CourtListener 10588249•People v. Ortega CA2/2
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Filed 5/21/25 P. v. Ortega CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B333869
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA330272)
v.
URIEL ORTEGA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, George G. Lomeli, Judge. Affirmed.
Alan Siraco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Uriel Ortega (defendant) appeals
the denial of his petition for vacatur of his second degree murder
conviction and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section
1172.6,1 entered following an evidentiary hearing. He alleges the
trial court’s determination that he remains guilty of murder
under current law is unsupported by substantial evidence, and
the trial court may have applied the wrong standard in making
its ruling. We find otherwise and affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2009, defendant was convicted of the second degree
murder of Kareem Wafer in violation of section 187, subdivision
(a). The jury found defendant committed the offense for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal
street gang with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist
in criminal conduct by gang members within the meaning of
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(l)(C), but found not true the
allegations pursuant to sections 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c)
and (d), that defendant personally and intentionally used and
discharged a firearm, proximately causing great bodily injury and
death. The court sentenced defendant to a term of 15 years to life
in prison. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. (People v.
Ortega (May 25, 2010, No. B216483) [nonpub. opn.].)
The section 1172.6 petition
On July 20, 2022, defendant filed a form petition pursuant
to former section 1170.95 (since renumbered as section 1172.6).
He checked the boxes alleging required conditions for relief and
1 All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.
2
requested the appointment of counsel. The court appointed
counsel, received the prosecution’s opposition, issued an order to
show cause and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. The
opposition exhibits included portions of the trial transcript,
including the jury instructions, the parties’ closing arguments,
and verdicts.
At the evidentiary hearing on July 21, 2023, the trial court
reviewed the parties’ briefs and the portions of the 2009 trial
record attached to the prosecution’s opposition. The court heard
the argument of counsel and found defendant ineligible for relief
as the jury was given no instructions regarding felony murder,
the natural and probable consequences doctrine or imputed
malice, but instead instructions regarding direct aiding and
abetting murder, as supported by the evidence. The court denied
the petition.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the order.
Relevant portions of the 2009 trial transcripts
Kimberly G. testified that on August 5, 2007, she was in
the driveway of a parking lot near Hoover Street “hanging out”
with Wafer, “Mikey B.” and other friends.2 At some point, Wafer
and Michael M. went into a walkway between buildings. Wafer
came back about 15 minutes later, followed by two Hispanic men.
Kimberly identified defendant both in court and in a
photographic lineup as one of the men. He had tattoos on his
face, and she had previously “seen him around.” The men
approached Wafer, defendant yelled, “Westside Hoover,” and
2 Mikey B.’s given name is Michael M., and is alternatively
referred to by witnesses as “Mikey B.,” “Mikey M.,” and
“Michael M.” We refer to him as Michael M.
3
stood in front of Wafer while the other man stood behind,
effectively “sandwich[ing] him” from about one foot away.
Kimberly heard gunfire and saw Wafer running toward a
liquor store across Hoover Street. She thought both men were
shooting because she had seen them both carrying guns. The
shooting continued as Wafer ran. Once across the street, Wafer
collapsed in the doorway of the store, and Kimberly ran for her
life. She testified “[t]hey were running after him” but then said
she did not think it was both of them. (Italics added.)
Michael M. testified he was a member of Bounty Hunters
Blood gang, and he would not have come to court if he had not
been subpoenaed. He was in the parking lot with Wafer, his
girlfriend Deira J., also known as Raquel G. (Deira) and others at
the time of the shooting. Michael M. claimed he refused to speak
to responding police officers, denied speaking to Officer Frank
Fedynich or saying to him, “That Mexican, he shot my cousin,”
and “It was that dude with tattoos on his face.” When Michael M.
was arrested about a month later on an unrelated matter, he
volunteered to be interviewed by detectives and Officer Fedynich
about the shooting of Wafer. When shown a six-pack
photographic lineup he claimed defendant’s photo was the only
one with black marker on his forehead and the only one in jail
clothing; but since he was acquainted with defendant before the
shooting, he picked out his photo without telling the officers he
recognized defendant. Michael M. claimed Officer Fedynich told
him to pick defendant’s photo and offered him money, and
Michael M. told them defendant was not the shooter.
As Michael M. was an uncooperative witness at trial and
much of his testimony conflicted with the statements given in his
interview with Officer Fedynich, impeachment testimony was
4
offered. Officer Fedynich testified he had known Michael M.
about five years, and until this investigation Michael M. had
always been cordial to him, including when they met on the
street Michael M. would give him a fist bump and had a
nickname for him.
Michael M. was arrested in September 2007 on a narcotics
charge and interviewed the next day. Michael M. was hesitant to
talk about the shooting, and going on the record pointing out
anybody. Officer Fedynich denied having offered Michael M.
money and testified everyone depicted in the photo array had
their forehead blacked out. When asked whether he recognized
the person who shot Wafer in the photo lineup, Michael M.
nodded his head at No. 3, the photo of defendant. Throughout
the interview Michael M. maintained, “I’m a gangster” and “I’m
not a snitch.” Officer Fedynich testified Michael M. did not say
he knew defendant or that defendant was not the shooter.
The testimony of Deira reproduced in the prosecution’s
exhibit began with her cross-examination and included redirect
and recross-examination. Deira had trouble remembering
August 5, 2007, and what she told detectives in her police
interview, so a recording of the interview was played in open
court. In her interview, she said she was standing next to her
boyfriend Michael M. when she saw three Hispanic men coming
through the parking lot. One had a mustache, and one had
tattoos on his forehead. She then saw people running, including
Michael M. and Wafer; as she ran to hide behind a car, she heard
gunfire. Deira claimed she did not see any fight, did not know
which of the three men did the shooting, and did not see a gun.
Deira said while Wafer ran, one of the men grabbed him.
She thought it was the one with the mustache but was not sure.
5
She heard five to seven shots. She said Wafer kept running and
the shots were fired while the man was holding him. She
thought the tattooed man fired the shots but did not see a gun.
The man with the mustache then left the parking lot but she did
not see the direction he went. She saw the tattooed man on the
“other side of the corner” outside the gate and then saw him run
down Hoover Street. The third man had already run away in the
opposite direction. When the assailants were gone, Michael M.
said, “Kare[em] got shot, Kare[em] got shot.” She saw Wafer,
went to him and called 911.
She identified photo No. 3 from a photographic lineup as
the man with the tattoos. She asked not to be called as a witness.
After the recording was played, Deira testified her memory
of the events of the shooting was better, and it was when she saw
Wafer and others start to run that she hid behind a van. She did
not see anyone holding Wafer, and it was once she was behind
the van she heard the gunshots. When she was shown a photo
array of men with their foreheads blacked out, she told detectives
“that guy looks like the guy with the tattoos on his face.” But she
did not identify defendant as the shooter until she felt pressured
to do so.
DISCUSSION
Defendant first contends the court’s finding he was guilty of
murder as an aider and abettor was error because the jury found
he did not use a firearm and there was no substantial evidence
that he was at the scene, pursued the victim or facilitated the
shooting.
6
I. Applicable legal principles
A. Section 1172.6
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437),
amending sections 188 and 189, the laws pertaining to felony
murder and murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, “to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with
the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The Legislature also
enacted former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6, which
provides a procedure to petition for retroactive relief for those
who could not now be convicted under sections 188 and 189 as
amended. (See People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) The
procedure provides that a petition may be filed by “[a] person
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
The 2019 amendments to sections 188 and 189 effectively
eliminated murder liability under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine and changed the requirements for felony-
murder liability. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 849.)3
3 Before the natural and probable consequences theory of
murder was eliminated (see Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f)),
“‘“A person who knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is
guilty of not only the intended crime [target offense] but also of
any other crime the perpetrator actually commits [nontarget
offense] that is a natural and probable consequence of the
intended crime.”’ [Citation.] A finder of fact relying on the
7
Under current law and with exceptions not relevant here, “in
order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act
with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) If the court finds the petitioner is entitled to
relief, it is required to vacate the murder conviction and
resentence defendant on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds.
(c) & (d); People v. Lewis, supra, at p. 960.)
B. Standard of review
In conducting an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), the trial court sits as an independent fact
finder (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951) and
must “‘review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve
contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all
under the reasonable doubt standard . . .’” (People v. Oliver
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 480, quoting People v. Clements (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298).
On appeal, we apply the substantial evidence standard of
review (see People v. Sifuentes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 217, 233–
234), under which “we must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the People and must presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably
deduce from the evidence” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294,
314). We defer to the trial court’s resolution of conflicts and
credibility determinations. (People v. Clements, supra, 75
natural and probable consequences doctrine is not concerned with
whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the nontarget
crime, but rather whether the nontarget crime was reasonably
foreseeable when judged objectively.” (People v. Hin (2025) 17
Cal.5th 401, 441.)
8
Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) “The same standard applies when the
conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence.” (People v.
Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “An appellate court must
accept logical inferences that the [trier of fact] might have drawn
from the circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30
Cal.4th 342, 396.)
“The standard is deferential, but the evidence in support of
the judgment must be reasonable, credible, and of solid value; ‘a
mere possibility’ or ‘[s]peculation is not substantial evidence’
[citation].” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 120.) “[B]ecause
‘we must begin with the presumption that the evidence . . . was
sufficient,’ it is defendant, as the appellant, who ‘bears the
burden of convincing us otherwise.’” (People v. Hamlin (2009)
170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1430.) Reversal on a substantial evidence
ground “is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support [the conclusion of the trier of fact].’” (People v. Bolin
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
II. Evidence of aiding and abetting
The trial court found the jury instructions given at the
2009 trial “clearly reflect [defendant] was not convicted under a
theory of liability pursuant to felony murder, natural and
probable consequences . . . nor any theory which imputed malice
upon him. Rather, the jury was specifically instructed on murder
and direct aiding and abetting.” The court noted “a number of
witnesses place[d]” defendant at the scene and testified that
defendant and another person actively pursued the victim. From
this the court inferred that defendant was “aiding and abetting
[by] tracking down this individual.” The court disregarded
9
testimony that defendant was the shooter,4 but according to
Deira’s testimony he actively pursued the victim, which
supported an aiding and abetting theory. Defendant contends
these findings were unsupported by substantial evidence.
“For a defendant to be liable as a direct aider and abettor,
‘the prosecution must show that the defendant aided or
encouraged the commission of the murder with knowledge of the
unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and with the intent or
purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating its
commission. [Citation.] . . . [Citations.] An aider and abettor
who knowingly and intentionally assists a confederate to kill
someone could be found to have acted willfully, deliberately, and
with premeditation, having formed his own culpable intent. Such
an aider and abettor, then, acts with the mens rea required for
first degree murder.’” (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 579.)
Defendant was convicted of second degree murder, which
“is ‘the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought but without the additional elements, such as
willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, that would support
a conviction of first degree murder.’ [Citation.] . . . [Citation.]
‘Malice is implied when the killing is proximately caused by “‘an
act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life,
which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows
that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with
conscious disregard for life.’”’” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53
Cal.4th 500, 507.) “‘In short, implied malice requires a
4 See People v. Cooper (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 393 (Cooper),
People v. Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376 (Arnold) and part III
of the Discussion.
10
defendant’s awareness of engaging in conduct that endangers the
life of another . . . .’” (Ibid.)
We “begin with the presumption that the evidence . . . was
sufficient, and the defendant bears the burden of convincing us
otherwise.” (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567,
1573.) “[T]he defendant must present his case to us consistently
with the substantial evidence standard of review. . . . [Citation.]
If the defendant fails to present us with all the relevant evidence,
or fails to present that evidence in the light most favorable to the
People, then he cannot carry his burden of showing the evidence
was insufficient because support for the [ruling] may lie in the
evidence he ignores.” (Id. at p. 1574.) Defendant was required to
summarize and discuss all relevant evidence. (See id. at p. 1573.)
He did not do so. Rather he mostly summarized and quoted in
his briefs facts in conflict with evidence that defendant pursued
Wafer. However, we defer to the trial court’s resolution of
conflicts and credibility determinations (People v. Clements,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298) and accept all reasonable
inferences the court could draw from the evidence (People v.
Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 314).
Defendant cites Cooper, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 393 and
Arnold, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th 376 to argue the trial court could
not have relied on testimony from witnesses that defendant was
armed, because the jury found untrue the allegation that he used
a firearm. (See Arnold, supra, at pp. 383–384, citing Cooper,
supra, at pp. 413, 415.) The trial court did not rely on evidence
defendant was armed in its analysis and expressly followed
Cooper.
Defendant argues he was acquitted of the gun allegations
and claims there was no evidence he committed an act that
11
facilitated or encouraged the murder, and the prosecution did not
prove beyond reasonable doubt he was guilty of murder as an
aider and abettor. In particular, defendant asserts the evidence
was insubstantial because “no witness” testified that defendant
ran after the victim, there was insufficient evidence he was
tracking him, and the evidence that defendant pursued Wafer
was conflicting.
Without mention of gun use testimony implicating
defendant, we have found ample evidence to support a finding
that “a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at
p. 314.) Kimberly testified that when Wafer came out of the
walkway between buildings he was followed by two Hispanic men
carrying large black guns. Deira saw two or three Hispanic men
coming through the parking lot, including one with a mustache
and one with tattoos on his forehead. Kimberly testified that two
of the men carried semiautomatic guns. Two of them
“sandwiched” Wafer from only about one foot away from him.
One yelled, “Westside Hoover.” Kimberly recognized defendant, a
man she had seen before, as the one in front of Wafer who yelled,
“Westside Hoover.” She also identified defendant in court and
from a photographic lineup. When Wafer ran across the street,
Kimberly heard gunfire and saw at least one of the assailants run
after him. Michael M. picked defendant’s photo from a
photographic lineup, but did not explicitly say he was the shooter.
In sum, as defendant did not carry a gun, it is reasonable to
infer there was at least one and possibly a second man visibly
carrying a gun. Viewed in the light most favorable to the court’s
determination, and drawing reasonable inferences, it is clear
defendant was one of the Hispanic men who emerged from the
12
walkway following Wafer, whether by running after him,
tracking him, or pursuing him, while knowing at least one of his
companions was armed. Defendant overtook the victim and
confronted him, helping to slow his flight or stopping it
momentarily, thereby facilitating the shooting by one of his
cohorts, which proximately caused Wafer’s death. The
circumstances of armed pursuit show defendant knew what they
were doing was dangerous to life and he nevertheless acted
deliberately with conscious disregard for life. In short, he
facilitated the shooting with implied malice. (People v. Cravens,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 507.) We conclude substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s determination the evidence showed
defendant was guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
III. The correct legal standard and prejudice
Defendant asks, if we find substantial evidence to consider
the trial court failed, that we use the right standard under
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), which governs the procedure
for the evidentiary hearing held after the issuance of an order to
show cause. Defendant argues that instead of acting as an
independent fact finder as required at the evidentiary hearing,
the court used the factors to determine prima facie eligibility
under section 1172.6, subdivision (a). Defendant reasons this is
shown by the court’s statements, including the following, which
defendant quotes with added italics: “[I]t remains that from
review of the overall record of conviction, this court finds that the
jury instructions given in the underlying trial clearly reflect the
petitioner was not convicted under a theory of liability pursuant to
felony murder, natural and probable consequences . . . nor any
theory which imputed malice upon him. Rather the jury was
specifically instructed on murder and direct aiding and abetting.”
13
We find it is defendant who fails to understand the legal
standard applied by the court. The trial court’s statement
explained why defendant is ineligible for relief under section
1172.6 as a matter of law. Where jury instructions show jurors
were not instructed on any theory of liability affected by Senate
Bill 1437’s changes to sections 188 and 189, or the record of
conviction shows the defendant’s conviction was based on a
theory of liability that remains valid under Senate Bill 1437, a
defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (People v.
Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389, 395.)
As the trial court explained, defendant’s jury was not
instructed with felony murder, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or any theory that imputed malice to
him—the theories of conviction that entitle a person to petition
for relief. (See § 1172.6, subd. (a).) The jury was instructed with
CALCRIM No. 401, defining aiding and abetting; CALCRIM
No. 520, defining express and implied malice; and CALCRIM
No. 521, defining first and second degree murder. Defendant was
convicted of second degree murder, and after reviewing the trial
evidence the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt
defendant was still guilty of murder. “Our Supreme Court has
recognized . . . that ‘notwithstanding Senate Bill 1437’s
elimination of natural and probable consequences liability for
second degree murder, an aider and abettor who does not
expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted of second
degree murder if the person knows that his or her conduct
endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard
for life.’” (People v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437, 442,
quoting People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 850.) Defendant
was thus ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
14
Ineligibility as a matter of law can be determined at the
prima facie stage. (Cf. People v. Allen, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 395–396.) But we reject any suggestion that such a
determination is nullified upon the issuance of an order to show
cause. Regardless, ineligibility as a matter of law does establish
harmless error. (See People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th
735, 745.)
We conclude the trial court did not err, and even if so we
would find any alleged error harmless.
DISPOSITION
The order of July 21, 2023, denying defendant’s section
1172.6 petition is affirmed.
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.
RICHARDSON, J.
15
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