People v. Boode CA1/4

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Filed 5/30/25 P. v. Boode CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A171369
v. (Alameda County
SHAWNDRA STAR BOODE, Super. Ct. No. H46925A)
Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Shawndra Star Boode appeals after the trial court took no
action on her Penal Code1 section 1172.1 petition for recall and resentencing.
We conclude the trial court’s order is not appealable and will dismiss the
appeal.
BACKGROUND
In 2010, a jury convicted Boode of two counts of first degree murder
under section 187, subdivision (a), and found true special circumstance
allegations under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3) and (17)(A), as well as
enhancements under sections 12022.5, subdivision (a), 12022.53,
subdivisions (d) and (g), and 12022.7, subdivision (a). The trial court
subsequently sentenced her to 120 years to life without the possibility of
parole.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless

otherwise stated.

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On March 12, 2024, Boode filed a section 1172.1 petition for
resentencing in connection with her 2010 convictions. Her petition discussed
her youth at the time of the underlying offenses, childhood trauma, and
subsequent rehabilitative efforts. She also referenced the Alameda County
District Attorney’s review of her sentence. On April 25, 2024, the trial court
declined to take action on Boode’s petition, citing section 1172.1,
subdivisions (a)(1), (5), and (c), and otherwise dismissed the petition for lack
of jurisdiction.
Boode timely appealed on May 23, 2024. Boode contends (1) the trial
court had jurisdiction under section 1172.1 to recall her sentence and
resentence her, (2) the court’s order stating it lacked jurisdiction is
appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b) as a postjudgment order that
affects her substantial rights, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in
taking no action on the petition. The Attorney General disagrees as to all
points.
DISCUSSION
Boode purports to appeal from the trial court’s order declining to take
action on her petition for resentencing. We conclude the order is not
appealable.
I. Governing Legal Principles
“The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not appeal a
trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made
appealable by statute.” (People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159
(Loper).) Boode purports to appeal under section 1237, subdivision (b), which
provides a defendant can appeal from “any order made after judgment,
affecting the substantial rights of the party.”

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Boode relies on section 1172.1, which provides authority for a trial
court to recall and resentence defendants “on its own motion” or under other
certain circumstances. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a).) “Like its predecessor
provisions . . . , section 1172.1 is a statutory exception to the general rule that
‘ “once a judgment is rendered and execution of the sentence has begun, the
trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence.” ’ ”
(People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 992 (Hodge).) However, the
trial court is under no obligation to respond to a section 1172.1 petition
because, as plainly stated in section 1172.1, subdivision (c), “A defendant is
not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section.
If a defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the court is
not required to respond.” “That [second] sentence excuses the trial court from
any responsibility to rule on such a request, or even to respond. It follows
that a defendant who chooses to file an unauthorized request for resentencing
has no right to a ruling.” (Hodge, at p. 996.) Thus, when a trial court
“declines to act on a defendant’s petition, it affects no substantial right, as a
defendant’s request carries neither a right to a resentencing nor an obligation
for the court to consider initiating one.” (People v. Faustinos (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 687, 696 (Faustinos).) “We conclude that there is no
appellate jurisdiction over an order declining to act on a defendant’s
unauthorized section 1172.1 petition, even though a court may initiate a
resentencing on its own motion.” (Faustinos, at p. 697.)
A. Analysis
Here, the trial court’s order did not affect Boode’s substantial rights for
the simple reason that she is not entitled to a response from the court
pursuant to section 1172.1, subdivision (c). (People v. Roy (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 991, 998 [following Hodge to hold that “defendant’s

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substantial rights are not affected by the challenged order because the trial
court had no obligation to act on defendant's request”].) The trial court’s
decision to take no action on defendant’s section 1172.1 petition is therefore
not appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b).
In her appellate briefs, Boode contends the trial court’s order is
appealable, citing to People v. Vaesau (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 132 (Vaesau),
Loper, supra, 60 Cal.4th 1155, and People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367
(Carmony). We find these cases are inapplicable and Boode’s reliance on
them unpersuasive.
In both Loper, supra, 60 Cal.4th 1155, and Vaesau, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th 132, the government parties “properly initiated” (Loper, at
p. 1158) the recall and resentencing proceedings as expressly authorized by
the relevant statutes. In Vaesau, the prosecution filed a request for recall
and resentencing under section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1). (Vaesau, at
p. 140.) In Loper, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation initiated a request for recall of defendant’s sentence under
section 1170, subdivision (e). (Loper, at p. 1158.) But unlike in Loper and
Vaesau, Boode filed an unauthorized section 1172.1 petition. And section
1172.1 does not obligate the court to respond to a defendant’s unauthorized
petition. (§ 1172, subd. (c).)
We find Boode’s reliance on Carmony unpersuasive as well. First,
Carmony dealt with a defendant’s right to appeal a trial court’s refusal to
dismiss a prior strike under section 1385. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 371.) As emphasized by the court in Faustinos, Carmony arose from a
conviction and sentence under section 1237, subdivision (a), which provides
for a defendant to appeal “from a final judgment of conviction,” whereas
Boode seeks to appeal under subdivision (b). (Faustinos, supra,

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109 Cal.App.5th at p. 699.) But unlike in Carmony where the appellate court
had jurisdiction under section 1237, subdivision (a), here, the appellate court
“has no basis to review a trial court’s decision not to initiate” a section 1172.1
resentencing, as there is no statutory obligation for the trial court to do so.
(Faustinos, at p. 699.)
Moreover, the statutory language of section 1172.1 is both clear and
distinguishable from section 1385. We agree with the analysis in both Hodge
and Faustinos. In Hodge, as here, Hodge requested the trial court recall his
sentence under section 1172.1. (Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 991.)
But as the Second District emphasized, “unlike the eligibility criteria
governing a trial court’s decision to deny compassionate release under former
section 1170 [as in Loper] and the limits on a trial court’s discretion not to
dismiss a prior strike under section 1385 [as in Carmony], section 1172.1
places no constraints on the trial court’s decision declining to initiate
reconsideration of a sentence on its own motion.” (Hodge, at p. 999; see
Faustinos, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 697 [“We lack any ‘discernable
criteria’ to review” a decision declining to act on a defendant’s section 1172.1
petition].) Because the trial court was not statutorily obligated to respond to
Hodge’s request, its denial of Hodge’s request did not affect Hodge’s
substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b). “The lack of any
statutory constraints on a trial court’s decision to decline action on a
defendant’s request for resentencing under section 1172.1 also means that
there would be nothing for this court to review on appeal.” (Hodge, at p. 998.)
Just as the Hodge court found the trial court’s order declining to recall
Hodge’s sentence non-appealable (id. at p. 991), so too is the trial court’s
order here.

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Boode argues Hodge is distinguishable because the trial court here
“substantively” responded to Boode’s petition, whereas the trial court in
Hodge issued a shorter order. However, we agree with the Faustinos court
that an order’s content cannot “transform a non-appealable order (stating
that it would not act on an unauthorized motion) into an appealable one by
addressing a matter that it needed not address (its jurisdiction to act on its
own), even if it was wrong about the matter.” (Faustinos, supra,
109 Cal.App.5th at p. 698.) “ ‘[A]ppealability depends upon the nature of the
decision made, not the court’s justification for its ruling.’ ” (Ibid.) We reject
Boode’s attempt to distinguish Hodge based on the content of the trial court’s
order here.
Like Hodge, Faustinos held that a trial court order declining to act on a
defendant’s unauthorized section 1172.1 petition was non-appealable, even
after a 2024 statutory amendment to section 1172.1 allowing the court “on its
own motion” to recall and resentence a defendant “ ‘at any time’ ” if there is a
change in applicable sentencing laws. (Faustinos, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at
p. 695; § 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) Boode argues Faustinos is distinguishable
because unlike in Faustinos, Boode cited changes in applicable sentencing
laws in her petition. We disagree with Boode’s argument. As the Faustinos
court noted, although the 2024 amendment now allows a trial court to
“initiate a resentencing on its own motion,” the court is still not required to do
so under subdivision (c). (Faustinos, at p. 696.) Boode’s references to alleged
changes in applicable sentencing laws therefore do not affect the non-
appealability of the trial court’s order.
Boode is not without remedy. She may file a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the trial court to challenge the court’s finding that it lacked
jurisdiction to consider her petition for resentencing. Boode “has a remedy if

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a trial court wrongly declares that it lacks jurisdiction to act on its own
motion under section 1172.1. That remedy is to petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the trial court. [Citations.] In such a petition, the defendant would
set forth the circumstances that ‘would support setting the matter for a new
sentencing hearing,’ and if the trial court concludes the petition may have
merit, it can act on it. [Citation.] In the unlikely event that the trial court
wrongly insists it has no authority to act even when told that changes in law
create discretionary section 1172.1 jurisdiction, the defendant could petition
for a writ of habeas in our court.” (People v. Faustinos, supra,
109 Cal.App.5th at pp. 698–699.) “The virtue of this path is that it could
create a record of the trial court’s view [citation], rather than have the
appealability of a simple post-judgment order turn on discerning what may
have been in the court’s mind.” (Id. at p. 700.)
We conclude, for the reasons stated in Hodge and Faustinos, that the
trial court’s order declining to take action on Boode’s section 1172.1 petition
is not appealable.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.

BROWN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, J.
GOLDMAN, J.

People v. Boode (A171369)

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