CourtListener 10601790•People v. Williams CA2/6
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Filed 6/10/25 P. v. Williams CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B338080
(Super. Ct. No. YA067398)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v.
JAMES WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
James Williams appeals an order denying his petition for
recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1)1. He contends the trial court erred because his
aggregate sentence of 99 years to life is de facto life without the
possibility of parole (LWOP). The Attorney General concedes
appellant is eligible for relief. We agree and will remand.
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
In 2009, a jury convicted appellant of first-degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a); count 1); three counts of attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a),
counts 2-4); and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2), count
5). The jury found true allegations appellant personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm in committing the murder
(§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)) and personally used a firearm in
committing the attempted murders (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) as well
as allegations all the crimes were committed for the benefit of a
criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). Appellant was a minor
when these crimes were committed. He was sentenced to an
aggregate prison term of 129 years to life.
On direct appeal we struck the consecutive 10-year gang
enhancements imposed on each of the three attempted murder
counts and ordered the sentences on each of those counts
modified to reflect a 15-year minimum parole eligibility term.
This effectively reduced appellant’s aggregate sentence by 30
years, resulting in a term of 99 years to life. We also ordered the
judgment modified to reflect an award of 1,180 days of
presentence custody credits, and to correct a clerical error in the
abstract of judgment. In all other respects, we affirmed. (People
v. Williams (Jan. 23, 2013, B232001) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2024, appellant filed a petition for recall and
resentencing pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). His
petition met the filing requirements under the statute. The
2 We recite only the procedural background because the
facts surrounding the offenses are irrelevant to this appeal. (See
People v. White (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 914, 916, fn. 2; People v.
McNeely (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 739, 742.)
2
prosecution opposed his petition. The trial court found appellant
ineligible for resentencing because he was not sentenced to
LWOP or its functional equivalent “given the fact he’s eligible
under youthful offender parole at age 37 in 2025, as well as an
elderly parole eligibility at age 50.”
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues, and respondent concedes, remand is
necessary because appellant was sentenced to de facto LWOP for
crimes he committed as a juvenile. We agree. As the pertinent
facts of this case are undisputed, we review de novo appellant’s
eligibility for relief under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). (See
People v. Davis (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 429, 438.)
Section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) allows certain juvenile
offenders who have served at least 15 years of an LWOP sentence
to petition for recall and resentencing. People v. Heard held the
plain language of section 1170 applies to LWOP sentences only,
but denying section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) resentencing relief to
juvenile offenders originally sentenced to a term that
indisputably qualifies as the functional equivalent of LWOP is a
violation of equal protection. (People v. Heard (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 608, 629 (Heard); see also, People v. Bagsby (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1047 [67 years, plus 40 years to life is
functional equivalent of LWOP]; People v. Sorto (2024) 104
Cal.App.5th 435, 440 [10 years, plus 130 years to life is functional
equivalent of LWOP] (Sorto).)
We conclude a sentence of 99 years to life indisputably
qualifies as the functional equivalent of LWOP, entitling
appellant to resentencing eligibility under section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1). We do not, however, consider whether any
lengthy sentence where a defendant is not released until well into
3
his senior years, i.e., a “non-obvious” case, is de facto LWOP.
(See People v. Munoz (Apr. 8, 2025, B336656) 110 Cal.App.5th
499 [50 years to life is not the functional equivalent of life
without parole even if defendant is not eligible for parole until he
is 65 years old.].)
In People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin), the
California Supreme Court held section 3051, which provides
certain juvenile offenders with youth offender parole hearings
during or before their 25th year of incarceration, mooted a
constitutional challenge to a sentence of two consecutive
mandatory 25 year to life terms for crimes committed by a minor.
But Franklin declined to decide “whether a life sentence with
parole eligibility after 50 years of incarceration is the functional
equivalent of an LWOP sentence . . . .” (Id., at p. 268.) Franklin
confirms “a juvenile may not be sentenced to the functional
equivalent of LWOP for a homicide offense without the
protections outlined in Miller”3 (id. at p. 276) but expresses “no
view on Miller claims by juvenile offenders who are ineligible for
[a youth offender parole hearing], or who are serving lengthy
sentences imposed under discretionary rather than mandatory
sentencing statutes.” (Franklin, at p. 280.) Appellant was
sentenced to multiple discretionary terms totaling 129 years to
life, modified to 99 years to life, for crimes he committed as a
minor. His eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing
3 Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 [183 L.Ed.2d 407]
(Miller), holding 8th Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment requires sentencing courts to weigh specific
factors relating to a juvenile defendant’s youth and maturity
prior to imposing LWOP for homicide.
4
pursuant to section 3051, which was enacted after his sentence
was imposed, does not alter our conclusion.
In People v. Lopez (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 649 we concluded
section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) does not preclude a defendant
whose LWOP sentence was modified pursuant to Graham4 prior
to section 1170’s enactment from seeking resentencing under
section 1170 because the statute “‘uses the phrase “was
sentenced” and refers to the past.’” (People v. Heard, supra, 83
Cal.App.5th at p. 629, citing People v. Lopez, at p. 654, italics
omitted.)
Applying this reasoning, the Heard court held section 3051
does not preclude a defendant from seeking resentencing under
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) because eligibility for parole “does
not change the fact that the sentence was a de facto life without
parole sentence at the time it was imposed.” (People v. Heard,
supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 629; People v. Sorto, supra, 104
Cal.App.5th at p. 448 [“the fact that section 3051 superseded
Sorto’s sentence is irrelevant. Instead, it is enough that he ‘was
sentenced’ to the functional equivalent of LWOP.”].)
Even considering appellant’s potential for earlier parole
eligibility under sections 3051 and 30555, we conclude he remains
4 Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 [176 L.Ed.2d 825]
held imposing LWOP on juveniles for non-homicide offenses
violates the 8th Amendment.
5 Section 3055 establishes the elderly parole program for
“any inmate who is 50 years of age or older and has served a
minimum of 20 years of continuous incarceration on the inmate’s
current sentence, serving either a determinate or indeterminate
sentence.” (§ 3055, subd. (a).)
5
eligible for recall and resentencing under section 1170,
subdivision (d)(1) because he was sentenced to de facto LWOP.
DISPOSITION
Judgment is reversed and remanded for resentencing
pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
I concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
6
YEGAN, J., Dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The “never-ending” Court of Appeal
exercise in sentencing continues. I cannot participate in this
academic exercise. There is no miscarriage of justice here and we
are not required to accept the Attorney General’s concession.
(See, e.g., Thaler v. Thaler (1932) 127 Cal.App. 28, 29). Were one
to put on “horse blinders” and only view the sentence when it was
imposed, appellant would arguably be eligible for Heard relief.
(People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608.) But things have
changed. The majority opinion recognizes that appellant is
eligible for parole this year. So, in reality, and notwithstanding
the original sentence, he is not serving a sentence of Life Without
the Possibility of parole. The parole Board will release appellant
from prison when it determines that he is suitable for parole. He
thus has a “realistic hope of release and a genuine opportunity to
reintegrate into society.” (People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th
349, 373.)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
Altus W. Hudson, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Sydney Banach, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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