marcus Ebon Groner physically attacked his father.
A jury convicted Groner of abuse of an elder under circumstances likely to
cause great bodily harm (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (b)(1); count 1) and assault
with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245(a)(4); count 2). As to both
counts, the jury found true Groner personally inflicted great bodily injury.
(§ 12022.7(c).) The court sentenced Groner to a prison term of five years plus
25 years to life on count 1 and stayed the same sentence as to count 2.
On appeal, Groner claims the facts underlying count 2 establish two
distinct assaults, so the court prejudicially erred by failing to give a
unanimity instruction on its own motion. We conclude the continuing course
of conduct exception applies such that the court was not obligated to instruct
on unanimity. We accordingly affirm.
I.
A.
In December 2021, Marvin Groner was in his mid-seventies. He went
to his son Groner’s apartment to help him with his car. Marvin parked in the
apartment complex’s lot next to Groner’s car.
The pair tried to jump-start Groner’s car without success. Marvin used
a pocketknife to scrape some battery acid off the connector, but that did not
help. Afterward, he put the knife in his pocket. Marvin and Groner
ultimately called a tow service to come get the car.
While waiting for the tow service, Marvin sat in the driver’s seat of his
car with the door ajar, checking his phone, and Groner went inside his
apartment. An agitated Groner came out, sat down in the front passenger
seat of Marvin’s car, and asked Marvin to give him the phone and take him to
the store. Marvin declined because they had to wait for the tow service.
Groner—who has been diagnosed with schizophrenia—suddenly
reached for Marvin’s phone, pushed Marvin out of the driver’s side door and
onto the ground, and began kicking and hitting Marvin. When Marvin told
Groner to get off him, Groner did. Marvin got up, and Groner asked him for

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his car keys. Marvin said he did not have them and crossed the street to get
away from Groner.
Groner pursued Marvin. He pushed Marvin to the ground and began
hitting and kicking him again. Marvin remembered the knife in his pocket
and used it to try to make Groner stop. Bystanders intervened, ending the
beating.
B.
Two eyewitnesses observed the altercation.
The first witness lived in Groner’s apartment complex. While sitting on
his balcony stairs, he heard Groner yelling and saw Groner push Marvin out
of his car and “start[ ] beating him.” The witness did not observe Marvin
yelling or doing anything physical in return. The witness then saw Marvin
run across the street and Groner cross after him. The witness went to get
mace, and when he came back out of his apartment, Marvin was on the
ground and Groner was “kicking [Marvin] in the head.”
The second witness was one of Groner’s neighbors. He was on a
balcony when he saw Groner, who was across the street, hit Marvin several
times in the head, knock him down, and kick him multiple times in the head.
C.
Officers arrived on scene and identified Groner as a potential suspect.
When officers began to approach Groner, he ran into his unit. It took longer
than an hour before officers were able to take him into custody.
The officers obtained surveillance video of the second portion of the
assault from the San Diego Metropolitan Transit Service central dispatch
station. The video was admitted into evidence and played for the jury. This
court has reviewed the video.

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D.
Marvin was transported to the hospital by ambulance. Hospital staff
saw Marvin had external injuries to his head including bruising, swelling,
and a laceration. After a CT scan revealed no internal injuries, staff closed
the laceration with two staples. Marvin also had scrapes on his knees. His
injuries caused soreness.
E.
Groner was charged with three counts. The operative pleading also
alleged Groner had committed two serious felony priors and multiple strike
priors.
The jury found Groner guilty of the first two counts, related to his
actions towards Marvin, but found him not guilty of count 3, resisting an
officer (§ 148(a)(1)). Groner admitted the serious felony priors and the strike
priors. The court found true beyond a reasonable doubt several aggravating
circumstances.
At the sentencing hearing, the court denied Groner’s motion to strike
his strike priors. As to count 1, the court imposed a five-year sentence
enhancement for the great bodily injury allegation with a consecutive term of
25 years to life in prison. The court also imposed a five-year sentence
enhancement for the great bodily injury allegation with a consecutive term of
25 years to life in prison on count 2, but it stayed the sentence under Penal
Code section 654. The court stayed punishment on the serious felony priors.
II.
We summarize the relevant law before addressing Groner’s claim.
A.
To convict a defendant of a crime in California, the jury’s verdict must
be unanimous. (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132.) If a defendant

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is charged with one crime but the evidence suggests more than one criminal
act, either (1) the prosecution must elect the crime on which it relies or
(2) the court must give the jury a unanimity instruction requiring them to
agree on one act for which the defendant is culpable. (Ibid.) This process “is
intended to eliminate the danger that the defendant will be convicted even
though there is no single offense which all the jurors agree the defendant
committed.” (Ibid. [cleaned up].) The court must give the unanimity
instruction if it is warranted, even if the defendant fails to request it. (People
v. Hernandez (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 569.)
Several exceptions to the need to instruct on unanimity exist, including
the continuous course of conduct exception. (Hernandez, 217 Cal.App.4th at
p. 572.) The exception “arises in two contexts.” (Ibid.) “The first is when the
acts are so closely connected that they form part of one and the same
transaction, and thus one offense.” (Ibid. [cleaned up].) The second is when
the statute under which the defendant is charged “contemplates a continuous
course of conduct of a series of acts over a period of time.” (Ibid. [cleaned
up].)
“Because our consideration of whether the trial court should have given
a particular jury instruction involves a mixed question of law and fact which
is predominantly legal, we review de novo whether the specific instruction
was required.” (People v. Sorden (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 582, 616 [cleaned
up].)
B.
Groner rightfully concedes “the offense of elder abuse ‘contemplates a
continuous course of conduct of a series of acts over a period of time’” such
that the continuous course of conduct exception applies to count 1. (Citing
People v. Rae (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 116, 123-124.) He contends, however,

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that assault “does not,” and here the “two distinguishable acts of assault” in
count 2 gave rise to a duty to instruct sua sponte on unanimity. The People
counter that “the acts were so closely connected that they formed part of one
and the same transaction.” We conclude the People have the better
argument.
The eyewitness who observed the entire incident, in his opening
summation of the events, described what happened in a single paragraph
that conveyed the events as part of a single transaction: “[Groner] pushed his
father out of the car, and [Groner] started beating him and everything, like
kicking him and stuff. His father ran across the street, and [Groner] went
across the street where his father was by the [restaurant]. I went to get my
mace. I came back, and [Groner] was kicking his father.”
Similarly, Marvin’s testimony did not suggest any meaningful time
lapse during the struggle. When Groner stopped kicking and hitting Marvin,
Marvin said Groner asked for his keys, Marvin replied he did not know where
they were, and then he “continued to try to go across the street.” There was
not a lengthy period of time separating Groner’s kicks and punches—just the
time it took for Marvin to try to “put distance between” himself and his son.
That Marvin referred to when he “was first assaulted” in his testimony
is not dispositive. When he began describing what happened across the
street, the prosecutor suggested, “Let’s call the first incident in the car and
then the second incident out on the street.” We agree with the People this
was simply a means to conveniently break down the assault for the jury and
was not an indication the prosecutor was presenting two discrete criminal
acts for the jury’s consideration.
Instead, the prosecutor largely described the behavior giving rise to the
assault charge as one event, referring to “the incident,” “part[s] of the assault”

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or “part[s] of the incident.” (Italics added.) Although at the beginning of
closing arguments the prosecutor referenced “an earlier incident,” the
prosecutor focused not on presenting the jury with alternative theories of
assault but instead on describing “a serious beating, a vicious attack, a
vicious assault.” (Italics added.) When breaking down the elements of the
offense, the prosecutor did not do so twice—once for a first incident and again
for a second—but just once. The prosecutor thus presented the assault
charge as a unified event rather than a series of separate incidents.
The defense likewise focused on what happened as a single incident.
Defense counsel explained to the jury that “[c]ounts 1 and 2, basically deal
with the same thing, the assault allegedly on Marvin.” (Italics added.)
Defense counsel described the two counts as “[t]wo crimes for the same
action.” (Italics added.)
Perhaps tellingly, Groner cites no cases in support of his position that
the continuing course of conduct exception is inapplicable here, instead
focusing most of his argument on the issue of prejudice.
Yet we conclude this case is analogous to Sorden, in which this court
concluded no unanimity instruction was required. In Sorden, the defendant
was subject to a criminal protective order in favor of a prior girlfriend.
(Sorden, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 589.) The defendant unexpectedly saw his prior
girlfriend in a neighbor’s home. (Id. at pp. 589-590.) While inside the
neighbor’s home, the defendant grabbed his prior girlfriend by the arm to
lead her outside. (Id. at p. 590.) He punched the neighbor, who punched him
back. (Ibid.) The prior girlfriend fell down while trying to escape, and the
defendant picked her up and put her down outside. (Id. at p. 616.) The
defendant then lifted her over his shoulder and carried her to the end of the
driveway, where he released her. (Id. at pp. 616-617.) The defendant was

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charged with willfully violating a protective order (id. at p. 591), as well as an
enhancement for a violation of the order “involving an act of violence” (id. at
p. 614; Pen. Code, § 166(c)(4).)
On appeal, the defendant claimed the court should have given a
unanimity instruction for the jury to agree as to which act constituted
violence for purposes of the enhancement because the allegation “‘involved
two discrete acts [i.e., the punch and the forceful carrying] and two discrete
victims.’” (Sorden, 65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 615-616.) This court disagreed,
concluding the continuing course of conduct exception applied because “[a]ll
of the violence occurred over a short period of time as [defendant] was
removing [his prior girlfriend] from [the neighbor]’s apartment.” (Id. at
pp. 616-617.)
The same is all the more true here, where there was a single victim and
the violence occurred over a short period of time as Groner unprovokedly beat
his father while they waited for a tow truck to arrive.
Accordingly, the assault was a single transaction such that the
continuing course of conduct exception applies. The court therefore did not
err by not instructing the jury on unanimity. Given this conclusion, we need
not address the remainder of the parties’ arguments, including the People’s
contention that the instructions given conveyed the unanimity requirement
or prejudice.

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III.
We affirm.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.

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