CourtListener 10590155•People v. Hampton CA2/5
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Filed 5/22/25 P. v. Hampton CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B335278
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA157867)
v.
DION LAMONT HAMPTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Teresa P. Magno, Judge. Affirmed.
Jean Matulis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Deepti Vaadyala, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
Dion Lamont Hampton (defendant) pleaded no contest to
second degree robbery after the trial court denied his motion for
mental health diversion (Pen. Code, § 1001.36).1 On appeal,
defendant argues that the trial court’s handling of his motion was
procedurally defective. We conclude there was no error, and
affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The Underlying Crime
On July 14, 2022, defendant and Qunshone Harris
approached Eric Brannon as he was walking through the parking
lot toward the South Bay Pavilion Mall. Defendant and Harris
asked Brannon if he was affiliated with any street gang; Brannon
said no. After Brannon entered the mall, defendant and Harris
again approached him and demanded that Brannon give them his
belongings. As Brannon turned to leave the mall, either
defendant or Harris approached Brannon from behind, grabbed
him by his shirt collar, and pushed him to the ground, in the
process ripping Brannon’s shirt and yanking off one of his
necklaces. When Brannon got back up, defendant threw the first
punch. A fistfight ensued, and Brannon ended up back on the
ground. Defendant and Harris searched Brannon’s pockets,
taking his wallet and iPhone; they also yanked off his remaining
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
two necklaces. Defendant and Harris fled with Brannon’s
belongings.
II. Charges
The People charged defendant with second degree robbery
(§ 211), and further alleged the aggravating circumstance that he
“engaged in violent conduct in committing” the offense.2
III. Mental Health Diversion
A. Mental health report
In February 2023, the trial court granted defendant’s
request to appoint an expert to examine his mental health.
In March 2023, the expert—Dr. K. Drorit Gaines—filed a
23-page report that defendant’s attorney acknowledged was “very
thorough.” In preparing the report, Dr. Gaines performed a
battery of tests on defendant, interviewed him for seven hours,
and reviewed his medical records. Dr. Gaines opined that
defendant had borderline intellectual functioning, “[m]ajor
neurocognitive disorder due to multiple etiologies” (due in part to
brain injuries), and a language disorder.
With regard to mental disorders, Dr. Gaines opined that
defendant suffered from (1) posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD)-Complex, (2) reactive attachment disorder, and (3)
cannabis use disorder. Dr. Gaines explained that PTSD
manifests, as pertinent here, as “[f]eeling[s] of detachment or
estrangement from others,” “[r]estricted range of affect,” and
“[h]ypervigilance and heightened physiological arousal”; Dr.
Gaines also explained that reactive attachment disorder
manifests in an inability to “know how to relate properly to
others.”
2 The People also charged Harris, and he also entered a plea.
3
With regard to whether these mental disorders played a
significant factor in the charged robbery, Dr. Gaines opined:
“It is my opinion that [defendant]’s mental disorders
were a significant factor in the commission of this
charged offense. Neuropsychological examination
provides evidence that [defendant] suffers from Axis I
disorders, highlighted with borderline intellectual
disabilities, major neurocognitive disorder, language
disorder, and PTSD-Complex. Developmental
disorders, such as borderline intellectual disabilities,
and trauma-related disorders, such as PTSD-
Complex, show consistent presence in [defendant]’s
daily functioning. As such, [defendant] likely
displayed symptoms consistent with these relevant
mental disorders at or near the time of his offense.”
When Dr. Gaines asked defendant about the charged
offense, defendant stated, “I was kicked out [of my home]. I had
no money. I had nothing to lose. I had nothing to eat and I got
myself in that situation.”
B. Request for mental health diversion
On July 18, 2023, defendant asked the trial court for a
further continuance of the trial date to “file a formal mental
health diversion motion” based on Dr. Gaines’s report. When the
court pointed out the length of time defendant’s case had been
pending and asked why a motion had not been filed earlier,
defendant explained that the court had “asked [defense counsel]
to make sure that [mental health] services are lined up before
providing a mental health diversion motion.” The court then
asked defense counsel whether Dr. Gaines’s report “address[ed]
mental health diversion,” including the two elements of eligibility
4
for such diversion—namely, whether defendant suffered from a
mental illness and whether that illness was a “substantial factor
in the commission of the crime.” Defense counsel responded that
Dr. Gaines had not been “ask[ed] . . . to do specifically mental
health diversion,” but explained that the report set forth a
mental health diagnosis and “state[d] that mental disorder [was]
a significant factor in the charged offense.” The court
“recommende[d]” that defendant submit Dr. Gaines’s report so
that the court could (1) consider the issue of defendant’s
eligibility for mental health diversion based on that report, the
preliminary hearing transcript, and the probation report; and if
defendant was found eligible, (2) next examine suitability, at
which time defense counsel would be given an opportunity to line
up mental health services. Defense counsel responded, “Okay.”
When the court sought to confirm defense counsel’s assent by
asking, “Are you fine with that?,” counsel responded by verifying
that the court had a copy of Dr. Gaines’s report. The court
invited the parties to submit “any other materials” they wanted
the court to “consider” on the issue of eligibility for diversion, and
set the matter for a further hearing a week later.
On July 25, 2023, the trial court issued its tentative ruling
that (1) defendant “suffers from” three “eligible mental
disorders”—namely, (a) PTSD-Complex, (b) reactive attachment
disorder, and (c) cannabis use disorder; and (2) none of those
disorders was “a significant factor in the commission of the
robbery.” With regard to the significant factor element, the court
explained that neither reactive attachment disorder nor cannabis
use disorder were significant factors in the robbery because the
former manifests in an “[in]ability to form healthy relationships”
and the latter “manifest[s] by physical reaction to the addiction
5
for cannabis.” The court noted that PTSD-Complex manifests by
“caus[ing] someone to be hypervigilant—and overreact—
especially when something is triggered regarding the past
traumatizing events,” but found that the “preliminary hearing”
testimony and defendant’s own explanation of why he committed
the robbery refuted any notion that defendant had been either
hypervigilant or overreacted in response to any trigger because
defendant and Harris had been “predatory” “aggressors” in an
“old-fashioned robbery in which force [had been] used for
financial gain.” The court acknowledged that Dr. Gaines had
come to a different opinion, but found that the opinion did not
have “a very persuasive basis” given that it had seemingly been
refuted by other evidence. Thus, the court found that the
statutory “presumption” that a mental health disorder played a
significant factor in a crime had been “overcome.” In response,
defense counsel argued that (1) Dr. Gaines’s report did not
“specifically” address “mental health diversion,” and asked for
additional time to have Dr. Gaines “prepare another report,” and
(2) the “trigger” for defendant’s PTSD-Complex was “being kicked
out of the home,” such that anything he did thereafter was the
result of “poor decisionmaking” and hence attributable to the
mental disorder. The court denied defendant’s request to have
Dr. Gaines prepare a further report, noting that the report
already contained “the facts” regarding a diagnosis and
causation, such that a further report with additional “spin or
analysis” by Dr. Gaines would not be helpful. The court denied
defendant’s motion.
D. The plea
On August 24, 2023, defendant entered a no-contest plea to
the robbery count and admitted the aggravating circumstance.
6
The court placed defendant on formal probation for three years.
E. Appeal
After the trial court issued a certificate of probable cause,
defendant filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for mental health diversion because the court (1)
wrongfully “refus[ed] to allow [him] to file a formal diversion
motion” with a new report by Dr. Gaines with a “specific focus” on
the requirements of the mental health diversion statute, and (2)
applied the improper legal standard for assessing eligibility for
mental health diversion. Typically, “[a] trial court’s ruling on a
motion for mental health diversion is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.” (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138,
1147.) However, defendant’s first challenge turns on the
meaning of the mental health diversion statute, and we interpret
statutes de novo. (People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694.)
Defendant’s second challenge addresses the failure to apply the
law correctly, which, if true, constitutes an abuse of discretion.
(Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 135-136.)
Defendant also alleges that both errors violate due process.
I. Procedures for Instituting Mental Health Diversion
Section 1001.36 “authorizes pretrial diversion for
defendants with qualifying mental disorders.” (People v. Braden
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 791, 799 (Braden).) Since January 1, 2023, a
trial court tasked with deciding whether mental health diversion
is appropriate under section 1001.36 must engage in a three-step
analysis, first asking whether a defendant is “eligible for pretrial
diversion,” and if so, whether they are “suitable for pretrial
diversion,” and if so, whether to nevertheless exercise the court’s
7
“‘residual’ discretion” to deny pretrial diversion. (§ 1001.36,
subds. (b) & (c); Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98
Cal.App.5th 882, 891-893.) A defendant is “eligible for pretrial
diversion” if (1) “[t]he defendant has been diagnosed with a
mental disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders” (DSM),
and (2) “[t]he defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor
in the commission of the charged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subds.
(b)(1) & (b)(2).) The “significant factor” element employs a
presumption: “If the defendant has been diagnosed with a
mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s mental
disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a
motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the
defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.” (Id., § 1001.36,
subd. (b)(2).)3 A court may consider whether a defendant is
eligible and suitable for pretrial diversion “[a]t any stage in the
proceedings,” and “[t]he hearing . . . shall be informal and may
proceed on offers of proof, reliable hearsay, and argument of
counsel.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (e).)
Defendant argues that the trial court erred procedurally by
(1) not allowing him to file a formal motion for mental health
diversion and (2) not allowing him to submit a second report by
Dr. Gaines specifically aimed at pretrial diversion. We reject this
argument for two reasons.
First, defendant has waived—if not invited—any error
regarding the procedures the trial court followed because he
3 Section 1001.36 enumerates four factors bearing on
suitability (id., § 1001.36, subd. (c)), but we do not list them here
because suitability is not at issue in this appeal.
8
agreed to them at the July 18, 2023 hearing. When the trial
court “recommended” looking first at defendant’s eligibility and
relying upon Dr. Gaines’s existing report to do so, defense counsel
said, “Okay” and proceeded to locate a copy of that report.4
(People v. Reynolds (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408 [“[a] party
forfeits his or her right to attack error by implicitly agreeing or
acquiescing at trial to the procedure objected to on appeal”];
People v. Wilson (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 266, 281 [“[c]oncurrence
in the procedure followed by the trial judge implies a waiver of
any objection, and consequently [a defendant] cannot complain
for the first time on appeal”].) What is more, the trial court
explicitly invited the parties to file additional materials—and
defendant opted not to file anything further.
Second, defendant has not demonstrated that his lack of
opportunity to file a formal motion or a supplemental expert
report prejudiced him. He has not articulated what he would
have said or done differently in a formal motion than he was able
to convey with his oral, informal motion. He has also not
articulated how a supplemental expert report would have
affected the trial court’s ruling, which found the absence of a
nexus between defendant’s mental health disorders and the
charged offense based on the facts of the crime and defendant’s
own statements to Dr. Gaines about why he committed that
4 We accordingly reject defendant’s assertion, made for the
first time in his reply brief, that the trial court was railroading
defendant into this procedure, such that any objection would
have been futile.
9
crime. Nothing in a supplemental report could change those
facts.5
II. Use of Incorrect Standard
As noted above, one of the two eligibility requirements is
that “[t]he defendant’s mental disorder” be a “significant factor in
the commission of the charged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
Also as noted above, the statute presumes this causal factor once
a “defendant has been diagnosed with a mental disorder,” but
makes that presumption rebuttable upon “clear and convincing
evidence that [the mental disorder] was not a motivating factor,
causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s
involvement in the alleged offense.” (Ibid.)
Defendant argues that the trial court did not employ the
presumption because the court referred to the fact that defendant
“ha[d] not established that the mental diagnosis was a significant
factor in the commission of the charged offense,” which defendant
reads as placing the burden on him to prove this element and
hence ignoring the statutory presumption. This argument
misreads the record and misunderstands the law. As our
Supreme Court has noted, section 1001.36 makes it “the
defendant’s burden to make a prima facie showing” of eligibility.
(Braden, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 812, italics added; § 1001.36,
subd. (e).) Thus, the trial court’s reference to defendant not
5 This is likely what the trial court was getting at by
indicating that an additional report would be unhelpful because
it would have contained, at best, new “spin or analysis” rather
than new “facts.” We therefore reject defendant’s assertion that
this reflects the trial court’s prejudgment or bias. Defendant
additionally asserts that the trial court demonstrated bias by not
allowing defendant to argue the motion, but the transcript of the
hearing contradicts that assertion.
10
“establish[ing]” the “substantial factor” element of eligibility is
entirely proper. Further, the trial court repeatedly acknowledged
that it found the “presumption of the [mental disorder] diagnosis
having caused the commission of the charged offense” had been
“overcome.” Thus, defendant’s argument that the court failed to
apply the presumption is squarely refuted by the record.
Defendant criticizes the trial court’s verbiage in finding the
presumption to be rebutted, asserting that the court did not
parrot the language in section 1001.36 by finding that the
evidence showed his mental disorders were “not a motivating
factor, causal factor, or contributing factor” to the charged
offense. But such precision is not required. (People v. Mayfield
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 196 [where “[t]he record . . . as a whole”
indicates that the “court” “applied the proper concept,” “isolated’
“misstate[ments of or omissions from] the applicable standard”
may be disregarded].)
* * *
Because both of defendant’s procedural challenges lack
merit, his derivative due process challenge also lacks merit.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
11
We concur:
_________________________, J.
BAKER
_________________________, J.
MOOR
12
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