CourtListener 10597652•In re E.C. CA2/2
Texto completo
Filed 6/3/25 In re E.C. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re E.C. at al., Persons B341904, B342196
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No.
21CCJP03306A-B)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
D.O. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
Anne E. Fragasso, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant D.O.
Paul Couenhoven, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant L.C.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________________
L.C. (mother) challenges the juvenile court’s orders
terminating parental rights to her daughters, S.M. and E.C., who
have different fathers. Mother’s sole contention is that the trial
court erred in finding compliance with the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et
seq.1) because the ICWA inquiry was inadequate as to the
fathers. D.O., E.C.’s father, joins mother’s ICWA challenge.
Because sufficient evidence supports the court’s finding, we
affirm.
BACKGROUND
1. The Family
Mother has two daughters, S.M. and E.C. (children), and a
son A.M., who is not the subject of this appeal. J.M. is the father
of S.M. and A.M., and D.O. is E.C.’s father. Mother met both
when she lived in Connecticut, which is where the fathers
remain. Mother suffers from psychiatric disorders and substance
abuse, and has a history of domestic violence with J.M. A
dependency case was opened in Connecticut based on this
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2
violence, but mother absconded with her daughters to California
while that case was pending.
2. Procedural Background and ICWA-related Facts
In June 2021, before the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (Department) filed the section
300 petition, mother and J.M. each told the Department they had
no known Indian ancestry.
In July 2021, the Department filed a petition requesting
the juvenile court exert dependency jurisdiction over S.M. and
E.C., alleging that mother and J.M. engaged in domestic violence
in the children’s presence, and that mother has substance abuse
and mental health problems placing the children in danger. D.O.
filed an ICWA-020 form stating he had no Indian ancestry. At
the detention hearing, the juvenile court found no “reason to
know” E.C. is an Indian child.
In August 2021, mother filed an ICWA-020 form stating
she had no Indian ancestry, and D.O. and J.M. each denied
having Indian ancestry. The same month, the court found no
reason to know that the children are Indian children. The
Department filed an amended petition to add allegations of J.M.
physically abusing the children, his drug use, and mother’s
abduction of the children from Connecticut.
At the September 2021 jurisdiction and disposition hearing,
the juvenile court sustained the amended petition, removed the
children from all parents, and ordered reunification services for
all parents.
D.O. appealed from these orders. (See In re E.C. (Aug. 18,
2023, B315124) [nonpub. opn.].)
3
In November 2021, a social worker contacted J.M.’s
parents, G.M. and E.G., and his sister H.M., who each expressed
some interest in caring for the children.
At the August 2022 six-month review hearing, the juvenile
court continued family reunification services for D.O. and mother,
and noted that J.M. had waived reunification services.
The next year, in August 2023, the Department called the
number they had for J.M.’s parents, E.G. and G.M., but it was not
in service. The Department also tried to call H.M., but an
unknown person answered and stated that they did not know
H.M. Later that month, we affirmed the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional finding. The Department had conceded its ICWA
inquiry was inadequate, so we remanded with directions to the
Department and the juvenile court to comply with ICWA. (In re
E.C., supra, B315124.)
In September 2023, the children’s foster parents denied
knowing of any Indian ancestry of the children.
In November 2023, the juvenile court terminated D.O.’s
reunification services.
In December 2023, maternal grandmother reported she had
no Indian ancestry on her side of the family and that she did not
believe maternal grandfather, who lives in Mexico, had any
either. She did not provide maternal grandfather’s contact
information. D.O.’s mother also stated she had no Indian
ancestry in her family, and neither did her husband’s side of the
family.
In February 2024, maternal great aunt, Y.C., who is the
sister-in-law of D.O.’s mother and thus also a paternal great
aunt, reported that neither she nor her husband have Indian
ancestry.
4
In March 2024, a different maternal great aunt, maternal
aunt, and maternal grandfather all reported no Indian ancestry.
The same month, the Department asked J.M. for his relatives’
contact information, and he responded, “I don’t associate with my
family anymore so I don’t know how’d that be possible.”
In April 2024, the children’s therapist and foster parents
reported they did not know the children to have Indian ancestry.
In May 2024, D.O. filed a petition under section 388, which
the juvenile court denied. At the permanency planning hearing,
the court found adoption to be the appropriate plan and found no
reason to know that the children were Indian children.
D.O. filed a section 388 petition to request that E.C. be
placed with D.O.’s mother in Connecticut, in response to which
the trial court allowed the “relatives [to be] assessed,” while
indicating it did not intend to move the children anywhere.
In August 2024, the court found that it had no reason to
know that the children are Indian children, but ordered the
Department to continue to investigate.
On November 5, 2024, the juvenile court found no reason to
know the children were Indian children and terminated all
parental rights over S.M. and E.C. Father appealed from these
orders.
DISCUSSION
1. Applicable Law
ICWA was enacted “out of concern that ‘an alarmingly high
percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often
unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and
private agencies.’ ” (Haaland v. Brackeen (2023) 599 U.S. 255,
265 [143 S.Ct. 1609].) It “aims to keep Indian children connected
to Indian families.” (Ibid.) To that end, under ICWA and
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California law implementing it (§§ 224–224.6), a juvenile court
and the Department have duties to assess whether a child in a
dependency action is an “Indian child.” (§§ 224.2, 224.3.)
The Department and juvenile court have “three distinct
duties” under ICWA. (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1052 (D.S.).) The Department discharges its initial duty by
“asking” family members “whether the child is or may be an
Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) This includes asking not only
the child’s parents, but also others, including but not limited to,
“extended family members.” (Ibid.) For its part, the juvenile
court is required, “[a]t the first appearance” in a dependency case
to ask each participant present “whether they know or have
reason to know that the child is an Indian child.” (Id., subd. (c).)
The second duty, which is triggered if there is “reason to
believe that an Indian child is involved,” is the duty of the
Department or the juvenile court to “make further inquiry
regarding the possible Indian status of the child.” (§ 224.2, subd.
(e).) This involves conducting further interviews and contacting
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Department of Social Services,
and any tribe that might have information. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).)
The third duty is the duty to notify the relevant Indian
tribes. (§ 224.3, subd. (a); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) This duty is
triggered if the Department or the court “knows or has reason to
know . . . that an Indian child is involved,” which occurs in one of
six statutorily defined circumstances. (§§ 224.3, subd. (a), 224.2,
subd. (d)(1)–(6).)
“The juvenile court’s factual finding that ICWA does not
apply is ‘subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.’ ”
(In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1134 (Dezi C.).) Although
the Court in Dezi C. expressly declined to decide what standard
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of review applies to a finding that an ICWA inquiry was
adequate, it noted “that the juvenile court’s fact-specific
determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly
diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’ ” “subject to
a deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C., at pp. 1134, 1141;
accord In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1101.)
2. Analysis
Mother argues that the Department’s initial inquiry into
the fathers’ Indian heritage was defective. With respect to S.M.,
mother faults the Department for not inquiring of her paternal
grandparents (J.M.’s parents) and paternal aunt (H.M.) about
their Indian ancestry.
We must first sort through some confusion in the record as
to who J.M.’s parents are.2 H.B. and G.B., on the one hand, and
E.G. and G.M., on the other, are each identified as S.M.’s
paternal grandparents. Other information in the record,
obtained from J.M. himself, shows that he was born to “[G.M.]
and [a] father who is unknown.” Because H.B. and G.B. are
scarcely mentioned, and only in a report from authorities in
Connecticut, and because G.M. is repeatedly identified as
paternal grandmother, and the record shows J.M. himself
reported she was his mother, we understand—as the juvenile
court likely did—that H.B. and G.B. are not in fact J.M.’s parents
and that G.M. is J.M.’s mother.3 Mother’s reference to G.M. as
J.M.’s “grandmother” is therefore incorrect.
2 Neither party squarely addressed this issue in their
briefs.
3 One way to reconcile J.M.’s father being “unknown” and
the identification of his father as E.G. is that the latter is merely
7
J.M. himself repeatedly denied having Indian ancestry. In
November 2021, a social worker spoke with G.M., E.G., and
paternal aunt H.M. about their interest in being caregivers for
the children, but did not ask them whether they had Indian
ancestry. In August 2023, however—after D.O. filed his prior
appeal that included an ICWA challenge—the Department called
the number it had for E.G. and G.M., but it was out of service.
The Department also attempted to call H.M., but an unknown
person answered the phone and stated they did not know her.
The Department thereafter sought information about J.M.’s
relatives from J.M., but he refused to provide any.
Mother acknowledges the Department’s unsuccessful
attempts to reach the known paternal relatives, as well as its
request that J.M. provide his relatives’ information, but she
asserts the Department should have also contacted the
Connecticut Department of Children and Family Services to seek
up-to-date contact information for these relatives. We disagree
and conclude that sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding that the Department fulfilled its duty of inquiry with
respect to S.M. (See In re Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1082
(Q.M.) [where a parent fails to provide names and contact
information for extended family members, the Department’s
ability to conduct an exhaustive ICWA inquiry is necessarily
constrained]; D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053 [the
Department is not required to “ ‘cast about’ ” for information].)
With respect to E.C., mother and D.O. fault the
Department for not ascertaining and contacting paternal
relatives beyond D.O.’s mother, R.C., who denied that either she
his stepfather. It makes no difference for purposes of our
analysis, however.
8
or her husband had Indian ancestry. But ICWA “ ‘does not
require the agency to “find” unknown relatives . . . merely to
make reasonable inquiries’ ”; “ ‘[t]he operative concept is those
people who are reasonably available to help the agency with its
investigation . . . should be asked.’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th
at p. 1140.) Further, the record shows that the Department also
asked paternal great aunt, Y.C., who denied that either she or
her husband J.C. have Indian ancestry. Neither mother nor D.O.
specify any other relatives the Department should have asked.
(See Q.M., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 1082 [“we cannot ask the
agency to intuit the names of unidentified family members”].)
Mother states the Department “never contacted” “other extended
family members” whom D.O. asked the Department to consider
for placement, but these were Y.C. and J.C., and R.C. and her
partner. As stated above, R.C. and Y.C. each denied that either
they or their partners had any Indian ancestry. This was
sufficient. (See Dezi C., at p. 1141 [sufficient evidence may
support ICWA finding “even if the [Department] did not inquire
of everyone who has an interest in the child,” italics added].)
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
RICHARDSON, J.
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