CourtListener 10596698•People v. Bean CA2/5
Texto completo
Filed 6/2/25 P. v. Bean CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B334652
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA449606)
v.
DAVID BEAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Halpern & Halpern and Henry Russel
Halpern, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, David A. Voet, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant David Bean and his co-defendant
Jenelle Williams were each charged with four murders occurring
at different locations within a time span of two weeks in the
summer of 2016. The same gun was used in all four murders.
Other crimes and enhancements related to the same incidents, as
well as priors, were also alleged.
Bean and Williams were tried together by the same jury in
2023. Bean was convicted of first degree malice murder, first
degree felony murder, and second degree malice murder, with
various enhancements and special circumstances found true. He
was acquitted of the remaining murder charge. He was also
convicted of three counts of being a felon in possession of a
firearm and one count of assault with a firearm.1 Bean was
sentenced to three consecutive terms of life without parole for the
murders, plus 25 years to life for assault with a firearm, plus an
aggregate firearm enhancement of 51 years and four months to
life, plus an aggregate determinate term of six years and eight
months.
On appeal, Bean challenges only the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain the three murder convictions, attempting to
do so without confronting either the deferential standard of
review applicable to such claims or the substantial record
evidence supporting the convictions. We reject his challenge to
each murder conviction.
1 Williams also appealed from the judgment but she is not a
party to this appeal. Her appeal is pending before us in case
number B329593.
2
We strike what is an unauthorized sentence of 10 years,
imposed but stayed, for two prior convictions under what appears
to have been the authority of Penal Code section 667, subdivision
2
(a)(1), and otherwise affirm the judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
3
A. Factual Background
1. Bean and Williams—General Background
Bean was a documented Eight-Trey gang member. He had
prior convictions for grand theft in 2001 and robbery in 2008,
which he admitted. His co-defendant Williams, aka “Gigi,” was at
least an associate of the rival gang known as the Rollin’ 60’s,
having grown up in that gang’s territory. According to her
testimony, she had never been “jumped in” to the Rollin’ 60’s
gang and was not a member. Williams admitted to having a prior
conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. She also admitted to
being a drug addict.
Bean and Williams went to elementary school together and
Williams testified she knew Bean “from the streets.” By July
2016, according to Williams, they had “possibly” or “probably”
become romantically involved and she knew he was an “Eight-
Trey Gangster.” According to Bean, in July 2016, he and
Williams had an exclusive romantic relationship, and at the time
of trial in 2023, he still loved her.
2 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
3 We take the facts from the trial evidence and set them out
in some detail, as we must, and in the light most favorable to the
judgment given the standard of review for insufficiency claims,
discussed below. (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 504.)
3
According to law enforcement, the Eight-Trey and Rollin’
60’s gang rivalry had existed for a long time and was ongoing.
Although dating across gang lines was not common, it did occur.
According to Bean, the Rollin’ 60’s gang had “[put] a hit” out on
him because he was dating Williams, who was at least, he
acknowledged, an associate of the Rollin’ 60’s gang and he was
therefore not supposed to be dating her.
4
2. July 29, 2016 Murder of Marcus Wilkerson (Ct.1)
On July 29, 2016, at just before 5:00 a.m., residents of the
area of Gage and Western Avenues in Los Angeles heard voices
and a gunshot outside and called 911. One witness heard a man’s
voice say something to the effect of, “Is this how it’s going to be?”
or “I can’t believe you’re doing this to me” or “Is it going to end
this way?” followed by a gun shot. Approximately an hour later, a
pedestrian discovered Wilkerson’s body behind a parked car and
called 911. When police arrived, they located the body, and a
spent .45 caliber bullet casing, branded Federal. Paramedics
arrived and determined that Wilkerson was dead. An autopsy
later determined he had a visible gunshot wound to his right
upper thigh near his groin, which had resulted in extensive blood
loss and ultimately his death by homicide.
Law enforcement investigation revealed that Williams had
previously been in a romantic relationship with Wilkerson and
she was angry with him for having been with another woman,
L.S., whom Williams had previously threatened. According to
4 Although Bean was acquitted of this murder, the facts are
relevant for context and a full understanding of the relationship
between Bean and Williams in connection with the other three
murders of which he was convicted.
4
L.S., she knew Williams as “Gigi,” a self-admitted member of the
Rollin’ 60’s gang, and the two had been friendly at one time. L.S.
said that Williams had once said to her, “ You f’ing with my man”
and “Bitch, I’ll kill both y’all,” along with “If I can’t have him, no
one can.” According to L.S., Wilkerson had told her that he feared
Williams and had said to L.S. that Williams would “be the death
of” him.
Williams had also threatened a woman who had had
frequent interactions with Wilkerson while the woman was at
work at the Jack-in-the-Box near where he was killed. The
woman gave him free food and paid him to wash her car until one
time when he drove the car away without her permission and she
reported it stolen. Williams threatened the woman by
telephone—from a number later connected to Williams—over
dropping the charges and about repaying Williams for
Wilkerson’s bail she had posted. The woman provided police with
video footage taken from the parking lot of the Jack-in-the-Box
about two weeks after Wilkerson’s murder. It showed Williams
getting out of a black Chevrolet Malibu registered to Bean. This
was law enforcement’s first connection between Williams, the car,
and Bean. Bean and Williams were seen together in that car at
other locations in this period.
Williams acknowledged in her testimony being “close
friends” with Wilkerson but denied having been romantically
connected with him or having any involvement in his death. She
said she had lied when she previously told law enforcement that
Wilkerson was her boyfriend and had done so because she was
high on drugs. She had bailed Wilkerson out of jail because they
were friends but had done the same for many people. Williams
said that at 4:45 a.m., some 15 minutes before Wilkerson was
5
killed, she was driving around in Bean’s car, which she said she
had borrowed after he spent the night with another woman.
According to Williams, she was looking for Wilkerson because he
had a court appearance that day and had not signed his bail
paperwork. She could not find him but, according to her, this
explained why her cell phone pinged off cell-phone towers near
the Wilkerson murder location.
Williams acknowledged knowing the other woman involved
with Wilkerson, L.S., “from the streets” but denied any reason to
be jealous of L.S.’s relationship with him. Williams testified that
L.S. had told her of Wilkerson’s death and Williams denied ever
having threatened L.S., contrary to L.S.’s testimony. L.S. also
testified that after she spoke with law enforcement at the scene
about Wilkerson’s murder, Williams threatened her for
cooperating with police, this time while possessing a gun.
According to L.S., Williams told people near her to move out of
the way and L.S. believed Williams was going to kill her. Bean
was then with Williams and he also threatened L.S. for her
cooperation with law enforcement in investigating Wilkerson’s
death, saying to her, “[H]ear me good. Get my fucking name out
your fucking mouth.” Bean testified that Williams had never
mentioned to him having seen Wilkerson with another woman or
being angry with him. Williams denied ever having threatened
L.S. over anything.
The day after Wilkerson’s death, Williams called his sister
from phone number 323-453-7617 to offer condolences. Williams
acknowledged using this phone number and cell phone records
tied to this number placed her at the murder scene when
Wilkerson was determined to have been shot. Wilkerson’s sister
said she frequently spoke with him over the phone and that his
6
girlfriend, “Gigi,” was often on the line interrupting the call. Gigi
was a jealous person, according to the sister, and often
complained to her about Wilkerson’s sexual involvement with
other women.
A bullet fragment taken from Wilkerson’s body was
determined to be too small and damaged to be forensically
connected to a particular gun. But the casing found at the scene
was later connected to the gun used in all four murders.
Williams testified she had bought the gun used to kill Wilkerson
a few days after his murder, on August 1st or 2nd. But when
confronted with Bean’s testimony that he had bought the gun on
August 3, 2016, and that it was his, Williams testified that they
had bought the gun together. She said a man had walked up to
Bean’s car where they were sitting and offered to sell them the
gun, and she paid for it with her money.
Bean testified that he knew Wilkerson as they had
“smoke[d]” together and that there was no animosity between
them. He denied killing Wilkerson, having been present when
Wilkerson was shot, having helped anyone get away after the
killing, or knowing who killed him. Bean said he knew L.S.
enough to say hello and acknowledged having asked her why she
had his name “in [her] mouth” about Wilkerson’s death when he
had nothing to do with that. Bean said he did not recall
specifically threatening L.S., but if he did, he did not recall
Williams being with him at the time.
Bean told a detective investigating the Wilkerson murder
that he had been by himself at a 24-hour “smoke shop” that night
in the same area where Wilkerson was killed. But, to his
surprise, he saw Williams immediately after when he left the
smoke shop and drove to a nearby clinic. Bean then drove
7
Williams to her motel room where she was living. He said he left
her room after about 10 minutes and had sex with another
woman at the same motel. He saw Williams the next morning at
around 10:00 a.m. and did not know her whereabouts in the
interim.
Cell phone data showed that the phone number associated
with Williams was near the Wilkerson murder scene both before
the killing and for about a half an hour after.
3. August 9, 2016 Murder of Shawn Pryor (Ct.4)
On August 9, 2016, Shawn Pryor and his wife, Sandra
Pryor, were staying in a motel in Inglewood. Surveillance video
from the motel captured Bean, Williams, and a female identified
as Tiffany Doxy entering the motel at approximately 2:39 a.m.
and proceeding towards the room on the second floor where the
Pryors were staying. Williams and Doxy went to the door and
knocked, while Bean held back down the hallway. The Pryors
heard the knock. When Shawn Pryor asked who it was, a voice
responded that it was “Tiffany.” Sandra Pryor went into the
bathroom to dress while Shawn Pryor opened the door. Doxy was
at the door, standing with another woman, identified as
Williams. Surveillance video showed Doxy and Williams at the
room at around 2:40 a.m. Bean was still holding back down the
hall, beyond view from inside the room.
Once Shawn Pryor opened the door, Doxy went inside and
asked him for some money and then Doxy left the room.
Surveillance video showed her briefly speak to Bean on her way
out. He was outside the door at that point. Sandra Pryor came
out of the bathroom just as Doxy was leaving. Williams came into
the room, ostensibly to buy drugs from Shawn Pryor but using
counterfeit bills, which he discovered after giving her change for
8
the purchase. Surveillance video from outside the room showed
Bean arriving at the room doorstep and stepping into the
doorway while Williams was inside. According to Sandra Pryor,
Bean stood in the open doorway with a gun and said to Shawn
Pryor something to the effect of, “You know what this is. Give me
your money. I want everything.” When this happened, Pryor
threw money he had in his hands on the floor. And he told
Sandra Pryor to shut the door. Williams, from inside, “pushed”
Sandra Pryor into the wall at the corner of the room behind the
door and said, “Don’t try it. Don’t move. Don’t say nothing.”
Sandra Pryor also heard Williams say at one point, “Tiffany set
this up. It was Tiffany,” meaning Doxy.
The Pryors together worked to close the door to keep Bean
out of the room but Bean fired his gun into the room through the
door. Sandra Pryor saw Bean through the crack in the door and
then heard gunshots while trying to close the door. Surveillance
video from outside the room showed Bean with something in his
hand at the door and two bursts of dust or debris bursting into
the camera view, as if disturbed from the force of a gun firing.
Shawn Pryor was able to close the door keeping Bean
outside the room. He and Williams then engaged in a struggle
inside the room and on the bed, during which the camouflage-
colored jacket Williams was wearing came off. Sandra Pryor had
picked up some of the money her husband had thrown to the
ground and put it in her purse. She went to the separate kitchen
area of the room to call 911. She heard glass breaking followed by
more gun shots while she was on the 911 call. After the shots,
Sandra Pryor saw her husband fall to the floor from the bed,
bleeding. Surveillance video showed Bean breaking the room’s
window from the outside with a gun and pointing the gun inside
9
the room. Sandra Pryor tried to come to the aid of her husband
but he was bleeding so profusely that she could not see the
gunshot wounds.
Williams left the room but left her jacket inside, which was
later turned over to police. Surveillance video showed her leaving
the room and then Williams and Bean running slowly and
leaving the motel together, at about 2:49 a.m. The video showed
Williams was not then wearing the jacket she was wearing when
she entered the room. Williams acknowledged in her testimony
that it was she, Doxy, and Bean in the surveillance video.
At approximately 3:00 a.m., law enforcement responded to
the motel shooting. They found Shawn Pryor face down in his
room with multiple gunshot wounds and not moving, with
Sandra Pryor still present in the room, very upset. Paramedics
arrived and assessed Shawn Pryor’s condition before taking him
away in an ambulance. Law enforcement took photographs of
Pryor before he was removed from the room, noting money bills
around him and blood in the room and on some of the bills,
indicating a physical struggle, according to law enforcement. An
autopsy later determined that Shawn Pryor had suffered fatal
gunshot wounds to his chest and abdomen. A deformed bullet was
lodged in his sacral bone. The shots had been fired from an
indeterminate range. The manner of death was homicide.
Investigation revealed a bullet hole in the motel room door
and the shattered side window. There were three expended
Federal brand .45 caliber bullet casings inside the room—two
near the door and one at the bed. A forensics specialist collected
the bullet casings and Williams’s jacket, which had a narcotics
pipe and a lighter in the pocket. There were also some counterfeit
bills inside the jacket as well as in Sandra Pryor’s purse. All the
10
counterfeit bills had the same writing on them: “For Motion
Picture Use Only.” Sandra Pryor had never seen her husband
with counterfeit bills before and she did not notice any in the
room before Bean and Williams arrived. DNA from the pipe in
Williams’s jacket was later matched to her and DNA from the
motel window sill around the shattered window was matched to
Bean.
The three casings and two bullets discovered in the motel
room were later determined to be from the same gun used in
Wilkerson’s killing. The bullet fragment taken from Shawn
Pryor’s body could not be either positively matched or excluded
from use by the same gun.
According to Williams’s testimony, she, Bean, and Doxy
went to the motel to buy cocaine from Shawn Pryor. She had
never met Doxy before and didn’t know Bean had a gun on him or
that a gun would be used. After Doxy left the motel room,
Williams asked Pryor for $30 worth of cocaine and gave him one
of three counterfeit $50 bills she was carrying. Pryor gave her the
cocaine and $20 in change. Pryor noticed the $50 bill did not look
right and he confronted Williams as she was leaving the room.
She denied the bill was counterfeit and he yanked her back into
the room, telling his wife to “go get the thing” because “this bitch
is trying to play me.” Williams screamed and Bean then appeared
at the motel room door, stepped into the room, and asked what
was happening. Williams responded that Pryor was upset about
the money. Williams denied pushing Sandra Pryor behind the
door. According to Williams, Pryor grabbed her arm and pulled
her back and they started fighting while someone closed the door
on Bean. Williams left the room after Bean fired the gun through
the window. Williams said she had no intention of robbing Pryor
11
or committing a burglary when she entered the room and that
she only wanted to buy drugs from him using the counterfeit
money.
In his testimony, Bean admitted shooting Shawn Pryor but
claimed he acted in defense of Williams. He said he, Williams,
and Doxy had gone to the motel to buy cocaine from someone
Doxy knew. When they arrived, Doxy told him to hang back while
she approached the dealer. Doxy and Williams went to the door of
the motel room. After he felt too much time had passed, Bean
went to the room and saw Shawn Pryor trying to prevent
Williams from leaving. Bean said he heard Pryor say to Williams,
“You ain’t fittin’ to leave. Here you trying to play games,”
referring to the counterfeit money. Pryor grabbed the change
back out of Williams’s hand and pulled her back into the room.
According to Bean, Pryor fired a shot at him while struggling
with Williams and before slamming the door on Bean. Bean
always kept a gun on him for protection and he used it to fire a
shot back at Pryor through the door. Bean then broke the motel-
room window and fired two more shots into the room. Bean said
he fired the shots to “d[if]fuse the situation,” intending to allow
Williams the opportunity to leave the room and escape. Williams
ran out of the room and they fled the motel.
According to Bean, they went to the home of his friend,
Jeffrey Burton, known as “Doughboy,” and Bean took a shower
because of his bleeding hand that had been cut when he broke the
motel-room window. Doxy drove herself somewhere else. Bean
left his gun in his car parked at Burton’s house and his car keys
on a table inside the residence. Bean could not explain how the
gun used in the shooting of Shawn Pryor was also used to kill
12
Doxy some 15 minutes later and he did not know what happened
to his gun after he got to Burton’s house.
Surveillance video from the motel showed no physical
contact or struggle between Shawn Pryor and Williams before
Bean appeared at the door and stepped inside, appearing to fire
the first shot into the motel room. According to Sandra Pryor, her
husband did not have a gun in the room and no forensic evidence
supported that Pryor either had or fired a gun.
4. August 9, 2016 Murder of Tiffany Doxy (Ct.8)
As shown on surveillance video, approximately 12 minutes
after leaving the motel where Pryor was shot, Williams, Bean,
and Doxy arrived about two miles away at a parking lot near a
liquor store, Doxy having driven her own Volvo with Williams as
a passenger behind what resembles Bean’s Chevy Malibu. That
car did not enter the parking lot but turned and waited on the
street nearby. Doxy stopped the Volvo after backing it into an
angled parking space but left the car running. Williams then shot
her in the face. Video footage from the nearby liquor store showed
a flash of light inside the Volvo consistent with the muzzle flash
of a gun being discharged. Williams got out of the passenger side
of the Volvo, wearing clothing that matched Sandra Pryor’s
description of what she had been wearing in the motel room, and
went to the nearby car resembling Bean’s, which had flashed its
headlights, and they drove away. Immediately after the shot,
Doxy’s car in reverse struck a wall in the parking lot at a
diagonal angle and the car was left running. There was a .45
caliber spent bullet casing later discovered on the front passenger
seat.
Law enforcement realized Pryor’s and Doxy’s murders were
connected because Doxy had been at the motel location where
13
Pryor had been shot, the two murders occurred close in time and
location, and Doxy was wearing the same clothes in both
locations, as seen on video from the motel. An autopsy later
revealed that Doxy had stippling on her face, indicating that the
gun had been discharged from one to three feet away, consistent
with the surveillance video showing the flash of light from inside
the car. The bullet to her face was lodged in her neck and she
died from the gunshot wound in the manner of homicide. Sandra
Pryor identified Doxy from a photograph as the victim of the
gunshot and as the person who had earlier come into the Pryors’
motel room.
Williams denied any involvement in or presence at Doxy’s
murder and suggested that a third party may have committed
the crime. Williams said that after she and Bean left the motel
where Pryor had been shot, they immediately drove in Bean’s car
to his friend Burton’s house, and it took about 10 minutes to get
there. When they got there, Doxy was outside the house in her
own car and she did not come into the house. At Burton’s request,
Williams gave him the keys to Bean’s car, where the gun was in
the center console. Williams then got into the shower with Bean,
so she did not actually see Burton or Doxy leave the house. After
Williams got out of the shower at Burton’s house, he returned but
Doxy did not.
Williams acknowledged that the surveillance video showed
Doxy’s Volvo drive into a parking lot near Burton’s residence
after they left the motel where Pryor was killed. She said that
neither she nor Bean were in the car with Doxy. She denied that
the person who got out of the Volvo after the muzzle flash was
her and further denied having killed Doxy or ever having been in
that car.
14
According to Bean’s trial testimony, after he and Williams
left the motel where Pryor had been shot, they went directly to
his friend Burton’s house, where he took a shower because his
hand was bleeding. Williams never told him she had shot Doxy.
He put the gun in his car console after they left the motel, and he
left it there. He could not explain how the same gun was used to
kill Doxy.
5. August 13, 2016 Murder of Kenyada Thornton (Ct.9)
On August 13, 2016, at around 10:40 a.m., Jose N., who
lived near 11th Avenue and West 63rd Street in the City of Los
Angeles, was at home drinking with friends. He saw a black
Chevy Malibu approach his house and double park in the street
in front, next to his own car. Williams got out of the driver’s side
of the Malibu and asked Jose N. if he wanted to buy a cell phone.
Bean remained seated in the passenger side of the parked
Malibu, reclining.
Jose N. repaired cars for Kenyada Thornton. As he was
speaking with Williams about the cell phone, Jose N. saw
Thornton walking up 63rd Street towards them with two black
objects in his hands. When Thornton approached, he asked
Williams who was in her car, referring to Bean. She responded,
“Don’t worry about it. It’s nobody.” After observing this, Jose N.
turned around to go inside his house to speak with his mother
about buying the phone. But he saw Thornton tap on the
Malibu’s front window on the passenger side with one of the
objects in his hands, likely the gun (“probably a nine” millimeter),
and then Thornton pointed the object in his hand downward
toward the ground. Thornton said to the man in the car, “What
are you doing around here?” and “You better get out of here,
motherfucker.” While inside his house but through a front
15
window, Jose N. could see Thornton then put both his hands in
front of his body while holding the objects in them, palms down.
Thornton turned around to walk away with his back to the car
before any shots were fired.
Jose N. then heard lots of gunshots, one kind distinctly
louder than the other with the louder ones coming first.
According to ballistics evidence, .45 caliber bullets are louder
when shot than nine-millimeter bullets shot from a less powerful
gun. Williams, who was still outside Jose N.’s house but
interacting with Jose N. from inside about the phone, said to him,
“I’ve gotta go.” She got back into the black Malibu and drove
away with Bean in the car. Jose N. remained inside his house for
about five minutes and someone called paramedics to assist
Thornton, who had been hit and had collapsed. When Jose N.
went outside, he saw Thornton lying on the sidewalk. There was
a phone and a gun near Thornton’s hand but someone in the
gathered crowd removed those items before law enforcement
arrived on scene. Law enforcement did not locate a firearm near
Thornton’s body when securing the scene. Jose N. later noticed
that his car parked in front of his house had been hit with
bullets.
Thornton was not breathing when paramedics responded to
the scene and transported him to a local hospital. An autopsy
revealed he had sustained a fatal gunshot wound to the chest and
the manner of death was homicide.
Crime scene investigators arrived about a half hour after
the shooting. They found eight .45 caliber casings and five or six
fired .45 caliber bullets and bullet fragments. They also found
multiple nine-millimeter bullet casings. The two different kinds
of casings were generally located in two distinct areas. Car
16
windows nearby had been shattered from bullet impacts. Two
bullets were recovered from Jose N.’s car and a bullet casing was
found in some grass nearby. The .45 caliber casings recovered
from the Thornton crime scene were later found to match those
from the Wilkerson and Pryor murders.
According to Williams, she drove Bean in his car to Jose
N.’s house. She knew Jose N. as “Victor.” While she and Victor
spoke about the phone, Thornton, who was her friend and a
Rollin’ 60’s gang member, approached her and asked, “What’s up,
Gigi?” He then asked her who was sitting in the Malibu, referring
to Bean, and she responded not to worry, “It’s nobody.” She was
attempting to diffuse any tension or conflict from her having
brought an Eight-Trey gang member into Rollin’ 60’s territory.
But at some point, Williams saw Thornton at the car asking Bean
something like “Where are you from” and “Why are you over
here.” She did not hear Bean’s response but she walked over to
Thornton and said, “Can you just leave us alone?” and “He’s not
over here for that.” Williams turned back to trying to sell Victor
the phone and then heard gunshots. She ducked behind a tree
and saw Thornton shooting at the Malibu. She got into the car
and she and Bean drove away.
According to Bean’s testimony, Thornton, whose body was
later found to have a Rollin’ 60’s tattoo, approached Bean’s car
while it was double parked in front of Jose N.’s house. Bean had
accompanied Williams to the location inside Rollin’ 60’s gang
territory where she was trying to sell a phone. Bean knew that
Rollin’ 60’s had a hit out on him for being an Eight-Trey member
and dating Williams. He was reclining in the passenger seat of
his parked car, trying to lay low. Thornton threw a gang sign,
meaning he made a hand gesture to indicate his Rollin’ 60’s
17
gang’s claim of the neighborhood as its territory. Thornton then
approached Williams and asked who was in the car. She told
Thornton not to worry who was in the car and that they were just
trying to “take care of [her] business.” Then Thornton walked
toward the car with his gun out, banged on the car with it, and
said, “What you doing over here? You know where you at.” After
starting to walk away, Thornton turned around and began
shooting at Bean through the car window while Bean was trying
to get out or duck. Bean fired back at Thornton in self-defense.
Thornton then ran away without Bean knowing whether he had
shot him.
6. The August 15, 2016 Arrest of Williams and Bean
and Retrieval of the Gun
On August 11, 2016, law enforcement obtained
identification information on the black Chevy Malibu found to be
related to the crimes. The license plate could be seen on
surveillance videos, from which it was determined that Bean was
the registered owner. On August 15, 2016, Detective Garza
alerted patrol officers to be on the lookout for the Malibu. That
day, Detective Garza saw and followed the Malibu, in which Bean
and Williams were riding, traveling on 80th Street. At around
noon, Sergeant Ramirez, while on patrol, saw the car stop near a
cannabis dispensary on Florence Avenue.
The dispensary was located next to a tobacco shop.
Sergeant Ramirez parked his car up the street—a vantage point
from where he could watch the vehicle after calling for backup.
While watching, the sergeant saw Bean get out from the driver’s
side of the Malibu and Williams get out from the passenger side
and they both entered the tobacco shop. They seemed to be aware
of the sergeant’s presence. While Bean stood in front of the
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dispensary, Williams went back to the Malibu and retrieved a
large purse from the passenger side, and then she went inside the
dispensary. Sergeant Ramirez lost sight of Williams and Bean for
up to half a minute but then he saw them leave the dispensary
together and walk towards his location. They then began to walk
in different directions. Sergeant Ramirez drew his weapon and
stopped Bean, waiting for assistance while Bean lay on the
ground. After Bean was handcuffed, Ramirez saw Williams
standing across the street. She too was arrested and taken into
custody without incident. DNA samples were taken from both
Bean and Williams.
Detective Bellows arrived after Williams and Bean had
been taken into custody. Sergeant Ramirez informed him that
Bean and Williams had entered the dispensary before walking up
the street. Bellows went inside the dispensary and obtained
consent to search the premises from the owner. He found on the
underside of a couch a semiautomatic firearm with a .45 caliber
bullet in the chamber and more bullets in the magazine. The gun,
bullets, and magazine were swabbed for DNA and booked into
evidence.
Detective Garza located Bean’s car, still running, outside
the dispensary. It was impounded and taken to a tow yard.
Bean’s driver’s license was found in a wallet recovered from
inside the car. The license had the same address as the vehicle
registration. A cell phone and some other items, including a
citation from August 9, 2016, during the crime spree, were also
found inside the car.
Surveillance video from the dispensary and tobacco shop
from August 15, 2016, at 11:31 a.m., showed Bean parking his car
outside the dispensary in the same place where it was later
19
seized by police. The footage also depicted Williams and Bean
getting out of the car in the same clothing each was wearing
when arrested. It further showed Williams retrieving the large
purse from the car and then going into the dispensary, and Bean
standing outside with his back turned to the camera. Video from
inside showed Williams secreting something in the dispensary
couch.
7. Bean’s Post-Arrest Statements to Police
The day after his arrest, Bean was interviewed by police
detectives. He was advised of his Miranda rights and impliedly
waived them by answering questions.5 He admitted membership
in the Eight-Trey gang but said he didn’t “bang” anymore because
of his age of 36. He said there was “no denying” that the Eight-
Trey and Rollin’ 60’s gangs were enemies and that he was in
Rollin’ 60’s territory during the Thornton shooting. He denied
that he and Williams were in a sexual relationship. He denied
having shot at Thornton first and claimed he was at a smoke
shop around the corner from the crime scene when Wilkerson was
killed and only ran into Williams unexpectedly after that.
8. Bean’s Jail Calls
Bean made a few recorded jail phone calls between the day
of his arrest on August 15, 2016, and August 18, 2016. Law
enforcement obtained the recordings, which were played for the
jury, with transcripts provided. On August 15, 2016, the day of
his arrest, Bean called his friend Jeffrey Burton, known as
“Doughboy,” and in coded language suggested that Burton check
“up under your couch” at the “smoke shop” on Florence Avenue
5 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. Bean does not
claim any Miranda violation.
20
for his items, referring to the gun Williams had left in the couch
at the dispensary.
Bean made a second call on August 15, 2016, to a woman
named Antoinette. In that call, he explained that the Rollin’ 60’s
gang had put “a hit out on” him and were coming after him,
“hunting for [him] every day,” so he had “brought it to them” in
their own territory, seemingly referring to his presence in Rollin’
60’s territory when Thornton was killed. In his trial testimony,
Bean denied that he had intentionally gone to Rollin’ 60’s
territory to kill someone and was only defending himself against
Thornton.
Bean made a second call to Doughboy on August 16, 2016.
In that call, again in coded language, Bean followed up on
whether Doughboy had retrieved his “laundry” from under the
couch by “lift[ing] the whole thing up.” Doughboy responded that
Bean’s “laundry [was] not there” and that when Doughboy had
inquired, the “manager” had said “the worst.” This led Bean to
ask, if the “worst” had occurred, implying that if the gun
Williams had hidden under the couch at the dispensary had been
found by law enforcement, why was he not then being charged
with more than what he understood to be a probation violation.
Bean later admitted in trial testimony that in the call, he was
asking Doughboy to find and get rid of the gun hidden in the
dispensary couch. He knew the gun had been used to shoot
people, so he did not want it to be found. He and Williams did not
discuss hiding the gun and he said he didn’t know she had put it
in or underneath the couch until after they left the dispensary.
On August 18, 2016, Bean called his mother. In that call,
he relayed that the gun connected to “all that shit”—the
murderous crime spree—had been found by law enforcement but
21
he denied it was his gun. He blamed everything on “that bitch” or
“that girl” and tried to distance himself. At trial, Bean testified
that he was not referring to Williams in the call to his mother
and that if he had ever said that Williams had used or owned the
gun, he was lying and that he never let anyone use his gun.
9. Ballistics Evidence Summary
The bullet casing found at the Wilkerson crime scene, the
three casings and two bullets recovered at the Pryor crime scene,
the bullet casing found on the passenger seat of Doxy’s car, and
the .45 caliber bullet casings from the Thornton crime scene and
the bullet recovered from Thornton’s body were all fired from the
same gun retrieved from the cannabis dispensary near where
Bean and Williams were arrested. The bullet recovered from
Pryor’s body and the bullet fragment recovered from Doxy’s body
were both of .45 caliber but neither could be positively matched to
or excluded from that same gun. The bullet fragment recovered
from Wilkerson’s body was too small and damaged to be
compared to the gun.
10. Gang Expert Evidence
Although there were no gang charges or allegations, the
prosecution presented opinion evidence from a gang expert. He
testified that the Rollin’ 60’s and Eight-Trey gangs have been
mortal rivals involved in an ongoing feud for many years. The
rivalry had produced murders, shootings, vandalism, and graffiti.
It was still ongoing in the summer of 2016.
The expert identified Bean from his tattoos as an Eight-
Trey gang member with the moniker of “Tiny Diamond.” A gang
“associate,” as Williams had been identified, is not a full-fledged
member of a gang who has gone through some form of initiation,
known as being “jumped in.” A gang associate can be a friend or
22
relative of a gang member, someone who grew up in the
neighborhood, or just someone the gang members know.
The neighborhood where Thornton was killed is a “hot spot”
for the Rollin’ 60’s gang. If an Eight-Trey gang member entered
that territory in July or August of 2016, there would have been a
“very high likelihood” of a response. Rollin’ 60’s gang members
would have considered that action to be one of an enemy
disrespecting the gang. In answer to a hypothetical question
reflecting facts from Thornton’s killing, the expert testified that if
an Eight-Trey member ventured into a Rollin’ 60’s hot spot area
armed with a gun, and the Eight-Trey member was approached
by an armed Rollin’ 60’s gang member, depending on the Eight-
Trey member’s purpose in entering Rollin’ 60’s territory, the gun
would be used either for self-protection or to shoot a rival.
The expert was not aware of any situation in which a male
member of Eight-Trey and a male member of the Rollin’ 60’s were
friends. But he could not rule out the possibility of a Rollin’ 60’s
associate “hanging around” with an Eight-Trey member if they
were dating across gang lines. Still, the consequences of a Rollin’
60’s associate bringing a male Eight-Trey member into Rollin’
60’s territory could be “physical violence on up.”
B. Procedural Background
An information alleging charges against Bean and Williams
was filed on February 8, 2018. At trial, on January 19, 2023, the
People filed a second amended information. This pleading alleged
as against Bean four counts of first degree murder (§ 187, subd.
(a)) (counts 1 (Wilkerson), 4 (Pryor), 8 (Doxy), and 9 (Thornton));
three counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1)) (counts 2, 6, & 10); and one count of assault with a
firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)) (count 5, Sandra Pryor). As to all four
23
murder counts, multiple-murder special circumstances within the
meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3) were alleged along
with several aggravating factors (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421).
As to the murder count 4 (Pryor), the second amended
information alleged that Bean had personally used, intentionally
discharged, and proximately caused death with a firearm (§
12022.53, subds. (b)-(d)) and that the crime occurred during an
attempted robbery or a burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A) & (G)).
As to the assault count 5 (Sandra Pryor), it was alleged that Bean
had personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subds. (a), (d)). As to
the murder count 8 (Doxy), it was alleged that the victim was a
witness to a crime and intentionally killed because of that fact (§
190.2, subd. (a)(10)). As to the murder count 9 (Thornton), it was
alleged that Bean had personally used, intentionally discharged,
and proximately caused death with a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds.
(b)-(d)). Prior strike and prior serious and violent felony
convictions were also alleged against Bean as to all counts (§§
667, subd. (a)(1); 667.5, subd. (b); 1170.12).
Ultimately, Bean was acquitted of Wilkerson’s murder
(count 1). He was convicted of the remaining charges, except as to
the Thornton murder (count 9), he was acquitted of first degree
murder and the conviction was for the lesser murder in the
second degree. The special circumstances and enhancement
allegations were found true, and the People at trial abandoned
proof of the aggravating factors after Bean had waived a jury
trial as to these.6 Bean admitted the prior convictions. He
6 With newly retained counsel, after the verdict, Bean moved
for a new trial under section 1181 as to the three murder and the
assault counts on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, the
same grounds urged on appeal by the same counsel, appointed on
24
ultimately received a sentence of three consecutive life terms
without the possibility of parole for the three murders (counts 4,
8, 9), plus 25 years to life, consecutive, for assault with a firearm
(count 5), plus an aggregate firearm enhancement of 51 years and
four months to life, consecutive, plus an aggregate term of six
years and eight months for the three gun possession counts
(counts 2, 6, 10) calculated by the imposition of the midterm, and
one-third the midterms, respectively, doubled for the prior
strikes, consecutive. Additional punishment of 10 years for the
two admitted prior strikes was imposed and stayed. The court
also imposed a restitution fund fine and two fee assessments,
along with victim restitution, imposed jointly and severally as
against Bean and Williams.7
III. DISCUSSION
A. Issues on Appeal and Standard of Review
Bean challenges each of his three murder convictions for
insufficiency of the evidence. The convictions rested on the
prosecution’s pursuit of the following theories at trial against
Bean: (1) first degree felony-murder for the shooting of Pryor
during the course of an attempted robbery and/or burglary; (2)
aiding and abetting Williams when she committed first degree
appeal, as to the murder counts. The People opposed the motion
below and the trial court denied it at sentencing.
7 Williams was convicted of second degree murder in count 1
(Wilkerson); first degree felony- murder in count 4 (Pryor); and
first degree murder in count 8 (Doxy), with true findings of
firearm enhancements and special circumstances, as alleged. She
was convicted of gun-possession charges in counts 3, 7, and 11.
She was acquitted of murder in count 9 (Thornton).
25
malice-murder by the execution-style shooting of Doxy to
eliminate her as a witness to the Pryor murder; and (3) malice-
murder for the shooting and killing of Thornton without
8
justification, found by the jury to be in the second degree.
Bean admitted to shooting Pryor but said he did so only to
enable Williams to free herself from her fight with Pryor and to
leave the motel room after the failed drug-buy. He denied that
the shooting was done during an attempted robbery or burglary,
instead just a failed drug-buy. He also admitted to shooting
Thornton but said he did so only in self-defense after Thornton
had shot at him first. Thus, for both the Pryor and Thornton
killings, there is no dispute that Bean was the actual shooter. As
to Doxy’s murder, Bean denied any culpability or involvement,
including having provided Williams with the gun used to shoot
Doxy, which Bean admittedly had just used to shoot Pryor less
than 15 minutes before, or driving the getaway car to which the
killer ran and entered immediately after shooting Doxy at close
range in her Volvo. And, as noted, both Bean and Williams
testified at trial. Thus, the jury’s task included making factual
determinations from the evidence based on credibility
assessments.
To frame our analysis, when assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a judgment of conviction, we review the
entire record “ ‘ “ ‘in the light most favorable to the judgment
below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—
8 Bean’s opening brief on appeal contains few record
references and does not accurately or fully characterize the record
evidence. Nor does the brief address the totality of the record
evidence as framed by the applicable standard of review for
insufficiency claims. He did not file a reply brief.
26
that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reyes
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes); see also Jackson v. Virginia
(1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318–319.) We ask “ ‘ “ ‘whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’
[Citation.]” (People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 302
Navarro), citing Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U.S. at pp. 318–
319.) “This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility
of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to
weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic
facts to ultimate facts.” (Jackson v. Virginia, supra, at p. 319.)
As part of this task of review for sufficiency of the evidence,
we “ ‘presume the existence of every fact that the jury could
reasonably have deduced from th[e] evidence.’ [Citation.]”
(Navarro, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 302.) And we “ ‘ “accept logical
inferences that the jury might have drawn from the
circumstantial evidence.” ’ [Citation.] We do not question the
credibility of a witness’s testimony, so long as it is ‘not inherently
improbable,’ nor do we reconsider the weight to be given any
particular item of evidence. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “To warrant the
rejection of the statements given by a witness who has been
believed by a trial court [or jury], there must exist either a
physical impossibility that they are true, or their falsity must be
apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions.” ’ ”
(People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 519.) The same standard
applies when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial
evidence. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053; see also
27
People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 713.) We will not
reverse unless there is no hypothesis upon which sufficient
substantial evidence exists to support the trial court’s judgment.
(People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) We do not consider
whether there is some evidence that could cause a trier of fact to
reach a different conclusion or reweigh the evidence. (People v.
Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.) The jury is not only
“ ‘authorized to make any logical and reasonable deduction’ ”
founded on the evidence, itis also “ ‘the exclusive judge of the
weight and value of the inference that may be drawn by it … .’ ”
(People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 202.) “ ‘Conflicts and
even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not
justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province
of the … jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the
truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.’
” (Ibid.; see also People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142
[appellate courts look for substantial evidence and do not resolve
credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts].)
That said, as the California Supreme Court recently
reiterated, “ ‘ “[e]vidence which merely raises a strong suspicion
of the defendant’s guilt is not sufficient to support a conviction.
Suspicion is not evidence, it merely raises a possibility, and this
is not a sufficient basis for an inference of fact.” [Citation.] The
substantial evidence rule mandates consideration of the weight of
the evidence before deferring to the conclusions drawn from the
evidence by the trier of fact. “[I]n determining whether the record
is sufficient . . . the appellate court can give credit only to
‘substantial[’] evidence, i.e., evidence that reasonably inspires
confidence and is ‘of solid value.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Collins
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 293, 307.) “A jury must avoid ‘ “ ‘unreasonable
28
inferences and not … resort to imagination or suspicion.’
[Citation.]” [Citation.] “Mere conjecture, surmise, or suspicion is
not the equivalent of reasonable inference and does not constitute
proof.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
B. Relevant Law of Murder
As noted, the convictions Bean challenges for insufficiency
of evidence involved the prosecution’s theories of felony murder
(Pryor), aiding and abetting first degree malice murder (Doxy),
and second degree malice murder (Thornton).
Malice murder is the unlawful killing of a human being
with malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) First degree malice
murder includes the additional elements of premeditation and
deliberation. (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 151; § 189
[degrees of murder].)
For purposes of murder, malice may be either express or
implied. (§ 188, subd. (a).) It is express when there is manifested
a deliberate intent to unlawfully take the life of another. (§ 188,
subd. (a)(1); People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 653
(Gonzales).) It is “implied when no considerable provocation
appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show
an abandoned and malignant heart.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(2); People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 844 (Gentile), abrogated by statute
on another ground as stated in People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th
401, 442.) Said another way, implied malice is shown “when a
person willfully does an act, the natural and probable
consequences of which are dangerous to human life, and the
person acts with conscious disregard for the danger to life that
the act poses.” (Gonzales, supra, at p. 653; People v. Superior
Court (Valenzuela) (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 485, 500 [same].)
29
Express malice requires an intent to kill but implied malice does
not. (People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 976.)
Felony murder involves a killing committed in the
perpetration of enumerated felonies, including attempted robbery
and burglary, and constitutes murder in the first degree. (§ 189,
subd. (a).) Section 189, subdivision (e) now provides that a felony
murder participant is liable for murder only if the person was the
actual killer or, if not, the person either “with the intent to kill,
aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of
murder in the first degree” or the “person was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life” (as described in § 190.2, subd. (d)). (§
189, subd. (e)(1)(3).) The perpetrator must have the specific
intent to commit the underlying felony and the killing must not
be merely incidental to that felony. (People v. Proctor (1992) 4
Cal.4th 499, 532.)
Someone who aids and abets the commission of a crime is
culpable as a principal in that crime. (§ 31; Gentile, supra, 10
Cal.5th at p. 843.) Aiding and abetting is not a separate crime
but a form of derivative liability for the underlying crime. (People
v. Francisco (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1190; accord Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) As applicable to murder, “under
direct aiding and abetting principles, an accomplice is guilty of an
offense perpetrated by another if the accomplice aids the
commission of that offense with ‘knowledge of the direct
perpetrator’s unlawful intent and [with] an intent to assist in
achieving those unlawful ends.” (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p.
843, quoting People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225 (Perez).)
“Guilt as an aider and abettor is guilt ‘based on a combination of
30
the direct perpetrator’s acts and the aider and abettor’s own acts
and own mental state.’ ” (People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th
689, 710 (Powell).) Generally, “proof of aider and abettor liability
requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s
actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the
aider and abettor’s means rea—knowledge of the direct
perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving
those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—
conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the
achievement of the crime.” (Perez, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1225.)
For a person not the actual killer, aiding and abetting an express
malice murder means that the aider shares the perpetrator’s
mental state of express intent to kill. (People v. McCoy (2001) 25
Cal.4th 1111, 1117 (McCoy).) Aiding and abetting an implied
malice murder requires that the aider intentionally, by words or
conduct, aid the perpetrator in a life-endangering act—not
necessarily the crime. And the aider must personally have (1)
knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, (2)
intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, and (3)
knowledge that the act naturally and probably will cause death,
but the aider nonetheless acts in conscious disregard of this
probable result. (Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713.)
In addition to proving the elements of murder, “when
provocation or imperfect self-defense are at issue, the prosecution
is compelled to disprove those circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 254.)
31
C. Analysis
1. Sufficient Evidence of Felony Murder of Pryor (Ct.2)
Bean contends, erroneously, there is no record evidence
that the killing occurred during a robbery or burglary or attempt
of either. He does not grapple with the evidence that supports the
judgment in this regard. He argues the record evidence supports
only that no robbery or attempt or theft occurred because,
contrary to or disregarding the evidence, no counterfeit money
was shown to have been presented by Williams for the drug-buy.
He further asserts he entered the motel room only after Pryor
“became enraged and began a physical fight” with Williams, and
that his only intent in shooting into the room was “to protect”
her. As Bean does not address or confront the record evidence—
direct and circumstantial, and reasonable inferences therefrom—
supporting the conviction, he fails to meet his burden on appeal
and we reject his insufficiency claim on count 2.
The prosecution’s theory of the Pryor murder was that
Bean and Williams planned to take Pryor’s cocaine and money
after using Doxy—a friend of Pryor’s—to set up the ruse that
Bean and Williams simply came to purchase cocaine. As observed
by the People as respondent here, in discussing the jury
instructions, the prosecution told the court that “there was both
the intent to do a robbery or the intent to commit this theft by
[false] pretense.” The jury was instructed that Bean could be
convicted of felony murder if he committed attempted robbery or
burglary, intended to commit attempted robbery or burglary, and
while doing so, caused the death of another person. The jury was
also instructed on the elements of attempt, robbery, and burglary
with the underlying felony of theft by false pretenses, and that
the jury need not be unanimous as to which theory. In closing
32
argument, the prosecutor told the jury that “Pryor was the victim
of an attempted robbery that went bad” after Bean and Williams
“set him up” by using Doxy as “someone that he knew” to gain
access to the room. And that “Pryor made the critical mistake of
fighting back, and when he [did so] and just tried to protect
himself and his wife, he was repeatedly shot and left for dead on
a motel room floor.”
As we have noted, attempted robbery or burglary will
support a first degree felony murder conviction under section 189.
(People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1118–1119 [killing
perpetrated in the commission or attempt to commit any of the
enumerated felonies will support first degree felony murder
conviction].) As the jury was instructed, robbery is the “felonious
taking of personal property in the possession of another, from
[their] person or immediate presence, and against [their] will,
accomplished by means of force or fear.” (§ 211.) Attempt
“consists of two elements: a specific intent to commit the crime,
and a direct but ineffectual act done towards its commission.” (§
21a.) Burglary is defined under section 459 as when the
defendant “enters any [defined structure] with intent to commit
grand or petty larceny or any felony.” Section 189 does not limit
the definition of burglary or exclude any kind of burglary. “An
intent to commit theft by a false pretense or a false promise
without the intent to perform will support a burglary conviction.”
(People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 354; see § 484, subd. (a)
[definition of “theft” as including the taking of money or property
by false or fraudulent representation or pretense].) Accordingly,
the same will support a felony-murder conviction with burglary
as the underlying felonious offense.
33
The prosecution’s theories underlying Bean’s felony-murder
conviction in count 2 for Pryor’s killing, whether attempted
robbery or burglary as the underlying felony, are fully supported
by substantial evidence appearing in the whole record—evidence
that Bean ignores. There is no dispute that Bean was the actual
killer. (See § 189, subds. (a) & (e)(1) [actual killer during
perpetration of enumerated felonies liable under law of felony
murder].)
The surveillance video, which we have reviewed, shows
Bean, Williams, and Doxy entering the motel together; Williams
and Doxy going to the Pryors’ door on the second floor with Bean
hanging back down the hall; Bean pacing around the second floor
balcony while Williams and Doxy gain entry into the Pryors’
room; Doxy entering and leaving the room shortly thereafter with
Williams remaining and the door open; Doxy briefly speaking to
Bean on her way out; Bean approaching the open door and
pushing on it to open it further and gain entry while someone is
pushing back from the interior of the room; bursts of dust or
debris in the camera view likely from the force of Bean’s gun
firing through the door; the door closing and Bean going to the
room’s side window and breaking it before firing more shots into
the room from that location; Williams—without the jacket she
had entered with—then slowly exiting the room and she and
Bean running away, going down the stairs and out to leave the
motel.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the
video evidences a plan or set-up to rob or steal from Pryor or
leads to reasonable inferences to that effect. The admitted photos
of the room after the shooting show Pryor’s body face down on the
ground and money bills, some bloody, near him. More bills are
34
shown in Sandra Pryor’s open purse. Some of the bills clearly
bear the label “For Motion Picture Use Only,” indicating their
counterfeit character. Williams herself admitted to having the
fake bills and testified she had given one of them—a $50—to
Pryor to purchase cocaine and got a $20 bill in change back from
him. Counterfeit bills were found in her jacket left behind.
Sandra Pryor testified that after the knock on the hotel
room door, the voice outside the door said it was “Tiffany.” She
relayed how Doxy and Williams were in the room and Doxy soon
left. Bean then showed up at the door with a gun and said, “You
know what this is. Give me your money. I want everything.”
Sandra Pryor explained how Williams then pinned her
against the wall behind the door and threatened her to not resist
by saying, “Don’t try it. Don’t move. Don’t say nothing.” While
against the wall and through the crack in the door, Sandra Pryor
could see Bean pushing the door open and she heard a gunshot.
She explained how she and Pryor pushed against the door trying
to keep Bean out, finally closing it. She testified that Pryor and
Williams began to fight inside the room after Bean had come to
the door with the gun and how Williams at one point said,
“Tiffany set this up. It was Tiffany,” which reflects an advance
plan among Williams, Bean, and Doxy to set up the drug-buy as a
ruse to rob or steal from Pryor. Sandra Pryor explained how she
had retreated to the separate kitchen area of the room to call 911
after Bean had shot through the door and while Williams and
Shawn Pryor were struggling inside the room. Then she heard
breaking glass and more gunshots, and saw Pryor falling to the
floor, bleeding. She tried to aid him but was unsuccessful. Bean’s
DNA was found on the broken window sill and he admitted to
having shot the gun. There was no evidence, other than Bean’s
35
own testimony, that Pryor had a gun and had shot first or that
Williams was in imminent danger inside the room when Bean
delivered the first shot through the motel-room door and the
9
additional shots through the broken window. Bean’s and
Williams’s slow run from the room and their flight from the motel
after the shooting, as well as their immediate targeting of Doxy
as a witness to the attempted robbery or burglary gone bad, are
further substantial evidence of Bean’s guilt for the felony murder
of Pryor.
All the physical evidence was consistent with Sandra
Pryor’s testimony, which the jury was entitled to credit over that
of Bean and Williams. The jury was entitled to conclude from all
the evidence that Bean either attempted to rob Pryor or that he
and Williams entered the motel room, having set up Pryor by
using Doxy to gain access to the room, with the intent to commit
theft by false pretenses by use of the counterfeit bills. (See People
v. Kwok (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1245 [as intent is rarely
susceptible of direct proof, it may be inferred from all the facts
and circumstances; where such facts and circumstances
reasonably indicate a defendant’s purpose in entering a premises
is to commit larceny or any other felony, a burglary conviction
will stand].)
9 Even if the jury had found it credible that Pryor had had a
gun and shot first in response to the attempt to rob him, as
pointed out by respondent, neither perfect nor imperfect self-
defense may be “invoked by a defendant who, through his own
wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a physical assault or the
commission of a felony), has created circumstances under which
his adversary’s attack or pursuit is legally justified. [Citations]”
(In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 773, fn. 1.)
36
In our view, there is overwhelming substantial evidence in
the record to support Bean’s felony murder conviction in count 2
and that evidence does not amount to mere conjecture or
speculation. On top of that, Bean’s opening brief does not address
the evidence that supports this conviction and thus fails to meet
his burden on appeal.
2. Sufficient Evidence of Aiding and Abetting First
Degree Murder of Doxy (Ct.4)
Bean frames the sufficiency challenge to his conviction for
the first degree malice murder of Doxy by aiding and abetting by
acknowledging that the evidence pointed to Williams as the
shooter, and that his guilt for the crime could only come through
the theories of aiding and abetting or conspiracy.10 He contends
the only evidence supporting this conviction is that he had
previously possessed the gun—less than 15 minutes before—and
was nearby when the execution-style shooting occurred. He
argues the record lacks evidence of how Williams obtained the
gun from him or why he would have allowed her to have it, and
that even if his car had been nearby, his mere presence near the
scene of a crime is insufficient to prove he aided and abetted the
10 Williams was convicted of first degree malice murder of
Doxy with findings that she personally used, intentionally
discharged, and proximately caused death with a firearm and
that the murder was committed for the purpose of eliminating a
witness. While Bean addresses an alternative conspiracy theory
in his argument, that is not a theory the People pursued at trial,
the jury was not instructed on it, and respondent does not
address it in its brief. Nor do we as we conclude substantial
evidence supports the conviction on the theory of aiding and
abetting, the one actually pursued at trial and on which the jury
was instructed.
37
murder. This is not a full or fair reading of the substantial record
evidence supporting the conviction.
The prosecution’s theory of murder against Bean for Doxy’s
killing was indeed by aiding and abetting. The evidence, both
direct and circumstantial, supported reasonable inferences that
the mutual decision or plan by Bean and Williams to kill Doxy
was reached within minutes of the Pryor killing as they left the
motel, because the Doxy killing occurred less than 15 minutes
later and less than three miles away. Williams rode in Doxy’s car
as a passenger when she and Doxy left the motel where the Pryor
murder had occurred and drove to a small parking lot, their
arrival there shown on surveillance video taken from a nearby
business.
Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences support
that Williams already had the gun in her possession while in
Doxy’s car after leaving the motel and that Bean had just handed
it to her because he had used it to kill Pryor only minutes before
and they were together when that happened. As shown on video,
Doxy stopped her Volvo in the parking lot, backing into a space at
an angle. As further shown, a car resembling Bean’s Malibu was
traveling in tandem with the Volvo when it approached the
parking lot but that car didn’t turn in. Instead, that car turned
the other direction, stopped in the street, and waited for Williams
to shoot Doxy and run to that car after its headlights flashed,
after which the car drove away. Reasonable inferences from the
evidence support that the other car was Bean’s; he was driving it;
he had given the gun to Williams right after shooting Pryor at
the motel so Doxy could be eliminated as a witness, as she knew
Doxy would be shown on the motel’s surveillance video and then
identified and found by police; he and Williams coordinated this
38
plan, at the latest, just after Pryor was shot and Bean waited for
Williams in his car near the parking lot while she shot Doxy
execution style in the Volvo; and then he and Williams drove
away.
Both Bean and Williams testified they went to his friend
Doughboy’s house together after the Pryor killing, omitting the
Doxy murder in between. There was no other apparent purpose
for them to stop on the way to that destination, other than to
eliminate Doxy. Bean could not explain how the same gun that
had killed Pryor also killed Doxy. And the jury was entitled to
reject Williams’s testimony that Doxy separately drove herself to
Doughboy’s house, that Doughboy drove Bean’s car away from his
house with Bean’s gun in the console, that Doxy left Doughboy’s
house in her own car and never came back, and that Doughboy or
some other third party must have used Bean’s gun to kill her.
The facts and reasonable inferences easily support Bean’s
conviction for first degree malice murder of Doxy by aiding and
abetting. They establish that Bean aided Williams’s commission
of Doxy’s murder with knowledge of Williams’s unlawful intent
and with his own intent to assist her in achieving those unlawful
ends. (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) Williams shot Doxy,
as shown on video, in the face at close range—the direct
perpetrator’s actus reus. Bean had given Williams the gun to use
in the crime, as he had just used it to kill Pryor less than 15
minutes before, and he did so before they left the motel where
Pryor had just been killed. Bean knew that Doxy was either part
of or a witness to the plan to set up Pryor at the motel room.
Bean stopped his car outside the parking lot where Doxy turned
in and stopped her own car, and he waited for Williams to shoot
Doxy so he could enable Williams’s flight from the scene. These
39
facts support Bean’s own actus reus—multiple acts—that
assisted Williams’s achievement of the crime. They also support
the reasonable inference of Bean’s knowledge of Williams’s
unlawful intent and his own intent to assist her in achieving her
unlawful ends—his own mens rea. (See People v. Thomas (2011)
52 Cal.4th 336, 355 [intent may be proven circumstantially];
People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 274 [defendant’s
presence at crime scene, failure to take steps to prevent the
commission of the crime, companionship, flight, and other
conduct before and after the crime are relevant factors in
determining liability for aiding and abetting].)
As for malice, Bean either shared Williams’s express intent
to kill Doxy or, at a minimum, he intentionally aided Williams by
his own conduct in a life-endangering act, with knowledge that
Williams intended to eliminate Doxy and his own intent to aid in
that act with knowledge that the act would naturally and
probably cause her death and in conscious disregard of this
probable result. (Perez, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1225; McCoy,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1117; Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p.
710, 713.)
We accordingly reject Bean’s insufficiency claim as to his
conviction for Doxy’s murder in count 4, finding the conviction
fully supported by substantial evidence in the record.
3. Sufficient Evidence of the Second Degree Murder of
Thornton Without Justification (Ct.9)
Bean contends there is insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for the second degree murder of Thornton, because, as
Bean testified, he acted only in self-defense when he admittedly
shot Thornton. But as with Bean’s other insufficiency claims, he
does not address the record evidence supporting the conviction, in
40
particular that this admitted shooting was without legal
justification.
The undisputed evidence showed Bean was sitting in the
passenger seat of his parked car, Williams having driven it to a
location within Rollin’ 60’s claimed territory. Bean, an Eight-Trey
gang member, was armed with the same .45 caliber gun
connected to the three prior killings. Thornton approached the
car on foot and tapped on the windshield with an object in his
hand, and said to Bean, “What are you doing around here?” and
“You better get out of here, motherfucker.” Jose N. saw Thornton
carrying two things in his hands that looked like a gun and a cell
phone, and Thornton’s tapping on Bean’s windshield was likely
with the gun, which was “probably a nine” millimeter. Shots
followed, Bean and Thornton each firing their respective guns, as
bullets and spent casings at the scene later showed. Thornton
was hit. This much, Bean acknowledges. But he testified that
Thornton shot first and that Bean only returned fire in self-
defense. His argument ignores the substantial evidence
supporting the conviction for second degree murder without
justification.
As Jose N. testified, after Thornton tapped Bean’s
windshield with an object in his hand, he pointed the object
downward toward the ground. Thornton then put both hands in
front of his body, turned away from Bean’s Malibu, and continued
to walk away—a retreat before any shots were fired. Jose N. then
heard a volley of gunshots, and Williams said to him, “I’ve gotta
go.” There were a lot of gunshots, with one series louder than the
other, the louder one coming first. Jose N. later saw a cell phone
and a handgun near Thornton’s body on the ground after the
shooting, but someone in the gathered crowd removed these
41
items before law enforcement arrived on scene. Add to this that
Bean immediately fled from the scene and that he and Williams
later tried to hide the gun used in all four killings, both facts
reflecting Bean’s consciousness of guilt. (People v. Jones (2018) 26
Cal.App.5th 420, 441 [evidence of consciousness of guilt
admissible to prove the crime]; People v. Dabb (1948) 32 Cal.2d
491, 500 [consciousness of guilt inferred from attempt to avoid
apprehension]; People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 131
[suppression of evidence showed consciousness of guilt]; People v.
Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 142 [same].)
The volley of gunshots in the exchange hit nearby parked
cars, including Jose N.’s. Two bullets were recovered from his car
along with a casing from nearby grass. Detectives also found
eight .45 caliber casings and five or six fired .45 caliber bullets
and bullet fragments at the scene, along with multiple nine-
millimeter casings, from the gun Thornton had carried. The .45
caliber casings matched those recovered from the Wilkerson
crime scene. A .45 caliber gun is louder when shot than a less
powerful gun shooting nine-millimeter bullets.
From the firearms evidence and Jose N.’s direct testimony
about the loudness of the first shots fired, the jury could
reasonably have inferred that Bean shot first. Add to this Jose
N.’s testimony that the object in Thornton’s hand was pointing
downward with both his hands in front of him and he was
turning around and walking away when the first shots were
fired. The jury was entitled to conclude from all this evidence
that Bean having shot at Thornton first while Thornton was
retreating and not a threat, Bean acted unjustifiably, despite
Thornton’s earlier aggressive words and his tapping on Bean’s
windshield, as Bean was not in imminent peril when he shot.
42
(See § 197 [enumerated circumstances of justifiable homicide].)
The jury was also entitled to disbelieve Bean’s contrary version of
events, including that he subjectively believed he was under
threat of death or great bodily injury when he fired. (People v.
Morales (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 978, 989 [jury is free to disbelieve
defendant’s claim of acting in self-defense, especially in light of
evidence to the contrary].) And the jury could also have taken
into account the evidence of Bean’s consciousness of guilt.
In short, the evidence was in conflict as to whether Bean
acted in self-defense when he shot Thornton, with substantial
evidence supporting the jury’s verdict that he did not. “ ‘ “[W]here
the evidence is uncontroverted and establishes all of the elements
for a finding of self-defense it may be held as a matter of law that
the killing was justified; however, where some of the evidence
tends to show a situation in which a killing may not be justified
then the issue is a question of fact for the jury to determine.” ’
[Citation.]” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1044.) The
jury here resolved this conflict adversely to Bean, and substantial
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment,
supports this conclusion. Bean has thus failed to show
insufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction.
D. Unauthorized Sentence re Imposed but Stayed Five-Year
Prior Enhancements
The second amended information, filed at trial on January
19, 2023, as to Bean, alleged two prior serious felony convictions
under section 667, subdivision (a)(1) in connection with the four
murder counts 1, 4, 8, and 9 and the assault count 5. It also
alleged two prior prison terms under what appears to have been
former section 667.5, subdivision (b) in connection with the same
counts, plus the firearm-possession counts 2, 6, and 10. These
43
latter were later deleted from the information by handwritten
interlineation. Bean admitted the two priors. He was ultimately
convicted here of counts 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10.
At sentencing, the trial court did not initially address the
section 667, subdivision (a)(1) priors. The court then recalled the
matter and said, “The court failed to address that the defendant
had two five-year priors. The court is going to exercise its
discretion, impose the 10 years, and then stay them, so there
would be no extra time.” The court did not reference a particular
statute or a particular count when doing so.11 The minute order
from sentencing, in reference to this, states: “The court imposes
the 10 years pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5(A) as the
defendant admitted the prior convictions. . . . The imposition of
sentence is stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654.” The
abstract of judgment, without reference to a particular count,
likewise indicates unspecified punishment for an enhancement
under section 667.5, subdivision (a), imposed but stayed.
It appears the minute order and abstract of judgment
contain a clerical error in that they indicate the imposition but
staying of an aggregate 10-year enhancement term under section
667.5, subdivision (a), instead of what appears to have been
intended by the court to be under section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
But such a sentence, even as intended, is unauthorized.
11 The People had requested in their sentencing memorandum
the imposition of 10 years, consecutive, for the two section 667,
subdivision (a)(1) priors, as attached to the assault count 5 and
the second degree murder count 9, citing “People v. Williams
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 397, 405 [‘[U]nder the three Strikes law, section
667(a) enhancements are to be applied individually to each count
of a third strike.’].)”
44
The legislative enactment of Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017-
2018 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2019, amended sections
667, subdivision (a) and 1385 to provide trial court discretion to
strike enhancements for felony convictions. (Stats. 2018, ch.
1013, § 1.) There is no statutory authorization for the trial court
to impose but stay rather than strike an enhancement, “not, at
least, when the only basis for doing either is its own discretionary
sense of justice,” as it appears here. (People v. Lopez (2004) 119
Cal.App.4th 355, 364.) Rule 4.447 of the California Rules of Court
provides authority for imposing but staying an enhancement, but
this rule applies only “when ‘an enhancement that otherwise
would have to be either imposed or stricken is barred by an
overriding statutory prohibition,’ ” a circumstance not present
here. (People v. Bay (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 126, 139.)
Although Bean did not object to the trial court imposing but
staying the two five-year prior enhancements, this aspect of the
sentence is unauthorized and is reviewable on appeal in the
absence of an objection below.12 (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40
Cal.4th 875, 886–889.) It is clear from the court’s entire sentence
and its comments when addressing these prior enhancements
that the court intended not to impose additional punishment for
them. We will therefore strike the 10 years imposed but stayed
for the two five-year prior enhancements under what the court
appears to have intended as section 667, subdivision (a)(1). (See
People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 [remand not
required if record clearly indicates trial court would have
12 We note that co-defendant Williams raises this issue as
error in the companion appeal. There, the People concede the
error.
45
exercised discretion and reached the same conclusion]; People v.
McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 425 [remand to trial court
not required when it would be an idle act].)
IV. DISPOSITION
The clerk of the trial court on remand is directed to correct
the sentencing minute order and the abstract of judgment to
strike what is indicated as the aggregate 10-year enhancement
imposed but stayed under section “667.5(A).” The judgment of
conviction is otherwise affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
WILLIAMS, J. *
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
MOOR J.
* Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
46
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