CourtListener 10598466•People v. Williams CA4/3
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Filed 6/4/25 P. v. Williams CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064661
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF1303892)
BYRON LOWE WILLIAMS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Riverside County, John D. Molloy, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions.
Jeffrey S. Kross, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Alana
Butler and Daniel Rogers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Byron Lowe Williams appeals the trial court’s order denying his
petition for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75.1
Williams contends the court erred in concluding he was not entitled to relief
because his sentencing enhancements under former section 667.5,
subdivision (b), were imposed but stayed, not executed. We agree with
Williams and reverse and remand for resentencing.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2015, Williams pled guilty to various felony offenses and
admitted eight sentencing enhancements under former section 667.5,
subdivision (b) (prison priors). The trial court sentenced Williams to a total
term of 11 years in state prison. The court sentenced Williams to one year of
prison on each of his eight prison prior enhancements but stayed each of the
eight sentences.
In 2022, Williams filed a petition for recall and resentencing
under sections 1172.7 and 1172.75. The hearing on the petition was
continued for over a year, and on December 21, 2023, the trial court heard
Williams’s resentencing petition. After hearing oral argument, the court
ultimately denied the petition, concluding Williams was ineligible for relief
because his prison prior enhancements were stayed, not executed. The court
reasoned since the sentences were stayed, Williams was not serving a term
on the prison priors, as articulated in the statute. The court subsequently
vacated the stayed sentences on Williams’s eight prison prior enhancements
and, instead, struck them. The amended abstract of judgment does not reflect
any of the eight prison prior enhancements, nor the struck sentences.
Williams timely appealed.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
DISCUSSION
The sole issue before us is whether section 1172.75 precludes
relief to defendants whose judgments include a former section 667.5,
subdivision (b), prison prior enhancement that was imposed but not executed.
We review this issue of statutory interpretation de novo. (People
v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) When interpreting a statute, ‘“[o]ur
fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to
effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving
it a plain and commonsense meaning. . . . If the language is clear, courts
must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would
result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory
language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may
consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and
public policy.’ [Citation.]” (Sierra Club v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th
157, 165–166.) “We must look to the statute’s words and give them their
usual and ordinary meaning.” (People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118,
1126.)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a), provides that “[a]ny sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a
prior conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is legally invalid.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (a), italics added.) “The Secretary of the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . [must] identify those persons in their
custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes [a prison prior]
enhancement” and provide the individual’s name and relevant information to
the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b),
italics added.) “If the court determines that the current judgment includes
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[a prison prior] enhancement . . . , the court shall recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c), italics added.) And the
resentencing must result in a lesser sentence, unless the court finds it would
endanger public safety. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1).)
There is a split of authority on the issue, and we await resolution
by our Supreme Court. In our own district, the divisions have disagreed on
the issue. (Compare People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, 40–41, 45,
48–49, [§ 1172.75 only applies to defendants with prison prior enhancements
that were imposed and executed], review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283169
(Rhodius), with People v. Christianson (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 300, 305
[§ 1172.75 requires resentencing for a prison prior enhancement that was
imposed but stayed], review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283189 (Christianson).)2
Williams urges us to follow the Christianson court’s reasoning
and conclude he is entitled to resentencing even where his prison prior
sentences were imposed but stayed. The Attorney General contends the
Rhodius court correctly concluded that section 1172.75 resentencing is
intended only for defendants serving a prison prior sentence, not for those
whose prison prior sentences were stayed or stricken. The Attorney General
argues the word “imposed” as used in section 1172.75 means imposed and
executed. We agree with Williams and adopt the Christianson court’s
statutory interpretation of section 1172.75.
The Rhodius court concluded the word “imposed” in the context of
section 1172.75 applies only to those enhancements that were imposed and
2 We are aware there are a multitude of opinions issued by other
appellate courts on this issue. Indeed, the number seems to grow daily. We
limit our discussion to Rhodius and Christianson because we believe these
cases adequately explain the reasoning supporting the different results.
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executed. (Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 45, rev. granted.) The court
relied on People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118. (Rhodius, at p. 43.)
In Gonzalez, our Supreme Court interpreted the word “impose” in
section 12022.53, subdivision (f)’s instruction that the trial court may not
impose more than one firearm enhancement per person for each crime, as
“shorthand for ‘impose and then execute.’” (Gonzalez, at pp. 1126–1127.)
The Christianson court addressed the Gonzalez holding, “not[ing]
that the Gonzalez court reached that conclusion, after acknowledging the
potential ambiguity in the term, by construing the word in the context of the
entire statutory scheme at issue before it, in sections 12022.5 and 12022.53.
[Citation.]” (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 313, rev. granted.) The
Gonzalez court’s interpretation was also consistent with the Legislature’s
intent to impose the longest term of imprisonment, “because it allowed the
trial court to impose and execute the enhancement with the longest
associated additional term of imprisonment, but also impose and
stay additional enhancements to ensure they could still be imposed in the
event the enhancement with the longest term of imprisonment was somehow
invalidated on appeal. [Citation.]” (Christianson, at p. 313.)
The court in Christianson noted the legislative intent behind
section 1172.75 is “expressly aimed at reducing sentences by retroactively
eliminating a sentencing enhancement” (Christianson, at p. 314), and
concluded “the Legislature intended to use the term ‘impose’ in the broader
sense, to include [former] section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements that
were both imposed and executed, and imposed and stayed” (Christianson, at
p. 313).
The Rhodius court further reasoned that because section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(1), requires the resentencing to result in a lesser sentence,
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this requirement “necessitates the conclusion that the repealed enhancement
increased the length of the sentence.” (Rhodius, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 43–44, rev. granted.) And only an imposed and executed enhancement
would increase the sentence. (Id. at p. 44.)
The court in Christianson also addressed section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(1)’s lesser-sentence-requirement. The court pointed out “the
trial court retains the ability to lift the stay and impose the term under
certain circumstance, such as if an alternately imposed term is invalidated.
[Citation.]” (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 312, rev. granted.)
Similarly, a prison prior enhancement that was imposed but its punishment
stricken could be later imposed and executed upon resentencing. (People v.
Garner (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1115 [trial court properly reimposed
previously stricken prison prior enhancements at resentencing under the
Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012].) Dismissal of a stayed or stricken prison
prior punishment therefore provides relief to the defendant by eliminating
that potential, thus fulfilling the Legislature’s intent that resentencing “‘shall
result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed.’” (Christianson, at
p. 310.) And if the Legislature had intended to limit section 1172.75 to only
those individuals who were currently serving an additional term based on the
enhancement, it had the ability to do so. (Christianson, at p. 313.)
The Christianson court noted the statute requires the state’s
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to identify the inmates
serving a term for a judgment that includes a prison prior enhancement
(§ 1172.75, subd. (b)) and requires the trial court to then review that
judgment to verify it includes the prison prior enhancement (§ 1172.75,
subd. (c)). (Christianson, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 311–312, rev. granted.)
It does not require the CDCR or the court to further verify the enhancement
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was imposed and executed. (Id. at p. 312.) Because a stayed or stricken
enhancement remains part of the judgment, defendants whose judgments
contain a now-invalid prison prior enhancement are eligible for section
1172.75 resentencing regardless of whether the enhancement’s punishment
was executed, stayed, or stricken. We do not draw a distinction in terms of
the application of section 1172.75 between an executed sentence and a stayed
or stricken sentence.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order denying resentencing is reversed, and
the matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing under section
1172.75. After the resentencing hearing, the court is directed to prepare an
amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the CDCR.
O’LEARY, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, J.
SCOTT, J.
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