CourtListener 10602814•People v. Arriaga CA6
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Filed 6/11/25 P. v. Arriaga CA6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H051594
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 18CR004863)
v.
CORRIE DENISE ARRIAGA,
Defendant and Appellant.
In October 2019, defendant Corrie Denise Arriaga pleaded no contest to first
degree “willful, deliberate and premeditated murder” (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a),
189),1 admitting the special circumstance that the murder was intentional and involved
the infliction of torture (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)). By the time of Arriaga’s plea, it was well
established that a person could not be convicted of premeditated and deliberate murder
without personally harboring malice. (See, e.g., People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155,
158–159 (Chiu); People v. Rivera (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1357 (Rivera).) Her
plea also followed the operative date of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 1437), which abrogated the natural and probable consequences doctrine of
accomplice liability and expressly provided that “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on . . . her participation in a crime.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2,
1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
p. 6675 [amending §§ 188 and 189].) In 2023, however, Arriaga petitioned under
section 1172.6 to have her murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced, asserting
that the prosecution had proceeded on a theory of imputed malice. Because the trial court
correctly determined that the record of conviction establishes that Arriaga is ineligible for
relief, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Brief Summary of the Offenses2
In August 2017, Courtney Ann Turney was found dead in an apartment shared by
Arriaga and Manuel Jesus Lopez Jarquin. Before Turney’s death, Arriaga had been
restricting Turney’s access to food and water, which resulted in Turney becoming
malnourished and dehydrated to the point of sometimes consuming birdseed and nonfood
items like cleaning products. Arriaga inflicted physical abuse on Turney and deposited
checks made out to Turney. Only Arriaga and Lopez Jarquin had the key to unlock the
front door of the apartment, and Turney had been unable to leave.
B. The Information and Arriaga’s Plea
In February 2019, Arriaga was charged by information with willful, deliberate,
and premeditated murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) with a torture-murder special circumstance
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)), torture (§ 206), human trafficking (§ 236.1, subd. (a)) with an
allegation of great bodily injury (§ 236.4, subd. (b)), false imprisonment (§ 368, subd. (f))
with an enhancement for great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and three counts of
theft from an elder or dependent adult (§ 368, subd. (d)).
In August 2019, Arriaga pleaded no contest to the charge of willful, deliberate,
and premeditated murder and admitted the torture-murder special circumstance with the
understanding that she would be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. In her
2
In a waiver of rights and plea form, Arriaga stipulated to several facts as true.
We derive our summary of the offense from these stipulated facts.
2
waiver of rights and plea form, Arriaga stipulated that the murder of Turney “was willful,
deliberate and premeditated, within the meaning of Penal Code section 189,” that it “was
intentional and involved the infliction of torture, within the meaning of Penal Code
section 190.2[, subdivision ](a)(18),” and that “[a]t the time of the offenses, [Arriaga] had
the requisite intent and mental state for the crime to which [she was] pleading guilty and
for the special circumstance [she was] admitting.”
In December 2019, the trial court sentenced Arriaga to the agreed-upon term of
life without the possibility of parole. The remaining counts were dismissed as part of the
plea agreement.
C. The Petition for Resentencing
In June 2023, Arriaga filed a form petition for resentencing under section 1172.6
seeking vacatur of her murder conviction and for resentencing. The People opposed the
petition, arguing that imputed malice theories had already been abrogated by the time
Arriaga pleaded no contest to first degree murder and that the torture-murder special
circumstance required a finding that Arriaga had the intent to kill Turney. The trial court
denied the petition at the prima facie stage, concluding that Arriaga could not have been
convicted under an invalid theory of murder and that the record of conviction
conclusively refuted the allegations in her petition for relief.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Section 1172.6 and Standard of Review
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1437, which
amended the murder law under sections 188 and 189 “ ‘to ensure that murder liability is
not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or
was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference
to human life.’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel).) Former
section 1170.95, now 1172.6, created a procedural mechanism for those convicted of
3
crimes under now-invalid theories of imputed malice to seek vacatur of their convictions
and for resentencing. (Curiel at p. 449; § 1172.6, subd. (a).)
In order to qualify for resentencing, the following three conditions must apply:
“(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed
the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was
convicted . . . following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the
petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder. [¶] (3) The
petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Once a petitioner has filed a facially sufficient petition alleging that he or she is
eligible for relief based on all the requirements set forth under section 1172.6,
subdivision (a), the trial court shall appoint counsel, and after the parties have had the
opportunity to submit briefing on whether a prima facie case for relief exists, the trial
court shall order a hearing to determine whether the defendant has stated a prima facie
case for relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3) & (c).) “ ‘[I]f the petition and record in the case
establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may
dismiss the petition.’ ” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460; see People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 971 [at prima facie stage, the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations
as true].)
We review de novo the trial court’s determination whether a defendant has made a
prima facie case for relief. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
B. Analysis
The trial court did not err by denying Arriaga relief at the prima facie stage
because the record of conviction conclusively establishes her ineligibility for relief. By
4
her plea, Arriaga as a matter of law admitted a specific intent to kill and could not have
been convicted under a theory of imputed malice. (See People v. DeVaughn (1977)
18 Cal.3d 889, 895 [“a plea of guilty admits all matters essential to the conviction”].)
In February 2019, Arriaga was charged with willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder with a torture-murder special circumstance under section 190.2, subdivision
(a)(18). And in August 2019, Arriaga specifically pleaded no contest to the murder
charge as alleged—she pleaded no contest to willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder, admitting the torture-murder special circumstance. The crime of murder was not
generically charged and did not permit the prosecution to proceed under any theory—
premeditation and deliberation were specifically alleged and admitted by Arriaga in her
plea. (Cf. People v. Romero (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 145, 153 [“generic charge of murder
committed ‘ “willfully, unlawfully, and with malice aforethought” ’ does not specify or
exclude any particular theory of murder”]; People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th
328, 337–338 [generic charge of attempted murder committed “ ‘unlawfully and with
malice aforethought’ ” permitted prosecution to proceed under any theory].)
By the time Arriaga was charged and when she entered her plea to first degree
premeditated murder in 2019, Senate Bill 1437 was already in effect and had already
eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine for all types of murder.
(Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 448.) And even earlier in 2014, the California Supreme
Court had already held that the natural and probable consequences doctrine did not
extend to aiding and abetting a first degree premeditated murder, and that an aider and
abettor to first degree premeditated murder must be convicted based on direct aiding and
abetting principles. (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 158–159.) Thus the only valid aiding
and abetting theory both at the time Arriaga was charged and at the time she entered her
plea was a theory of direct aiding and abetting, and “[a] theory of direct aiding and
abetting remains a valid theory after Senate Bill No. 1437.” (People v. Coley (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 539, 546.)
5
Furthermore, under Chiu, a defendant cannot be convicted of first degree
premeditated murder under an uncharged conspiracy theory if the target crime of the
uncharged conspiracy is not murder. (See Rivera, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 1357; In
re Lopez (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 350, 357 [accord].)3 Rivera, for example, held that it
would be error for the jury to reach a verdict of first degree murder if the target crime of
the uncharged conspiracy was discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle, even if the
natural and probable consequences of the target crime was first degree murder. (Rivera,
at p. 1357.) And if Arriaga had been convicted under an uncharged conspiracy theory
and the conspiracy was to commit murder, “a conviction of conspiracy to commit murder
requires a finding of intent to kill, and cannot be based on a theory of implied malice.”
(People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 607.)4
Arriaga’s admission of the torture-murder special circumstance is also proof that
she had the intent to kill and was therefore not convicted under an imputed malice theory.
Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18) establishes that a first degree murder is punishable by
life without possibility of parole or death if the murder “was intentional and involved the
infliction of torture.” “Proof of a murder committed under the torture-murder special
circumstance requires (1) proof of first degree murder, (2) proof that the defendant
3
Thus, Arriaga’s reliance on authorities involving pre-Chiu and pre-Senate Bill
1437 convictions is unavailing. (See, e.g., People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967
[finding prima facie case for relief had been made when defendant entered plea in 2013
before the Chiu decision]; Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th 433, 468 [pre-Senate Bill 1437 jury
finding of intent to kill did not conclusively negate defendant’s petition for relief because
jury had been instructed with natural and probable consequences doctrine].)
4
In her opening brief, Arriaga argues that she admitted only that the murder “was
committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation,” distinguishing this from an
admission that she “committed willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder.” To the
extent Arriaga argues that her admission is that someone (not herself) committed
premeditated murder, her plea of no contest to premeditated murder and admission of the
torture-murder special circumstance already admitted the essential element that she
intended to kill.
6
intended to kill and torture the victim, and (3) proof of the infliction of an extremely
painful act upon a living victim.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 647.) By
admitting the special circumstance as true, Arriaga admitted that she personally intended
to kill Turney.
The record of conviction thus conclusively establishes that Arriaga is ineligible to
be resentenced for three reasons. First, the charging document filed against Arriaga
alleging that she committed first degree premeditated murder did not allow the
prosecution to proceed under a now-invalid imputed malice theory. (See People v. Reyes
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 292, 298 [defendant who pleaded no contest to second degree
murder after Sen. Bill 1437’s effective date not eligible for resentencing].) Second,
Arriaga cannot establish that she could not presently be convicted of murder because of
changes made by Senate Bill 1437 because she was not convicted under prior law.
(Reyes, at p. 298; see also People v. Lezama (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 583, 590
[resentencing relief unavailable to defendant who pleaded guilty to voluntary
manslaughter after Sen. Bill 1437’s effective date]; People v. Gallegos (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 434, 443 [accord].) And third, she admitted the torture-murder special
circumstance as true, establishing her intent to kill.
Arguing otherwise, Arriaga notes that she entered her plea before the Legislature
enacted Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775), which made
retroactive application of Senate Bill 1437’s amendments to sections 188 and 189 more
broadly available.5 But Senate Bill 775 did not expand relief to those, like Arriaga, who
were convicted of willful, deliberate and premeditated murder with the intent to kill.
5
Senate Bill 775 “[c]larifie[d]” that resentencing relief was available to “persons
who were convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter under a theory of felony
murder and the natural [and] probable consequences doctrine” just as to “those . . .
convicted of murder under the same theories.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (a),
p. 6971.)
7
Arriaga was not convicted based on any “other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) As
we have explained, at the time Arriaga was charged and entered her plea (post-Chiu),
there remained no valid theory of first degree premeditated murder based on imputed
malice.
In sum, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Arriaga’s petition for
resentencing as she was not convicted of murder under a theory made invalid by Senate
Bill 1437.6
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying Arriaga’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.
6
Because we find the trial court did not err in denying Arriaga’s petition for
resentencing, we need not address her claims that the denial of the petition violated her
constitutional right to due process.
8
_____________________________________
LIE, J.
WE CONCUR:
_____________________________________
GREENWOOD, P. J.
_____________________________________
GROVER, J.
People v. Arriaga
H051594
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