In re J.A. CA2/8

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Filed 6/6/25 In re J.A. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re J.A., a Person Coming Under B336732 c/w B341840
the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County Super.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Ct. No. 22CCJP02479E)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CARLOS A. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Lisa A. Brackelmanns, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed in
part, dismissed in part and reversed and remanded.
Carol A. Koenig, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Carlos A.
William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Karla G.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________

SUMMARY
Mother Karla G. and father Carlos A. appeal from the
juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders
regarding their child Jeremiah A. Carlos C. also appeals from
the juvenile court’s order terminating jurisdiction.1
Karla G.’s appeal is moot because the order terminating
jurisdiction gave her sole physical custody and joint legal custody
of Jeremiah A. Carlos A.’s appeal is moot as to the dispositional
order removing Jeremiah A. from his custody because he did not
challenge the later order granting sole physical custody to Karla
G. Carlos A.’s other claims, however, are not moot because the
juvenile court’s findings and orders continue to impact his rights
as a parent and severely restrict his future contact with Jeremiah
A.
Carlos A. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the juvenile court’s findings that Jeremiah A. was at
risk of harm due to his sexual abuse of two of Jeremiah A.’s older
half-siblings and due to a traffic stop incident in which he was
charged with possession of methamphetamine. He also
challenges the dispositional orders based on those findings, which
restricted his contact with Jeremiah A. to monitored visitation

1 This court issued an order on March 5, 2025, consolidating
Karla G. and Carlos A.’s appeals from the jurisdiction and
disposition order, with Carlos A.’s appeal from the order
terminating jurisdiction.

2
and required him to complete sex abuse counseling for
perpetrators. He also contends that there was no basis for the
juvenile court’s issuance of a restraining order restricting his
contact with Karla G.
We affirm in part, as to the jurisdictional finding that
Jeremiah A. was at risk of harm due to the drug possession
incident. We reverse in part and remand, because there was not
substantial evidence of a risk to Jeremiah A. due to sexual abuse
of the half-siblings, and there was not substantial evidence of any
danger to Karla G. that would support the issuance of a
restraining order.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. Circumstances Prior to Filing of Dependency
Petition Regarding Jeremiah A.
Karla G. has five minor children; Carlos A. is the father of
her youngest child, Jeremiah A.
Karla G. first came into contact with the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in
2009 due to allegations of drug abuse by Karla G. and domestic
violence by the father of Jeremiah A.’s half-siblings. This referral
was investigated and closed as unfounded. DCFS investigated
two more referrals in 2012 and filed a dependency petition in
December 2012, alleging domestic violence by the half-siblings’
father and Karla G.’s failure to protect the half-siblings from
exposure to this violence. The juvenile court detained the half-
siblings from their father and ordered in-home family
maintenance services for Karla G. This case was closed in April
2014, with Karla G. and the half-siblings’ father having joint
custody of the children. After several more referrals concerning
domestic violence, physical abuse and neglect, a second

3
dependency petition was filed in August 2014. Again, the half-
siblings remained at home with Karla G. and she received family
maintenance services. This case closed in June 2015 with Karla
G. having sole legal and physical custody of the half-siblings.
In April 2022, another referral was made to DCFS. At that
time, Karla G. and Carlos A. had been in a relationship for about
three years. She was experiencing some mental health issues
and had made a suicide attempt. When interviewed regarding
this referral, Karla G. admitted she was feeling overwhelmed and
depressed, but stated that Carlos A. was supportive and helpful
to her and there was no domestic violence in their relationship.
On June 28, 2022, the four half-siblings were detained from
Karla G. and their father and placed with their adult sister
Evelyn C.
In August 2022, a new referral was made to DCFS, alleging
that Carlos A. had sexually abused two of the half-siblings, Ka. C.
and Ke. C. DCFS investigated and closed the referral as
inconclusive and found no current safety issue because the half-
siblings had no ongoing contact with Carlos A.
On January 25, 2023, the juvenile court sustained the
dependency petition regarding the four half-siblings, finding that
they were at risk due to mother’s mental health issues, drug
abuse, neglect of the children’s basic needs, and failure to protect
the children from contact with Carlos A. in light of his drug use
and a 1989 conviction for statutory rape.2 The court removed the

2 This petition makes no reference to the allegation of sexual
abuse of the half-siblings by Carlos A., only to his 1989 charge of
unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor. Carlos A. was
sentenced to 12 months’ probation on this charge, and the
conviction was set aside and dismissed in 1995.

4
half-siblings from Karla G. and from their father, ordered family
reunification services, and ordered that the half-siblings have no
contact with Carlos A.
Jeremiah A. was born in July 2023. DCFS did not, at that
time, detain Jeremiah A. or amend its petition to include him.
On August 14, 2023, a forensic interview of half-siblings
Ka. C. and Ke. C. was conducted. Ke. C. did not disclose any
sexual abuse, but Ka. C., then age 13, disclosed that Carlos A.
had touched her inappropriately on two occasions, over her
clothing, once while massaging her leg after a sports injury, and
once while playing “dog pile” with the children. At a review
hearing in the half-siblings’ case on September 14, 2023, the
juvenile court ordered continuing family reunification services for
Karla G., and again ordered that Carlos A. have no contact with
the half-siblings.
On September 25, 2023, Karla G. tested positive for
methamphetamine; she explained to DCFS social workers that
she had relapsed due to the half-siblings’ father’s suicide. A new
referral was made to DCFS on November 3, 2023, regarding
Jeremiah A. Although he was healthy and well-cared for, and
Karla G. was complying with her case plan, DCFS was concerned
about Karla G.’s relapse, her ongoing relationship with Carlos A.,
and his presence in her home on weekends.
When interviewed by DCFS social workers regarding this
referral, both Carlos A. and Karla G. adamantly denied that he
had sexually abused the half-siblings. Mother stated that the
half-siblings never disclosed any sexual abuse to her and had
been manipulated by their caregiver Evelyn C. into making false
allegations because Evelyn C. did not like Carlos A. Karla G. told
the social worker that Carlos A. had an attorney and planned to

5
fight the case in court, and that “all her DCFS cases have been
conspiracies.”
DCFS was concerned about Karla G. not believing Ka. C.’s
statements about sexual abuse, not being protective of the half-
siblings, and generally being in denial about the problems that
led to the dependency case. The social worker “explained to
mother that . . . if your children report they’ve been hurt or
abused and you now accuse them of lying, minimize their trauma,
and then continue to be involved with their alleged abuser that is
not being protective and that is why the [half-siblings] have not
been returned.” Karla G. responded that the half-siblings were
not present when Carlos A. visited the home on the weekends.
During a follow-up interview on December 14, 2023, the
social worker again told Karla G. that her relationship with
Carlos A. was a barrier to reunifying with the half-siblings.
Karla G. responded that Carlos A. does not live with her, she
does not plan to stay in a relationship with him but does need
financial support from him, and she “does not want to file a
[Restraining Order] against the father but is open to the court
doing it.”
During his follow-up interview, Carlos A. again denied ever
touching the half-siblings inappropriately. When asked about his
prior conviction for statutory rape, he explained that he was 19
and his girlfriend was 17 at the time, and they later married and
had three children together. When asked about a prior drug
charge,3 Carlos A. stated that he had borrowed a pair of shorts

3 Carlos A. was convicted of possessing a controlled
substance on August 30, 2015, and sentenced to 34 days jail and
24 months’ probation.

6
from a teammate after a soccer game, then got arrested for
having an open container of beer, and when he was searched,
methamphetamine was found in the pocket of the shorts. He
denied any current drug use and denied supplying drugs to Karla
G. He initially agreed to submit to a drug test, but when the
social worker followed up on December 21, 2023, to schedule the
drug test, he told the social worker to contact his attorney.
On January 30, 2024, a criminal case was filed, charging
Carlos A. with three violations of Penal Code section 647.6,
subdivision (a)(1). On March 4, 2024, Carlos A. entered a not
guilty plea, and the criminal court issued a protective order
prohibiting Carlos A. from having any contact with Ka. C. or Ke.
C.
II. Dependency Petition Regarding Jeremiah A.
DCFS filed a dependency petition under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, as to Jeremiah A. on February 7,
2024.4 Counts b-1, b-3 and j-1 alleged that that Carlos A. had a
history of drug abuse, was a current abuser of
methamphetamine, and had prior convictions for unlawful sexual
intercourse with a minor and rape,5 and that Karla G. had
endangered Jeremiah A. by failing to protect him from contact
with Carlos C. Counts b-2 and j-2 of the petition alleged that
Karla G. had a history of drug abuse and was a current abuser of
methamphetamine, and that her four other children were current

4 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

5 The language “and rape” apparently reflects a misreading
of Carlos A.’s rap sheet. His prior conviction in 1989 was for a
single count of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor.

7
dependents of the court due to her drug use. At an initial hearing
on February 23, 2024, the court did not detain Jeremiah A. from
Karla G. or Carlos A. but ordered that they submit to drug tests
and continue to live separately.
On March 19, 2024, DCFS filed a first amended petition.
This petition added into counts b-2 and j-2 the allegations that
Karla G. had a positive test for amphetamines on September 25,
2023, and had numerous missed drug tests. The first amended
petition added new counts b-4, d-1, and j-3, alleging that Carlos
A. had sexually abused Ka. C. and Ke. C. and Karla G. had
endangered Jeremiah A. by failing to protect him from contact
with Carlos A. DCFS asked the court to detain Jeremiah A. from
both parents due to Karla G.’s missed drug tests, failure to
participate in a drug treatment program, and refusing to believe
that any sex abuse occurred or that Carlos A.’s presence in her
home presented any risk to Jeremiah A. The court denied
DCFS’s request to detain Jeremiah A. from either parent, and
ordered that Carlos A. comply with any criminal protective order
regarding the half-siblings.
On March 26, 2024, DCFS filed a second amended petition,
adding a new count b-5 alleging that Carlos A. was cited for
possession of methamphetamine during a traffic stop on
February 14, 2024, and had “attempted to threaten” officers with
a plastic replica gun, and that Jeremiah A. and Karla G. were
present during this incident.
On March 27, 2024, Karla G.’s attorney filed a request for a
restraining order pursuant to section 213.5 against Carlos A.
The restraining order request named only Karla G. as a protected
party, and did not include Jeremiah A. In the section of the form
entitled “Describe Why You Need a Restraining Order,” Karla

8
G.’s counsel stated: “Father was in possession of
methamphetamine, threatened police officers . . . . On 02/14/24,
the child, Jeremiah [A.’s] father, Carlos [A.], was arrested, during
a traffic stop, booked and cited on Health and Safety 11337(a) for
possession of methamphetamine. The father was stopped by
Sheriff’s Department due to false vehicle plates. The father
attempted to threaten officers with a plastic replica firearm.
Mother and child Jeremiah [A.] were present in the vehicle
during the incident. . . . See DCFS Reports dated 03/26/2024 and
related cases 22CCJP02479ABCD for more details.”
The requested restraining order would require Carlos A. to
have no contact with Karla G. except for brief and peaceful
contact to communicate about court-ordered visitation, and to
stay 100 yards away from Karla G., her home, workplace, vehicle,
and place of worship.
At the initial hearing on the second amended petition on
March 27, 2024, DCFS again requested that Jeremiah A. be
detained from both parents. The juvenile court did not detain
Jeremiah A. from Karla G., but did detain him from Carlos A.
and ordered monitored visitation. In support of her request for a
temporary restraining order, Karla G’s counsel argued as follows
at the March 27, 2024 hearing: “Mother is requesting a
restraining order based off the February 14, 2024 incident. [¶]
Mother, of course, regrets that [Carlos A.] was in possession of
illicit substances during their coparenting time. [¶] And we are
asking for this restraining order today, not just to ensure
Jeremiah [A.]’s safety . . . but also to ensure that mother can be
successful in maintaining her sobriety . . . .”
The court granted Karla G.’s request for a temporary
restraining order, commenting that “[s]he has taken the steps of

9
actually demonstrating to the court that she is going to stay away
from [Carlos A.] by getting a restraining order.”
In preparation for the jurisdiction/disposition hearing,
DCFS re-interviewed Karla G., Carlos A., and other family
members, and prepared a Jurisdiction/Disposition report. In her
interview, Karla G. stated that she would believe her daughter if
she disclosed sexual abuse, but her daughter denied any sexual
abuse both to Karla G. and to a social worker. Karla G. also
stated that she had known Carlos A. for many years as a friend,
and she and her children received “a lot of moral and emotional
support from him” in dealing with the domestic violence
perpetrated by the half-siblings’ father.
Carlos A. declined to provide any statement regarding the
allegations in the petition, referring the social workers to his
attorney, but he did provide background information. He stated
that he had known Karla G. for about six years, initially as a
friend. He denied any drug use by himself or Karla G. and stated
that she was a good mother. He stated that he had tried to have
a good relationship with Karla G’s family but it had been
“difficult” and that family members had made “many false
allegations.” When asked about Carlos A.’s contact with
Jeremiah A., both Carlos A. and Karla G. said that he did not
come to her home on weekends anymore, but took Jeremiah A. to
the home of one of his adult children, or to a park or other public
place, and that he called every day to ask about Jeremiah A.
Evelyn C., when interviewed, stated that Ka. C. had
disclosed sexual abuse to her, and that both mother and maternal
grandparents believed that the sexual allegations were false and
“this is all manipulation . . . because she [Evelyn] never had a
good relationship with [Carlos A.].” Maternal grandmother,

10
when interviewed, stated that she had no concerns about Carlos
A.; he was a family friend for many years who worked with
maternal grandfather.
DCFS’s Jurisdiction/Disposition report recommended that
Jeremiah A. be removed from the custody of both parents. The
report stated that Karla G. was only in “partial complian[ce]”
with her case plan in the half-siblings’ case, raised concerns
about Karla G.’s missed drug tests and Carlos A.’s possible
negative impact on her sobriety, and stated that Carlos A. “may
have unaddressed substance abuse issues” and had refused to
submit to any drug tests. Regarding the sexual abuse/failure to
protect allegations, the report stated that criminal charges had
been filed against Carlos A., but Karla G. still did not believe that
he presented any risk to Jeremiah A., and that Karla G. and
Carlos A. “have both expressed that they believe that the
case . . . is based on a conspiracy and fabrications by social
workers and [Evelyn].”
DCFS also filed two Last Minute Information for the court
reports in preparation for the April 16 Jurisdiction/Disposition
hearing. The first Last Minute report stated that Carlos A. had
submitted to one drug test, which was negative. The report also
stated that DCFS had decided to file a supplemental petition
pursuant to section 342 in the half-siblings’ case regarding the
sexual abuse.6 The second Last Minute report stated that Karla

6 The record does not indicate that a section 342 petition was
ever filed. The six-month review report in Jeremiah A.’s case,
dated October 24, 2024, references the sustained petition in the
half-siblings’ case but does not indicate that any supplemental
petition had been filed or adjudicated. Jurisdiction in the half-
siblings’ case was terminated on October 23, 2024.

11
G. recently had several negative drug tests, was in compliance
with her case plan, and was aware of and willing to comply with
the juvenile court’s March 27 order detaining Jeremiah A. from
Carlos A. and providing for monitored visitation.
Attached to the second Last Minute report was the police
report from the February 14, 2024, traffic stop, which stated that
Karla G. was in the driver’s seat of the car and Carlos A. and
Jeremiah A. were passengers. Carlos A. put a plastic replica gun
down on the floor of the car when the officers told him to do so.
He “spontaneously stated that he had drugs,” and when he was
searched, a plastic bag containing a substance resembling
methamphetamine was found in his pants pocket. Carlos A. was
cited and released for possession of methamphetamine. Karla G.,
when asked about the traffic stop by DCFS social workers, said
that the gun was a water pistol and Carlos A. had pointed it out
to the officers so they would not mistake it for a real gun. Mother
also said that Carlos A. was wearing pants he recently bought
from a donation center, and he had “found a bag of a possible
substance in these pants.”
III. Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing
On April 16, 2024, after hearing argument from all parties’
counsel, the juvenile court dismissed counts b-1, b-3, and j-1 of
the second amended petition, finding that there was insufficient
evidence of Carlos A.’s history of drug abuse or current drug
abuse, or of Karla G. failing to protect Jeremiah A. from exposure
to Carlos A.’s drug abuse. The court found that Carlos A.’s 1989
conviction for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor was
remote in time, and occurred when he was 19 and the minor was
17, so it did not present a risk of harm to Jeremiah A. The court
dismissed count d-1, finding that Jeremiah A. was differently

12
situated from the half-siblings and so was not at risk of sexual
abuse.
The juvenile court sustained count b-2, amending it to state
that Karla G. was a “recent abuser” rather than a current abuser
of methamphetamine, and to remove references to missed drug
tests. The court sustained counts b-4 and j-3 as pled, and
sustained count b-5 as amended to state that Carlos A. was
“in possession” of a plastic gun rather than attempting to
threaten officers with it.
The court’s dispositional orders removed Jeremiah A. from
Carlos A., and ordered family maintenance services for Karla G.
and reunification services for Carlos A. Carlos A’s case plan
required him, among other things, to complete a drug/alcohol
program, drug testing, individual counseling, and “sex abuse
counseling for perpetrators.” Carlos A. was ordered to comply
with any criminal protective order or restraining order, and stay
away from Karla G.’s home and the maternal grandparents’
home. The juvenile court ordered monitored visits for Carlos A.
with Jeremiah A. and specified that Karla G. was not to monitor
or be present during these visits.
As to the restraining order, Carlos A.’s counsel argued that
it should not be granted because there was no evidence of
domestic violence between Carlos A. and Karla G., the
restraining order request was based solely on the February 14,
2024 traffic stop incident, and the police report did not indicate
that Carlos A. threatened or presented any danger to the police
or Karla G. during that incident. Karla G.’s counsel responded
that “[w]hile it’s true that there was no domestic violence
between these two parties, [Carlos A.] did still put mother in a
detrimental and dangerous position by having methamphetamine

13
with mother without mother’s knowledge in his vehicle where
baby Jeremiah [A.] was also present . . . .”
The court questioned whether a stay-away order would be
sufficient, asking counsel “[s]o is she in fear of father?” Karla G.
herself responded to this question, saying “No, I’m not fear [sic] of
father.” Karla G.’s counsel then reiterated her request for a
restraining order and declined the court’s suggestion to either
consult with her client in private or allow the court to inquire
directly as to Karla G.’s wishes.
The court found “that a sufficient showing has been made”
to grant the restraining order. The terms of the restraining order
were the same as those of the temporary restraining order, and it
would remain in effect until April 16, 2027.
Both parents filed timely appeals from the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders.
IV. Six-month Review Hearing and Termination of
Jurisdiction
On October 24, 2024, the juvenile court held a six-month
review hearing. DCFS’s report for this hearing stated that
Jeremiah A. was healthy and well-cared for by Karla C., and she
was in full compliance with her case plan. Carlos A., when
interviewed by DCFS for the review hearing, again denied any
sexual abuse but stated he would comply with court orders so as
not to place Jeremiah A. at risk of being removed from Karla G.
Carlos A. had provided numerous negative drug tests but had not
complied with the case plan requirements of a drug program and
sex abuse counseling for perpetrators, because he continued to
deny any drug use or sexual abuse. He had not contacted the
DCFS social worker about scheduling monitored visits with
Jeremiah A.

14
Prior to the October 24, 2024 review hearing, Carlos A. had
entered a plea to a lesser, non sex-offense charge of violating
Penal Code section 236 in the criminal case regarding the half-
siblings, and was sentenced to 36 months’ probation, 20 days of
community service and a 52-week parenting program, and
ordered to stay away from Ka. C. He told the DCFS social worker
that he intended to comply with the criminal court’s orders.
DCFS recommended closing the case with sole legal and
physical custody to Karla G. and monitored visits for Carlos A.
Father’s counsel requested unmonitored visits on the grounds
that Carlos A. had been “consistently testing negative” since
April 2024. DCFS’s counsel opposed this request, pointing out
that Carlos A. had not completed a drug program or sex abuse
counseling for perpetrators, as required by the case plan, and
that Carlos A.’s visits with Jeremiah A. had been “sporadic.”
The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction, effective October 31,
2024, with an order granting joint legal custody, sole physical
custody to Karla G., and monitored visitation to Carlos A.
The court further ordered that both parents must comply
with the restraining order, Carlos A. was to stay away from the
family home, and Karla G. could not monitor his visits. Attached
to the custody order was a form JV-206, stating that the reason
that Carlos A. was restricted to monitored visitation was that he
had not completed, among other things, “sexual abuse
treatment . . . for offenders.”
Carlos A. filed a timely notice of appeal.

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DISCUSSION
I. Mootness
Respondent argues that both parents’ appeals should be
dismissed as moot because the juvenile court terminated
jurisdiction over Jeremiah A. on October 24, 2024. Our first task
as a reviewing court is to “ ‘decide on a case-by-case basis
whether subsequent events in a juvenile dependency matter
make a case moot. . . .’ ” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276
(D.P.).)
Karla G.’s appeal is moot. Jeremiah A. was never removed
from her custody during the dependency case, and the juvenile
court’s order of October 24, 2024 provided her with joint legal and
sole physical custody of Jeremiah A. She did not appeal from this
order. Even if this court were to agree with Karla G.’s challenge
to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, subsequent events
have rendered it impossible to grant her any effective relief,
because she is suffering no ongoing harm from the juvenile
court’s findings and orders. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 276.)
Karla G. argues that this court should exercise its
discretion to reach the merits of her appeal even if it is moot.
We decline to do so. The factors discussed in In re D.P. as
weighing in favor of discretionary review are not present in this
case. The sustained allegations in Jeremiah A.’s case regarding
Karla G. are not “particularly pernicious or stigmatizing,” and
they are unlikely to cause any prejudicial impact in future
dependency or family court proceedings or other collateral
consequences. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 285-286.)
Carlos A. is differently situated. Some, but not all, of the
issues he seeks to raise on appeal are moot. Carlos A. seeks to
challenge the dispositional order removing Jeremiah A. from his

16
custody, arguing that the evidence in this case did not meet the
clear and convincing evidence standard for removal as required
by section 361, subdivision (d). This issue is moot. At the
October 24, 2024 review hearing, DCFS’s counsel requested that
the court close the case with sole physical custody to Karla G.,
joint legal custody, and monitored visitation for Carlos A. Carlos
A.’s counsel stated that “father is in agreement with joint legal
custody; however, he is requesting unmonitored visits. Since
Carlos A. did not contest DCFS’s request to grant sole physical
custody to Karla G. at the October 24, 2024 hearing, his
challenge to the removal order is moot, because it was superseded
by the exit order granting sole physical custody to Karla G.
Carlos A. does not seek to challenge this provision of the exit
order on appeal.
Carlos A.’s other challenges to the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders are not moot.
When a juvenile court’s findings and orders form the basis for
“an order that continues to impact a parent’s rights – for
instance, by restricting visitation or custody – that jurisdictional
finding remains subject to challenge, even if the juvenile court
has terminated its jurisdiction.” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 276.) The Supreme Court cited as examples of cases where
termination of jurisdiction does not render a parent’s appeal
moot, a case with “a stayaway order that remained in effect” after
termination of jurisdiction, and a case in which a father’s contact
with the child was “ ‘severely restricted as a direct result of the
jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders.’ ” (Id. at
pp. 276-277.)

17
Although Carlos A.’s counsel did not contest the award of
physical custody to Karla G. at the October 24, 2024 hearing, he
did argue for unmonitored visitation. The juvenile court
rejected that argument, and not only restricted his contact with
Jeremiah A. to monitored visits but also ordered that Karla G.
could not monitor or be present during Carlos A.’s visits, and
visits could not occur at Karla G.’s home. The court also ordered
Carlos A. to stay away from the maternal grandparents’ home,
precluding another possible location for visits. These orders
created severe logistical barriers to future contact with his child.
Moreover, if Carlos A. were to seek to modify the visitation order,
the family court would be notified via the JV-206 form that the
restriction to monitored visits was based in part on his failure to
complete “sex abuse counseling for perpetrators.”
Carlos A. also opposed the issuance of the restraining
order, which remains in effect until April 16, 2027, and which
could subject him to criminal prosecution if he were to have any
contact with Karla G. other than visitation exchanges and brief
communications about visitation, or come within 100 yards of
Karla G., her home, her workplace, or her vehicle, etc.
Carlos A. continues to suffer prejudicial consequences from
the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and the dispositional
orders based on these findings, from the issuance of the
restraining order, and from the terms of the custody order
terminating jurisdiction, so we will consider the non-moot issues
on their merits.

18
II. Jurisdiction Under Section 300, Subdivisions (b)
and (j)
Carlos A. contends that the juvenile court erred in
sustaining counts b-4, b-5 and j-3 of the second amended petition.
In reviewing a challenge to jurisdictional findings, we determine
if “ ‘substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them’ ” and “ ‘ “draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency
court . . . and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the
province of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766,
773 (I.J.).) We conclude that while count b-5 is supported by
substantial evidence, counts b-4 and j-3 are not.
A. Count b-5: the traffic stop incident.
Count b-5 alleged, in relevant part, that Carlos A.’s
possession of methamphetamine during the February 14, 2024
traffic stop interfered with his ability to provide regular care and
supervision of Jeremiah A., endangered Jeremiah A.’s physical
health and safety, and placed him at risk of serious physical
harm. Carlos A.’s counsel argued at the jurisdictional hearing
that Jeremiah A. was not endangered during the traffic stop
because Carlos A. “fully complied” with the police and was
“cited and released . . . without incident.” Regarding the drug
possession, counsel stated that “[t]he pants the father was
wearing were donated, and it was in those donated pants that
father found the crystalline substances. Father wanted to make
the police aware of the substance, which is why he volunteered
that information.” Counsel further argued that the plastic bag
was not within reach of Jeremiah A., and there was no evidence
that Carlos A. was under the influence of methamphetamine at

19
that time or any other time, so there was no nexus between
Carlos A.’s drug possession and a risk of harm to Jeremiah A.
The court sustained this count, amending it to state that
Carlos A. had possessed a plastic replica gun, not threatened the
officers with it. The court commented that “this is a situation
where it could have escalated – fortunately, it didn’t – when
father was pulled over for a traffic stop and then found in
possession of methamphetamine, and then was found with a
replica toy gun in his hand, which could have been mistaken for a
real gun . . .”
The juvenile court in this case had found that there was
insufficient evidence of drug abuse by Carlos A. to sustain the b-3
count. The question before us is whether Carlos A.’s possession of
methamphetamine, together with all the other evidence, is
sufficient to support a finding that Jeremiah A. was at risk of
harm. The relevant language of section 300, subdivision (b)
requires the court to find that a child “has suffered, or there is
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical
harm . . . as a result of . . . [t]he failure or inability of the child’s
parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child.”
Although this is not a case where jurisdiction rests on
parental drug abuse, the Supreme Court’s analysis of section 300,
subdivision (b) in In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520 (N.R.), is still
instructive. That case rejects the “tender years” doctrine and
holds that a parent’s drug abuse does not create a presumption of
risk to a young child. (Id. at pp. 556-560.) Instead, dependency
jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) “must be
established on the facts of each case.” (N.R., at p. 559.) The N.R.
court also stated, however, that it is “reasonable for courts to
infer that very young children require a substantial degree of

20
close supervision.” (Id. at p. 558.) Similarly, although Carlos A.’s
possession of drugs does not give rise to a presumption of risk,
the juvenile court could still infer that it presented more danger
to Jeremiah A. than to an older child.
The juvenile court in this case could reasonably have
concluded that Jeremiah A. was at risk of serious physical harm
due to Carlos A.’s failure or inability to adequately supervise or
protect him. The court focused on the February 14, 2024 traffic
stop incident in explaining the basis for sustaining the b-5 count.
While it is true that possessing methamphetamine in a car with a
baby could endanger the child in a number of ways – ranging
from the baby accidentally ingesting the substance, to a parent
using it and driving under the influence, to the risks inherent in
encounters with law enforcement – this incident alone might not
have been sufficient to support dependency jurisdiction. But the
juvenile court also had other evidence before it, including:
Jeremiah A.’s young age (nine months at the time of the hearing);
Carlos A.’s 2015 conviction for possession of methamphetamine,
for which he offered a strikingly similar and implausible
explanation; his refusal to submit to any drug tests until shortly
before the jurisdictional hearing; his denial of any problem with
drug abuse; and his insistence, along with Karla G., that the
dependency case was not based on any legitimate concerns and
was a “conspiracy.” Also, Karla G., who was Jeremiah A.’s
primary caregiver, had been struggling with substance abuse for

21
many years, and the social workers had expressed concerns about
Carlos A.’s potential negative influence on her sobriety.
In light of the totality of the evidence and the deferential
standard of review applicable in this case, we cannot say that the
juvenile court erred in sustaining the b-5 count.
B. Counts b-4 and j-3: sexual abuse of half-siblings
Counts b-4 and j-3 alleged that Carlos C. sexually molested
Ka. C. and Ke. C. by touching them inappropriately on their
genital area and breast, over their clothing, and that this sexual
molestation endangered Jeremiah A.’s “physical and emotional
health, safety and well-being” and placed him “at risk of physical
and emotional harm, damage, danger, and sexual abuse.”
Carlos A.’s counsel argued at the dispositional hearing that the
sex abuse allegations were not supported by the evidence, and
even if they were, Jeremiah A. was differently situated from the
half-siblings in that he was a male infant and was Carlos A.’s
biological child, so there was no evidence of risk to Jeremiah A.
Counsel also pointed out that the mere fact that a criminal case
was filed is not proof that sexual abuse occurred.
The court dismissed count d-1, because Jeremiah A. was
“differently situated” and so was not at risk of sexual abuse, but
sustained counts b-4 and j-3, stating that “mother and father
have not – still are minimizing father’s sexual abuse against the
older other children, where he has – I believe a criminal case that
is pending and they need to acknowledge the risk and address
those issues.”
Although the juvenile court does not explain the basis for
sustaining these counts in detail, the court apparently found that
the sexual abuse did occur. It is not the role of this court to
reweigh the evidence on this point. The juvenile court could have

22
found Ka. C.’s statements during the forensic interview and
Evelyn’s statement that Ka. C. had disclosed sexual abuse to her
more credible than Carlos A.’s, Karla G.’s, and the maternal
grandmother’s denials that any sexual abuse occurred.
But in order to sustain the b-4 and j-3 counts, the juvenile
court also had to find a risk of harm to Jeremiah A. Neither
DCFS nor the court ever articulated exactly what this risk was.
Karla G., when confronted by the DCFS social worker, pointed
out that her daughters were not present when Carlos A. visited
her home, and Carlos A. had no ongoing contact with them.
During each of the social workers’ visits to Karla G.’s home,
Jeremiah A. was reported to be healthy, well cared for, and
bonded to Karla G. There is no evidence that Carlos A. abused or
neglected Jeremiah A. in any way, either when he was visiting
Karla G.’s home on weekends or later, when his visits with
Jeremiah A. took place at the homes of one of his adult children
or in a park or other public place. There is also no evidence that
Carlos A. failed to comply with the criminal protective order
requiring him to stay away from Ka. C. and Ke. C.
The Supreme Court in I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th 766, clarified
that a child may be found at risk of harm within the meaning of
sections 300, subdivisions (b) and (j) due to the sexual abuse of a
sibling, even if the child is not specifically at risk of sexual abuse
– but that sexual abuse of a sibling is not always sufficient to
sustain a (b) or (j) count. (I.J., at pp. 776-777.) The I.J. court
provided guidance as to the factors juvenile courts should
consider in determining whether a child is at risk of harm due to
sexual abuse of a sibling. None of those factors is present in this
case. Jeremiah A. is differently situated from Carlos’ 13- and 11-
year-old stepdaughters in that he is a male infant and is Carlos

23
A.’s biological child. There is no evidence that Carlos A. had any
propensity to abuse very young or male children. Also, unlike the
children in I.J., Jeremiah A. never lived in the same home with
Ka. C. or Ke. C. (and was not yet born in 2022, at the time of the
reported incidents), so there is no possibility that he could have
witnessed, been present, or learned of any incident of sexual
abuse. (Id. at p. 778.) Moreover, the conduct described in Ka.
C.’s and Evelyn C.’s statements –inappropriate touching over Ka.
C.’s clothing – was not “serious and prolonged” or “ ‘aberrant in
the extreme’ ” as was the sexual abuse in I.J and similar cases.
(Id. at p. 778; see In re S.R. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 44, 55-56
[jurisdictional findings that child was at risk due to sexual abuse
of sibling not supported by substantial evidence due to
differences in age, gender and circumstances].)
Counts b-4 and j-3 were not supported by substantial
evidence. Although jurisdiction was still proper on other
grounds, sustaining these counts was not harmless error because
it affected the court’s dispositional orders.
III. Dispositional Orders
Carlos A.’s counsel stated at the dispositional hearing that
Carlos A. was willing to do a drug program and weekly testing
but objected to being ordered to do sex abuse counseling since he
denied any sex abuse. The juvenile court ordered Carlos A. to
complete, in addition to a drug program with testing and several
other requirements, “sexual abuse [counseling] for perpetrators,”
and to have monitored visitation in a neutral setting with a
DCFS approved monitor, Karla G. not to monitor or be present at
Carlos A.’s visits. Having found that the b-4 and j-3 counts of the
petition were not supported by substantial evidence and should

24
not have been sustained, we must consider the impact of this
holding on the dispositional orders challenged on appeal.
The juvenile court may, at disposition, make “all reasonable
orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance
and support of the child.” (§ 362, subd. (a).) This may include
making orders to address problems that are not described in the
sustained petition. (In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297,
311.) The court has “wide latitude in making orders for the well-
being of the child,” so long as they are “reasonably necessary to
eliminate the conditions that led to the dependency.” (Ibid.)
Similarly, when terminating jurisdiction, the court “may
reasonably determine that continued supervision of the minor as
a dependent child is not necessary for the child’s protection, and
at the same time conclude that conditions on visitation are
necessary to minimize . . . the danger that visits might subject
the minor to the same risk . . . that previously led to the
dependency adjudication.” (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th
196, 204.)
So, our conclusion that the juvenile court should not have
sustained the b-4 and j-3 counts does not necessarily mean that it
could not make dispositional orders addressing the issue of
sexual abuse. The question is whether these dispositional orders
were “reasonably necessary” to protect Jeremiah A. and ensure
his well-being.
The order requiring Carlos A. to complete “sex abuse
counseling for perpetrators” is not reasonably necessary to ensure
Jeremiah A.’s safety and well-being. As discussed supra, neither
DCFS nor the juvenile court ever articulated any specific risk to
Jeremiah A. presented by the 2022 incidents of sexual abuse of
the half-siblings, and the evidence does not support a finding that

25
there was any such risk. Even in light of the “wide latitude” that
juvenile courts have in making dispositional orders, this portion
of the court’s dispositional orders is not supported by any
substantial evidence of a risk to Jeremiah A. and was an abuse of
discretion.
The order restricting Carlos A. to monitored visitation,
however, was not a clear abuse of discretion. Given the court’s
jurisdictional findings regarding Carlos A.’s possession of
methamphetamine; the fact that Carlos A. had never been
Jeremiah A.’s primary caregiver and had, at most, a few hours of
parenting time each week throughout Jeremiah A.’s life; and
Carlos A.’s failure to contact the social worker to schedule visits,
the juvenile court could have reasonably concluded that
monitored visitation was necessary to protect Jeremiah A.’s
safety and well-being even apart from any consideration of risks
related to sexual abuse. It is unclear, however, whether the
juvenile court would have granted Carlos A.’s request for
unmonitored visitation at the October 24, 2024 hearing – by
which time he had numerous clean drug tests – in the absence of
the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders regarding
sexual abuse. The issue of Carlos A.’s visitation must be
remanded to the dependency court.
IV. The Restraining Order
Carlos A.’s counsel argued at the dispositional hearing that
there was no basis for issuance of a restraining order because
there was no domestic violence between Carlos A. and Karla G.,
the restraining order request was based solely on the February
14, 2024 traffic stop incident, and there was no showing that
Carlos A. threatened or harmed anyone during this incident, so
“father does not present a danger to mother.” The juvenile court

26
found “that a sufficient showing has been made” to grant the
restraining order, because Karla G. “feels that father put her in a
detrimental situation and was blindsided by this, and this could
have escalated and turned into something far more serious,
placing both herself and the child at risk.”
Carlos A. argues on appeal that the juvenile court abused
its discretion in granting the restraining order. Respondent’s
brief does not address this issue, since DCFS did not request the
restraining order. Co-appellant Karla G. initially took no
position regarding the restraining order, but later filed a brief
arguing that issuance of the restraining order was supported by
substantial evidence and it was “not unreasonable” for the trial
court to conclude that the restraining order was “necessary to
prevent [Carlos A.] from contacting [Karla G.] or otherwise
disturbing her.”
Section 213.5, subdivision (a) provides that a juvenile court
may issue an order enjoining any person from “molesting,
attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting,
battering, harassing, telephoning . . . destroying the personal
property, contacting, either directly or indirectly . . . coming
within a specified distance of, or disturbing the peace of any
parent . . . .” A dependency court’s issuance of a restraining order
is subject only to review for abuse of discretion, and we are to
“ ‘view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent,
and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold
the juvenile court’s determination. If there is substantial
evidence supporting the order, the court’s issuance of the
restraining order may not be disturbed.’ ” (In re Bruno M. (2018)
28 Cal.App.5th 990, 996-997.) Moreover, the burden of proof for
the party seeking a restraining order is not high. Evidence that

27
the restrained person has previously stalked, attacked, or
harmed the protected person is “ ‘certainly sufficient,’ ” but is not
required, nor is “evidence of a reasonable apprehension of future
physical abuse. [Citation.] There need only be evidence that the
restrained person ‘disturbed the peace’ of the protected [person].”
(Id. at p. 997.) Disturbing the peace, in this context, refers to
“ ‘ “conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the
other party.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Despite the low burden of proof and the deferential
standard of review, there must be some evidentiary basis for the
issuance of a restraining order. (In re C.Q. (2013) 219
Cal.App.4th 355, 365 [juvenile court’s issuance of a restraining
order is not proper unless failure to issue the order might
jeopardize the safety of the protected person].) Here, there is
simply no evidence that a restraining order against Carlos A. was
needed to protect Karla G. from any harm or danger. Throughout
the case, Karla G. stated that there was no domestic violence of
any kind between herself and Carlos A. and described him as a
supportive co-parent. When the court inquired whether Karla G.
was in fear of Carlos A., she spoke up (apparently against the
advice of counsel) to say that she was not. Nor was there any
evidence that Carlos A. ever came to Karla G.’s home or
otherwise contacted her without her consent, or that he failed to
comply with the juvenile court’s February 23, 2024 order that he
and Karla G. were to live separately, or with the March 27, 2024
orders restricting him to monitored visits and requiring him to
stay away from Karla G.’s home. On the contrary, after the
March 27, 2024 order was issued, both Karla G. and Carlos A.
stated that he no longer came to her home, but visited with
Jeremiah A. at an adult sibling’s home or in a public place.

28
The only basis for a restraining order provided by Karla
G.’s counsel or referenced by the court was the February 14, 2024
traffic stop incident. That incident, while certainly problematic
in other ways, did not involve any behavior by Carlos A. that
would support the issuance of a restraining order protecting
Karla G. He did not coerce her into his car or drive in an unsafe
manner; on the contrary, the police report states that she was
driving. He did not exhibit any aggressive or threatening
behavior towards Karla G. or towards the police during the stop.
DCFS, and the court, may have had legitimate reasons to
want Karla G. to end her relationship with Carlos A. DCFS was
concerned that Carlos A. would jeopardize Karla G.’s fragile
sobriety and reduce her chances of reunifying with her other
children. The social workers, the court, and Karla G.’s own
counsel apparently regarded getting a restraining order –
whether she needed or wanted one or not – as a requirement for
Karla G. to prove that she was a responsible and protective
parent. This is a misuse of section 213.5. It would be a tragic
irony if restraining orders, which are intended to empower
victims of family violence, were to become merely an arbitrary
task that a parent in a dependency case must complete in order
to keep or regain custody of her children. The juvenile court’s
issuance of the restraining order after hearing was an abuse of
discretion and is reversed.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the juvenile court with
instructions to vacate the jurisdictional findings as to counts b-4
and j-3 of the second amended petition, and the portions of the
April 16, 2024 dispositional orders and October 31, 2024 juvenile
custody orders that require Carlos A. to complete sex abuse

29
counseling for perpetrators; to amend the corresponding
provisions of the JV-206 form dated October 31, 2024; and to
vacate the restraining order issued on April 16, 2024.
On remand, the juvenile court is to consider whether the
provisions of the October 31, 2024 juvenile custody order
requiring that Carlos A.’s visits with Jeremiah A. be monitored,
that Karla G. cannot monitor or be present during his visits, and
that Carlos A. is to stay away from the maternal grandparents’
home, are still reasonably necessary to protect Jeremiah A. from
any risk of harm, in light of this court’s decision.
Karla G.’s appeal is dismissed as moot.
In all other respects, the juvenile court’s findings and
orders are affirmed.

MATTHEWS, J.*
We Concur:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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