Young v. Collect Co. CA4/3

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Filed 5/29/25 Young v. Collect Co. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

WILLIAM YOUNG et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants, G063409

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2022-
01281968)
COLLECT CO,
OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Thomas S. McConville, Judge. Reversed and remanded. Requests for Judicial
Notice. Denied.
William Young and Jennifer Young, in pro. per., for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Rimôn Law and Daniel F. Lula for Defendant and Respondent.
After obtaining a judgment for attorney fees against plaintiffs
William Young and Jennifer Young in the related case of Young v. Byars (the
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Byars action), defendant Collect Co (Collect Co.) levied execution of that
judgment on plaintiffs’ causes of action and rights to recover money in this
action—a tort action plaintiffs had filed against Collect Co., which was still
pending (the Underlying Action). Then, asserting that it now owned the
causes of action plaintiffs had asserted against it, Collect Co. moved to
dismiss the Underlying Action on the ground plaintiffs no longer had
standing to pursue the action. The trial court granted Collect Co.’s motion to
dismiss the action with prejudice and entered judgment of dismissal.2 We
reverse and remand for further proceedings in the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
THE BYARS ACTION
A detailed factual summary of the Byars action is set forth in our
recently-filed opinion. (Young v. Byars (Apr. 25, 2025, G063346, G063723)
[nonpub. opn.].) We limit the facts set forth here to those relevant to this
appeal.
Plaintiffs filed the Byars action on June 7, 2017, against two
individuals who are not parties to this appeal, Brandon M. Byars and Jack
McIntyre. On January 22, 2018, plaintiffs obtained a default judgment for
$91,217 jointly against Byars and McIntyre.

1
Orange County Superior Court case No. 30-2017-00924659.

2
The judgment is in the form of a written order of dismissal
signed by the trial court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581d.)

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On December 3, 2020, pursuant to a written agreement titled
“Collect Co Client Agreement” (underscoring omitted), plaintiffs agreed to
“irrevocably assign” to Collect Co., for collection purposes, all of their rights,
title, and interest in five separate judgments, including the judgment they
had obtained against Byars and McIntyre. Pursuant to that agreement, on
December 7, 2020, plaintiffs executed before a licensed California notary
public an “Acknowledgment of Assignment of Judgment” (the Assignment), in
which they irrevocably granted and assigned to Collect Co. “all right, title,
and interest in the [judgment]” against Byars and McIntyre. Collect Co. filed
the Assignment in the Byars action on December 11, 2020.
Plaintiffs thereafter unsuccessfully attempted in the Byars action
to vacate the Assignment. On February 1, 2023, the trial court issued a fee
award in favor of Collect Co. and against plaintiffs in the amount of
$47,816.06 (fee award). Collect Co. thereafter undertook to enforce the fee
award as a judgment against plaintiffs, including by seeking (and obtaining)
a writ of execution from the clerk of the Orange County Superior Court.
Collect Co. then caused the Orange County Sheriff’s Department to levy on
and sell the Youngs’ intangible personal property, including “[a]ll things in
action Judgment Debtors may have against Account Debtors now or in the
future, including but not limited to any past, present, and future causes of
action and rights to recover money or other personal property
in. . . : [¶] . . . [¶] b. [the Underlying Action].” Plaintiffs did not file a claim of

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exemption or other documents in connection with the sale or move to set it
aside.
II.
THE UNDERLYING ACTION
In a continuing effort to invalidate the Assignment, plaintiffs
filed the Underlying Action against Collect Co. and other defendants on
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September 26, 2022. The next day, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.
Plaintiffs alleged multiple causes of action against Collect Co., including
fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent
deceit, fraudulent concealment, conversion, unjust enrichment, breach of
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
extortion, and financial elder abuse.
On February 16, 2023, Collect Co. filed a notice of lien pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 708.410 et seq.,4 based on the fee award it
had obtained in the Byars action. On March 24, 2023, Collect Co. filed a
“Notice of Sale and Assignment of Plaintiffs’ Right, Title and Interest in this
Action to Collect Co” stating that on March 23, 2023, the Orange County
Sheriff had “irrevocably sold to Collect Co . . . all right, title, and interest that
plaintiffs . . . had in the [case]” and that “Plaintiffs no longer have any right,

3
Because the Underlying Action was related to the Byars action,
it was assigned to the judge who had presided over the Byars action, but
plaintiffs filed a peremptory challenge to that judge pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 170.6, and the Underlying Action was then reassigned to
Judge McConville.

4
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise stated.

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title, or interest in this action.” Collect Co. did not cite any statutory or other
legal authority supporting such a notice.
On August 21, 2023, Collect Co. moved to dismiss the action with
prejudice, asserting that, because it now owned the claims asserted against it
by plaintiffs, plaintiffs no longer had standing to sue on their claims.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion. On October 26, 2023, the court granted the
motion and ordered the case dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs filed their
notice of appeal on December 4, 2023. The trial court signed a written order
dismissing the action on January 3, 2024. We treat plaintiffs’ notice of appeal
as one prematurely filed from the January 3, 2024 signed order of dismissal.
DISCUSSION
I.
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS’ CASE

The central issue before us is whether Collect Co. was legally
permitted to levy execution on the pending tort claims against Collect Co. in
the Underlying Action and then assume control of the litigation and dismiss
the claims plaintiffs had asserted against it with prejudice. We conclude it
was not and reverse the order granting the motion to dismiss and the
resulting judgment.
“‘“Both standing and the interpretation of statutes are questions
of law to which we typically apply a de novo standard of review.”’” (San
Diegans for Open Government v. Fonseca (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 426, 436.)
The basis for Collect Co.’s motion to dismiss the Underlying
Action was its assertion that it had lawfully levied execution on plaintiffs’
pending claims. In its minute order granting the motion, the trial court found
“[Collect Co.] has established that the instant action is property that it
acquired through a Sheriff’s sale” and cited section 695.030, subdivision

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(b)(2). The court did not, however, decide whether Collect Co. was legally
permitted to levy execution on plaintiffs’ claims and then take control of the
litigation pending against it. We conclude it was not.
Contrary to Collect Co.’s argument, a cause of action that is the
subject of a pending action is not subject to execution of a money judgment.
(§ 699.720, subd. (a)(3); McKee v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1993) 15
Cal.App.4th 282, 290.) Section 699.720 expressly exempts “[a] cause of action
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that is the subject of a pending action . . . .” (Id., subd. (a)(3).) Subdivision (b)
of that section provides that “[n]othing in subdivision (a) affects or limits the
right of the judgment creditor to apply property to the satisfaction of a money
judgment pursuant to any applicable procedure other than execution.” (§
699.720, subd. (b), italics added.) The California Law Revision Commission
comment to section 699.720 specifically identifies the lien procedures in
section 708.410 as a proper means to enforce a money judgment in a pending

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Notably, Collect Co. failed to address section 699.720,
subdivision (a)(3) in its appellate briefing, even though plaintiffs cited it
multiple times in their opening brief. At oral argument, counsel for Collect
Co. made the remarkable suggestion that, although Collect Co.’s purported
execution on plaintiffs’ pending causes of action was a violation of section
699.720, by “pulling up to 40,000 feet” and considering the totality of the
facts, the court could conclude no “injustice was done.” We understand this to
refer to counsel’s (and Collect Co.’s) view that the Youngs’ causes of action
against Collect Co.—the very causes of action Collect Co. purported to
purchase in contravention of section 699.720—had no merit or were frivolous.
It should go without saying that we do not administer justice by squinting at
the relative equities from “40,000 feet” and gauging which of the parties has
engaged in the most (or least) egregious misconduct. We administer it at
ground level, based on a clear-eyed assessment of the facts and governing
legal principles. Nor do we administer justice based on the principle that two
wrongs make a right.

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action or proceeding. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 16C West’s Ann. Code
Civ. Proc. (2022 ed.) foll. § 699.720, p. 226.)
Section 708.410, subdivision (a), authorizes a judgment creditor
to obtain a lien on any cause of action for money and any judgment
subsequently obtained in the action “to the extent required to satisfy the
judgment creditor’s money judgment,” and it establishes the procedures for
doing so. Section 708.470 contemplates the lien be paid out of a judgment,
and section 708.480 provides that a lien may be enforced only after a
judgment in the underlying action is entered and has become final. “These
judgment lien statutes are subject to strict construction because they are
purely the creation of the Legislature.” (Pangborn Plumbing Corp. v.
Carruthers & Skiffington (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1056.)6
The lien granted by section 708.410, subdivision (a) attaches only
to the cause of action and any recovery arising therefrom. (Id., subds. (a)(1),
(a)(2).) Collect Co. was required to follow the lien procedures set forth in
sections 708.410 through 708.480, which superseded former section 688.1.
(Roseburg Loggers, Inc. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc. (1975) 14
Cal.3d 742, 749, italics added [Former “[s]ection 688.1 provides the exclusive
procedure by which a judgment creditor may satisfy a judgment against a
cause of action”]; In re Marriage of Kerr (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 130, 133
[sections 708.410 through 708.480 superseded former section 688.1].) Rather
than doing so, Collect Co. circumvented the statutory lien procedures and
caused the Sheriff’s Department to sell plaintiffs’ contingent claims that were

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There is no doubt Collect Co. is well aware of the statutory lien
procedures, not only because it is in the business of collecting on judgments,
but because it actually filed a notice of lien on February 16, 2023, in the
Underlying Action.

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pending against it, which plainly were not subject to execution. (§ 699.720,
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subd. (a)(3).)
Collect Co. argues that once the Sheriff’s sale took place, the sale
became “absolute” and could “not be set aside for any reason” (§ 701.680,
subd. (a)) because plaintiffs did not timely sue within 90 days to set it aside
pursuant to section 701.680, subdivision (c)(1). We find this argument
unavailing. Plaintiffs’ failure to timely challenge the sale does not necessarily
end the inquiry. Equitable principles may apply here to invalidate Collect
Co.’s actions. (See § 701.680, subd. (e) [“This section does not affect, limit, or
eliminate a judgment debtor’s equitable right of redemption”]; Lang v. Roché
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 254, 261 [“‘Equitable redemption is the right of a
judgment debtor to redeem property that was sold at an execution sale for a
“grossly inadequate price” where the purchaser is guilty of unfairness or has
taken undue advantage’”].)8

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Collect Co.’s counsel advised the court at oral argument that
Collect Co. purchased the Youngs’ claims for one cent.

8
Although we do not decide the issue, on the record before us, the
equities arguably favor plaintiffs on this issue. Collect Co. executed on
pending causes of action brought against it, not to satisfy the almost $48,000
attorney fee award it had obtained against plaintiff, but rather to assume
control of the litigation and dismiss all of plaintiffs’ claims. Indeed, former
“section 688.1 was adopted to prohibit a judgment creditor from levying
execution upon his debtor’s cause of action or judgment” because
“[e]xperience has shown that substantially less than fair value was
frequently realized upon such sales.” (Nicoletti v. Lizzoli (1981) 124
Cal.App.3d 361, 366.) “[T]he purpose of section 688.1 is to allow a judgment
creditor to seek recovery of his claim from the proceeds of a judgment without
permitting him to levy and sell the cause of action itself, a procedure which
was deemed unfair to judgment debtors but which was authorized by statute
prior to the enactment of section 688.1.” (Cetenko v. United California Bank
(1982) 30 Cal.3d 528, 533, fn. 7.)

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In addition, Collect Co. cites no law that would make it
mandatory for the trial court handling the pending claims to dismiss the case
upon proof of the sale without evaluating whether Collect Co. had legally
levied execution on the claims, or whether plaintiffs had some equitable right
to challenge Collect Co.’s actions. It is far from clear to us that a pretrial
motion to dismiss was a proper procedural vehicle for Collect Co. to prove it
had purchased the right to control the litigation and divest plaintiffs of
standing. This was not a case in which plaintiffs lacked standing from the
outset and that fact was apparent on the face of the complaint, or otherwise
judicially noticeable. Although it is true a plaintiff’s standing may be raised
at any time in a proceeding (see Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors
(1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 438), Collect Co. cites no legal authority for bringing an
evidentiary motion in the form of a motion to dismiss under the
circumstances here, where plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims when
the case was initiated and Collect Co., a defendant in the action, thereafter
contended it had lawfully acquired the right to assume control over the
litigation and force a dismissal of the complaint. None of the cases cited in
Collect Co.’s motion involved a motion to dismiss. (Common Cause v. Board of
Supervisors, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 436–438 [standing evaluated in the
context of a motion for preliminary injunction with respect to whether
plaintiffs could prevail on the merits of their claims]; See Carsten v.
Psychology Examining Com. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 793, 795–796 [standing
asserted as basis for demurrer]; Blumhorst v. Jewish Family Services of Los
Angeles (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 993, 997–998 [demurrer]; Hudis v. Crawford
(2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1589 [demurrer].) Further, although it styled
its request as a motion to dismiss, Collect Co. actually sought a dispositive
ruling in its favor prior to trial based on evidence it submitted in support of

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the motion. Yet it did not attempt to comply with the statutory procedures
applicable to summary judgment motions, which would have afforded
plaintiffs all the procedural protections required for such motions.
II.
THE REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Collect Co. filed a motion to augment the record with nine
exhibits. We granted the motion in part as to the first three exhibits, and
denied the motion to augment as to exhibits 4 through 9 because they were
part of the record in the Byars action, not the Underlying Action. We deferred
ruling on whether to take judicial notice of these exhibits. We decline to take
judicial notice of these exhibits from the Byars action because they are
unnecessary to the determination of the issues in this appeal. (Soukup v. Law
Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 279, fn. 9.) The only document
relevant to the issues before us is the trial court’s minute order in the Byars
action awarding the attorney fees to Collect Co. which became a judgment in
favor of Collect Co. against plaintiffs. That order is already part of the record
on appeal.
Plaintiffs also filed a request for judicial notice of various
documents, including the original judgment in the Byars action and
documents relating to Collect Co.’s efforts to collect on its fee award/judgment
against plaintiffs. We deny the request as unnecessary to the issues on
appeal. In addition, we note that some of the documents plaintiffs ask us to
judicially notice are already part of the record on appeal.

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III.
PLAINTIFFS ARE ADMONISHED REGARDING PERSONAL ATTACKS
ON THE TRIAL JUDGE IN THE BYARS ACTION

Plaintiffs have made repeated personal attacks on the trial judge
assigned to the Byars action in their appellate briefing and in their motion to
transfer the appeal of this case to a different appellate district. Among other
things, plaintiffs accuse the trial court of “fabricating statements,”
“fabrication of evidence,” making “false statements,” “collu[ding] with the
perpetrators [i.e., Collect Co.],” and engaging in conduct that “is subject to
criminal charges.”
These unsupported attacks are inexcusable. It is one thing to
assert a trial court has made an error. That is permissible and, indeed, is the
very purpose of pursuing an appeal: to correct error below. It is quite another
matter to level serious, unsupported accusations attacking the integrity of
the trial court. That is entirely beyond the pale and is likely to result in
monetary or other sanctions if repeated. Accusations of judicial wrongdoing
“are serious, and we treat them as such.” (People ex rel. Harris v. Sarpas
(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1557.) “Impugning the integrity of the trial
judge without facts is rarely a good idea (citation), and serious accusations
against a trial judge . . . had better be supported by concrete
evidence.” (Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC v. Summit Healthcare REIT,
Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 771, 793.) Plaintiffs have provided no evidence to
support their accusations against the trial judge. We admonish plaintiffs in
the strongest possible terms not to engage in such behavior in any future
filings. (Fink v. Shemtov (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1176.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings in the trial court. The parties’ requests for judicial
notice are denied. Appellants shall recover their costs on appeal.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

MOTOIKE, J.

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