People v. Walsh CA3

CourtListener 10588287Calctapp21 de mai. de 2025

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Filed 5/21/25 P. v. Walsh CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
----

THE PEOPLE, C101227

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. 20F2823 &
23MH6298)
v.

ABRAM ALEXANDER WALSH,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Abram Alexander Walsh appeals from a commitment order in a
proceeding under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. and Inst. Code,
§ 6600 et seq.).1 Defendant challenges the commitment order, arguing that the lack of a
personal advisement and waiver of his right to a jury trial violated his constitutional
rights to due process and equal protection. As detailed below, we reject defendant’s due

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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process claim, conditionally affirm the commitment order, and remand for the parties to
litigate the equal protection claim in the trial court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2020, defendant pled no contest to committing a lewd or lascivious act on a
child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)), possession of child pornography (§ 311.11, subd. (b)),
and possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). The
court sentenced defendant to five years in prison.
In 2023, prior to defendant’s release, the People petitioned for defendant to be
committed as a sexually violent predator (SVP). Following an off-the-record discussion
with counsel at a pre-trial hearing, the trial court stated, in defendant’s presence, that
“[j]ury has been waived.” A bench trial was held, and the court determined defendant to
be an SVP. The court ordered defendant committed to the Department of State Hospitals
for an indeterminate term.
Defendant timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
In an SVP proceeding, a defendant “is entitled to a trial by jury.” (§ 6603,
subd. (a).) If the defendant or the petitioning attorney “does not demand a jury trial, the
trial shall be before the court without a jury.” (§ 6603, subd. (f).) Defendant effectively
acknowledges that the SVP statutory scheme does not require a trial court to advise a
defendant of his right to a jury trial or obtain a personal waiver of that right.
Nonetheless, defendant argues that the court’s failure to do so here violated his
constitutional rights in two respects. First, he contends that due process “mandates a jury
trial waiver for SVP defendants that [includes] the same protections afforded criminal
defendants.” Second, he claims that the SVP statutory scheme denies him equal

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protection under the law because the statutes governing other civil commitment
proceedings provide for a jury trial by default and a personal jury trial waiver.
Due Process
The People argue that defendant has forfeited his due process claim by not raising
it below. Defendant submits that claims implicating fundamental constitutional rights
cannot be forfeited and that we may consider his claim for the first time of appeal
because it concerns a “pure issue of law.” We need not decide whether this claim is
forfeited because it fails on the merits.
In People v. Rowell (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 447, the defendant argued that the
interests implicated by SVP civil commitment proceedings “are no less fundamental than
those in criminal proceedings, and that the defendant in [such] a commitment proceeding
‘ “is entitled to the full panoply of the relevant protections which due process guarantees
in state criminal proceedings.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 453.) Because of this, the defendant claimed,
“a personal waiver of his right to a jury trial was required.” (Ibid.) Another panel of this
court disagreed, explaining that “the fact that the interests involved in involuntary
commitment proceedings are fundamental enough to require a jury trial does not lead
ineluctably to the conclusion that the waiver of a jury trial in such proceedings must be
personal as in criminal prosecutions. The fundamental right to a jury has been protected
by section 6603, which grants the defendant the right to a jury trial upon demand. But
the SVP commitment proceeding is a civil proceeding, not a criminal one, and the full
panoply of rights applicable in criminal cases do not apply. [Citation.] [¶] Accordingly,
a defendant’s personal waiver of a jury trial in an SVP proceeding is not required.”
(Rowell, at p. 454.) Other courts to have considered this issue have reached the same
conclusion. (See People v. Washington (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 453, 471 (Washington)
[applying four-factor test to conclude that in SVP commitment proceeding “the lack of an
advisement of Washington’s right to a jury trial and an express personal waiver of that

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right did not violate Washington’s due process rights”]; People v. Magana (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 310, 319 (Magana).)
Defendant acknowledges these precedents but argues their “reasoning was
flawed.” We disagree and adhere to the decisions holding that due process does not
require a jury trial advisement or the personal waiver of a jury trial in SVP proceedings.
Equal Protection
The People also argue that defendant’s equal protection claim is forfeited. In
Washington, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th 453, the court declined to find the defendant’s equal
protection claim forfeited even though the defendant had failed to assert it in the trial
court. There, as here, the equal protection claim was premised on the differential
treatment of SVPs relative to other civil committees with respect to jury waiver
procedures. (Id. at pp. 471-473.) The court explained that, given the nature of the claim,
it would have been impractical for defendant to have raised it in the trial court:
“Although Washington’s attorney failed to argue that Washington was entitled to a jury
trial absent a personal waiver by Washington after a jury trial advisement, it is hard to
envision how counsel could have asserted this claim. . . . The only way Washington
could have asserted an equal protection challenge in the trial court would have been for
his attorney to request the trial court advise Washington of his right to a jury trial and
take a personal waiver of that right. Then, if the court declined to do so based on the
absence of a requirement in the SVPA, Washington’s attorney could have argued not
doing so would violate equal protection principles. But presumably, Washington’s
attorney believed Washington wanted to proceed with a court trial (which may or may
not have been the case), and thus, counsel would have been unlikely to demand the court
advise Washington of his jury trial right and take a personal waiver.” (Id. at pp. 473-
474.)
Other courts have applied Washington’s reasoning when declining to find
forfeiture of the same equal protection challenge raised in the present case. (See

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Magana, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 321 [“To raise an equal protection challenge in the
trial court, Magana’s attorney would have needed to demand a full advisement of
Magana’s jury trial rights, then asserted an equal protection challenge if the court
declined to provide it”]; People v. Cannon (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 786, 795, review
granted Feb. 15, 2023, S277995 [“Similarly to the Washington court, we presume defense
counsel reasonably believed defendant wished to waive his right to a jury trial and, as
such, reasonably believed it was unnecessary to demand that the trial court advise him of
his jury trial rights before raising an equal protection claim. [Citations.] Under these
circumstances, the forfeiture doctrine should not apply”].)
We adopt the same approach and conclude that, in these unique circumstances,
defendant has not forfeited his equal protection claim. The parties agree that, that if the
claim is not forfeited, we should remand for litigation of the equal protection claim. We
agree that remand is appropriate. (See Washington, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 475
[conditionally affirming order declaring defendant to be an SVP and remanding for the
parties to develop a record on the equal protection claim]; Magana, supra, 76
Cal.App.5th at p. 315 [same]; People v. Cannon, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 801 [same];
People v. Morrison (2025) 110 Cal. App.5th 702, 713 [same].) It bears mention that our
Supreme Court, having granted review in Cannon, is currently poised to decide what
level of scrutiny applies in determining whether the SVPA violates equal protection
because it does not require an advisement or personal waiver of a jury trial as afforded in
other civil commitment statutes.
DISPOSITION
The order declaring defendant to be an SVP and committing him to the
Department of State Hospitals for an indeterminate term is conditionally affirmed. We
remand for defendant to have an opportunity to raise an equal protection challenge to the
SVPA’s jury trial provisions. If the trial court determines there is an equal protection
violation, the court shall vacate the order declaring defendant to be an SVP and set the

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matter for a jury trial, unless defendant provides a knowing and intelligent waiver of his
right to a jury trial after being personally advised of that right.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

/s/
RENNER, J.

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