CourtListener 10588437•Widdess v. Jemico CA1/4
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Filed 5/21/25 Widdess v. Jemico CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
JOHN WIDDESS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170413
v.
JEMICO, LLC, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 23CV036594)
Defendant and Appellant.
Jemico, LLC appeals from the trial court’s order denying its motion to
compel arbitration on the ground that it waived the right to enforce an
arbitration agreement with its former employee, John Widdess. Jemico
urges, and Widdess agrees, we must evaluate de novo whether there was a
waiver under Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th
562 (Quach), which was decided after the trial court’s ruling and abrogated
the authority the court applied. After our independent review under Quach,
we conclude that Jemico waived its right to arbitrate. Accordingly, we
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Jemico does business as Renewal by Anderson of San Francisco, a
window and door replacement provider. Widdess worked for Jemico as a
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“Design Consultant” or sales representative from July 2018 until December
2020. At the beginning of his employment, he executed an arbitration
agreement, which Jemico placed in his personnel file soon after.
In June of 2023, Widdess filed this action against Jemico for
whistleblower retaliation, wrongful termination in violation of public policy,
and failure to pay wages. He alleged he was terminated for complaining
about Jemico’s practices related to sales commissions. On August 4, 2023,
Jemico filed its answer generally denying Widdess’s allegations and
asserting several affirmative defenses. The answer did not mention an
arbitration agreement. On the same day, Jemico served Widdess with two
sets of form interrogatories, 42 requests for production of documents, and a
deposition notice setting Widdess’s deposition for the following month.
Widdess served Jemico with discovery requests several days later.
During the afternoon of September 5, 2023, Jemico’s counsel sent an
email to Widdess’s counsel “to request a mutual 30-day extension to the
deadlines for discovery responses.” This email did not mention any
arbitration agreement. Widdess served responses to Jemico’s discovery
requests the next morning. Then counsel spoke on the phone. Widdess’s
counsel granted Jemico a 30-day extension to respond to Widdess’s discovery
requests and gave notice that he and his client were unavailable for the
scheduled deposition and would provide new dates. According to Widdess’s
counsel, Jemico’s counsel stated that Jemico “was considering enforcing an
arbitration agreement between the parties” and asked if Widdess “want[ed]
to stipulate to arbitrate.” Counsel responded that he would ask his client,
but his view was that Jemico waived the right to compel arbitration under
the circumstances. Widdess’s counsel memorialized this conversation in an
email to Jemico’s counsel later that day.
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On October 5, 2023, Widdess’s counsel confirmed that his client would
not agree to arbitration. During a phone call the next day, he agreed to
Jemico’s request for a further extension of its discovery deadlines, and
Jemico’s counsel reminded him to provide dates when Widdess was
available to appear for deposition. Widdess’s counsel provided available
dates on October 9, but Jemico did not re-notice Widdess’s deposition.
On October 20, 2023, Jemico filed a case management statement.
Jemico anticipated completing Widdess’s deposition and written discovery in
the case by February 2024, and first stated that it planned to file a motion
to compel arbitration. Jemico requested a jury trial, and said the case
would be ready for trial within the year. On October 31, after Widdess
declined to grant any further extensions of its discovery deadlines, Jemico
served responses consisting solely of objections. On November 6, the trial
court continued the initial case management conference because Jemico
“represent[ed] an intent to file a motion to compel arbitration” and ordered
Jemico “to reserve a [motion to compel] on the same date” as the
rescheduled case management conference, “forthwith.”
Jemico filed its motion to compel arbitration on November 15, 2023. It
relied principally upon St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187 (St. Agnes), which was abrogated by Quach, as the
governing authority and argued that “prejudice from the litigation of the
dispute is the critical factor in waiver determinations.” According to Jemico,
it had “not undermined the public policy rationale associated with
arbitrations” or “impair[ed] [Widdess]’s ability to take advantage of the
benefits of arbitration.” So, Widdess could not demonstrate any prejudice
and Jemico had not waived its right to arbitrate. Widdess opposed the
motion solely on the ground that Jemico had waived its right to compel
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arbitration. He argued that “a showing of prejudice . . . is no longer critical
or required in arbitration waiver determinations because the United States
Supreme Court abrogated the prejudice requirement” in Morgan v.
Sundance, Inc. (2022) 596 U.S. 411 (Morgan). Moreover, Widdess claimed
he suffered prejudice from Jemico’s substantial participation in the
litigation before asserting its right to arbitrate, and that other factors
specified in St. Agnes supported a finding of waiver.
In support of its reply brief, Jemico’s counsel filed a declaration
stating that he “had not seen a copy of the Arbitration Agreement executed
by” Widdess until sometime after he filed Jemico’s answer on August 4, and
“before [he] proposed the mutual 30-day stay in responding to discovery
requests” on September 5. Counsel did not provide a reason for the delay or
specify when he first saw an executed copy of the agreement. Nor did he
indicate when he first learned Widdess had agreed to arbitration. Contrary
to opposing counsel’s contemporary account of the conversation, Jemico’s
counsel declared that on September 6 he told Widdess’s counsel that
Jemico’s “intent was to seek arbitration.”
Jemico also supported its reply with a declaration from its human
resources director, who explained that Jemico’s practice is “to place all
documents signed by employees in their personnel file at the time the
document is signed, or reasonably soon thereafter.” She confirmed that
Widdess’s personnel file contained an executed copy of the arbitration
agreement. The human resources director did not specify when Jemico
retrieved the agreement from Widdess’s personnel file after learning of his
lawsuit, or when it notified its counsel of the agreement.
Following a hearing, the trial court applied the St. Agnes multifactor
standard to find waiver and denied Jemico’s motion. In its written order,
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the court explained that Jemico’s answer did not raise arbitration as a
defense. It had propounded discovery, including form interrogatories
“generally not available in arbitration,” and informed Widdess of the
arbitration agreement only after receiving his discovery responses. “Jemico
thus obtained substantial benefit from California’s liberal discovery
mechanisms not generally available in arbitration.” “At the same time,”
Jemico served “objections and did not serve substantive verified responses”
to Widdess’s discovery requests. Thus, the court found “Jemico acted
inconsistently with the right to arbitrate” and its actions “prejudiced
[Widdess].”
II. DISCUSSION
A. Relevant Authorities and Standard of Review
On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement, the trial court
shall order a matter to arbitration if it “determines that an agreement to
arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: [¶] (a) The right
to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1281.2.)
In analyzing whether a petitioner waived the right to compel
arbitration, California courts previously applied St. Agnes, which set forth
several factors germane to the analysis and held that among them,
prejudice “is critical.” (St. Agnes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1203.) In Quach,
the California Supreme Court disapproved application of the St. Agnes
factors “as a single multifactor test for determining whether the right to
compel arbitration has been lost through litigation.” (Quach, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 584.) Our high court explained that “[a]mong the factors we
identified as relevant to a ‘waiver’ determination in St. Agnes are some that
are relevant to other defenses, such as forfeiture, estoppel, laches or
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timeliness, but not to waiver.” (Ibid.) Going forward, courts must “be
careful to consider only those factors that are relevant to the specific state
law defense the party resisting arbitration has raised.” (Ibid.)
When analyzing a waiver defense, Quach held that under generally
applicable contract law, the party asserting waiver “must prove by clear and
convincing evidence” that it is highly probable “the waiving party knew of
the contractual right and intentionally relinquished or abandoned it.”
(Quach, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 584.) The waiving party’s knowledge may be
actual or constructive, and intent “may be proved by evidence of words
expressing an intent to relinquish the right or of conduct that is so
inconsistent with an intent to enforce the contractual right as to lead a
reasonable fact finder to conclude that the party had abandoned it.” (Ibid.)
In an important departure from the St. Agnes analysis, “neither the effect of
that conduct on the party” asserting waiver “nor that party’s subjective
evaluation of the waiving party’s intent is relevant.” (Id. at p. 585.) Thus,
following the lead of the United States Supreme Court in Morgan, Quach
held that “[t]o establish waiver, there is no requirement that the party”
asserting waiver “demonstrate prejudice or otherwise show harm resulting
from the waiving party’s conduct.” (Ibid.; see Morgan, supra, 596 U.S. at p.
419.)
Generally, we review a trial court’s waiver finding for substantial
evidence. (Campbell v. Sunshine Behavioral Health, LLC (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 419, 428 (Campbell).) However, because the trial court did not
have the benefit of the decision in Quach and instead applied St. Agnes, we
will review the record de novo and ask whether Widdess “ ‘has established
by clear and convincing evidence that [Jemico] knew of its contractual right
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to compel arbitration and intentionally relinquished or abandoned that
right.’ ” (Campbell, at p. 428.)
B. Analysis
The first element of waiver is clearly present. Jemico had
constructive, if not actual, knowledge of the arbitration agreement from the
time of Widdess’s employment, and at least from the time he filed this
lawsuit. According to Jemico’s human resources director, in accord with
company policy, the agreement was sitting in Widdess’s personnel file since
he executed it in 2018. Nothing in the declarations supporting Jemico’s
motion suggests that Widdess’s “personnel file or the arbitration agreement
. . . had ever been missing or inaccessible” or “sheds light on the [three]-
month delay between the beginning of this litigation and [Jemico]’s
‘discovery’ of the arbitration agreement.” (Campbell, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th
at p. 430.) The evidence reflects “either an intentional and willful decision
to withhold the arbitration agreement, or a complete lack of diligence” in
Jemico’s examination of Widdess’s personnel file. (Ibid.) We find it highly
probable that Jemico knew of its right to seek arbitration, not after it filed
its answer, but “from the outset of the case.” (Ibid.)
Since there has been no express waiver, we must next consider
whether Jemico’s conduct in this litigation was “so inconsistent with an
intent to enforce” the arbitration agreement “as to lead a reasonable fact
finder to conclude that [Jemico] had abandoned” any such right. (Quach,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 584.) We conclude that it was. Instead of promptly
asserting a right to arbitration, Jemico answered Widdess’s complaint
without mention of arbitration and served discovery, “suggesting it did not
intend to seek arbitration.” (Id. at p. 586.) Once it obtained an initial round
of discovery responses from Widdess, Jemico continued to represent to
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Widdess and the trial court that it would move forward with discovery
apace. According to Widdess’s counsel (and consistent with his
contemporary e-mail), Jemico’s counsel first raised the arbitration
agreement by stating Jemico was merely “considering” enforcing it. This
does not evince an actual change in strategy, especially because Jemico
continued to act as if it would proceed with discovery. (See Davis v. Shiekh
Shoes, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 956, 968, fn. 7 (Davis) [“ ‘In [a party’s]
pre-trial huffery and puffery[,] [it] may float all sorts of intentions, serious
or not.’ ”].)
After counsel’s vague announcement, Jemico continued to request
dates for Widdess’s deposition and sought and obtained brief, routine
extensions of its deadline to respond to Widdess’s discovery. It was not until
four months after the action was filed, on October 31, 2023, when Jemico
apparently decided to stop participating in discovery and served its
objection-only responses. Still, it was only after the trial court directed
Jemico to file any motion to compel arbitration “forthwith” that it finally did
so, nearly five months after Widdess filed his complaint and after engaging
in litigation for most of that period. Beyond attributing a month of delay to
waiting for final confirmation that Widdess would not agree to arbitrate,
Jemico does not explain its delay in advising the court and counsel that an
arbitration agreement applied and that it wished to enforce it. (See Davis,
supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 969 [“the absence of a reasonable explanation for
delay is a significant factor weighing in favor of finding waiver”].)
“ ‘It is well established that a four- to six-month delay in enforcing the
right to arbitrate may result in a finding of waiver if the party acted
inconsistently with the intent to arbitrate during that window.’ ”
(Campbell, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 432.) That was the case here. The
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facts are similar to those in Quach, and evoke its concern with condoning
“undue delay and gamesmanship” by employers who sit on their rights to
compel arbitration. (Quach, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 586.) While the delay in
Quach was longer, the employer similarly “indicated its intent to pursue a
jury trial rather than arbitration, and actively engaged in discovery.” (Id. at
p. 587.)
Guess?, Inc. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 553 also found
waiver on similar facts, reversing the trial court. As the Court of Appeal
summarized: “A defendant answered a complaint but did not allege a right
to arbitrate as an affirmative defense, then participated in the discovery
process without claiming a right to arbitrate. Three months later, the
defendant moved to compel arbitration. The plaintiff cried foul, pointing out
that the defendant had known about the arbitration provision at the time
this case was filed and served.” (Id. at p. 555.) The same summary applies
here, as does the Court of Appeal’s warning—entirely consistent with
Quach—that “in litigation as in life, you can’t have your cake and eat it too.”
(Ibid.)
Armstrong v. Michaels Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. 2023) 59 F.4th 1011,
which Jemico relies on, is not to the contrary. Armstrong found no waiver
where the defendant raised arbitration at the outset as a defense in its
answer and “explicitly and repeatedly” notified the plaintiff and the district
court that it would move to compel arbitration after obtaining limited initial
discovery (ultimately, responses to “five interrogatories” and the production
of “twenty-eight pages of documents”). (Id. at pp. 1013, 1015.) While the
delay in Armstrong was longer than in this case, it was due to a removal to
federal court and an impactful decision by the United States Supreme
Court. (Id. at pp. 1013–1014.)
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The facts are different here. Jemico waived any right to compel
arbitration under Quach.
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying Jemico’s motion to compel arbitration is affirmed.
Widdess is entitled to his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(2).)
SIGGINS, J.*
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
STREETER, J.
* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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