People v. Swanson CA6

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Filed 6/11/25 P. v. Swanson CA6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H050624
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 22CR006397)

v.

FREDDY GUSTAF SWANSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Freddy Gustaf Swanson was convicted by a jury of, among other
offenses, attempted carjacking and was sentenced to a total term of eight years and two
months in prison.
On appeal, Swanson argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for attempted carjacking and that, at sentencing, the trial court erred in
awarding presentence custody and conduct credits. The Attorney General contends that
the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Swanson’s conviction but
concedes that Swanson is entitled to additional credits.
Following oral argument, we vacated submission and requested supplemental
briefing on whether double jeopardy would bar retrial of the lesser related offense of
attempted vehicle theft if we were to conclude that substantial evidence did not support
Swanson’s attempted carjacking conviction, directing the parties’ attention to People v.
Goolsby (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1220 (Goolsby II).1
We further asked the parties to brief the following issues: 1) if we conclude double
jeopardy bars retrial of the lesser related offense of attempted vehicle theft, do we apply
the “accusatory pleading” test or the “elements” test to evaluate whether there are any
uncharged lesser included offenses to the charged offense of attempted carjacking; 2)
pursuant to the applicable test, are there any lesser included offenses to attempted
carjacking, including but not limited to, e.g., attempted grand theft auto (Pen. Code,
§§ 664, 487, subd. (d)(1)),2 attempted grand theft person (§§ 664, 487, subd. (c)), simple
assault (§ 240), or simple battery (§ 242); and 3) depending on the resolution of the
previous issues, what would be the appropriate disposition in this case?
As we explain below, we conclude that the evidence was not sufficient to support
a conviction for attempted carjacking and further conclude that retrial of the lesser related
offense of attempted vehicle theft is barred by double jeopardy. We agree with the
parties that there are no lesser included offenses to attempted carjacking and that
Swanson is entitled to additional credits. Consequently, we will reverse the judgment
and remand the matter for the trial court to vacate Swanson’s conviction for attempted
carjacking and resentence him on his remaining convictions.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedural background
On September 26, 2022, the Monterey County District Attorney filed a first
amended information charging Swanson with one felony count of attempted carjacking

1
Goolsby II considered, as directed by the California Supreme Court in People v.
Goolsby (2015) 62 Cal.4th 360 (Goolsby I), whether retrial on a lesser related offense
was barred by double jeopardy principles. (Goolsby I, at p. 368.)
2
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
(§§ 664, 215, subd. (a); count 1); one felony count of unlawful driving or taking of a
vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 2); one felony count of receiving a stolen
motor vehicle (§ 469d, subd. (a); count 3); two felony counts of evading an officer (Veh.
Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); counts 4, 6); two felony counts of evading an officer against
traffic (Veh. Code, § 2800.4; counts 5, 7); and one misdemeanor count of possession of
methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 8).
The information further alleged that, as to count 1, Swanson was on bail at the
time of the offense (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)), and as to counts 2 and 3, Swanson had a prior
conviction for automobile theft (§ 666.5, subd. (a)). In addition, the information alleged
five aggravating factors: 1) counts 1 through 7 involved great bodily harm or the threat of
great bodily harm (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1));3 2) counts 1 through 7 involved
planning, sophistication, and professionalism (rule 4.421(a)(8)); 3) counts 1 through 7
involved an attempted or actual taking of great monetary value (rule 4.421(a)(9)); 4) in
counts 1, 4, 5, and 7, Swanson engaged in violent conduct (rule 4.421(b)(1)); and 5) as to
counts 1 through 7, Swanson had prior convictions or sustained juvenile delinquency
petitions that are numerous and of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)).
On September 28, 2022, a jury convicted Swanson on all counts with the
exception of counts 6 and 7 (felony evading an officer and felony evading an officer
against traffic). Following a court trial,4 the court found both enhancements true along
with certain factors in aggravation.
On October 26, 2022, Swanson filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that
there was no substantial evidence to support a conviction for attempted carjacking
(§§ 664, 215, subd. (a); count 1).

3
Unspecified rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
4
Swanson waived his right to a jury trial on the enhancements and factors in
aggravation.
3
At the November 4, 2022 sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Swanson’s
motion for a new trial. The trial court then sentenced Swanson to a total term of eight
years and two months in state prison, consisting of an upper term of four years, six
months on count 1, plus two years consecutive for the on-bail enhancement; a
consecutive one year term (one-third the middle term of three years) on count 2; a
consecutive eight month term (one-third the middle term of two years) on count 4; and a
concurrent term of 365 days on count 8. The court stayed the sentences on counts 3 and
5 pursuant to section 654.
The court imposed a restitution fund fine of $1,200 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(2)) and an
additional parole revocation fund fine of $1,200, suspended pending successful
completion of parole (§ 1202.45). The court also imposed a court operations assessment
of $240 (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), a court facilities assessment of $180 (Gov. Code,
§ 70373), and a total of $12 in emergency medical air transportation fees (Gov. Code,
§ 76000.10). Finally, the court awarded 200 days of custody credit plus 30 days of
conduct credits “calculated at 15%” for a total of 230 days.
Swanson timely appealed.
B. Factual background
1. January 19, 2021 incident5
On January 19, 2021, the victim reported that his vehicle had been stolen. Later
that day, a Monterey police officer responded to a report of two vehicles driving
recklessly. The officer tried to pull one of the vehicles over, and the driver turned and
5
The facts relating to this incident, which formed the basis for the charges of
unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851 subd. (a); count 2); receiving
a stolen motor vehicle (§ 469d, subd. (a); count 3); evading an officer (Veh. Code,
§ 2800.2, subd. (a); count 4); evading an officer against traffic (Veh. Code, § 2800.4;
count 5); and possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a);
count 8), are not relevant to the issues presented on appeal. Therefore, we present only a
brief summary of what occurred.
4
looked at the officer before accelerating away. Given the traffic congestion and the
driver’s recklessness, the officer ended his pursuit. The officer later learned the vehicle
he was pursuing had been reported stolen earlier that day. The officer identified Swanson
in court as the driver.
The evening of January 19, 2021, a Seaside police officer was following a vehicle
that he suspected was the one the victim had reported stolen that morning. The officer
tried to pull the vehicle over, but it immediately turned into the opposite lane and drove
off at a high rate of speed.
Swanson was arrested on the evening of January 20, 2021. Swanson had a small
bag of methamphetamine on his person. The stolen vehicle was recovered in a separate
location on January 21, 2021.
2. April 29, 2021 incident
On April 29, 2021, John Doe6 woke up at his usual time of around 5:00 a.m. and
began making his breakfast smoothie. Doe realized that he had left the cup he used for
that beverage in his truck so he went outside to retrieve it. As Doe stepped out on his
porch, he saw a man sitting on the curb across the street. It was very dim, with the only
light coming from the apartment complex across the street.
Doe walked down the two flights of stairs to where his truck was parked and as
Doe reached the back of his truck, the man sitting on the curb got up and walked away
down the street. Doe approached the driver’s side door of his truck and noticed that it
was slightly ajar. The interior light was not on, and Doe thought that the man he had seen
previously had been in his truck.
As soon as Doe opened the door to his truck, a man (later identified as Swanson)
jumped out. Swanson shoved Doe out of his way, back toward the rear of the truck, and

6
The victim was identified as “John Doe” at trial.
5
tried to flee “immediately.” As “he was going past [Doe]”, Doe grabbed Swanson’s
sweatshirt, swung him around, and Doe put him in a choke hold.
Doe and Swanson struggled in the parking area, with Swanson facing away from
Doe in a “rear naked choke.” Swanson swung his arm behind him trying to strike Doe
and hit him at least once on the back right side of his head just behind his ear.7 Doe did
not let go and Swanson knelt on the ground, saying he could not breathe.
Doe loosened his choke hold and Swanson slowly stood up, with Doe still holding
him. Swanson started to twist around to face Doe and, fearing that Swanson had another
weapon, Doe shoved him away. Swanson ran off down the street.
Doe was treated at the emergency room for a gash on his head, which required
seven staples to close. The physicians said that the wound caused nerve damage, and at
the time of trial, Doe was experiencing numbness with an occasional jolt of pain from the
injury. Doe also had some abrasions on his arm, elbow, and knees caused by the
pavement as he grappled with Swanson.
After the incident, Doe looked inside his truck and saw that the ignition cylinder
had been removed and left on the floor. Based on his experience as an auto mechanic,
Doe knew that, once the ignition cylinder was removed, a thief would only need to insert
a screwdriver into the ignition switch and turn it. Doe thought that Swanson was
“probably about 30 seconds away from stealing my truck.” Doe also saw that the glove
box was opened, and the interior dome light had been removed.
When police examined the truck, they collected DNA evidence from the interior
and from a “shaved key” they found on the floorboard which had a high probability of
coming from Swanson.

7
Doe testified the object that struck him was sharp and “most likely … a
screwdriver.”
6
II. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the evidence
Swanson argues the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to support his
conviction for attempted carjacking, specifically in that there was not “substantial
evidence that he intended to take the truck from … Doe’s immediate presence much less
that he intended to do so through force or fear.”
The Attorney General argues that there was substantial evidence Swanson formed
the requisite specific intent for attempted carjacking when Doe arrived at the truck and
interrupted his efforts.
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to
support a conviction for attempted carjacking.
1. Additional background
In count 1, the information accused Swanson of attempted carjacking in violation
of sections 215, subdivision (a) and 664, when he “[attempted to] unlawfully take a motor
vehicle in the possession of JOHN DOE from his or her person and immediate presence
and from the person …, against the will and with the intent to permanently and
temporarily deprive the person in possession of the motor vehicle of the possession and
accomplished by means of force and fear.”
The trial court instructed the jury on count 1 as follows: “A person who attempts
to commit carjacking is guilty of attempted carjacking even if, after taking a direct step
towards committing the crime, he or she abandoned further efforts to complete the crime
or if his or her attempt failed or was interrupted by someone or something beyond his or
her control. [¶] On the other hand, if a person freely and voluntarily abandons his or her
carjacking, then that person is not guilty of attempt[ed] carjacking. [¶] … [¶] To prove
that the defendant is guilty of carjacking, the People must prove that: [¶] One, the
defendant took a motor vehicle; [¶] Two, the vehicle was taken from the immediate
7
presence of a person who possessed the vehicle or was its passenger; [¶] Three, the
vehicle was taken against that person’s will; [¶] Four, the defendant used force or fear to
take the vehicle or to prevent that person from resisting; [¶] And five, when the
defendant used force or fear to take the vehicle, he intended to deprive the other person of
possession of the vehicle either temporarily or permanently. [¶] The defendant’s intent
to take the vehicle must have been formed before or during the time he used force or fear.
If the defendant did not form this required intent until after using the force or fear, then
he did not commit carjacking. [¶] … [¶] Fear, as used here, means fear of injury to the
person himself or injury to the person’s family or property. [¶] A vehicle is within a
person’s immediate presence if it is sufficiently within his or her control so that he or she
could keep possession of it if not prevented by force or fear. [¶] A carjacking occurs
when a person uses force or fear to take the vehicle or to prevent that person from
resisting either before, while, or after the defendant initially takes possession of the
vehicle. [¶] Mere theft becomes carjacking if the perpetrator, having gained possession
of the property without the use of force or fear, resorts to force or fear while driving off
with the vehicle.”
In final argument, the prosecutor asserted that the fourth element of the offense
was established “[a]s soon as [Swanson] put his hands on [] Doe, that’s when that theft
turned into the attempted carjacking because he used the force or fear on [] Doe. And
then he was unable to get away with the vehicle. He fled. That’s when your attempted
carjacking occurred. [¶] Attempted -- the defendant took a direct but ineffective step
towards committing a carjacking and he intended to commit it. [¶] When the defendant
chose to use force, push [Doe], continue that scuffle, put that laceration into … Doe’s
head, that’s when the carjacking occurred. [¶] The defendant intended to do that. He
intended to use the force. He intended to steal the car. And had [] Doe not come out, it
wouldn’t have been … interrupted.”
8
Defense counsel did not specifically address count 1 in his closing argument but
instead urged the jury to acquit Swanson because there was no direct identification of him
by Doe.8
The jury returned a general verdict on count 1, finding Swanson “[g]uilty of
the crime of ATTEMPTED CARJACKING, in violation of California Penal Code
[sections] 664/215(a).”
2. Standard of review and applicable legal principles
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we “review the whole record in the
light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578 (Johnson).) “In applying this test,
we … presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could
reasonably have deduced from the evidence.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327,
357 (Zamudio).) “We ‘must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn
from the circumstantial evidence.’ ” (Ibid.) ‘We resolve neither credibility issues nor
evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A
reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s
verdict.” (Ibid.) “Simply put, if the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings,
the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also

8
Doe testified that he told police officers that the man who had tried to take his
truck had a tattoo of a “flower” or “rose” covering the back of his right hand. On cross-
examination, Doe said that, just prior to him taking the witness stand, the district attorney
showed him photographs of the backs of Swanson’s hands. When shown the photo of the
back of Swanson’s right hand, Doe was “really surprised” because there “was no flower
tattoo” or any other kind of tattoo covering that hand.
9
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th
107, 143.) “However, ‘[a] reasonable inference … “may not be based on suspicion alone,
or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work. [¶] ...
A finding of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence rather than … a mere
speculation as to probabilities without evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th
353, 360 (Davis).)
Section 215, subdivision (a) states: “ ‘Carjacking’ is the felonious taking of a
motor vehicle in the possession of another, from his or her person or immediate presence,
or from the person or immediate presence of a passenger of the motor vehicle, against his
or her will and with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person in
possession of the motor vehicle of his or her possession, accomplished by means of force
or fear.” Courts have repeatedly observed that the carjacking statute is modeled on the
robbery statute. (In re Travis W. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 368, 373–377, and cases cited
therein.) Although distinct crimes with some notable differences, carjacking and robbery
are closely related and cases regarding robbery are instructive regarding carjacking
because the elements and statutory language of the two offenses are similar. (People v.
Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1059–1061 (Lopez).)
“An attempt to commit a crime consists of two elements: a specific intent to
commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission.” (§ 21a.)
Thus, attempted carjacking requires the specific intent to take a vehicle not one’s own;
from the immediate presence of a person possessing the vehicle; against that person’s
will; using force or fear to accomplish the taking; intending to deprive that person of the
vehicle either temporarily or permanently. (§ 215; CALCRIM No. 1650.) The
accompanying act required is “a direct but ineffective step [¶] ... [¶] that goes beyond
planning or preparation and shows that a person is putting his or her plan into action,”
and “indicates a definite and unambiguous intent to commit [carjacking].” (CALCRIM
10
No. 460.) A person is guilty of attempted carjacking “even if, after taking a direct step
towards committing the crime, ... his or her attempt failed or was interrupted by someone
or something beyond his or her control.” (Ibid.)
3. Analysis
The evidence presented below was insufficient to establish that Swanson intended
to use force or fear to take Doe’s vehicle. Once Doe opened the door to his car, there was
no evidence that Swanson intended to do anything except flee and any force he employed
thereafter was to escape from Doe’s grasp rather than to take Doe’s vehicle.
We briefly recount the salient evidence. At around 5:00 a.m., Doe went to his
truck to retrieve a cup. It was still dark and Doe did not see that anyone was inside his
vehicle though he saw someone sitting on the curb across the street. When Doe reached
the driver’s side door, he noticed it was ajar but thought that the person across the street
had been in his vehicle. The interior light was not on, because Swanson had removed the
dome light, presumably to minimize being detected.
As soon as Doe opened the door, Swanson jumped out, put both hands on Doe’s
chest and shoved him “out of the way.”9 In Doe’s words, Swanson tried to “flee
immediately” but Doe grabbed Swanson’s sweatshirt as he attempted to escape. It was
only after Doe had Swanson in a choke hold that Swanson swung his arm at Doe,
eventually striking him once in the head with a sharp object.
As they struggled, Doe testified that Swanson never attempted to move toward or
re-enter the truck, saying “It never got back into the truck. It was all outside. It actually

9
Doe repeatedly used the phrase “out of the way” or its equivalent to describe
how Swanson shoved him, e.g., “somebody jumped out of my truck and shoved me out
of the way[,]” “[h]e pushed me out of the way[,]” “they pushed me out of the way, both
hands, right on my chest, shoved me out of the way[,]” “I was pushed out of their path
towards -- towards the rear of the truck.”
11
moved towards my driveway.” When Doe loosened his grip on Swanson and pushed him
away, Swanson immediately ran away.
None of this evidence supports the conclusion that Swanson intended to take the
truck from Doe’s immediate presence at any time. Rather, the evidence shows only that
Swanson made every effort to avoid detection (entering the truck at 5:00 a.m. before
sunrise and removing the dome light so as to prevent anyone seeing him in the vehicle),
as well as that, once he was detected, Swanson’s singular intention was to escape. While
it is clear that Swanson initially intended to steal Doe’s vehicle, under “ ‘ “no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s verdict[]”
(Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357) that Swanson was guilty of attempted carjacking.
As discussed above, “the Legislature modeled the carjacking statute on the
robbery statute,” and therefore courts have relied on robbery cases to interpret the
carjacking statute. (Lopez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1059.) The taking of the vehicle must
be from the “person or immediate presence” of the person. (§ 215, subd. (a).) “ ‘A
vehicle is within a person’s immediate presence for purposes of carjacking if it is
sufficiently within his control so that he could retain possession of it if not prevented by
force or fear.’ ” (People v. Johnson (2015) 60 Cal.4th 966, 989.) Appellate courts have
taken an expansive view of the “immediate presence” element of carjacking and it is not
a requirement that the victim “be physically present in the vehicle when the confrontation
[with the prospective carjacker] occurs.” (People v. Medina (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 643,
650.)
Robbery and carjacking are both continuing offenses that are proven if force or
fear is used to prevent retaking of property initially obtained without either. Robbery
“begins from the time of the original taking until the robber reaches a place of relative
safety,” and “[i]t is sufficient ... that [defendant] used force to prevent the ... retaking [of]
the property and to facilitate his escape.” (People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23,
12
28.) A like rule applies to carjacking. “[M]ere vehicle theft becomes carjacking if the
perpetrator, having gained possession of the motor vehicle without use of force or fear,
resorts to force or fear while driving off with the vehicle.” (People v. O'Neil (1997) 56
Cal.App.4th 1126, 1131.)
In this case, however, the evidence presented was that Swanson’s use of force was
intended to effectuate his escape (on foot), not to complete the theft of Doe’s truck. For
example, when Doe went to open the door to the vehicle, Swanson pushed Doe “out of
the way” and tried to run past him, away from the truck’s cab. In order to establish that
Swanson’s use of force was intended to allow him to resume his efforts to steal the
vehicle, there must be credible evidence of this specific intent. Such evidence might
include testimony that Swanson took steps to prevent Doe from retaking the truck or that
Swanson attempted to reenter the vehicle. However, Doe offered no testimony that
Swanson made even the slightest effort to do either of those things. In fact, Doe’s
testimony was consistent and clear that the only reason Swanson remained anywhere
near the truck during their encounter was because Doe grabbed Swanson’s sweatshirt and
placed him in a chokehold, preventing his escape. It was at that point that Swanson
swung his arm at Doe, striking him once in the head with a sharp object. When Swanson
said he could not breathe, Doe relaxed his grip a bit and Swanson was able to stand up,
with Doe still holding him. Swanson began to slowly twist his body around to face Doe
and Doe, fearing that Swanson was armed and would “jab at [his] face[,]” let go and
“shoved [Swanson] away.” Once Doe released his grip, Swanson immediately ran off.
The Attorney General argues we should affirm the conviction because the “jury
could have inferred that if [Swanson] saw Doe coming and if [Swanson] had wanted to
abandon his efforts to steal the truck, he would have fled before Doe made it to the
truck.” We are not persuaded. There was no evidence that Swanson was aware of Doe’s
approach or that Doe was associated with the vehicle until Doe reached the door of the
13
truck. Consequently, any inference that Swanson saw Doe approaching and chose to
assault Doe instead of fleeing amounts to nothing more than “ ‘ “a mere speculation as to
probabilities without evidence.” ’ ” (Davis, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 360.)
Having reviewed the record in the light most favorable to the judgment below
(Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 578), as we must, we conclude that there is not
substantial evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value establishing that
Swanson formed a specific intent to commit the crime of carjacking, and that he took a
direct but ineffectual act toward its commission.
B. Double jeopardy
1. Applicable legal principles
Both the United States Constitution and the California Constitution prohibit a
defendant from being “twice put in jeopardy” for the same offense. (U.S. Const., 5th
& 14th Amends.; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) “ ‘At its core, the double jeopardy
clause “protect[s] an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible
conviction more than once for an alleged offense.” [Citation.] The policy underlying
the double jeopardy protection “is that the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual … thereby subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Wilson (2023) 14
Cal.5th 839, 852 (Wilson).) In applying double jeopardy protections, California courts
take guidance from “those decisions interpreting the double jeopardy clauses of both the
United States and California Constitutions.” (People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 271
(Hatch).)
“Whether double jeopardy principles bar a second prosecution depends on how the
first trial ended.” (Wilson, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 852.) Where the defendant is acquitted
on a charge, double jeopardy “ ‘unequivocally prohibits a second trial … [citation]’ ” on
14
that same charge. (Ibid.) Double jeopardy will not necessarily preclude retrial where a
defendant succeeds in having a conviction overturned on appeal or through collateral
attack “ ‘because of some error in the proceedings leading to conviction.’ [Citation.]”
(Id. at p. 853.) Nevertheless, “[a] settled exception to this rule permitting retrial after a
successful appeal occurs when a conviction has been reversed due to insufficiency of the
evidence. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) A reversal based on legal insufficiency of the evidence
has the same double jeopardy effect as an acquittal “because it means that no rational
factfinder could have voted to convict the defendant.” (Tibbs v. Florida (1982) 457 U.S.
31, 41.)
2. Retrial of lesser related offense
We next address whether double jeopardy bars retrial on the lesser related offense
of attempted vehicle theft given that, in this case, the evidence was not sufficient to
support a conviction for attempted carjacking but could have been sufficient to support a
conviction for that lesser related offense. Before trial, Swanson requested that the jury be
instructed on attempted vehicle theft as a lesser related offense in count 1 and the
prosecution agreed. At the conclusion of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on
the lesser related offense of attempted car theft.10 However, it also instructed the jurors
that it should only reach a verdict on the lesser related offense if it first concluded that
Swanson was not guilty of the greater offense of attempted carjacking.11 Having

10
Specifically, the court instructed the jury: “To prove that the defendant is guilty
of attempted unlawful taking of a vehicle, the People must prove that: [¶] One, the
defendant took a direct but ineffective step toward committing an unlawful taking of a
vehicle; [¶] And two, the defendant intended to commit the unlawful taking of a vehicle.”
11
In her summation, the prosecutor also informed the jurors that they could only
consider the lesser related offense if they “all agree that it has not been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed [] attempted carjacking.”
15
concluded that Swanson was guilty of attempted carjacking, the jury did not return a
verdict on the lesser related offense of attempted vehicle theft.
In Goolsby I, supra, 62 Cal.4th 360, the California Supreme Court held that retrial
on a lesser related offense does not violate section 654 even where the defendant’s
conviction on the greater offense was reversed for insufficient evidence. (Goolsby I,
supra, at pp. 363.) In that case, although the lesser related offense was not charged in the
information, the jury had been instructed on it and the defendant raised no objection to
that instruction. (Ibid.) However, believing the lesser related offense was a lesser
included offense, the trial court erroneously “instructed the jury to reach a verdict on it
only if it acquitted defendant of the charged [greater offense].” (Ibid.) The jury found
the defendant guilty of the greater offense and, as instructed, did not render a verdict on
the lesser offense. (Ibid.) Because the jury did not reach a verdict on the lesser related
offense, that charge remained “ ‘unresolved[.]’ ” (Id. at p. 367.) The Supreme Court
remanded the case to the appellate court for consideration of whether a retrial on the
lesser related offense was barred by double jeopardy principles. (Id. at p. 368.)
On remand, the court of appeal concluded that retrial of the lesser related offense
was barred by double jeopardy. (Goolsby II, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1224.) The
court determined that this was so because the trial court discharged the jury without
requiring it to return a verdict on the lesser related offense. (Id. at p. 1226.) In so
holding, the court rejected the People’s argument that double jeopardy does not prohibit
retrial where reversal is due to an error of law, such as where the “jury’s failure to return
a verdict on the lesser related offense was due to misinstruction.” (Ibid.) The court noted
that the reversal of the verdict on the greater offense was based on the insufficiency of the
evidence, not an error of law. (Ibid.) Discharging the jury without requiring that it return
a verdict on the lesser related offense, “ ‘is tantamount to an acquittal and prevents a
retrial, unless the defendant consented to the discharge or legal necessity required it.
16
[Citations.]’ (Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 516 [183 Cal. Rptr. 647, 646
P.2d 809], fn. omitted.)” (Goolsby II, supra, at p. 1225.)
In his supplemental brief, Swanson argues that, because the jury was instructed on
the lesser related offense of attempted vehicle theft but was discharged without rendering
a verdict on that offense, double jeopardy bars any retrial on that charge. The Attorney
General contends that double jeopardy does not bar a retrial because, at the close of
evidence, the trial court instructed12 the jury that it could “accept a verdict of guilty of a
lesser related crime only if you have found the defendant not guilty of the corresponding
greater crime.” As a result, when the jury failed to return a verdict on the lesser related
offense of attempted vehicle theft, it was due to this instruction.13 According to the
Attorney General, Swanson consented to the jury’s discharge and “waived any plea of
first in jeopardy” by filing a motion for a new trial, citing People v. Eroshevich (2014) 60
Cal.4th 583, 590 (Eroshevich).
We conclude Swanson has the better argument. We first note that the Attorney
General’s citation to Eroshevich is misplaced. Eroshevich does state that, as a general
rule, “[a] defendant who files a motion for a new trial, like a defendant who moves for a
mistrial, waives state and federal double jeopardy protections. [Citations.]” (Eroshevich,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 590.) Here, however, Swanson did not move for retrial on the
lesser related offense (and it is not clear how he could have done so, given that no verdict

12
The Attorney General points out that while neither party requested this
instruction (CALCRIM 3517), neither party objected when the trial court proposed that it
be given.
13
The Attorney General also makes the following concession: “[T]here was no
legal necessity to discharge the jury. The record does not demonstrate the jury
deadlocked on any of the issues presented to it nor was there any reason to declare a
mistrial. The jury appears to have duly discharged its duties, having found appellant
guilty of the greater offense and been instructed not to issue a verdict on any lesser
offenses.”
17
was entered on that charge), so Eroshevich is not applicable. Consequently, Swanson’s
(unsuccessful) motion for a new trial on his attempted carjacking conviction did not
waive his right to assert double jeopardy as to the lesser related offense of attempted
vehicle theft.
Goolsby II, on the other hand, is on point. In the present case, the jury was, at
Swanson’s request and without objection from the prosecution, instructed on attempted
vehicle theft as a lesser related offense to attempted carjacking. In accordance with the
trial court’s instruction, the jury did not return a verdict on that offense since it found
Swanson guilty of the greater offense. Although Swanson did not object to the jury being
discharged before reaching a verdict on the lesser related offense of attempted auto theft,
this does not equate to consent. (Goolsby II, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1226–1227.)
Once the jury was discharged without having reached a verdict on the lesser related
offense, it was as if Swanson was acquitted on that charge and double jeopardy precludes
retrial.
C. Lesser included offenses
Pursuant to sections 1181, subdivision 6, and 1260,14 where “ ‘insufficient
evidence supports the conviction for a greater offense [an appellate court] may, in lieu of
granting a new trial, modify the judgment of conviction to reflect a conviction for a lesser

14
Section 1181, subdivision 6 provides that a trial court may grant a new trial
“[w]hen the verdict or finding is contrary to law or evidence, but if the evidence shows
the defendant to be not guilty of the degree of the crime of which he was convicted, but
guilty of a lesser degree thereof, or of a lesser crime included therein, the court may
modify the verdict, finding or judgment accordingly without granting or ordering a new
trial, and this power shall extend to any court to which the cause may be appealed … .”
Section 1260 provides that “[t]he court may reverse, affirm, or modify a judgment
or order appealed from, or reduce the degree of the offense or attempted offense or the
punishment imposed … and may, if proper, order a new trial and may, if proper, remand
the cause to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be just under the
circumstances.”
18
included offense.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Bailey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 740, 748, fn.
omitted, (Bailey).) To evaluate whether an uncharged offense is necessarily included
within a charged offense, courts employ two tests: “the ‘elements’ test and the
‘accusatory pleading’ test.” (People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1227.) “Under the
elements test, if the statutory elements of the greater offense include all of the statutory
elements of the lesser offense, the latter is necessarily included in the former. Under the
accusatory pleading test, if the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading include
all of the elements of the lesser offense, the latter is necessarily included in the former.
[Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1227–1228.)
In response to our question regarding which of these two tests we should apply to
evaluate whether there are any lesser included offenses to attempted carjacking, the
parties agree that we should apply the elements test because the first amended
information incorporated the statutory definition of attempted carjacking without
referring to particular facts. (People v. Robinson (2016) 63 Cal.4th 200, 207.) We agree
that the elements test applies.
We now examine whether there are, under the elements test, any lesser included
offenses to attempted carjacking. In response to our request for supplemental briefing,
the parties examined whether attempted grand theft auto (§§ 664, 487, subd. (d)(1)),15

15
Section 487, subdivision (d)(1) provides: “Grand theft is theft committed in any
of the following cases: [¶] … [¶] (d) When the property taken is any of the following: (1)
An automobile.” “An attempt to commit a crime consists of two elements: a specific
intent to commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission.”
(§ 21a.)
19
attempted grand theft person (§§ 664, 487, subd. (c)),16 simple assault (§ 240),17 or simple
battery (§ 242)18 would be lesser included offenses to attempted carjacking. The parties
agree that none of these crimes qualify under the elements test as lesser included offenses
and we concur.
As discussed in People v. Marquez (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1064 (Marquez),
attempted grand theft auto is not a lesser included offense of attempted carjacking
because attempted grand theft auto requires an intent to permanently deprive the victim
of possession, whereas attempted carjacking can be committed with the intent to either
temporarily or permanently deprive the victim of possession. (Id. at p. 1068.) Similarly,
attempted grand theft person does not satisfy the elements test because, like attempted
grand theft auto, the perpetrator must have the intent to permanently deprive the victim of
possession and attempted carjacking may be committed with the intent to temporarily
deprive the victim of possession.
Simple assault also does not meet the elements test as a lesser included offense of
attempted carjacking. “[A]ssault requires actual knowledge of the facts sufficient to
establish that the defendant’s act by its nature will probably and directly result in injury
to another.” (People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 782.) Attempted carjacking,

16
Section 487, subdivision (c) provides: “Grand theft is theft committed in any of
the following cases: [¶] … [¶] (c) When the property is taken from the person of
another.”
17
Section 240 provides; “An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present
ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.”
18
Section 242 provides: “A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or
violence upon the person of another.”
20
however, does not require any injury to another person and may be accomplished by fear
alone. (§§ 215, 240.)
Similarly, battery is not a lesser included offense of attempted carjacking because
battery requires the willful application “of force or violence upon the person of another.”
(§§ 215, 242.) “ ‘Any harmful or offensive touching constitutes an unlawful use of force
or violence’ under [section 242]. [Citations.]” (People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th
400, 404.) Attempted carjacking, on the other hand, does not require the application of
force but may be accomplished by fear alone. (§ 215; Marquez, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1067–1068.)
As neither party has identified any lesser included offense to attempted carjacking
and our research has disclosed none, there is no basis for this court to modify the
judgment “ ‘to reflect a conviction for a lesser included offense.’ [Citations.]” (Bailey,
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 748, fn. omitted.) Accordingly, we will remand the matter for the
trial court to strike Swanson’s conviction for attempted carjacking and to resentence him
on the remaining convictions.
D. Credits
Swanson argues and the Attorney General concedes that the trial court erred when
it calculated his presentence custody credits subject to the 15 percent limitation in section
2933.1. We agree with the parties. Attempted carjacking is not a designated offense
under section 2933.1, subdivision (a) and thus Swanson was not subject to the 15 percent
credit limitation.
As we are reversing the judgment and remanding the matter for resentencing, the
trial court can recalculate the number of credits due.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded. On remand, the trial court
shall strike Swanson’s conviction on count 1 due to insufficiency of the evidence and
21
resentence him on counts 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8. At resentencing, the trial court shall
recalculate Swanson’s credits.

22
____________________________
WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
LIE, Acting P. J.

_____________________________
BROMBERG, J.

People v. Swanson
H050624

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