People v. Thompson CA4/1

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Filed 5/23/25 P. v. Thompson CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083636

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD190308)

MIGUEL ANGEL THOMPSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
David J. Danielsen, Judge. (Retired Judge of the San Diego Sup. Ct.
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
Brad J. Poore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney
General, Christopher P. Beesley and Britton B. Lacy, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Following his resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, Miguel
Angel Thompson appeals the sentencing court’s denial of his motion under
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 and his motion to
strike his prior serious felony enhancements, contending there was
insufficient evidence to support a finding that he was an associate of the
Mexican Mafia.
We conclude (1) the record contains substantial evidence that
Thompson was a former associate of the Mexican Mafia and (2) the record
does not support Thompson’s claim that the court misapprehended his status
as a gang dropout at the time of sentencing. Besides, Thompson forfeited this
claim of factual error by not raising it at sentencing. Finally, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Thompson’s Romero motion or his
motion to strike his prior serious felony enhancements, as the record
indicates the court afforded minimal weight, if any, to Thompson’s gang
affiliation in exercising its sentencing discretion. We thus affirm. We
remand, however, for the trial court to address Thompson’s letter about
custody credits under People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954 to the extent
it has not done so.
I.
A.
In 2002, Geraldo Ojito was charged with murder and jailed awaiting
trial. From September 2004 through January 2005, Ojito was Thompson’s
cellmate.
Thompson wrote a “wila,” or note, threatening to “green light” anyone
who testified against Ojito in his upcoming murder trial. It was found in the
home of a key prosecution witness for Ojito’s trial. Thompson wrote a second
“wila” in 2005 that confirmed Thompson had written the first one.
Thompson was charged with and convicted of attempting to dissuade a
witness by force or threat. (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (c)(1); count 1.) The

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jury found not true the allegation that Thompson committed the offense for
the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street
gang. (§ 186.22(b)(1).)
Because Thompson had two prior strikes, he was sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of 25 years to life on count 1. He was also
sentenced to a determinate term of 12 years: five years each for two prior
serious felony enhancements and two years total for three prison prior
enhancements (as the sentence on the third was stayed).
B.
Under Penal Code section 1172.75, the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation identified Thompson as a person serving a
prison term under section 667.5(b) that could be legally invalid. The trial
court appointed counsel to represent Thompson.
Based largely on Thompson’s criminal history and prison record, the
People opposed resentencing Thompson to a lesser sentence beyond striking
the prison prior enhancements, arguing that would endanger public safety.
In their brief, the People stated Thompson “is an Otay gang member” as well
as “an associate of EME, the Mexican Mafia.” (Italics added.)
Thompson, meanwhile, “invit[ed]” the court to strike or dismiss one of
his two strike priors in addition to the two invalid prison prior
enhancements, contending his lack of recent discipline, positive
programming, age, health, and his youth at the time he committed the
strikes took him outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law.
Thompson’s prison record indicates he was previously identified as an
associate of the Mexican Mafia. By 2019, however, CDCR records formally
identified Thompson as a “dropout.”

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C.
At the January 2024 resentencing hearing, the court indicated it had
read Thompson’s sentencing brief, the People’s opposition, the information,
the original abstract of judgment, the original and supplemental probation
reports, Thompson’s original statement in mitigation, the People’s original
statement in aggravation, and supplemental materials submitted by
Thompson.
Thompson committed his first strike prior—an assault with a deadly
weapon—when he was 21 years old. A shoplifting codefendant was chased by
a security guard, whom Thompson hit on the neck with a bottle. He
committed his second strike prior—a robbery armed with a firearm—in 1992
at the age of 25. While transporting undocumented immigrants, a dispute
arose over payment, resulting in the charges.
Defense counsel argued Thompson’s youth when the strikes were
committed and the fact there was not “anything really terribl[e]” about them
warranted striking at least one. Counsel acknowledged Thompson “wasn’t a
great prisoner” at first. He noted, however, that all changed in 2018, when
Thompson successfully debriefed from the Mexican Mafia. Thompson also
began taking classes and bettering himself over the ensuing five years.
Counsel contended Thompson’s “criminal record is not really that terrible”
and that “no one was hurt” during the commission of the current offense.
The People noted Thompson’s criminal conduct had not ended in 2018;
in 2018, he was convicted of possessing a dangerous stabbing weapon in
prison, and in 2021, he was caught in possession of a controlled substance in
prison. Thompson’s CDCR disciplinary history “is significant and shows the
dangerousness that [Thompson] poses.” The People stated, “The fact that he
has the ability or the power to, more or less, put a green light out shows his

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position within the gang because not just anyone can do that. Yet he was
able to do that.” The People argued Thompson’s behavior had not changed
and he “remains a danger to the community if” his sentence were to be
reduced.
The court noted Thompson’s resentencing “shall result in a lesser
sentence . . . unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that
imposing such a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” The court
explained public safety is endangered if it is likely “the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or serious danger to others.” In
assessing whether that was true here, the court noted the importance of
exploring and considering “a number of factors.”
Regarding Thompson’s criminal history, the court noted that from early
adulthood he committed crimes “on a regular basis.” The court disputed that
the first strike was not serious and concluded the second was “much more
serious.” Between the beginning of his criminal career and the commission of
the current offense—which the court deemed a “significant strike”—
Thompson spent 14 of 20 years in prison. His “performance on probation and
parole during that time was considered abysmal and his behavior in the
institutions was noted as being very substandard.”
As to the current offense, “threats of death on individuals who would
have the temerity to come to court and tell the truth” are “a very serious
assault on the justice system.” The threat here was “insidious” due to “the
claim of connections that allows one to make those threats and never
personally have to carry them out to have associates who were well known in
all communities . . . for carrying out the exact type of threats that were
involved.”

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On the other hand, the court found “some very positive things,” with
Thompson “embracing opportunities” to better himself.
The court indicated it also considered Thompson’s age, his length of
incarceration, his health, “the changes in [Thompson’s] circumstance since
the original sentencing,” and Thompson’s “previous opioid problem and his
efforts to address” it.
The court concluded, based on “everything that [it] kn[e]w,” it “would
not strike the strikes” because Thompson “brings himself within the spirit of”
the Three Strikes law. Assessing “the totality of all of these issues” and
considering “all of the facts and circumstances of this case,” the court also
concluded a lesser sentence “would endanger public safety.” The court noted
its discretion to strike the two prior serious felony enhancements but,
“considering all of the factors relevant to that, that would not be an
appropriate exercise of discretion.”
The court thus struck only the prison priors and sentenced Thompson
to a prison term of 25 years to life plus ten years.
Thompson’s counsel did not object at all during the sentencing hearing.
II.
We review trial court decisions denying Romero motions and motions to
strike prior serious felony enhancements for an abuse of discretion. (People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374, 378.) “This standard is deferential” and
“asks in substance whether the ruling in question ‘falls outside the bounds of
reason’ under the applicable law and the relevant facts.” (People v. Williams
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162.) “The typical abuse of discretion standard
involves an analysis of whether the trial court’s decision is supported by
‘“substantial evidence.”’” (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 711.) “‘A
substantial evidence inquiry examines the record in the light most favorable

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to the judgment and upholds it if the record contains reasonable, credible
evidence of solid value upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have relied
in reaching the conclusion in question,” even in the face of “countervailing
evidence.” (Ibid.)
Thompson’s arguments on appeal are not a model of clarity. As best we
can discern them, we address them in turn. We deem forfeited any
arguments we do not address for failure to adequately develop them. (People
v. Verdugo (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 320, 333, fn. 11 [“Issues not adequately
developed in an appellate brief are generally deemed forfeited.”].)
A.
Thompson appears to contend the trial court erred in finding he was
previously an associate of the Mexican Mafia. To the extent the court made
such a finding, substantial evidence supports it. While Thompson claims he
was never really an associate of the Mexican Mafia and instead only
impersonated one, Thompson’s prison record is replete with references to his
association with the Mexican Mafia. Even were there evidence to the
contrary—though Thompson points to none in the record—this is substantial
evidence of Thompson’s former gang affiliation.
To the extent Thompson claims the court erroneously found he was still
an associate of the Mexican Mafia at the time of sentencing, the record does
not support this contention. Thompson’s argument relies on certain
statements made by (1) the prosecution in its sentencing brief and during the
sentencing hearing and (2) the court during sentencing. But this reliance is
misplaced.
First, to the extent the prosecution portrayed Thompson’s gang
affiliation as ongoing, there was substantial evidence before the court that
Thompson was no longer an associate of the Mexican Mafia. Thompson’s

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sentencing brief twice referenced his successful debrief from the Mexican
Mafia. His prison records confirm Thompson’s status as a gang dropout. And
during the hearing, defense counsel again informed the court that Thompson
had successfully debriefed from the Mexican Mafia.
Second, contrary to Thompson’s claim, the court’s statements do not
imply it misapprehended Thompson’s gang affiliation at the time of
sentencing. In the portion of the hearing transcript on which Thompson
relies, the court recounted the details of the underlying offense in
determining it was “a significant strike,” but the court did not conclude
Thompson was dangerous because he presently retained the ability to put a
“green light” on someone.
Accordingly, these claims fail to persuade on this record.
B.
Next, we agree with the People that Thompson forfeited his challenges
to the court’s supposed and erroneous reliance on his Mexican Mafia
association by failing to raise this issue below. Thompson claims he
preserved his challenges and, at any rate, challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence need not be raised below to preserve them for appeal. (Citing People
v. Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 785, 795.) But contrary to Thompson’s claim,
he raised no objection below, and the actions he did take were inadequate to
preserve his arguments for appeal.
“[T]he forfeiture rule for alleged sentencing errors” is that, “unless a
party makes a contemporaneous objection, he or she generally cannot
challenge a court’s ruling for the first time on appeal.” (People v. McCullough
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 594.) This is because, “[a]lthough the court is required
to impose sentence in a lawful manner, counsel is charged with
understanding, advocating, and clarifying permissible sentencing choices at

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the hearing.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353.) There are narrow
exceptions to the rule for some “legal error[s],” which appellate courts will
review “‘because such error[s are] “clear and correctable” independent of any
factual issues presented by the record at sentencing’” (McCullough, at p. 594),
but forfeiture generally applies to “factual error[s]” (ibid.), which are “not
readily susceptible of correction on appeal” (Scott, at p. 355).
Thompson asserts a factual error: that the court purportedly
misapprehended Thompson’s gang affiliation status in declining to strike his
strike priors and prior serious felony enhancements. A defendant “may not
‘transform . . . a factual claim into a legal one by asserting the record’s
deficiency as a legal error.’” (McCullough, 56 Cal.4th at p. 597.) By failing to
object to the trial court’s purportedly mistaken reliance on his gang
affiliation, Thompson “forfeit[ed] both his claim of factual error and the
dependent claim challenging ‘the adequacy of the record on that point.’”
(Ibid.) The purported error could easily have been corrected had Thompson’s
counsel contemporaneously objected below. (Scott, 9 Cal.4th at p. 351.) The
court afforded such an opportunity when, after imposing sentence, it asked,
“Is there anything else?” Defense counsel responded, “No.” We thus invoke
the forfeiture rule “as a matter of policy to ensure the fair and orderly
administration of justice.” (Ibid.) The cases on which Thompson relies are
inapt and do not persuade us otherwise.
C.
At any rate, to the extent Thompson claims the court abused its
discretion in denying his motions, we disagree. While Thompson contends
the court’s misapprehension of his gang affiliation at the time of sentencing
“was central” to the court’s denial of his motions, the record discloses
otherwise.

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1.
We deferentially review Romero rulings for abuse of discretion and
“must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the
defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of [the defendant’s] background, character,
and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in
whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though [the defendant] had
not previously been convicted of one or more” strikes. (Williams, 17 Cal.4th
at pp. 161-162.) As the circumstances must be “‘extraordinary’” for a
defendant to “‘be deemed to fall outside the spirit’” of the Three Strikes Law,
“the circumstances where no reasonable people could disagree that the
[defendant] falls outside the spirit of the [T]hree [S]trikes scheme must be
even more extraordinary.” (Carmony, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
The court was thorough at the sentencing hearing here. While it did
not specifically mention Thompson’s debriefing as a mitigating factor, it did
rely on the fact that Thompson “has decided to rehabilitate his life” and was
“now embracing opportunities and completing opportunities,” which it said it
“need[ed] to take . . . into consideration”—and that it did so. Meanwhile, it
did not mention Thompson’s gang affiliation, past or present, as one of the
many aggravating circumstances it considered. Thus, to the extent the court
considered Thompson’s gang affiliation, it accorded it minimal, rather than
outsized, significance.
Meanwhile, the court carefully considered Thompson’s underlying and
previous offenses, his background, his age, and other relevant factors before
determining Thompson “is someone who is clearly . . . within the spirit of” the
Three Strikes law. On this record, we cannot conclude the court abused its
discretion in denying Thompson’s Romero motion.

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2.
Though Thompson did not raise Penal Code section 1385(c) during the
sentencing hearing, he argued it in his sentencing brief as a reason to strike
his prior serious felony and prison prior enhancements. Construing this
argument as a motion to strike Thompson’s prior serious felony
enhancements, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in denying
it.
Amended Penal Code section 1385(c)(1) provides that,
“[n]otwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if
it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.” Section 1385(c)(2) requires the
court to “consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the
defendant to prove” any of the enumerated mitigating circumstances, “unless
the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public
safety.” “Stated simply, if the court does not conclude that dismissal would
endanger public safety, then mitigating circumstances strongly favor
dismissing the enhancement. But ultimately, the court must determine
whether dismissal is in furtherance of justice. This means that, absent a
danger to public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating
circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement.”
(People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1036.)
As Thompson acknowledges, the court found striking his prior serious
felony enhancements would endanger public safety. He claims, however, that
this “finding was based on a fact that was not supported by substantial
evidence”—his continuing association with the Mexican Mafia. Yet as
explained above, such a reading of the sentencing hearing transcript takes
the court’s words out of context. The portion of the sentencing hearing
transcript Thompson quotes comes from the court’s analysis of the

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seriousness of the underlying offense, which occurred more than a decade
before Thompson’s debriefing and thus has no bearing on his gang
affiliation—or lack of one—at the time of sentencing. The court did not
mention gangs at all in concluding dismissing the prior serious felony
enhancements would endanger public safety. Instead, the court made clear it
was basing its public safety determination on its “consideration of all of the
facts and circumstances of this case,” demonstrating Thompson’s gang
affiliation, to the extent the court considered it at all, was only one of many
factors the court considered.
* * *
In sum, the court properly weighed and considered relevant factors in
denying both Thompson’s Romero motion and his motion to strike his prior
serious felony enhancements. We therefore discern no abuse of discretion.

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III.
We affirm. We received, however, a copy of a Fares letter that was
transmitted to the trial court to inform it of an error in the calculation of
Thompson’s custody credits. We judicially notice the Fares letter (Evid. Code,
§ 452(d)) and note we have received no notice the trial court has either
amended or denied amendment of Thompson’s custody credits as a result. To
the extent it has not already done so, we remand this matter for the sole
purpose of allowing the trial court to verify proper custody credits were
awarded and, if not, correct the award, issue an amended abstract of
judgment, and forward a copy to the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation.

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

KELETY, J.

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