Kirkeby v. Kahn CA4/1

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Filed 6/9/25 Kirkeby v. Kahn CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

GLENN KIRKEBY et al., D083388

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2017-
00032731-CU-BT-NC)
ANNE KAHN et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Earl H. Maas III, Judge. Affirmed.
Decker Law, James Decker, and Griffin Schindler for Defendant and
Appellant.
Law Offices of Robert A. Ball, Robert A. Ball, and John M. Donnelly for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.

In this appeal, her third from the underlying lawsuit, Anne Kahn and
an entity controlled solely by her, Anne Kahn, Inc. (Kahn, Inc.), challenge the
trial court’s order distributing $1,578,111 to Glenn and Anastasia Kirkeby in
partial satisfaction of a judgment in their favor against their former business
partner and Kahn’s ex-husband, Lawrence Burns. Burns defrauded the
Kirkebys out of millions of dollars and the Kirkebys obtained a judgment
against him for $9,111,648. The funds that were distributed were proceeds
from the sale of property that Burns, using a limited liability company later
adjudged his alter ego, purchased with money embezzled from the Kirkebys.
On appeal from the distribution order, Kahn contends reversal is
required because the judgment against Burns is void under Code of Civil

Procedure section 580.1 Alternatively, Kahn argues the order must be
reversed because the property was formerly owned by an entity controlled by
Burns, and not Burns himself; the property was awarded to Kahn under her
marital settlement agreement with Burns; and the Kirkebys did not, as the
trial court determined, have a valid lien on the property. Kahn further asks
this court to “order restitution to [her] of any funds received by the Kirkebys”
from the proceeds of the property sale. As we explain, we reject Kahn’s claim
that the judgment is void. Further, we hold the trial court’s decision to
distribute the funds to the Kirkebys was otherwise proper. Accordingly, we
affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Initial Litigation & Stipulated Injunctions
The Kirkebys filed suit against Burns in 2017, alleging he defrauded
them and embezzled from their business. The lawsuit was also filed
derivatively on behalf of MHCD, LLC, an entity jointly owned by the

1 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

2 Additional facts concerning the underlying dispute are set forth in our
earlier opinions deciding Kahn’s prior two appeals in this case. (See Kirkeby
v. Kahn (Sept. 17, 2024, D082333) [nonpub. opn.] and Kirkeby v. The Crosby
Clinic, LLC (January 13, 2025, D083640 [nonpub. opn.].)
2
Kirkebys and Burns. In January 2018, the Kirkebys filed their First
Amended Complaint (FAC) against Burns and various other entities alleged
to be controlled by Burns, including NSI Services LLC (NSI), which the FAC

referred to as the “Crosby Center Entities.”3
The FAC alleged the Kirkebys started a drug and alcohol abuse
rehabilitation facility in 2002 shortly after meeting Burns. Burns claimed to
be a licensed attorney and experienced business manager, who would help
them operate the business. The FAC alleged that, unbeknownst to the
Kirkebys, Burns misappropriated funds, assets, business opportunities, and
real estate (including the property underlying this appeal) through his
management of the rehabilitation center, known as the Crosby Center. In
2014, the Kirkebys discovered Burns was embezzling the business’s assets

and contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation.4 The complaint also
alleged Burns and the Crosby Center Entities were each other’s alter egos,
and specifically that NSI was used as a shell to defraud the Kirkebys and
MHCD.
In October 2019, MHCD filed a cross-complaint, which alleged
similar claims against Burns, Kahn, and the same Crosby Center Entities.
In addition, the complaint contained a cause of action for quiet title, asserting

3 The complaint named as the other entity defendants: The Crosby
Clinic, LLC; Interlawus, LLC; AAE Alcohol Rehab Service Center; AAE
Crosby Center; AAE Women Eating Disorder Center; Dream Catcher Detox
Center, Inc.; KBY Properties, LLC; Crosby Recovery Foundation; AAA
National Credit Reporting, Corp.; Internet Creative Marketing, Inc.;
Stonegate Investment Group, LLC; Applied Psychology Systems, LLC; The
Neuroscience Institute; and L Burns Research Institute.

4 The Kirkebys assert in their brief that Burns and Kahn are each facing
over 40 felony criminal charges in a case pending in San Diego Superior
Court.
3
that Burns and the Crosby Center Entities’ concealment, misappropriation,
and diversion of MHCD’s assets resulted in the defendants wrongfully
obtaining title to two properties in Escondido, one located on Camino De Las
Lomas (the Camino Property) and one located on Circle R Way (Circle R
Property). MHCD sought adjudication of its ownership rights in the
properties, and to quiet title in the two properties in its favor. At the same
time, MHCD filed notices of pendency of action with the San Diego County

recorder for the properties.5
On December 10, 2019, MHCD, Burns, several entities controlled by
Burns that were named parties in the litigation, including NSI, and Kahn
entered into a stipulation for each property that enjoined its transfer. Under
the stipulations, the parties “agree[d] not to, and [were] enjoined from,
encumbering, impairing, selling, transferring, conveying, or otherwise
assigning the real estate and improvements ... during the pendency of this
lawsuit.” In addition, the stipulations permitted the Crosby Clinic and NSI
to seek refinancing of the Circle R Property, which faced foreclosure. MHCD
agreed to dismiss its quiet title claim without prejudice and release the
notices of pendency filed for each property to allow for the refinancing of the
Circle R Property using the Camino Property as collateral. The stipulations
were signed into orders by the trial court on December 17, 2019.
B. Violations of the Stipulated Injunctions & Receivership
Despite the stipulated injunction orders precluding transfer or
encumbrance of the properties, on November 3, 2020, Burns encumbered the
Camino Property with a deed of trust in the amount of $200,000. A little over

5 Also in October, the trial court struck the answers to the FAC of many
of the entity defendants, including NSI, for failure to retain counsel, and
entered defaults against them.
4
a month later, on December 14, 2020, Burns conveyed title in the Camino
Property from the Crosby Clinic to “Larry Burns Trustee of the Xanadau
Dominican Irrevocable Trust – 2020” and conveyed title in the Circle R
Property from NSI to “Larry Burns Trustee of the Xanadau Dominican
Irrevocable Trust – 2020.” This prompted the Kirkebys, on March 1, 2021, to
record the stipulated injunction orders on the Camino and Circle R Properties
with the county recorder.
The following month, Kahn, Inc. filed a complaint against Burns in San
Diego County Superior Court, Anne Kahn, Inc. v. Burns, Case No. 37-2021-
0001811-CU-BC-NC. Kahn, Inc. alleged it “was in possession and control” of
the Circle R Property. Specifically, that an entity called Health Care
Investments, Inc. transferred the property by grant deed to NSI on February
4, 2019, and that on April 4, 2019, NSI and Kahn, Inc. “entered into an
implied-in fact contract granting Kahn, Inc. the exclusive right to operate”
the Circle R Property. Kahn, Inc. further alleged it “invested more than
$1,500,000 into the” Circle R Property. The complaint also alleged that the
Crosby Clinic transferred ownership of the Camino Property to Kahn, Inc. via
grant deed on October 7, 2020. Kahn, Inc. asserted claims against Burns for
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, declaratory and injunctive relief,
equitable indemnity, and quiet title.
On November 3, 2021, the Kirkebys filed an application for an order to
show cause asserting Burns had violated the court’s stipulated injunction
orders concerning the two properties by transferring and encumbering the
Camino Property with a $200,000 mortgage and by transferring the Circle R
Property. After issuing an order to show cause, the court granted the
application and found Burns in contempt for violating the terms of the
stipulated orders. On December 13, 2021, the Kirkebys filed a joint motion

5
for an injunction or, alternatively, the appointment of a receiver to preserve
the value of the Circle R Property to satisfy any future judgment. The motion
alleged the property was in imminent danger of foreclosure and had been
extensively damaged by squatters. On December 28, 2021, the court issued
an order granting the motion, and appointed a receiver with authority to sell
the Circle R Property.
On January 31, 2022, Kahn filed an ex parte application requesting to
dissolve the lis pendens filed by the Kirkebys and seeking to stay the order
appointing a receiver. Kahn argued that she was a significant investor in the
properties and that the lis pendens on the properties were improper. The
court denied the application on February 2, 2022. A little over two weeks
later, however, Kahn, Inc. recorded its own lis pendens on the properties
based on its pending lawsuit, Anne Kahn, Inc. v. Burns, Case No. 37-2021-
0001811-CU-BC-NC. In March 2022, the Kirkebys’ counsel made three
requests to Kahn, Inc. to remove the notices of pendency on the two
properties. The Kirkebys asserted the notices violated the stipulated
injunction orders and that Kahn, Inc. had made material misrepresentations
about its ownership of the properties in its complaint against Burns.
Kahn did not respond to the requests and instead, on March 16, 2022,
filed an ex parte application to postpone a pending foreclosure sale of the
Circle R Property and to remove the receiver. Kahn stated in the application
that she formed Kahn, Inc. to formalize an agreement with Burns to operate
the Circle R Property as a hotel, and that on October 17, 2019, NSI and
Kahn, Inc. entered into a lease agreement. A copy of the purported lease was
attached to the ex parte application.
On March 29, 2022, the Kirkebys filed an ex parte application for an
order to show cause asserting Kahn was in contempt of the stipulated orders

6
based on her recording of notices of pendency on the two properties. On April
4, 2022, the court denied Kahn, Inc.’s ex parte application, and postponed a
hearing on the Kirkebys’ application to permit Kahn to provide proof of
removal of her notices of pendency.
C. Sanctions Against Burns
While the proceedings involving Kahn were moving forward, the
Kirkebys were also pursuing their remedies against Burns. After he failed to
reconvey the Camino Property back to the Crosby Clinic in violation of the
trial court’s January 14, 2022 order, on March 3, 2022, the Kirkebys and
MHCD jointly moved for terminating sanctions against Burns and the Crosby
Clinic. The Kirkebys also moved for terminating sanctions based on Burns
failure to respond to their discovery requests.
On May 2, 2022, the trial court granted the motions, issuing
terminating sanctions against Burns “based on his disobedience of the court’s
1/14/22 order as to … reconveyance of the property.” and Burns’s “repeated
violations of orders.” The court struck Burn’s answers to the FAC and
MHCD’s cross-complaint, deemed all the matters alleged in the FAC and
cross-complaint admitted, and entered defaults against Burns in favor of the
Kirkebys and MHCD. In addition, the trial court deemed all of the
allegations against NSI and the Crosby Clinic (as well as the other entities
controlled by Burns) admitted.
D. Sale of the Circle R Property & Kahn’s Attempts to Intervene
Days later, on May 5, 2022, Kahn, Inc. filed an ex parte application
seeking to intervene in the underlying proceedings. Kahn, Inc. asserted it
had leased the Circle R Property from NSI through December 31, 2026 and
that the lease agreement also gave Kahn, Inc. a purchase option. Kahn, Inc.
also asserted it had been notified by the court-appointed receiver that he was

7
selling the Circle R Property and, therefore, intervention was required to
prevent the sale and preserve Kahn, Inc.’s interest in the property. On May
9, 2022, the trial court set the matter for a hearing on July 8, 2022.
On July 6, 2022, the court granted the receiver’s motion to approve the
sale of the Circle R Property for $4.2 million. The court also authorized
payment for services to the receiver and his counsel, as well as payment of
accrued property taxes and a water lien on the property. In addition, in its
order the court stated it had considered the arguments asserted by Kahn, Inc.
in its ex parte application to intervene in the matter and explained in detail
its reasons for rejecting the arguments. Specifically, the court found that
contrary to Kahn, Inc.’s assertions, Kahn had been provided with notice of
the receivership and that the receiver had been properly appointed by the
court. The court rejected Kahn’s assertion that she had a marital interest in
the property, noting that NSI purchased the property just four days after
Kahn and Burns were married, and that it was undisputed that the Circle R
Property was “owned by NSI, Kahn is not a member of NSI and Kahn is not
on title.”
Further, the court noted that Kahn admitted that Kahn, Inc. had not
entered into a written lease with NSI (despite Kahn, Inc.’s submission of a
purported written lease agreement), and instead that Kahn, “Inc. had only an
‘implied-in-fact’ oral lease.” The court further rejected Kahn, Inc.’s claim that
it had an interest in the property based on its stipulated judgment in the case
it filed against Burns. The court explained, Kahn, “Inc. sued NSI and the
parties stipulated to entry of judgment in the amount of $1,856,000. See
[Anne Kahn, Inc. v. Burns, Case No. 37-2021-0001811-CU-BC-NC]. Judge
Cynthia Freeland, the trial judge in that case, denied [Kahn,] Inc.’s 7/1/22
motion for approval of the stipulated judgment, ruling in part: ‘Plaintiff has

8
not provided the court with the information needed to assess the propriety of
the requested relief. More specifically, Plaintiff has not submitted the
confidential settlement agreement for the court’s consideration, and Plaintiff
has not explained how the proposed settlement will impact or otherwise
affect the Dissolution Proceeding and/or the Kirkeby Action, all of which
would enable the court to assess the enforceability of the proposed settlement
agreement in light of the other pending proceedings that all parties to this
case repeatedly have referred to throughout these proceedings.’ ”
After the issuance of this order, on July 8, 2022, Kahn, Inc. filed a
noticed motion for leave to file a cross-complaint in intervention, again
asserting intervention was appropriate based on its leasehold agreement
with NSI. In their opposition to Kahn, Inc.’s motion, the Kirkebys asserted
there was insufficient evidence to show the existence of a lease or that Kahn
had invested any money into the property, and that the purported oral lease
was merely an attempt to defraud them and the court. The opposition also
stated the Kirkebys were investigating whether the written lease submitted
to the court by Kahn was fraudulent. The Kirkebys explained they had
issued a subpoena to LawDepot, which appeared in the document’s footer, in
order to determine when the document was created, and that Kahn had
moved to quash the subpoena.
On July 29, 2022, the court denied Kahn, Inc.’s motion to intervene.
The court found that there was no evidence to support Kahn, Inc.’s claim that
it held a lease for the Circle R Property. The court pointed to Burn’s
statements in a declaration submitted in his marital dissolution proceeding
that Kahn “does not have authority to manage the hotel. The hotel is owned
by my business NSI. NSI has the license to operate the hotel … so [Kahn]

9
does not have a license to operate the hotel.”6 In addition, the court found
the lease agreements, one purported to be dated April 3, 2019 and the other
October 4, 2019, were fraudulent. The court pointed to the subpoenaed
testimony of the custodian of records for LawDepot, who stated the company’s
records made clear that the lease dated in April 2019 was created on May 1,
2022 by an account belonging to Burns four days before Kahn submitted her
declaration to the court attaching the document and that the lease dated in
October 2019 was created in 2021.
E. Dismissal of Kahn and Dissolution Judgment
On September 26, 2022, the Kirkebys and MHCD dismissed Kahn
(individually) from the underlying proceedings without prejudice based on
her lack of assets to satisfy a monetary judgment. Two days later, on
September 28, 2022, a judgment of dissolution was entered in the divorce
proceedings between Kahn and Burns (Burns v. Kahn, Case No.
20FL010428N). The judgment incorporated a marital settlement agreement
(MSA), which included a document titled “Settlement Agreement” and
another titled “Stipulated Addendum to Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage
and Marital Settlement Agreement.”
The Settlement Agreement, incorporated into the MSA, provided that
title in the Camino and Circle R Properties would be transferred from the
Crosby Clinic and NSI (which the document described as entities created and
maintained by Burns) to Kahn free and clear of any interest of Burns, the
Crosby Clinic, or NSI. The document, however, stated the transfers are
“[s]ubject to approval by the Court in related matters, including the Kirkeby

6 Kahn’s declaration in support of the motion also acknowledged the
Circle R Property had been purchased by NSI in December 2018, and that
title had been solely in NSI’s name.
10
Matter.” Similarly, the “Stipulated Addendum” stated that the parties to the
dissolution agreed that the Circle R and Camino Properties “shall be awarded
to [Kahn] as her sole and separate property and the parties shall sign all

documents necessary to transfer all two (2) properties to [Kahn].”7
On September 30, 2022, Burns, as manager of the Crosby Clinic,
transferred title in the Camino Property to Kahn by quitclaim deed.
F. Reversal of Default & Trial
A minute order dated November 18, 2022 indicates the Kirkebys
requested a scheduled default prove up hearing be vacated and instead that
the case be set for trial on the issue of damages. On November 22, 2022, the
court entered an order prepared by the Kirkebys stating that in lieu of the
prove-up hearing, the matter was set for trial “on the issue of damages only”
and modifying its May 2, 2022 order issuing terminating sanctions against
Burns to be “changed to issue sanctions on the issue of liability, [and] that
the matters alleged in [the FAC] remain deemed admitted as to Burns.” The
order further provided that “the defaults previously entered against Burns
pursuant to the [May 2, 2022 order] be vacated, but that Burns be permitted
to only present evidence at the upcoming trial on the issue of damages.”
On January 5 and 30, 2023, the parties proceeded to a bench trial on

the issue of damages for the claims asserted against Burns.8 After the
conclusion of the two-day damages trial, the court issued its final decision.

7 The Stipulated Addendum contains a signature line for the court, but it
is blank.

8 In between the two trial dates, a stipulated judgment was entered by
the court in Kahn, Inc.’s case against Burns, Anne Kahn, Inc. v. Burns, Case
No. 37-2021-0001811-CU-BC-NC, awarding Kahn, Inc. damages of
$1,500,560.31.
11
Therein, the court noted that Burns was previously found guilty of contempt
and that his liability was “established by motions well prior to trial.” The
court found “the evidence regarding intentional transfer of assets, sometimes
in direct contravention of existing court orders, [wa]s abundant” and awarded
the Kirkebys “$3,037,216 in damages directly related to the intentional
actions” of Burns and also awarded treble damages, for a total compensatory
damage award of $9,111,648. The court denied the Kirkebys’ claim for
punitive damages, finding they had not established that Burns would have
the ability to satisfy such a judgment. Finally, the court found the Kirkebys
were entitled to an award of attorneys fees and could seek them in post-
judgment proceedings.
The court entered judgment in favor of the Kirkebys on April 20, 2023.
The judgment included the court’s finding that “[p]rior to trial, the Court
ordered issue sanctions against Burns and the Crosby Center Entities,
inclusive of NSI and the Crosby Clinic, on the issue of liability and all
matters alleged in the above referenced causes of action in the FAC were
deemed admitted as to Burns and the Crosby Center Entities. This included
admission of Paragraphs 25 through 28 of the FAC which alleged, among
other things, that at all relevant times to these proceedings, Burns and the
Crosby Center Entities, inclusive of NSI and the Crosby Clinic, were the alter
egos of each other, and further, the alter egos of Burns as well as each other’s

12
agent, servant, employee, assignee, successor-in-interest, co-conspirator and

aider and abettor.”9
On August 18, 2023, the Crosby Clinic, which was then managed by

Kahn, filed a motion to vacate the judgment.10 Kahn argued (1) the superior
court’s November 22, 2022 order vacating an entry of default against Burns

9 The month before the judgement was entered, on March 16, 2023, Kahn
filed an ex parte application to expunge the Camino Property stipulation.
Kahn argued she was the owner of the property pursuant to the judgment in
her marital dissolution proceeding, that she had been dismissed from this
case in September 2022, and that the Camino Property stipulation was never
signed by the Crosby Clinic, which had been dismissed as a defendant in
December 2022. (Kirkeby v. Kahn, supra, D082333.) The court denied the
application, but set the matter to be determined by noticed motion and
calendared a hearing for May 5, 2023. (Ibid.) Then, on March 29, 2023, now
aware of the transfer of the Camino Property, the Kirkebys filed a motion to
compel compliance with the stipulated injunction, asserting Burns had again
violated the injunction by transferring the Camino Property to Kahn via
quitclaim deed on September 30, 2022 and that the transfer was an attempt
to defraud them. (Ibid.) On April 11, 2023, Kahn filed her motion to expunge
the stipulated injunction, repeating the arguments she made in her previous
ex parte application. (Ibid.)
After a hearing on May 5, 2023, the court granted the Kirkebys’ motion
to compel compliance with the stipulated injunction and denied Kahn’s
motion to expunge the order. (Kirkeby v. Kahn, supra, D082333.) The court’s
order detailed Burn’s repeated violations of the injunction with respect to the
Camino Property and rejected Kahn’s argument that the stipulated
injunction was void. The court ordered her to reconvey title in the Camino
Property to the Crosby Clinic pursuant to the injunction and the court’s
authority under section 128, subdivision (a)(4). (Kirkeby v. Kahn, supra,
D082333.) Kahn appealed from the order, and this court affirmed. (Ibid.)

10 A Statement of Information filed by Kahn with the Secretary of State
indicated Kahn was the managing member of the Crosby Clinic. The
document was submitted by the Kirkebys in support of an ex parte
application for an order to show cause why Kahn was not in violation of the
stipulated orders preventing transfer of the Camino and Circle R Properties.
13
did not comply with section 473 and deprived Burns of due process and a fair
hearing; (2) that the order exceeded the court’s jurisdiction, was void, and
should be vacated; and (3) the subsequent judgment was void and should be
vacated for failing to comply with section 580, subdivision (b). The Kirkebys
opposed the motion, contending the Crosby Clinic lacked standing to contest
the judgment because it had not shown any injury, and that its corporate
status as a separate entity should be disregarded because it had been
adjudged the alter ego of Burns. The Kirkebys also asserted the damage
award was against only Burns and thus the Crosby Clinic could show no
injury.
After a hearing on the motion, on September 29, 2023, the trial court
issued an order denying the motion. In its order, the court stated, “After
careful consideration of the parties’ arguments and authorities, the Court is
unpersuaded the Kirkebys obtained the November 22, 2022, order, and
subsequent April 20, 2023, judgment, through extrinsic fraud .... While the
Court declines to address every argument raised, the Clinic’s argument that
Burns relied on entry of default as a tactical decision is belied by and
decisively at odds with the record and history of this matter. As noted in the
Kirkebys’ opposition, Burns sought to have the subject defaults vacated,
albeit unsuccessfully, participated in numerous motions, and ultimately

participated in trial in January of 2023.”11
On November 2, 2023, the Kirkebys filed a motion requesting that the
court distribute the proceeds from the sale of the Circle R Property held in

11 The Crosby Clinic, under Kahn’s control, appealed the decision, and
this court affirmed the trial court’s order. We held that Crosby Clinic lacked
standing to challenge the judgment against Burns and that the judgment had
not awarded damages against the Crosby Clinic after default, only against
Burns. (Kirkeby v. The Crosby Clinic, LLC, supra, D083640.)
14
the court’s general fund to them in partial satisfaction of the judgment
against Burns. The Kirkebys argued they were entitled to preference in the
distribution of the funds because without their substantial effort and
expenditure, the funds would not exist. Specifically, they asserted their
efforts prevented loss of the Circle R Property through either foreclosure or
Kahn’s unlawful attempts to remove the property from the trial court’s
jurisdiction and frustrate the receivership. The Kirkebys further argued that
Kahn’s claim to the funds, based on the alleged existence of a commercial
lease between Kahn, Inc. and NSI lacked evidentiary or legal support.
Kahn and Kahn, Inc. both filed competing motions seeking distribution
of the funds. Kahn argued the funds were hers because the judgment of
dissolution of her marriage to Burns declared her the owner of the Circle R
Property. Kahn, Inc. argued it was entitled to the funds because NSI had
granted it a leasehold interest in the property prior to the receivership, it had
invested $1.8 million in the property in reliance on the leasehold, and it
obtained a judgment of $1,500,506.31 in its case against Burns, Anne Kahn,
Inc. v. Burns, Case No. 37-2021-0001811-CU-BC-NC.
After a hearing on the competing motions for distribution, on December
29, 2023, the court issued its order granting the Kirkebys’ motion and
denying the motions of Kahn and Kahn, Inc. The court emphasized that the
judgment was based on its finding that the Circle R Property “was obtained
by Burns through embezzled funds.” The court stated that “Burns misled the
Kirkebys by hiding his transfer and misappropriation of over $3,000,000
owed to, but never shared to the Kirkebys, to purchase the Circle R Way
Property for Burns’ own benefit.”
The court also outlined the proceedings that led to its findings,
including the stipulated order precluding the transfer of the property, which

15
prevented its imminent foreclosure; the subsequent receivership to maintain
its value; and Kahn’s “numerous efforts to gain control and ownership of the
Circle R” Property, including the filing of a lis pendens in violation of the
stipulated injunction order and Kahn, Inc.’s commencement of separate
litigation. In addition, the court highlighted its finding in the judgment that
Burns, NSI, and the Crosby Clinic “were all the alter egos of each other.” The
trial court found that because “the judgment in this matter include[d] an
explicit finding that the Circle R Way Property was acquired by Burns
through funds embezzled from the Kirkebys,” it was “both a logical legal and
equitable conclusion that the Surplus Funds should be distributed” to them.
With respect to Kahn’s motion, the court recognized a strong
presumption that property acquired during marriage is community property,
but found Kahn had failed to explain how the judgment of dissolution could
override the court’s finding that Burns obtained the property through fraud.
The court also rejected any suggestion that Kahn was defrauded by Burns,
noting that “months prior to [their] separation, Kahn willingly assisted Burns
in his attempts to prevent the sale of the Circle R Way Property in violation
of court orders.” With respect to Kahn, Inc. the court found its motion “void
of any legal argument” that would alter the court’s decision. The court also
found the Kirkebys had a first in right priority lien to the Circle R Property
based on the stipulated injunction order precluding the property’s transfer
and on their related lis pendens. Thus, the court concluded it was
unnecessary to consider the subsequent stipulated judgment Kahn, Inc.
obtained in its case against Burns. If it were to reach the issue, however, the
court stated it would likely find the judgment fraudulent and noted that
“[m]any of the arguments proffered by Kahn, Inc. … are inaccurate in the

16
description of historical events and ignore, and/or directly contradict,

statements made by Kahn to the Court before current counsel’s retention.”12
Kahn and Kahn, Inc. jointly appealed from the court’s order.
DISCUSSION
I
Kahn first argues that the court’s order should be reversed because the
judgment against Burns is void under sections 473, subdivision (d) and 580.
The Crosby Clinic advanced a similar argument in its appeal from the court’s
denial of its motion to vacate the judgment under section 473, subdivision (d).
(Kirkeby v. The Crosby Clinic, LLC (January 13, 2025, D083640 [nonpub.
opn.].) There, the Crosby Clinic argued that because the Kirkebys failed to
plead a specific amount of damages in the FAC, the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to enter the judgment awarding them damages. Kahn now
similarly asserts that because Burns’s answer was stricken, section 580
precluded the trial court from awarding damages.
In the earlier appeal we concluded any damages awarded against the
Crosby Clinic were precluded by section 580 because it suffered a default
judgment and the FAC did not plead a specific amount of damages against it.
This conclusion, however, did not require reversal because the judgment only
awarded damages to the Kirkebys against Burns, not the Crosby Clinic, and
Burns was not subjected to a default judgement. Thus, the damages awarded

12 The court provided Kahn and Kahn, Inc. ten days to post an
undertaking under section 917.2 to stay the order pending appeal. On
January 8, 2024, Kahn caused NSI to file a petition for bankruptcy, which
resulted in an automatic stay in this case. As a result, the Kirkebys filed a
motion for relief, and on March 27, 2024, the bankruptcy court vacated the
stay, finding Kahn filed the case “in bad faith to try and stay the state court’s
order and prevent the disbursement of the funds on deposit in the Superior
Court’s General Fund to the [Kirkebys].”
17
against Burns were not invalidated by the Kirkebys’ failure to plead a specific
amount of damages in the FAC.
A
As we explained in our prior opinion, section 425.10, subdivision (a)
states that a complaint shall contain both a “statement of the facts
constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language” and a
“demand for judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims to be
entitled.” Further, the statute provides that “[i]f the recovery of money or
damages is demanded, the amount demanded shall be stated.” (§ 425.10,
subd. (a).)
Section 580, subdivision (a) is a corollary to section 425.10,
subdivision (a). It states that “[t]he relief granted to the plaintiff, if there is
no answer, cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint, in the statement
required by Section 425.11, or in the statement provided for by
Section 425.115; but in any other case, the court may grant the plaintiff any
relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced within
the issue. The court may impose liability, regardless of whether the theory
upon which liability is sought to be imposed involves legal or equitable
principles.” (§ 580, subd. (a).) Cases in which sanctions result in a default
judgement are subject to the same limitation. (See Electronic Funds
Solutions, LLC v. Murphy (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1175 [§ 580 governs
“the amount of damages available on a default judgment entered as a
discovery sanction”].)
“ ‘[T]he primary purpose of [section 580] is to guarantee defaulting
parties adequate notice of the maximum judgment that may be assessed
against them.’ ” (Stein v. York (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 320, 325 (Stein).) “A
defendant has the right to elect not to answer the complaint. [Citation.]

18
Although this may [be] a tactical move by [a] defendant, it is a permissible
tactic. [A d]efendant, relying on the absence of a statement of damages in the
complaint, [is] entitled to have default entered against him. Section 580
‘ensure[s] that a defendant who declines to contest an action ... [is] not ...
subject[ed] ... to open-ended liability’ and operates as a limitation on the
court’s jurisdiction.” (Ibid.)
Section 580 is strictly construed. (Greenup v. Rodman (1986) 42 Cal.3d
822, 826.) “ ‘The notice requirement of section 580 was designed to insure
fundamental fairness. Surely, this would be undermined if the door were
opened to speculation, no matter how reasonable it might appear in a
particular case, that a prayer for damages according to proof provided
adequate notice of a defaulting defendant’s potential liability.’ ” (Stein,
supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 325.) “If a default judgment awarded against a
defendant exceeds the relief demanded in the complaint [citation], or is a
different form of relief than that demanded in the complaint [citation], the
defendant is ‘effectively denied a fair hearing … [citations].’ Thus, a default
judgment in an amount greater than the amount demanded is void and
subject to either direct or collateral attack.” (Id. at p. 326.)
“ ‘We review de novo the trial court’s determination that a default
judgment is or is not void.’ ” (Airs Aromatics, LLC v. CBL Data Recovery
Technologies, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1013, 1018 (Airs Aromatics).)
B
Here, it is undisputed that the FAC did not contain a demand for a
specific amount of damages. Rather, the Kirkebys prayed only for
“compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial,” as well as
“exemplary damages” and “treble damages.” Thus, as we held in Kirkeby v.
The Crosby Clinic, LLC, supra, D083640, any award of damages in this case

19
as a result of a default judgment is subject to the limitation of section 580.
The damages awarded against Burns, however, were not the result of a
default judgment. Rather, the trial court vacated the default against Burns
with respect to the Kirkebys’ damages claim and the parties proceeded to a
contested trial on the issue of damages. (See Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney
Canada, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 613, 624–625 [discovery sanctions that
established liability, “simply deprived [the defendant] of the right to litigate
the issue of liability,” and defendant “was in no different position than any
defendant who admits liability, but disputes damages; who answers the
allegations concerning damages, but fails to answer the liability allegations;
or who has suffered an adverse summary adjudication of the issue of liability.
In none of those instances is there a default”].)
With respect to the court’s authority to vacate the default, Kahn and
Kahn, Inc. assert that “[b]ecause the trial court granted [the Kirkebys’
request to vacate the judgment] without any authority, the order vacating the
default is void for lack of jurisdiction.” Kahn and Kahn, Inc., however, offer
no explanation as to why the trial court lacked authority to vacate the
default. In support of this assertion, they cite only Plaza Hollister Ltd.
Partnership v. County of San Benito (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1, 20. Plaza,
however, has no relationship to the issues presented in this appeal. In Plaza,
the Sixth District concluded that a stipulated judgment entered between a
county board of supervisors and a property owner that determined the
property’s tax basis was void because the trial court that entered the
judgment lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. (Id. at pp. 23–
26.) No such jurisdictional defect exists in this case and appellants have
provided no alternative grounds to support their claim that the trial court
lacked authority to vacate the default judgment. (See Shaw v. Los Angeles

20
Unified School District (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 740, 754 (Shaw) [“It is the
parties’ responsibility to support claims of error with meaningful argument
and citation to authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); [citation.]
When they do not furnish legal argument with citation to authority on a
particular point, we may treat the point as forfeited and pass it without
consideration.”].)
Kahn and Kahn, Inc. next argue that even if the default was properly
set aside, the judgment entered against Burns still violates section 580
because Burns’s answer was never reinstated. Kahn and Kahn, Inc. argue
this precluded Burns from contesting the merits, implicating section 580.
The appellants, however, again provide no relevant legal support for their
argument. (Shaw, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 754.) In addition, this
argument was not raised by Kahn or Kahn, Inc. in the trial court, forfeiting it
for purposes of appeal. (See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 506, 548 (Hewlett-Packard) [“ ‘ “As a general rule, theories not
raised in the trial court cannot be asserted for the first time on appeal; ….
This rule is based on fairness—it would be unfair, both to the trial court and
the opposing litigants, to permit a change of theory on appeal.” ’ ”].)
Even if we were to reach this argument, however, we would reject it on
its merits. First, Kahn and Kahn, Inc’s position does not accurately reflect
the trial court proceedings. They suggest that because the court did not
“reinstate” Burns’s answer after vacating the default, it was not actually
vacated and that Burns’s due process rights were violated by the eventual
judgment awarding damages against him. The court’s order makes clear,
however, that the court did vacate the default before it proceeded to a
disputed trial on the merits of the Kirkebys’ damage claims.

21
Further, to the extent that Kahn and Kahn, Inc. contend Burns was
precluded from contesting the merits, such contention is contradicted by the
record. As the Kirkebys point out, Burns actively participated in the
damages trial and had an opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine
the Kirkebys’ witnesses. Burns thus had the opportunity to contest the
merits of the Kirkebys’ damage claims, and section 580’s rule precluding
default damages greater than the amount pleaded in the complaint was not

implicated.13

13 Kahn and Kahn, Inc. rely on Stein, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th 320 and
Airs Aromatics, supra, 23 Cal.App.5th 1013, to support their argument that
the absence of an answer, and not the entry of default judgment, invokes
section 580. In Stein, the plaintiff sued her lawyer, York, for malpractice.
(Stein, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 323.) After engaging in some discovery,
and an unsuccessful demurrer, York declined to answer the complaint and
the plaintiff requested a default. (Ibid.) The court granted the request and a
default was entered against York. The case proceeded to a default prove-up
hearing, the court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, and awarded
damages of $2.65 million. (Ibid.) York then moved to modify the judgment
because the damages exceeded the amount requested in the complaint, which
was nothing. The trial court denied the motion and York appealed. (Id. at
p. 324.) The Court of Appeal sided with York, holding that the damages were
void under section 580. (Id. at p. 327.) Here, in contrast, the default was
vacated and the parties proceeded to trial on the issue of damages.
Accordingly, York does not support reversal.
Airs Aromatics likewise concerned a relatively straightforward
application of section 580, where there was no question that the judgment
entered after default exceeded the amount of damages pleaded in the
complaint. The defendant argued that the motion to set aside the default
judgment, which was filed several years after the default was entered, was
untimely because the judgment was voidable, and not void. (Airs Aromatics,
supra, 23 Cal.App.5th at p. 1021.) The court rejected the argument,
concluded the judgment was void, and reversed the trial court’s order denying
the defendant’s request to set aside the default. Airs Aromatics does not
support reversal here.
22
II
Kahn and Kahn, Inc. next make a series of alternative arguments that
they contend require reversal of the court’s distribution order. They argue
that the order should be reversed because (1) no judgment was entered
against NSI, (2) there was no adequate finding of alter ego liability in the
judgment, (3) the Kirkebys did not have a first-priority lien on the Circle R
Property, and (4) Kahn has a community property interest in the property.
These arguments are not well-taken.
A
Kahn and Kahn, Inc. assert that “[w]ithout any judgment against NSI
Services, the Kirkebys have no right to the Surplus Funds.” As an initial
matter, because this argument was not raised in the trial court it is forfeited.
(Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 548.) This
argument is also a red herring. As discussed, the funds at issue are the
proceeds from the court-appointed receiver’s sale of the Circle R Property.
After the sale, the funds were placed into the court’s general fund and held in
reserve pending the outcome of the litigation. Through that litigation the
court determined the Circle R Property was purchased by Burns, through
NSI, with money that was fraudulently obtained from the Kirkebys. Indeed,
this fact is not disputed by Kahn. After the damages were fixed by the
results of the subsequent trial, the court awarded the proceeds of the sale of
the property to the Kirkebys because the funds used to purchase the property

23
were stolen from the Kirkebys. Put simply, the lack of judgment against NSI

is not relevant.14
B
Kahn and Kahn, Inc. next argue that the trial court erred to the extent
its decision to distribute the funds to the Kirkebys was based on a finding of
alter ego. “In order to prevail in a cause of action against individual
defendants based upon disregard of the corporate form, the plaintiff must
plead and prove such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individuals do not exist, and that an
inequity will result if the corporate entity is treated as the sole actor.” (Vasey
v. California Dance Co. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 742, 749.) “ ‘Among the factors
to be considered in applying the doctrine are commingling of funds and other
assets of the two entities, the holding out by one entity that it is liable for the
debts of the other, identical equitable ownership in the two entities, use of
the same offices and employees, and use of one as a mere shell or conduit for
the affairs of the other.’ [Citations.] Other factors which have been described
in the case law include inadequate capitalization, disregard of corporate
formalities, lack of segregation of corporate records, and identical directors
and officers. [Citations.] No one characteristic governs, but the courts must

14 Kahn and Kahn, Inc. cite a statement from Oksner v. Superior Court
(1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 672—“A judgment creditor is, of course, entitled to
subject to his judgment only property which belongs to his debtor ….”—in
support of their argument. Oksner is inapposite. The case considered
whether a security interest in real property owned by the judgment debtor
prevented the transfer of the asset to satisfy a judgment. (Id. at p. 681.) The
Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred by requiring the judgment
debtor to surrender the trust deed to the property, which prevented a
foreclosure sale by the lender. (Id. at p. 686.) Here, no one—including NSI—
claimed any secured interest that was not satisfied at the time of the
property sale.
24
look at all the circumstances to determine whether the doctrine should be
applied.” (Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th
523, 538–539 (Sonora Diamond).)
If the corporate form, or here the LLC, is disregarded, then the court
will hold the alter ego—in this case Burns—“liable for the actions of the
[entity]: ‘As the separate personality of the [entity] is a statutory privilege, it
must be used for legitimate business purposes and must not be perverted.’ ”
(Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 300 (Mesler).)
Further, when the entity form “is abused it will be disregarded ... so that the
[entity] will be liable for acts of the [members] or the [members] liable for acts
done in the name of the” entity. (Ibid., italics added; see also id. at p. 301
[“The law of this state is that the separate corporate entity will not be
honored where to do so would be to defeat the rights and equities of third
persons.”]; Curci Investments, LLC v. Baldwin (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 214, 221
[“ ‘The alter ego doctrine prevents individuals or other corporations from
misusing the corporate laws by the device of a sham corporate entity formed
for the purpose of committing fraud or other misdeeds.’ ”].)
Contrary to the assertion of Kahn and Kahn, Inc., the allegations in the
FAC that were admitted by the court’s imposition of sanctions against Burns
sufficiently supported the court’s finding in the subsequent judgment that
NSI was Burns’s alter ego, and vice versa. Specifically, the FAC alleged NSI
was the alter ego of Burns and that Burns was the alter ego of NSI; Burns
had sole control, management, and ownership of the entity; Burns diverted
the assets of the entity for his personal use; the entity was a mere shell used
to defraud the Kirkebys and MHCD; and the entity was a subterfuge for
Burns fraudulent activity. These allegations, as admitted, sufficiently
supported the trial court’s finding that NSI and Burns were each other’s alter

25
egos. (See Sonora Diamond, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 538 [the “alter ego
doctrine will be invoked” when there is “such a unity of interest and
ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the shareholder do not in reality exist”
and there will “be an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as
those of the corporation alone”].) For this reason, the court’s finding that the
proceeds from the sale of the Circle R Property should be distributed to the
Kirkebys was appropriate regardless of whether Burns used NSI to purchase

the property.15 (See id. p. 538 [“when the corporate form is used to
perpetrate a fraud, circumvent a statute, or accomplish some other wrongful
or inequitable purpose, the courts will ignore the corporate entity and deem
the corporation’s acts to be those of the persons or organizations actually
controlling the corporation”].)
We also reject Kahn and Kahn, Inc.’s argument that the aiding and
abetting allegations in the FAC were inconsistent with the court’s finding
that NSI and Burns were alter egos. The appellants did not raise this
argument in the trial court and thus have forfeited the argument for
purposes of appeal. (See Greenwich S.F., LLC v. Wong (2010) 190
Cal.App.4th 739, 767 [failure to raise an issue in the trial court forfeits the

15 Kahn and Kahn, Inc. argue the distribution to the Kirkebys constituted
improper outside reverse corporate veil piercing. We disagree. The case
appellants cite, Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp. (2008) 162
Cal.App.4th 1510, concerned a corporation, not a limited liability company
with one member like NSI. (See id. at pp. 1512–1513 [“third party creditor
may not pierce the corporate veil to reach corporate assets to satisfy a
shareholder’s personal liability”].) Unlike Postal, there is no evidence in the
record that NSI had other creditors competing for its assets. Further, the
court’s order approving the receivership sale required the receiver to
eliminate any judgment liens on the property before transferring the
remaining funds to the court’s general fund.
26
claim of error on appeal].) In addition, Kahn and Kahn, Inc. provide no legal
authority to support their assertion that the aiding and abetting allegations
negate the alter ego findings. Accordingly, we disregard this “conclusory
argument[] that [is] not supported by pertinent legal authority.’ ” (Champir,
LLC v. Fairbanks Ranch Assn. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 583, 597.)
Even without these procedural grounds for rejecting Kahn’s argument,
the argument is also not persuasive. The fact that the Kirkebys alleged
aiding and abetting liability against Burns and the various entities he
controlled is not relevant to whether the proceeds from the sale of the Circle
R Property were properly distributed to the Kirkebys in partial satisfaction of
their judgment against Burns. Whether aiding and abetting liability is
unavailable because the entity defendants were merely alter egos of Burns,
and thus could not conspire with him, has no bearing on the issues before this
court.
C
Kahn and Kahn, Inc. also assert that the court erred by finding that
the Kirkebys had a first-in-right priority lien on the Circle R Property based
on their recording of the stipulated injunction order on March 1, 2021
because after the sale of the property the trial court ordered it to be
transferred free and clear of any liens and encumbrances. As with other
arguments made by the appellants, however, they provide no legal authority
to support this bald assertion. Accordingly, we have no basis to reverse the
trial court’s order on this ground. (See Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144
Cal.App.4th 344, 368 [“ ‘This court is not inclined to act as counsel for …
appellant and furnish a legal argument as to how the trial court’s rulings in
this regard constituted an abuse of discretion’ [citation], or a mistake of
law.”].)

27
D
Kahn and Kahn, Inc.’s final argument, again with no citation to any
legal authority, is that the trial court erred by disregarding Kahn’s
community property interest in the Circle R Property. As discussed, the trial
court found that the marital settlement agreement awarding the property to
Kahn did not prevent the court from finding the property was fraudulently
obtained by Burns. While the Kirkebys do not address this issue in their
briefing, we do not find Kahn’s argument concerning her community property
interest persuasive.
First, the record establishes NSI purchased the property just four days
prior to the marriage, and that the property was purchased solely by NSI. In
addition, the MSA that purportedly awarded the property to Kahn was
entered after the Circle R Property was placed in receivership. Further, the
MSA itself stated the transfer of the property from NSI to Kahn was
“[s]ubject to approval by the Court in related matters,” including this case. It
is undisputed that Burns and Kahn never received the trial court’s approval
for a transfer of the property. In sum, Kahn and Kahn, Inc. have failed to
show that the trial court erred by finding that the Circle R Property was
obtained by Burns using funds embezzled from the Kirkebys and that Kahn
did not have a valid interest in the property.

28
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondents are awarded the costs of appeal.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

CASTILLO, J.

29

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